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7Abstract
The thesis examines the role of formal and informal relations in the social organisation of 
production through a case study of two railway repair plants, one in Britain and one in Russia, 
both of which privatised in the course of the research.
Although many Western commentatcrs have noted the importance of informal relations in the 
social organisation of production, very little systematic research has been devoted to this 
theme, while in Russia it has only just begun to be a legitimate object of research. Moreover, 
most of the studies o f informal relations have viewed their role within the framework of 
workers’ resistance rather than seeing them as a universal aspect of social organisation which 
perform functions for all actors and which are a contested terrain. This thesis studies informal 
relations as a field of conflict and compromise between workers and managers.
The thesis is based on fieldwork carried out in both plants over the period 1993-7. In each case 
special attention is paid to a number of key areas of informal organisation: the management o f 
the production process, the determination of wages, the differentiation of the labour force, the 
role of line managers and relations with customers.
Both enterprises were state enterprises at the beginning of the research and were surprisingly 
similar, with a very formal hierarchical management structure and an extensive network o f 
informal relations. The rigid planning system led to similar problems of meeting the plan, and 
similar informal solutions to those problems.
In both plants the initial preparation for privatisation was associated with formal initiatives to 
restructure the internal relations of the plant, but these had very little impact. The striking 
contrast came when the plants were fully privatised. While privatisation for the Russian plant 
was a means of consolidating its privileged monopoly position, leading to few real changes 
within the plant, the British plant was subjected to a very radical restructuring which sharply 
reduced the significance of informal relations, although these changes were not made without 
resistance and informal relations began to take on new forms. In both plants the power o f 
workers was at the same time being sharply reduced by the growing threat of redundancy.
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9Introduction
In this introduction I will outline the theoretical assumptions used in my dissertation, review 
the substantial literature on formal and informal relations and on core and peripheral workers 
in the enterprise and I will survey some recent case-studies in enterprises devoted to the 
investigations of the co-existence of formal and informal relations.
Theoretical assumptions
The most fundamental aspect of the development of the social relations in any industry is that 
these social relations have a very complicated nature. People construct the rules and people 
violate the rules. That is why the processes of social interaction could be formal or informal. 
By informal relations, I  understand the multiple types o f  relations between people which arise 
in the process o f  production as well as in processes outside production and which are 
characterised by co-operation and co-ordination o f  people without using any formal rules 
and regulations. This relation could be as a substitution of the formal one. Or sometimes 
these relations could be an additional resource in order to ease some o f the processes within 
the organisation. But because the rules and regulations constructed by people do not always 
correspond with all their requirements, the rise and circulation of informal relations come to 
be an inevitable part o f any organisation.
At the same time, the development of any type of relations inevitably corresponds with the 
group o f people in whose interests they are implemented. That is why the construction of any 
kind of relations could serve the interests of definite classes. In the following thesis, I would
10
argue that the formalisation of some processes which are taking place in the organisation (or 
sometimes also the process of informalisation) is always taking place in the interests of 
particular groups of people. Very often the mutual distrust of different groups o f people 
creates defensive mechanisms, which could be used by one group against the others. And 
people could use formal/informal relations as a form of such defensive mechanism. In chapter 
3 I will describe such a situation, when in the interest o f  the upper managers several 
regulations were worked out which banned strikes and picketing in the Russian plant. At the 
same time, the opposite example could be given, when the workers try to by-pass the formal 
rules and regulations in order to fulfil the plan quicker. In these circumstances again, the 
informal processes are organised in the interest o f particular groups of people. Thus, the usage 
of formal/informal relations is a part of the bargaining between different groups of people.
When we enter the world of work, the relationships between the employer and the employee 
have particular importance. In many cases the use of informal relations is a part o f  the 
bargaining process between the employer and employee. At the same time, one o f  the 
explanations of the existence of informal relations was given by John Maclnnes, who wrote
In essence much of labour’s bargaining power (whether formally organised into a combination or 
not) depended on the ability unilaterally to restrict what the employer could get from the 
workforce: whether by means of go slow, or by the enforcement of custom and practice. In a very 
real sense the ability formally or informally to bargain the terms of co-operation with the employer 
were a form of working class property rights. However, they could not, except in exceptional
I l
times, be admitted to  exist by em ployers, who had at least to profess to believe in their 
prerogatives and ‘right to manage’/
I believe that in many cases the formalisation o f the processes within the organisation 
happened in accordance with the desires and wishes of those on the top. It does not 
necessarily exclude the interests of the employees, but it mainly serves the particular interests 
of a particular class.
Thus, in my dissertation I would argue that in each organisation there is a co-existence of 
formal and informal relations. People create formal rules and regulations in order to help in 
resolving some problems within the organisation. Nevertheless, the creation of formal rules 
and regulations takes some time. At the same time some processes and problems need to be 
resolved as quickly as possible. And i f  there are rules and regulations which do not 
correspond with the formal rules, created in the organisation, inevitably some informal rules 
will be constructed, which will play a role of substitution or as a means of by-passing the 
system of formal rules.
Consequently, this dissertation examines the way in which different groups of people, 
participating in the organisational world, construct their relationships within the enterprise. 
Mainly because the world is class structured, therefore, the manipulation of the formal and 
informal rules leads to the utilisation o f  the different formal or informal relations in the 
interest o f  the different groups, sometimes opposed. Different groups within the enterprise 
use different strategies in order to resolve the problems o f  a particular group. That is why the
1 Maclnnes, 1987, p. 12.
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formal and informal relations are a very useful mechanism o f  manipulation in the interests o f  
different groups o f  people.
The nature of the labour relations is really difficult to analyse, but as John Maclnnes stressed, 
one of the important parts of the labour relations consists of
The labour contract between employer and worker. This usually sets out the rates and method of 
payment, and makes some description, explicit or implicit, of the sort of work and effort the 
workers deliver in return.2
I would argue in my thesis later that usually in .different organisations we can observe the 
situation, when the agreed formal contracts are broken by at least one of the parties involved. 
For example, I will show how the formalised payment system constructed in the Russian 
plant (although it was never organised on a fair basis), during the transition to the market 
economy, was absolutely transformed into the new half-formal or often even fully informal 
system, based on very vague characteristics.
The other reason for the rise of informal relations is that life is much more complex, and it is 
very difficult to confine it by a set of formal rules and regulations. Again, if we look at the 
employer-employee relations, we can see that a lot of things could not be defined precisely. I 
fully agree with Baldamus’s consideration on this matter when he wrote,
Who can define ability, restricted output, capacity (‘fullest’ or otherwise)? If the intensity of effort 
expected from the worker is left undefined, then, surely, everything else that is stated about wages.
2 Maclnnes, 1987, p. 130.
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hours, and method of payment is equally indeterminate ... the formal contract between employer 
and employee is incomplete in a very fundamental sense/
Then, all lacunas, which were left beside the formal agreement, are the subject for further 
negotiations and renegotiations between the employer and employee.
Moreover, as John Maclnnes argues, the position of managers within the organisation is very 
difficult, because they have
mutually exclusive and contradictory aims, which they must try to reconcile. On the one hand, 
there is a need to enforce order, create stability and predictability, make rules and enforce them: to 
create a formal division of labour and police its operation. On the other hand, there is the need to 
foster innovation and change, ensure creativity, and encourage informality, autonomy, self- 
responsibility and flexibility. It is frequently difficult to reconcile these mutually contradictory 
goals in practice, and impossible to lay down a general policy that spells out in advance how they 
are to be reconciled in every particularity. Thus, there is always a difference between what has 
been called the ‘espoused’ and ‘operational’ policies of managers towards labour. The first refers 
to their formal rules, the second to the informal processes of compromise and trade-off by which 
they are applied/
Informal relations could be developed on different levels of the organisation. It could involve 
the relationships between individual members o f the organisation or they could be organised 
between different groups in the organisation. We should stress that the system o f informal 
relations could penetrate every organisation (independently of its political system) and 34
3 Baldamus, 1961, pp. 90-1.
4 Maclnnes, 1987, p. 131.
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different levels of the organisation: they could be developed in the workplace, in the shop, in 
the company, or in the industry as a whole. At the same time, the focus of our investigation is 
mainly limited to the development and transformation of informal relations within two 
companies.
Britain and Russia differ markedly in terms of development o f the political system, and the 
form o f the state. At the same time we should stress that several features o f labour relations 
have some resemblance. For example, according to John Maclnnes
British management did not develop any distinct strategy for dealing with or managing labour. It 
did not see any distinct need to plan in detail the social relations of production: how labour was to 
be trained, motivated, deployed and developed. These matters were often left to local management 
to work out informally.5
If we look at Russia’s relations of production, we can also see that Russian managers 
governed a lot of processes informally. At the same time, the use of informal relations in 
different countries still has some distinctive features, which we have to examine.
Therefore, the focus o f the thesis is twofold. First, at a general level it reveals the 
identification of the processes of informal relations which are taking place within any 
industrial enterprise. On the basis of my case-studies, I argue that these processes are not 
merely peculiar to a particular state: they are occurring all over the world in any industry.
9 Maclnnes, 1987, p. 131
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Second, at a lower level of analysis a cross national study permits the examination of 
variations of the informal relations and what circumstances influence those variations.
Comparative studies as a strategy of doing research
My interest in comparative research did not happen by chance. More and more people in the 
world would like to know how do people in other societies live and how their everyday life 
has developed. That is why for me, as a part of the modem world, it was particularly 
interesting to see the everyday life of other people in a different country. From the one side, 
the investigation of the stranger could be very primitive, because he could ask questions and 
get answers, which are well known by the native people, from the other side, the research of 
the stranger could be really revealing, because he/she could see some things, which are quite 
common in the native culture, and mainly because of that fact it does not attract the particular 
attention o f the native researchers, while the view of the stranger on the common things could 
be really interesting. Moreover, the stranger could pay particular attention to the same 
processes, which are taking place within the enterprise, but the basis o f  these processes could 
be absolutely different.
At the same time, because for many years in Russia the quantitative tradition of doing 
research prevailed, and the tradition of doing qualitative research is only now developing, 
there are some prejudges about using qualitative methodology not only in investigation o f the 
processes within one country, but also for exploring different countries which may have so 
many differences that it is impossible to compare them. My own experience proved the 
hypothesis that by using qualitative methodology it is possible to compare not only similar
16
countries, but also absolutely different countries (for example, in terms of their belonging to 
absolutely different political systems). And the results of such comparison could be very 
productive not only in terms o f creating new theory, but also in general understanding of the 
real world by one particular researcher.
In the modem world there are a lot of ways o f researching social life. And in my opinion, the 
more different strategies will be used by researchers, the more accurate view of the modem 
world the whole society will get at the end. Because only the diversity of views could 
represent the real diversity o f  the world. The comparative strategy of doing research gives us 
a possibility to look at the processes that are taking part in different countries, but to develop 
a comprehensive view. There are different opinions about the using of case studies in 
investigating social life, but I liked the explanation o f the case-study, given by Charles C. 
Ragin in his book:
Case-oriented methods are holistic - they treat cases as whole entities and not as a collection of 
parts. Thus, the relations between the parts of a whole are understood within the context of general 
patterns of covariation between variables characterising the members of a population of 
comparable units. Second, causation is understood conjuncturally. Outcomes are analysed in terms 
of intersections of conditions, and it is usually assumed that any of several combinations of 
conditions might produce a certain outcome. These and other features of case-oriented methods 
make it possible for investigators to interpret cases historically and make statements about the 
origins of important qualitative changes in specific settings.6
Ragin, 1987, p. x.
17
A primary goal of my research was to identify the common features in different 
environments, and to define the key factors which influenced the most noticeable differences 
in common processes that were taking place within two different organisations.
To highlight the specific features of transformation from public into private I will compare 
two plants with similar labour process which are situated in different countries. It happened 
that I began the investigation o f the Russian plant in October 1992. From 1992-1994 I was 
participating in the project ‘Restructuring of Management and Labour Relations in Russian 
Industrial Enterprises’, funded by the ESRC and leaded by Professor S. Clarke and Doctor P. 
Fairbrother. One of the Russian plants was selected as an object for detailed investigations. 
Later, when I began a post-graduate student at Warwick University, it was my intention to 
find a similar enterprise in Britain, which fulfils approximately the same tasks.
Global restructuring
Various factors have emerged in the last decades in different countries: although there are a 
lot of differences between different countries, nevertheless there is a strong linkage of 
processes that are taking place in different countries. The ideas of competitiveness and 
productivity increase have penetrated almost each country in the world. At the same time, a 
lot of literature has been devoted to the processes o f  globalisation. The slogan of Theodore 
Levitt ‘think global, act local’ became a leading rule of one of the best (in terms of 
profitability) multi-national companies in the world. At the same time, despite the very 
frequent usage of such words as internationalisation and globalisation, I agree with P.
18
Burnham who wrote that the key processes o f  internationalisation are poorly understood 
and weakly theorised. ’1
The world is always transforming and national economies of different countries are in the 
process of constant transition. We can see that globalisation penetrated different arenas of 
social life. From the one point, the move towards the marketisation of economies was part of 
the processes o f transformation in Britain as well as in Russia. But at the same time, when we 
are trying to scrutiny these processes at the very low level, we can see all the disparities and 
differences in the strategies on the national level. At the same time, whatever processes have 
taken place in the real world, it is clear that common processes widespread all over the world 
nevertheless will always have their own features.
This dissertation is written on the basis of case studies conducted in two different countries, 
which passed through the processes of privatisation. Nevertheless, despite the similarities of 
the title of the processes that were taking place in these countries, the deeper investigation of 
these processes showed us that these processes are more complex than appears at first glance. 
Thus, from the one side, the processes in different countries have their own national features, 
and therefore it is really difficult to compare them. From the other side, despite all the 
differences in the implementation of the common processes on national grounds, the 
production itself and the presence of people within production lead to the situation that some 
processes inevitably will be duplicated in different countries. That is to say, there are some 7
7 Burnham, 1996.
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universal rules which govern the social processes in production. And that is why such 
processes are necessary and possible to investigate.
Although the process of globalisation itself is very questionable, nevertheless, we cannot 
ignore that the processes which are taking place in different countries have very many 
common features, and the changes which are taking place could be really significant and have 
their own distinctive national features for this particular country, but at the same time they 
could represent the variation o f  the world economic processes.
I hoped that my investigations would enable me to illuminate some o f the informal processes 
which are taking place in a modem organisation. The most difficult thing which I faced was 
the problem that these informal processes are usually not on the surface o f the enterprise, and 
therefore they are hidden from the researcher, especially from the foreign researcher. At the 
same time, I hope that a number of sociological methods helped me to investigate people’s 
experience, their everyday life.®
I hope that the processes described on the pages of this dissertation will make a contribution 
to the understanding of the world of the modem organisation. It draws particular attention to
* One of the few Russian sociologists to write on this theme wrote ‘ when we observe the processes existing in 
our economy, inevitably there are a lot o f  questions raised: "Is it rational? Maybe it should be done in another 
way? " Then there is a feeling, that all these are very peculiar -  a managerial theatre of the absurd. At the same 
time it would be incorrect to speak about the irrationality o f the managerial actions o f particular groups. They 
could be irrational in some very concrete case, but in the whole sense they are rational and can be analysed. 
Let's try to find out this rationality in a  very inviolable sphere of activity o f the management apparatus - in the 
system of hidden communication o f the management groups ’, Pavlenko, 1989, p. 190.
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the interrelations between formal and informal relations within a modem enterprise, and 
describes how complex could be such processes.
Literature review
Literature devoted to the socialist labour process
There was a lack of empirical research o f Soviet enterprises during the whole Soviet era, and 
such investigations as were undertaken were characterised more by rather general 
philosophical than particular sociological views. A lack of real empirical evidence from the 
shop floor led to the situation in which what was discussed in the scientific literature was not 
the real processes of labour collectives, but what should be. A lot of research was conducted 
according to a theoretical scheme which had been worked out in the minds of Soviet 
sociologists and all the subsequent research findings were polished and embedded into this 
already constructed theory. A little research was devoted to the real processes which were 
taking place in the Soviet production process, but the most hidden area o f this research was 
the processes of informal relations in the enterprises of the former Soviet Union. I first 
became interested in these questions in those days because my father, who worked in one of 
the transport ministries in Moscow, travelled a lot, all over the country, visiting almost two 
hundred different plants, and told me real stories from the plants - how he was met by the 
people from the plant, how the work is organised - and his stories sounded very different from 
the material which I could find in the official literature. May be this influenced my desire to 
reveal the real plant’s life and make it public.
21
The literature devoted to the socialist labour process was mainly very theoretical. Some 
sociologists considered the sociological aspects o f Communist attitudes towards the labour 
process and the basis of the development of communist labour. In the sociological circles of 
the 70s and the beginning of the 80s there were very popular discussions devoted to the 
problems of the elimination of socio-class differences, and non-antagonistic relations in 
socialist production.
At the same time, ‘applied sociology’ was mainly concerned with the motivation of labour 
activity, labour adaptation and psychological climate of the labour collective. There were a lot 
of sociological publications with innumerable amounts of measurement of labour satisfaction, 
the psychological climate of the socialist collective, problems of leadership and so on. Since 
the 70s theoretical as well as applied sociology concentrated on the questions of construction 
of enterprise social development plans.
Other popular issues were socialist competition in production as well as the reduction of 
absenteeism and labour turnover. In the late 70s and the beginning of the 80s the most 
popular issues become the 'human factor’ and ‘social factors’ of the effectiveness of labour. 
Usually the research was based on quantitative data and rested on a restricted empirical base. 
The critique and the main problems o f  the Russian sociologists were pointed out by one of the 
current Russian sociologists, A. Kravtchenko, in his recent book The History o f  the Western 
Sociology o f  Work, where he tries to compare the western and Russian approaches in 
sociology :
Russian sociology is more theorised than western sociology. The western sociologists prefer to
resolve problems by the means of their private theories (theory of middle range?), while Russian
22
sociologists resolve the same problems with global theories. The western sociologists try to prove 
things which we, in our sociology, only show and explain. A nd, at the end, our western colleagues 
don’t want to draw  theoretical conclusions, if  there is no clear empirical evidence o f  these 
processes, and if  these conclusions aren’t confirmed by the empirical data. By contrast, our 
scientists tend to global theorising, while the results o f  the surveys don’t allow us to go beyond the 
level o f  the enterprise.9
Sociological literature and labour sociology also became a mirror of the political processes 
which were taking place in Russia. And when at the XXVII congress of the CPSU the further 
development of collectivist' principles was stressed, it was immediately developed in the 
sociological literature. In one of the text-books for high school students, it was stressed that 
collectivism is a very important feature of the socialist labour process, and that:
as there will be the improvement of all the units of the economic mechanism, the development of 
the collectivist principles of labour will be an objective necessity.10 
The idea of transformation of socialist into communist labour also played a negative role in 
the development of the Russian sociology of labour. And any phenomena which did not 
correlate with communist behaviour according to this doctrine were ignored by Soviet 
sociologists.11
’ Kravchenko, 1991, p. 39.
10 Dikareva and Mirskaya, 1989, p. 101.
" At the same time an echo of real industrial life and the main relations which penetrated labour relations under 
socialism were represented in the oral history of the everyday life of people, in the form of sayings, proverbs and 
phrases. The most useful dictums I would like to note here: ‘You do something for me - 1 will do something for
23
The dichotomy of formal and informal relations was unfortunately among such phenomena. 
In the sociology of labour this dichotomy was deeply criticised, mainly because of its western 
origin, and some authors stressed that the view of reality through the prism of the formal and 
informal has nothing in common with a Marxist approach. However, as the following 
chapters will show, the Marxist approach could be combined with a sociological analysis of 
the coexistence of formal and informal relations in organisation.
At the beginning of the 90s, the necessity of investigating the informal and unofficial as 
another side o f reality was announced so, for example, one of the text-books for the students 
of sociological departments in the universities stated:
Non-official rules o f  the games, which are hidden from the uninitiated, need to be sociologically 
investigated, whenever they might arise: in production, the sphere o f  trade or in the management 
sphere.12
At the same time, despite this declared necessity, the main issues which were studied by 
sociologists in Russia continued to be very far from the investigations o f the interrelations 
between formal and informal relations.
The analysis o f  the sociological literature of the last 5 - 7  years has shown that, with a few 
exceptions, there have been no serious investigations of informal relations in production. 
Moreover, as before, there is a lack information about detailed analyses of the life of
you’. (Similar to the English equivalent - ‘you scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours’).’ To speak against the 
boss is to piss against the wind’, ‘You are the boss - 1 am a shit, I am the boss - you are a shit'.
12 Kravchenko, 1993, p. 86.
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industrial enterprises. The majority of publications are concerned either with the very abstract 
theoretical analysis of economic processes, or are devoted to  macro-processes in Russia. And 
mainly public opinion polls, the sources of federal statistics and, more rarely, interviews with 
experts, are taken as the basis for the analysis.
So at the very beginning o f my research project I was faced with a lack of Russian literature 
devoted to case studies o f enterprises. If in the western countries the case study method had 
become very common, in Russia and the CIS countries unfortunately it is quite unknown even 
among professional sociologists and only now some literature about it is appearing. An 
analysis of the contemporary situation with regard to the case-study method is presented in 
the first thesis devoted to this method. This thesis was defended at the Moscow Institute of 
Sociology by Irina Kozina, a sociologist from Samara. In her thesis she stressed that
If in western countries the use of the case study strategy is a quite common practice, in this country
(Russia.-M.K.) we can talk only about very rare cases.13 
So the analysis of the Russian industrial case-studies was based on the primary research in 
which I took part and that o f my collaborators, supplemented by monitoring o f the local and 
national Russian press, within the collaborative research project, funded until April 1994 
under the East-West Programme of the ESRC, on the ‘restructuring of management and 
industrial relations in Russia’, directed in Britain by Simon Clarke and Peter Fairbrother.
11 Kozina, 1996, p.4.
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At the same time, it would be wrong to consider that the literature devoted to the labour 
processes in production, which were taking place not only in Russia, but in the whole block 
of Soviet countries, did not exist at all.
We should only stress, that such literature was hidden from those sociologists, who were 
conducting their research in the 70s and 80s in those countries, and mainly, the serious 
sociological literature, concerned with the real processes of the Soviet production system was 
only published in the West. And only now, when the boundaries between the West and the 
East have been destroyed, can we read the best examples of such sociological investigations. 
One of such masterpieces was the book of Miklos Harazti, A Worker in a Worker's Slate. His 
book was one of the excellent examples which could be regarded as a counter-argument of 
the sociologists who stood on a realistic position to the Hungarian pseudo-specialists in the 
sphere of labour. In his book Miklos Harazti questioned the piece-rate system in the 
Hungarian labour process and he paid attention to the hidden processes of violation of the 
norms and regulations under the socialist labour process. At that time, when pseudo-scientists 
glorified the piece-rate system, he wrote:
Under the piece-rate system, and any other forms of payment by results, its breach is both 
inevitable and tolerated. A piece-rate worker does not earn money just by working, but rather 
because he works without observing the regulations.14
14 Harazti, 1977, p. 44
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At the same time, Harazti touched another very important problem - the division between 
them and us. He proved that within the so-called socialism system, within the labour process 
there is a clear boundary between the workers and the management.
Based on a scientific organisation of labour, Soviet production always has been strongly 
technologistic. That is why the whole social organisation of labour was determined by 
technological characteristics. In theory the Soviet production process was very formalised, but 
in practice, because of the very high level o f instability, when there was a constant shortage of 
materials and parts, continuous breakage o f equipment and so on, the labour process relied on 
the activity of human beings. Moreover, the very existence of production was possible only 
because people violated the formal rules and laws. The system of the Soviet labour process 
was penetrated by the informal relations.
Among the western literature there were some issues, which were thoroughly scrutinised, for 
example the negotiations o f  the plan targets with the top authorities, the horizontal and 
vertical connections of enterprises, and the use of informal channels in this connection, as 
well as the reality of scarce resources. The discrepancies of the Soviet planning system were 
seriously analysed in the works of D. Dryker.15 But at the same time there was a lack of 
material devoted to the internal functioning o f the enterprise. The most vulnerable point in my 
view was a lack o f information about the shop-floor relations, how the work was organised 
within the workshop and which mechanisms are used to make the workers work.
15 See for example: Dryker, 1981.
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The main preliminary information which 1 obtained about the reality of shop-floor relations 
within the Soviet Industry was the study of Michael Burawoy, building on his study of the 
labour process from within in industrial enterprises in Syktyvkar. His previous Hungarian 
study, 16 was very revealing for the understanding of the system of piece-rates within a 
socialist enterprise as well as for the understanding of interrelations between formal and 
informal relations on the Hungarian shop floor. A lot of the processes which were taking 
place in the Hungarian enterprise were observed later in my study of the Russian enterprise. 
The article devoted to the Hungarian factory was also very important as the comparative 
analysis of two factories where Burawoy worked: the Hungarian ‘Red Star’ and the very 
similar factory in South Chicago. In this article the system of formal and informal relations at 
work was described very clearly. Despite the label ‘socialist production’, the ethnographic 
study of the everyday lives o f the workers on the Hungarian shop floor reveals the relations of 
awful exploitation of the workers by the managers and the whole political apparatus. This 
study very openly showed us that the mythical socialist labour without conflict doesn’t exist, 
and the very high level of exploitation of the workers leads to plenty of conflicts on the shop 
floor. To some extent my investigation, as will be shown later, is an attempt to show the real 
processes on the Russian shop floor and to reveal all its hidden agenda: disparities, disputes, 
negotiations and confrontations as they exist in the everyday life o f the factory.
The other most valuable source of the real processes which were taking place in Soviet 
industry was the works of Don Filtzer, who used an extensive range of materials, but mostly
14 Burawoy, 1985.
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official documents and newspaper sources. But still his works didn’t reveal the real situation 
on the shop floor. He argued in his books, that the Soviet labour process had some 
contradictions. First of all Filtzer considered, that
The Soviet Union is a ‘class’ society, whose reproduction is based on exploitation. There is a 
ruling stratum , an elite, based in the bureaucracy, but not coterminous with it, which extracts a 
surplus product from a workforce.17
One of his main statements was that there are some similarities in relations between the 
workers and the elite between capitalism and socialism. He stressed:
The elite’s relationship with the workforce was essentially unstable, reflecting the inherent 
instability o f  the Soviet system o f  production. A t a general level, the elite-workforce relationship 
was reproduced in a fashion similar to that between capitalist and workers under capitalism. The 
elite controlled the means o f  production, while the worker controlled only her or his labour 
pow er.18
Since the very beginning of the Soviet state labour relations in Russia developed in the 
following direction: in order to stabilise its position, the ruling elite was trying to atomise the 
workforce and to undermine potential opposition. Since 1929 in Russia any forms of 
collective protest were suppressed. Strikes became illegal and if strikes arose, the organisers 
were arrested. The trade unions were absolutely helpless, because they implemented the
17 Filtzer, 1992, p. 122.
18 Filtzer, 1992, p. 127.
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government’s policy. The division of labour and individualisation of the labour process led to 
such a situation, when for workers
The only room for manoeuvre was to attem pt to exercise control over the immediate work 
situation. This meant not simply high absenteeism  or labour turnover, but more importantly the 
reappropriation o f  partial control over the labour process itself.19
According to Don Filtzer, in the environment where there were always breakdowns of process 
of production, irregular supplies and frequent plan changes, the workers found ways to 
exercise control over work speeds, the intensity of their labour and the quality of their work.
So, in the Soviet labour process most things were out of control, so the managers were trying 
to influence the factors they could. The managers tried above all to fulfil the plan, but they 
were afraid of overfulfilment, because it could lead to a higher plan, they tried to organise 
new supply channels if necessary and to find out ways to co-operate with workers.
Here we should stress that the position o f  middle managers in enterprises in Russia has 
always been ambiguous. Because they had to control workers, they were put in a position of 
power over the workers. From the other side, in order to fulfil the plan and to preserve their 
position, they had to co-operate with workers, that is why they usually tried to implement 
different techniques in order to reduce the destructive effects of the workers’ militancy.
The workers, where possible, tried to go slow, to organise interruptions or other means of 
control o f the labour process. In the circumstances, where there is a high labour turnover and
19 Filtzer, 1992, p. 129.
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high labour shortage, for managers it was almost impossible to overcome this established 
system. That is why the workers’ control over the labour process was quite considerable. And 
a very complicated system of bargaining over areas of control was constructed. And this is 
one of the main differences with the capitalist labour process. If in capitalist enterprises 
collective arrangements between management and workers regarding dispute resolution were 
constructed, in Russia there were no institutionalised mechanisms for negotiations between 
the workers and the management and up to the present time the system of bargaining does not 
exist. The mechanisms of bargaining vary from enterprise to enterprise and from industry to 
industry. Thus, in Soviet industry there was created such a situation, when negotiation about 
the plan targets or material supplies or any other problems in production passed through a 
system of informal negotiations between the workers and the management. Because the 
industrial relations in production were highly individualised, the negotiations very often were 
made between individual workers and management. Because the workers control the labour 
process considerably, the managers very often were forced to make concessions to the 
workers. Thus, on the shop floor in Soviet industry a system where informal relations played 
a substantial role in industrial relations was constructed.
The main difficulty of generalisation about the informal relations on a Russian enterprise is
the fact, that there are so many important variables, and because the scope of informal relations is 
so great that personality can play a decisive role in defining the characteristics of a particular shop 
or enterprise.20
“ Clarke, 1995, p. 8.
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Here, trying to compare the informal relations within the western enterprises, we should stress 
that within western enterprises the gap between formal and informal relations is more narrow, 
as is the extent of informal relations. That is to say, if in the Russian enterprise the labour 
process is mainly fulfilled through the system of informal bargaining between different 
groups or individuals who try to by-pass the system of formal relations, in western reality the 
formal system is sometimes supplemented by the informal one. Although the balance of the 
formal and informal is very unstable, and varied from enterprise to enterprise in any country, 
still, there are general macro-characteristics, which could give a general idea about the extent 
of usage of these or those relations.
The most effective and substantial analysis o f informal relations in Soviet production was 
made by Samara researcher Sergei Alasheev,21 who participated in the research project on the 
‘Restructuring of Management and Industrial Relations in Russia’. His main argument is that 
informal relations in production appeared because of the inadequacy of the formal regulations 
to the requirements o f  production. He made a thorough analyses of different types of informal 
relations and then he examined the changes in the role of informal relations which are 
emerging as a result o f  the transition to a market economy: the disappearance o f some 
informal relations, their institutionalisation into formal ones, and the emergence of other 
informal relations in different spheres o f enterprise activity.
21 Alasheev, 1995.
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Literature devoted to the capitalist labour process
If the descriptions of shop floor realities were very rare in the Soviet production process, by 
contrast, there was a lot of literature regarding the capitalist shop floor. At the same time, 
even if there were a lot of publications regarding the capitalist labour process, we should 
stress that among these publications there was still a tendency towards very detailed analysis, 
and there is a lack of attention to the problems of informal relations as such. Let’s consider 
the main issues, which were discussed in the sociological literature.
The sociological literature, where to some extent the problems of formal/informal relations 
were touched, can be divided into two different categories:
1. Theoretical issues, where the problems of informal relations were touched to some 
extent.
2. Case-studies and surveys, where the problems of informal relations were 
investigated.
Theoretical issues
Theoretical issues concerned with informal relations of the capitalist labour process are 
almost non-existent in modem sociological literature. The reason for this lack o f  attention 
could be that this issue is considered as unfashionable by modem sociologists. Otherwise it 
could be difficult to explain, why there is no literature regarding this matter. The most 
comprehensive view on the nature o f informal relations and the reasons why they exist in 
organisations was developed in the late 50s by the American scientist Melville Dalton who, in 
his book Men who Manage pointed out that the world of organisation is very comprehensive
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and, in order to understand it, it is necessary to ‘look at the interdependence of facade and 
interior’ of any organisation 22
The further analysis of the theoretical literature has shown, that the focus of theoretical 
debates moved away from the analysis of informal relations. Mainly the debates were focused 
around several issues which were considered as the most basic features of the production 
process.
A  key debate about management in capitalist society was focused on the labour process 
debate. The analysis of the labour process developed by Marx was updated by Braverman 
who, in his influential book Labour and Monopoly capital (1974), pointed out the following 
key features of the capitalist labour process:
• the separation o f conception and execution (or manual and non-manual labour).
• the division of labour which is achieved in this century by scientific management 
(Taylorism).
• the tendency in the capitalist labour process is towards deskilling and 
fragmentation o f work and a structure of planning, co-ordination and control of the 
labour process.
The other very intensive debates were devoted to the problems of control of labour under the 
capitalist labour process. Karl Marx revealed the fundamental conflict underlying the 
relationships between capital and labour and therefore the relations between management and
“  Dalton, 1959, p. 218.
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the workforce need to be seen in the light of this basic fact. Therefore, if there is management 
control over the workforce as a driving force of any production organisation, then there will 
be attempts from the controlled group to overcome this control and to find different ways of 
escaping from this control.
Some issues of informal relations were touched in the sociological literature concerned with 
resistance in organisation.23 Watson (1987) made a review of some forms o f employees’ 
resistance, as for example, cheating and fiddling, rule manipulation, joking and horseplay. 
But mainly because his focus was on the employees’ resistance, there was no serious 
discussion regarding the interdependence of formal and informal relations. At the same time, 
we should stress that all types of resistance could be regarded only as a part of the whole set 
of informal relations within the organisation. And the world of informal relations embraces 
not only resistance and negative responses of the employees, but also different kinds of 
positive actions: all the actions which are characterised by a lack o f formalisation.
From my point o f  view the problems of de-skilling, control of work, resistance in 
organisations and others are interrelated with the problems of formal and informal relations, 
but among the modem sociological literature there is a lack o f attention to these issues. 
Although there are some publications which analyse the problems o f informalities,24 
nevertheless there is almost no literature regarding the questions how they are organised, how
21 See for example: Jermier ( 1988).
24 An analysis o f formal and informal relations has been developed by several authors in a range o f sociological 
literature: Boer (1990), Chisholm (1989), De Certeau (1984), Fitzpatrick (1988), Kolb and Bartunek (1992).
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they operate on the shop floor, whether there are any specific features of the use of informal 
relations within the state sector or within the private sector and so on. To some extent these 
problems are touched by those who did case studies in enterprises.
Case-studies
My intention is not to show the whole history of the investigation of informal relations in the 
labour process through the centuries, so my particular attention concentrated on the second 
half of the twentieth century. At the beginning of this period the most interesting case studies 
of informal relations at work were made by the famous American sociologists D. Roy, who 
paid a lot of attention to informal relations on the shop floor.25 He worked for nearly one year 
as a drill-operator in one of the machine shops of a steel processing plant, and he kept a daily 
record of his life on the shop floor. The focus of his interest was the structure of inter-group 
connections and work behaviour at the machine level.
Huw Beynon presented one of the most comprehensive socially constructed views of the day- 
to-day realities of the workers and shop stewards in one of Ford’s plants.26 In this study he 
described in a very revealing manner the unknown sides of work, and paid a lot o f attention to 
the informal relations among the employees, shop stewards and other people at work and after 
work. This book opened a new era in the realistic description of enterprise life. Another
15 See for example: D. Roy (1955), Roy (1952), Roy (1953). 
“ Beynon (1980).
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excellent example of case-studies, where the problems of formal and informal relations were 
discussed, is represented in the collection of books edited by A. Zimbalist.27
I found a very interesting view on the issues of informal relations in the works o f Louise 
Lampere and Nina Shapiro-Perl. Lampere presents evidence from the Apparel Industry which 
she gathered on the shop floor. The most interesting examples concerned the way in which 
work was organised. Within the workshop informal rules were established among the 
employees. These rules were transmitted to the newcomers, and if someone did not agree with 
the rules, he had to obey, because even the instructors and the head of the training department 
had to accept the informal rules established on the shop floor. At the same time, Lampere 
describes different informal techniques which women on the shop floor invented in order to 
secure their positions. And although the work force was divided along age and ethnicity, 
nevertheless ‘within a particular department, especially among experienced workers, there are
other signs of resistance to management control of production and attempts to protect their
28collective interests.’
Nina Shapiro-Perl presents other evidence from the Costume Jewellery Industry in 
Providence, based on ethnographical fieldwork carried out by the author. One of the main 
issues, which she was interested in was the organisation of the piece-rate system within the 
factory. Her main finding from my point o f view was concentrated in the following words: 17
17 Zimbalist (1979). 
”  Lampere (1979).
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Piecework provides the illusion that one’s payment is related to one’s productivity/9 
The same opinion was pointed out by Braverman:
The pay of labour is a socially determined figure, relatively independent from productivity.* 30 
The main observation of Shapiro-Perl was that:
On the shop floor, piecework becomes a battlefront between workers and management. Every day 
workers challenge the management’s manipulations of the piecework system and develop their 
own strategies of resistance, though they may not fully realise the significance of their actions.
Further, the author have examined some of the strategies that workers used to fight 
management’s manipulations of the piecework system. They used their informal mechanisms 
in order to control the production time: they tried to speed up during time study and to go 
slow, if it was in their interests. If to generalise, she examined the strategies that workers from 
different countries have used for centuries.
There were some other case studies in which the authors to some extent paid attention to the 
dichotomy of formal/informal relations, among them books of R. Cavendish On the Line, S. 
Westwood All Day, Every Day, Collinson D. Managing the Shopfloor*1 and so on. The most 
important feature which characterises all the case studies by these authors is that they 
consider the world of work as a class-constructed reality. They look at workplace relations 
through the prism of a ‘them and us’ perspective and they show us the struggle of workers
”  Shapiro (1979).
30 Braverman, 1974, p. 98.
11 Cavendish (1982), Westwood (1984), Collinson (1992).
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against the administration who invent the exploitative system or against the new subtle 
techniques which are invented by the company’s managers in order to increase productivity. It 
means that the Marxist approach is very much alive in the thoughts of modem sociologists 
and there is not any substantial replacement for his theory.
It was true in almost all cases that the main aims of research were a bit different then those of 
informal relations, and authors tried to reveal other problems o f the everyday life of people in 
the factories. And only because the everyday life o f people is always interconnected with 
formal and informal relations, especially in the world of work, the authors could not ignore 
such important things. At the same time, we should stress, that at the moment we have a lack 
of case studies, where the main focus o f the research was the investigation o f  the 
interconnections o f formal and informal relations. That is why in my own research, the results 
of which are represented in this thesis, formal and informal relations in production process 
were chosen as the main focus for sociological investigation.
To some extent the problems of informal relations has been touched in various surveys. 
Mainly surveys touched not the problems o f informal relations, but the usage of formal 
agreements and formal contracts in industrial relations. Edwards did a special survey which 
was devoted to the development of formal industrial relations on the railways. At the 
beginning she stressed that although there were a lot o f different reforms o f formal industrial 
relations, nevertheless ‘the effect of these reforms is difficult to evaluate because of the lack 
of detailed empirical investigations of the formalised system’.32 It is stressed in the article
“ Edwards, 1987, p. 63.
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that in the late 70s and the beginning of the 80s some surveys were conducted investigating 
the questions of formal written procedures at the workplace level,33 but mainly they were 
concerned with workplace industrial relations and the system of collective bargaining. At the 
same time, formal and informal relations as a whole system of the organisation, which 
penetrates all level of the organisation have hardly at all been investigated in the sociological 
literature. At the same time, while investigating the formalised system of collective 
bargaining on the railways, Edwards has pointed out that despite the extreme degree of 
centralisation and regulation in the organisation of the formal system of industrial relations on 
the railways and a system of collective bargaining that is also highly centralised and ‘rule 
bound’, in fact there are a lot of informal activities from the side of the LDC representatives, 
who engage in a variety of informal actions in order to overcome the obstacles, presented by 
the formal system.34 From her article it is apparent that trade union representatives engage in 
a ‘wide range of activities, which fall outside or, in some cases, contravene the formal rules of 
the system’. The main question which is raised by Edwards is: what is the relationship 
between the formal system of industrial relations and representative power? And one of her 
suggestions, developed from her survey, is that ‘representatives, who engage in informal 
activity will be more powerful than those who operate within the confines o f the formal
”  See for example: Daniel and Millward (1983), Thompson and Beaumont (1978), Edwards (1978, 1983), 
(Edwards and Lloyd 1980).
MEdwards, 1987, p. 71.
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system’.35 Her main conclusion is that ‘formality does not produce uniformity and 
predictability at the workplace level and it does constitute a valuable power resource which 
can be used to the benefit of either side and in particular to that of management.’36 I would 
like to continue her thesis and say that the informality could also be used as a valuable source 
of power. The intrinsic feature of any social process is the appearance of social relations, 
which could be formalised or informalised. Labour process theory, with its origins in the 
work of Karl Marx, seeks to uncover the social and economic interests of particular groups of 
people. But from this fact also arises the suggestion that because o f their intrinsic antagonism, 
these groups of people will search for some mechanisms (formal and informal) in order to 
secure the position o f their particular group. Thus, the question of formal and informal 
relations is inseparable from the questions o f socially constructed reality and class- 
constructed society. And the usage of informal relations could be considered only in 
conjunction with other theories.
'Core' and ‘peripheral’ workers
The distinction between core and peripheral workers plays an important part in the informal 
organisation o f the workplace, in Russia even more than in Britain. We will explore the 
similarities and differences through our case studies, but here we will look briefly at different 
approaches to these concepts in Russia and the West.
’’Edwards, 1987, p. 73.
“ Edwards, 1987, p. 86.
41
‘Core’ and ‘peripheral’ work in the western tradition
There has been a long tradition of concern about those groups of workers who were 
included in the category ‘the peripheral labour force’. In the last decades of the 19th 
century, the ‘casual’ worker was one of the important points of Charles Booth’s classic 
study of London working class life. Booth investigated the life of working people in 
London, and for this purpose he divided the population into eight categories, three of were 
concerned with:
1. The lowest class of occasional labourers, loafers and semi-criminals.
2. Casual earnings - ‘very poor’.
3. Intermittent earnings. (Booth, 1892-97,1, p.33.)
Booth considered the problem as related both to the demand for and supply o f labour of 
this particular kind. It is necessary to say that from the beginning the conception of 
peripheral workers was connected with labour market segmentation.
In the 30s, this framework was developed in the US and some western countries for 
systematically analysing the participation o f the adult population in the world o f work. But 
it was very urgent at that time, because there was a high rate of unemployment and people 
were looking for jobs. For example, the population o f  the US was strongly divided 
between workers and non-workers. But the patterns of workers’ participation in the world 
of work was much more complicated than the simple division between workers and non­
workers. In order to understand this complication, a lot of conceptual frameworks were 
developed, among which was the conception of ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ workers. At the
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beginning the ‘peripheral’ workers were regarded as those who ‘held a job some time 
during the proceeding year but who worked less than full time throughout the entire twelve 
months’ (Morse, 1969). This conception was quite behavioristic, because it defined as 
‘peripheral’ all those who worked less than full-time for the full year, but it did not include 
those who wanted to work but not full time (married women and students). Then, in the 
sixties in the works of some American writers, like Morse and others the concept of 
peripherality was expanded to include many discreet subgroups.
This concept got a new sense in Britain in the early 80s in shaping debate about labour 
market flexibility and employment restructuring. This conception was closer to the 
enterprise level and to some extent reflected the real situation in industry. Some authors 
argued that employers organised their work force in a segmenting way so that there is a 
great division among employees between the ‘core’ of full-time workers, and the 
‘periphery’ of part-time, temporary, subcontract and ‘outsourced’ workers. The term 
‘flexibility’ was applied as ‘the solution to recession, heightened competition and 
uncertainty. ... but also it has been applied to all forms o f employment outside the full­
time, “permanent” contract such as part-time and temporary work’.(Pollert, 1988).
John Atkinson and Denis Gregory argued that ‘the division into “core” and “peripheral” 
groups can take many forms, and employers have a whole range of options open to them to 
fragment their workforces in ways which suit their particular circumstances.’ (Atkinson 
and Gregory, 1986, pp. 12-16.) They opened discussion about ‘numerical flexibility’ and 
‘functional Flexibility’ of firms. Their point of view was that a new division o f labour had 
arisen, and firms try to achieve greater flexibility by the reorganisation o f their workforce.
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Trying to analyse the ‘new-style flexible firm’, they assumed, that ‘such a flexible firm 
divides its workers into ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ because it seeks different kinds o f flexibility 
from each group’ (ibid., p. 13). Explaining the model of the flexible firm, they stressed that 
the flexible firm could employ a number of external sub-contracting groups, temporary 
staff and some self-employed people for a short term. Such kinds of groups provide the 
‘numerical flexibility’. But these workers are excluded from career status . The ‘core’ 
workers provide ‘functional flexibility’ through lowered job demarcations and multi­
skilling, new skills in different job but ‘enjoy greater continuity of employment than 
peripheral workers’ (ibid., p. 13). Atkinson and Gregory stressed, that they used this model 
of the ‘flexible firm’ as ‘an analytical tool’ in order to understand what is going on. And 
they pointed out some difficulties which arose with this framework, because some of the 
firms (especially foreign-owned) exactly demonstrate this segmentation, but some don't. 
But the whole debate about this issue revealed a new look at the division o f labour and 
segmentation of the labour market.
Core and peripheral relations in Russia
The debate which developed in the 80s was almost unknown among Soviet sociologists. 
And this approach, which helps us to consider the division o f labour within Russian 
conditions, wasn't developed. That is why I consider that it will be interesting to apply this 
approach to former Russian conditions and to investigate what changes have happened 
during the last decade. I would think that the implementation of this framework in Russian 
reality could also help us to understand the main differences between ‘Russian’ and 
‘western’ labour forces and the segmentation of the labour market, as well as similarities
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which are now appearing on the Russian stage. Let's consider now, what were included in 
the ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ work forces in Russia in the past and how it is changing in new 
conditions.
1. By ‘core’ workers traditionally in Russia we understood the workers, who were 
involved in the main production process. For example, in my enterprise, which repairs 
carriages for the underground, the ‘core’ workers would be those who are involved directly 
in the process of repair of these carriages, and those who are engaged in the re-assembling 
and assembling work (electricians, fitters, and so on).
Besides, by ‘core’ workers, historically management understood a special category of 
workers, who had worked in the enterprise for 20-30 years, had a great commitment to the 
enterprise, and had a big sense of loyalty towards management's decisions. Such ‘skilled’ 
(kadrovyie) workers always had a more privileged position within the enterprise in 
comparison with new ‘unverified’ workers. In some Russian enterprises the ‘core’ workers 
are legally put into a privileged position in the collective agreement, because if they have 
worked for the enterprise for 10-20-30-40 years, they have some extra money for their 
length of service, but even if  it is not formally registered in the collective agreement, the 
division between old skilled workers, so called ‘old inhabitants’, and others still exists and 
is important in informal relations. (For example on my plant - there is a clear division 
between ‘old’ workers - stariki - and new workers - pupils). And there was a mutually 
advantageous approach between such ‘core’ workers and management: managers gave 
them the better and more skilled tasks and in return for this, the workers gave managers 
their support and loyalty.
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So, such workers have a more privileged position because the management usually 
provided them with some extra payments, extra bonuses, more profitable work for those 
who work on piece rate. If there is some distribution of goods or places in the recreation 
areas or for the sanatorium, such workers got them in the first place. Selection for 
promotion is also usually made by middle management in accordance with the loyalty of 
this person to the management. So, from the point of the administration, such workers 
were a highly valued full-time work force whom they can rely on. Thus, managers will 
consider some workers as ‘central’ workers not only for their skills, but mostly for their 
contribution to their managerial authority and to their position.
2. By ‘peripheral’ workers we understand the full-time semi-skilled or unskilled workers, 
whose status is much lower than ‘core’ workers, who, as a rule, work on the enterprise for 
a shorter time than some of the ‘core’ workers. By low status we mean also the lower 
status of the occupation. If the occupation was traditionally one of low status, then it 
automatically confers low status upon the individuals or groups who are involved in it. 
One of the examples o f such low status occupations might be cleaners. It is everywhere 
regarded as a low status job. And the cleaners are regarded as peripheral workers. Usually, 
they are involved in a shorter day’s work. They work for 3-4 hours a day, or could have 
variable work schedules.
Also by ‘peripheral’ workers were meant the workers who provided some additional work 
for the enterprise, for example, repair workers, who were engaged in the repair of some 
parts or equipment, tools, i.e. the workers who were involved not in the main process of 
production, but in subsidiary production.
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3. At the same time within the main production, there was one more division between 
those who fulfilled the main work and those who do additional, less skilled work so that 
within one brigade there might also be a division between ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ workers.
4. Also those who did work which was not connected with the main production process at 
all were regarded as ‘peripheral’ workers. For example, on the plant for repairing electric 
trains, the director understood that it is a very profitable business to produce parquet floors 
for the Russian market, so he organised such a workshop. Workers such as those who are 
working within this workshop would be regarded as workers of a non-production process 
because this is not a core process of this enterprise.
5. Such ‘peripheral’ workers who work part-time, several days a week or several hours a 
day almost didn’t exist in Russia. It happened very rarely, if  some person had good 
connections with the director of the enterprise, or the bosses of the personnel department, 
who might allow such work. Mainly it was women who had babies who did such part-time 
work. In modem conditions, when there are difficulties with orders and a lack o f work 
within the enterprise, the administration is forced to work a four day week, but sometimes 
this situation concerns all employees, not only part of them.
6. We also should distinguish this view o f  core and peripheral workers from a scientific 
position, which might be objective and include different divisions among the workers, 
from the position of managers within enterprise, who consider ‘core’ workers first o f all 
from the point of view of loyalty to their decision-making policy, and peripheral workers 
those on whom they can't rely. The managers also understand divisions between ‘core’ and 
‘peripheral’ workers from the point of view of the technological process, but they always
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try to use this division for the control of workers. We can give one example of such a 
situation, when the managers try to use the situation with low-skilled workers. It is very 
common within the enterprise to put a low grade worker on higher grade work. It is very 
widespread for the women who work on the cranes. And it is a prerogative of the shop 
chief to give them a higher skilled job. But because of this situation, the person who was 
put in a higher position will depend on the shop chief and foremen and will do everything 
they want.
From the point of security, all these workers we have enumerated above (‘core’ as well as 
‘peripheral’) have a secure state job. And their position is much better than those who are 
working in many private firms or co-operatives, because such work is still regarded as 
unstable and insecure. Work in state and former state enterprises provides more security and 
has a more stable position and for some workers, who are involved in the most profitable 
activities, they can also provide high wages, as we shall see with the development of small 
enterprises in our Russian plant.
Different countries -  similar relations on the shop floor?
Russia and Britain represent very different cases in modem development. They both have 
their own environment, different political systems, different ideology, but at the same time it 
does not mean that it is not impossible to compare these two countries. Despite huge 
differences in these countries there are some common features. And here we should stress that 
there some processes that have the same characteristics in different societies. And one of 
these processes is the process of labour. And we should remember the words of Karl Marx,
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when he wrote, ‘the labour process is the universal condition o f exchange of substances 
between man and nature, the eternal natural condition of human life, and therefore it does not 
depend on any form of life, in turn, it is inherent in all social forms’ (Capital, Volume One, 
Chapter 5, Paragraph 1).
And here it is very important to stress that whatever conditions could be in the labour process, 
there always would be a place for informal relations: they existed, they exist and they will 
exist. Perestroika, restructuring in the former Soviet Union and economic recession and 
transformation o f some of the public firms into private companies in Great Britain did not 
destroy the informal relations in these two countries. Having considered above a number of 
problems with modem research about formal and informal relations, we would like to point 
out, that the informal processes have become an integral part of the processes of everyday life 
of people. Why is it so? From the one side, the existence of the informal relations is very 
common, because the main feature of the informal relations is their flexibility, quickness and 
a lack of any paper work. That is why it is very difficult sometimes to find the real 
documentary evidence of the informal deal.
Informality always has an impact on the formal system. From our point of view, the system of 
formal and informal activities are interrelated and supplement each other. M. Laquerre, in his 
book devoted to the informal city, argues, that ‘the informal system is included in the larger 
formal space. The reality of informality is seen as related to the topography of the formal
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societal system and constitutes a province of that system’.37 Trying to understand the 
interrelations of the formal and informal relations he suggests that:
The informal system is also seen as a reaction to the formal system, especially  when it is 
superimposed.
The informal system appears also as a challenge to the formal system.
The informal system appears as a substitution for what is missing in the formal system.
The informal system is complementary to the formal institutions.’ (Ibid., 1994, p. 160- 161).
Let us consider what role the system of informal relations plays in the modem labour process 
and how it is changing today.
The structure of the thesis
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows:
The thesis is divided into two parts, the first of which will be devoted to the description of the 
processes which were taking place in the British plant. Chapter 1 describes the processes in 
the British plant from the beginning o f my study till the end of July 1995, when the plant was 
taken over by Swedish-Swiss company ABB. Chapter 2 moves on to examine the specific 
issues of privatisation and restructuring within the British plant and what changes have 
happened on the shop floor. The second part will be devoted to the description o f the 
processes in the Russian plant. Therefore Chapter 3 introduces the Russian plant, presenting
17 Laquerre, 1994, p. 160.
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the history of the Russian plant and then exploring changes in its economic situation up to 
and including 1993, with the issue of formal and informal relations being explored by looking 
first at the management structure, and then at the payment system and conflicts around 
payment. Chapter 4 examines the failure of the plant to fulfil the plan in May 1993 and the 
whole set of objective and subjective reasons which influenced this failure. This chapter 
reveals the nature o f the formal/informal relations within Russian production as they were.
Chapter 5 is devoted to the changes which took place within the Russian enterprise after 
privatisation. It first looks at changes in the management structure and the economic situation 
and then goes on to consider the extent of changes in four main areas: the relations between 
the core and the periphery, changes in the payment system, changes in industrial conflict and 
changes in formal and informal relations. The main conclusion is that despite all formal 
processes towards privatisation, nevertheless there were not so many changes within the 
enterprise after privatisation, and in many spheres there is a continuity of processes which 
were taking place before privatisation with those which happened later. And in some spheres, 
as for example in the payment system there was a real increase of informality.
Chapter 6 presents a comparative analysis of the two plants from the sociological perspective. 
The main conclusion of this chapter is that, despite the same processes which were taking 
place in different countries, nevertheless, the plants went in opposite directions. At the same 
time some processes which happened within both enterprises showed a common tendency to 
the further development of informal relations.
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Chapter I. The Doncaster Plant before Privatisation
The early history of the plant, 1847-1987
The plant has a very long and interesting history. It began in 1847, when the Great Northern 
Railway started negotiations to purchase land in the town. Two years later work had 
commenced. The first new locomotives emerged from the works in 1867. In 1869 the famous 
‘8ft single’ appeared with its giant driving wheels. By the beginning of the XXth century the 
plant had progressively increased in size and the new Crimpsall Repair shop was opened in 
1901. Before the First World War the Doncaster workshops employed over 2,107 employees 
covering all the major crafts.38 The 2107 employees were split up as shown in Table 1.1.
The work conditions at that time were reported as follows:
Until January 1872 employees at the plant w orked a fifty-eight and a h a lf  hour week. From 
M ondays to Fridays inclusive they started work at 7 a.m. and finished at 6 p.m., being allow ed an 
hours break from 1-2 p.m. On Saturdays work finished ‘early’ at 2 p.m..39
What was the discipline at the Works at that time is revealed by the following paragraphs:
Discipline at the works was strict. A man had to  present h im self at the checker’s cabin by the 
entrance gate to  his department when the w orks’ hooter sounded at the start o f  the day’s activities.
31 Bagswell, p. 35
39 Bagswell, p. 37
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He called ou t his works number to  the clerk in the cabin and received in return a metal disc with 
his number on it. This would be returned at the end o f  the shift. Every other Friday he was given a 
brass disc instead o f  the usual tin one. At the end o f  that day’s shift, in return for his disc, he was 
given a pay tin containing his w ages for the past fortnight. He pocketed his cash  and returned the 
tin box.'*0
The jo b  w as ‘overlooked’, listed on Patrick Stirling’s return o f  O ctober 1870, w as to enforce good 
discipline throughout the works. They would ensure that those guilty o f  disobedience to orders, or 
found ‘d ipping’ or ‘waxing’, i.e. stealing material or tools, w ere dismissed and sometimes, in 
addition, prosecuted.
During the First World War the plant produced ammunition and other material for the war 
effort.
After the First World War the main activity of the plant was building vehicles. On the 22 
February 1923 Mr. H.N. Gresley was appointed as Chief Mechanical Engineer at Doncaster.
Gresley’s policy was to continue using the best designs of locomotives from the pre-1923 
companies and to develop them with his own innovations. He appreciated that improvements in 
design were urgently needed, particularly on the locomotives, serving the Scottish lines.'*7 
In 1924 at the British Empire Exhibition in Wembley the ‘Pacific’ locomotive Flying 
Scotsman was the best performer. A lot of important locomotives were produced in Doncaster 
between the wars, included Silver Link, Pacific A4 Mallard, Cock of the North and so on. 401
40 Management Committee Minutes 30 August 1874.
41 Bagswell, p. 54.
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During the Second World War the works produced tank turrets, naval guns, aircraft wings 
and so on. One of the consequences of the war was the opening up of employment 
opportunities for women. ‘Most o f  the women came to the plant works because they had 
received ‘call up’ papers in which they were offered the alternative o f joining the armed 
forces or doing work in the factory.... When they moved into the works they were given jobs 
in the different departments and shops.’42 They’ve done all kinds of jobs, they’ve been 
painters and crane drivers, cleaners and fitters and so on.
The women worked a 12 hour shift: either the day shift from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m. or a night shift 
from 8 p.m. to 5 a.m., but overtime was often worked from 5 - 7:30 p.m. from Mondays to 
Thursday inclusive. Women, employed to fulfil the men’s responsibilities achieved equal pay 
with men after thirty-two weeks. The total bonus received by men was greater than that 
received by women.
For the whole long history o f the plant, there were a lot o f worker dynasties. Whole families 
from the community were proud to send their representatives to the plant. Below you could 
see one of the worker dynasties.43
43 Bagswell, p. 71.
43 The description of the dynasty was given me by Hugh Parkin, the Senior Foremen, who is still working in the
plant.
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Table 1.1. Pre-war employment at Doncaster plant
LOCOMOTIVE SHOPS LOCOMOTIVE
DEPARTMENT
CARRIAGE SHOP
7 overlookers 7 overlookers 4 overlookers
123 erectors 140 engine drivers 25 machine men
56 fitters 141 firemen 3 smiths
93 tuners 169 engine cleaners 4 tinmen
79 machine man 23 cokemen 47 painters
67 smiths 41 fitters 4 carriage washers 
and cleaners
53 spring makers 2 turners 5 gas makers
15 boiler smiths 2 machine men 89 carriage woodmen
5 copper smiths 6 smiths 99 wagon woodmen
14 steam hammer 
men
9 boiler smiths 44 carriage fitters
173 strikers 2 copper smiths 16 carriage trimmers
6 pattern makers 6 copper smiths 11 sawyers
11 joiners 6 strikers 119 labourers
2 saddlers 1 joiner 2 clerks
14 puddlers 1 bricklayer 5 wagon cover 
repairers
2 grinders 7 carriage washers 7 grease factors
4 messengers, office 
boy and cleaners
8 stationary 
enginemen
12 brass moulders 4 wagon 
woodworkers
5 coke burners 4 carriage 
fitters
8 painters 32 carriage 
examiners 
and greases
5 bricklayers 51 labourers
2 gas fitters 1 timekeeper
4 stationary engine 
man
2 clerks
5 gas makers 2 harness 
repairers
28 iron moulders
120 labourers
6 time keepers
5 watchmen
18 clerks
4 draughtsmen
946 TOTAL 661 TOTAL 500 TOTAL
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Worker dynasty in Doncaster plant since 1865
Thomas Parkin 
1865-1912 
(Sawyer’s Labourer)
I
George Parkin
1885 - 1936 
(Wagon Woodman) 
. (foreman)
Charles Thomas Parkin
1913 -1958
(Fitter)
(Production Engineer)
Kenneth Parkin
George Reginald Parkin
1915- 1963
(Fitter)
1946-1951
(Fitter)
Douglas Parkin 
1939- 1983 
(Chargehand) 
(Electrician)
George Alan Parkin 
1944 - 1987
(Mech/electric engineer)
Hugh Parkin 
1956 - present time 
(Fitter)
(Senior Foreman)
Janet Parkin 
1968 - 1969 
(Clerk)
Paul Parkin 
1978- 1987 
(Electrician)
Simon Neil Parkin 
1989-present time 
(Clerk)
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At mid-century the Doncaster plant employed around 5 000 people - it was in fourth place 
after Swindon (10100), Derby (8 800) and Crewe (7173).
In 1970 Doncaster Works and the rest of the Railway Workshops became a part of British 
Rail Engineering Limited (B.R.E.L.). Since the 80s in Britain the recession and the decline of 
production have continued. In the Government there were strong voices against state 
influence on the economic life of the society. That is why the new trend appeared, the main 
aim of which was the question of the financial and economical survival o f the state sector. 
B.R.M.L. was organised from the former B.R.E.L. after another phase of restructuring in the 
late 80s.
The recent history, 1987-1993
The government decided to implement the new commercial practices into the enterprise’s 
activity, to give more commercial freedom for managers, and to force the state sector to 
compete with the private one. It led to the situation, when the managers of the state 
enterprises were forced to reorganise the industrial relations in order to survive in the hard 
competition. To follow the policy of commercialism, and in order to be more attractive for 
buyers, in 1987 the whole plant was divided into three parts.
1. The wagon manufacturing and repair facilities were sold to R.F.S. Industries, a 
consortium financed by several banks.
2. The National Store, under BR direct control, and holding the spares for the entire BR
network.
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3. The remaining area of the Works based around the Diesel Locomotive Repair Shop has 
been reorganised to form B.R.M.L. Doncaster Depot. BRML was characterised by a 
declining workload for several years. At the same time there were at least 3 other depots, 
which were doing the same job in the whole of Britain (Wolverton, Crewe, and Derby).
Although restructuring was taking place, the Workshop itself had a limited amount of 
investment.
The B.R.M.L. policy
In 1989 B.R.M.L began to implement a new policy. The main idea of that policy was the very 
fashionable principle - ‘Human Resource Strategy’. It included a number o f principles, which 
we will try to enumerate below:
1. The first principle concerned the remuneration and the application o f the basic pay. 
According to this principle, all the members o f staff would have the same status. Each 
grade would have a salary band recognising level of skills, experience, achievements and 
qualifications.
2. The second principle introduced was that the current incentive scheme, which was 
implemented in 1978, would be abolished and consolidated into the salary of those who 
were receiving it.
3. The third principle suggested that all enhancement rates would be simplified and 
rationalised, instead of a multiplicity of formulas for payment relating to premiums for 
shift work, there would be a common basic minimum salary, and a common maximum 
salary band.
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4. The core part of the new B.R.M.L. policy was the fourth principle, which was devoted to 
the creation of a simplified grading structure based on a flexible team working concept, o f  
which the basic principles would be:
• team responsibility for tasks undertaken;
• training for the staff to meet all the tasks (that meant, multi-skilling and multi­
tasking).
•  staff would be required to be fully flexible within each team to required levels.
The first step in the implementation of the new policy was the introduction of the new Profit 
Related Payment Scheme. The scheme assumed two sum payments annually to all employees, 
based on a 50% share of profits made by B.R.M.L. above that budgeted for. Another 50% 
would go for company capital investment.
In connection with reorganisation, the number of employees by 1990 was 771. Since 1985 the 
number of apprentices also decreased and the plant stopped recruiting people.
Recent developments
Since 1990 the plant was among the sites of BR offered for privatisation. The whole 
atmosphere o f uncertainty and the scared feeling affected the people within the plant. During 
the 5 years since 1990 the people didn’t know about the future o f their company. The most 
vulnerable points were the conditions of people’s service and pensions. The number of people 
employed has decreased considerably and by March 1994 there were 619 employees at the 
plant. Among them 400 - core workers. By March 1995 in the workshop 483 person were
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working of whom 90 were salaried staff. As regarding the local conditions there was a high 
level of unemployment, no industries, a shortage of job  vacancies. The city and the Railway 
were inseparable.
Plan of the plant
ISecurity
Entrance
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Production organisation DRML 1994/1995 
Manpower: June 1995 
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Waged 531
Salaried -96 Depot manager
r i i
production technical quality in 
manager assurance 
resources systems
h~rn i
formation supplies accounts personnel
manager
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Production manager
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62
The organisation of production
When BRML was formed in 1987 the main aim of this organisation was to provide dedicated 
facilities for the overhaul and repair o f locomotives, coaches and multiple units from its four 
sites in Eastleigh, Wolverton, Springbum and Doncaster. In general terms Eastleigh was 
responsible for electric multiple units, Wolverton for coaching stock, Springbum and 
Doncaster for locomotives and diesel multiple units. All these Depots were totally dependent 
on sales. The shift towards commercialisation forced the management of the Doncaster Depot 
to reconsider the policy of specialisation. That is why by the year 1993, the Doncaster Depot 
repaired almost every vehicle running on the British railways, including the locomotive range 
from class 31-s built in 1950, to the latest Class 91 Intercity 225, Regional Railways coaches, 
carriages for the London underground and so on.
Thus the Doncaster Depot was providing service in the following areas: 
cost effective maintenance - locomotives
- unscheduled component exchanges - locomotives and D.M.U.’s 
scheduled examinations/ overhauls - D.M.U.’s
- scheduled examinations/ overhauls - Parcels vehicles, 
damage repair - all vehicles.
- modification/Experiments - all vehicles.
The plant does repair o f  the following trains:
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1. Regional Railways
2. Intercity.
3. Network South East.
4. Red Star.
5. Unexpected orders from British Telecom, pits and so on.
The Doncaster Depot overhauled a wide variety of Diesel Multiple Units from the first 
generation o f DMUs to the modem ones. There was an overnight bogie change facility, with 
vehicles coming in after the evening rush and returned to service for the morning peak.
The w atchw ord at this depot was ‘Cost Effective M aintenance’, the speedy tum -round o f  vehicles 
achieved, in part, by a policy o f ‘component exchange’. Although the s ta ff was generally fully 
capable o f  undertaking repairs, the practice was to exchange the damaged worn out component for 
a new one, to  minimise delays.'"
The stages of overhaul
All the vehicles should pass through the stage o f preliminary examination, where the special 
examiner will check what work should be done. Then the vehicle will be transferred to the 
dismantling and parts repair.
The bodies are lifted from the bogies and placed on stands • the bogies and bodies are 
overhauled simultaneously.
Bagswell, p. 107.
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The bogies are dismantled and cleaned;
Wheels are checked and the profile is turned if  necessary;
All axles undergo ultrasonic tests to ensure there are no defects;
Meanwhile the body will have its seats and tables removed, upholstery, carpets and cushions 
replaced as necessary.
The air conditioning unit is removed and a replacement fitted, electric and air systems 
checked and overhauled along with draw gear and couplings;
After the bogies are refitted the vehicle is transferred for the repaint.
The repaired vehicle is then assembled in its formation, each coach overhauled to a schedule 
that brings the set o f vehicles together simultaneously.
The DMU and the locomotives are tested in the testing house for a certain time in order to 
check that all the parts are working well.
The technology
In 1950/60 the Railway rolling stock was completely changed. Diesels and electric 
locomotives substituted the old steam locomotives. With the spread o f  railway electrification 
the trains were provided with semi-automatic and automatic electrical systems. By the 
beginning of the 80s the steam loco absolutely disappeared. This was a revolution in the 
methods of traction. Technological and economic revolution led to the introduction of high­
speed trains from 1976 (Intercity 125s). These new trains have brought a lot of automatic 
control. It required new methods of repair and new equipment for repair.
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With the changes in trains, the work pattern in the workshops has changed as well. Much of 
the earlier labour in the workshops was heavy and arduous. Muscular strength and stamina 
were required to hold down a job in the foundry or blacksmiths shop, or when a man was 
employed as riveter or coppersmith. Men learned their particular manual skills gradually over 
a period as long as twenty years. With the disappearance of steam, much of the heavy work 
also disappeared. An increasing proportion of the labour force was employed fitting electrical, 
rather then mechanical equipment. In the carriage works the use of plastic rather than wood 
greatly reduced the demand for skilled carpenters. The new passenger trains were much more 
sophisticated then their steam-age predecessors. Air conditioning, power address system and 
automatically opening and closing corridor doors, which were unknown in the rolling stock o f 
the 1950s, became standard for many coaches being built in the 1970s.
In general, the Doncaster plant was operated with technological equipment that was mainly 
out of date (built in the late 60s and the beginning o f the 70s). The railway system belonged to 
the public sector o f the economy, which is why there were not so many subsidies, especially 
by the time of privatisation when investment had fallen to nil. With all this old technology 
like mobile cranes and pneumatic machines, the Doncaster plant could maintain the rolling 
stock of the British Rail, but there was not so much chance to break through and buy modem 
equipment because o f  absence of investment. Several things, like a guillotine scissors, were 
bought in 1994, but still it was a tiny part of the whole equipment.
During the last ten years new train models have appeared world-wide to deal with repairs on a 
corrective rather than preventive basis. A whole-train diagnosis system was developed. 
Malfunctions are located and indicated in the driver’s cab. A diagnostic computer produces
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state analyses, which can be used for immediate malfunction reporting or can be stored for 
workshop evaluation.
At the time research was done the Depot was faced with very high competition with the 
others for workload contracts. ABB transportation and BR Engineering have invested heavily 
in modernising the repair facilities at Crewe and Derby. As a result of all these investments, 
the repair statistics at Derby and Crewe were 15 % better than BRML.45
During the last few years the number of aluminium-bodied vehicles on BR has increased. 
BRML lacks the equipment to handle the new technology. That is why, even if they had an 
excellent record in repairs (the plant has adopted the European Foundation o f  Quality 
Management model), without the investment it was difficult for the plant to compete with the 
other depots.
But it is necessary to mention that, despite the increasing number of aluminium vehicles, 70- 
80 % of the running rolling stock consisted of the high speed trains built in the 70s. And it is 
not a very quick thing to change the whole rolling stock. That is why the Doncaster Depot 
could maintain repair of the majority of trains.
Organisational process
Since the very beginning o f the century within British Rail a hierarchical structure of 
organisation of labour dominated. By the beginning o f my study on the plant there was the 
following organisational structure:
4] Financial Times.
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Managing director 
I
Production manager 
I
Shift production engineer 
I
Supervisors E grade 
I
Supervisor D grade 
I
Supervisor Junior WSC (Foremen) 
I
Chargehand (cat4) skilled man 
I
Worker Cat3 (crane drivers)
I
Worker Cat2 (labourers)
I
Worker Catl (labourers)____
According to the workload for the following month, the production manager made a priority 
o f vehicle repair for each particular day. Together with the shift managers they considered the 
workload for the whole shift. Then the work tasks were divided between different supervisors 
according to their specialisation. The supervisors defined particular tasks to fulfil for the 
foremen, who accordingly transferred the further detailed tasks for the shift to the 
chargehands. And the chargehands distributed the amount of work for the gang46 between the 
workers.
A gang is a formal collective organisation of workers, usually 10-12, combined on the trade principle: fitters, 
electricians, platers and so on.
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Here we can see that above the workers there was constructed a hierarchical system of 
organisation of production and control of labour.
The model of organisational structure described above had very much in common with 
Weber’s model o f bureaucracy. The organisational structure itself was based on a clear-cut 
hierarchy of authority of pyramid shape, with clearly defined duties and responsibilities at 
each level and command exercised down a vertical line.
Subsequent research has shown that where bureaucratic principles were properly implemented 
organisations experienced many dysfunction. Merton (1957) argued that Weberian-style 
bureaucracy became rigid and inflexible...
Organisational members tended to follow the rules slavishly, regardless of whether in fact these 
were a rational and efficient way of dealing with an issue, to become committed to the formal 
procedures in a ritualistic manner that ignored the goals the rules were intended to 
realise....Specialisation could lead to a narrow and restricted outlook that would provide incapable 
of solving new problems....
The various managerial strata in large, impersonal and centralised bureaucracies tend to become 
isolated from each other, develop their own internal group solidarity, and withhold or distort 
information. In these circumstances a group can maximise its freedom of action to bend the rules 
to suit their own goals rather than those of top management, protect itself from outside interference 
and protect individuals who fail to do their own job properly/7 47
47 Hill, 1984, pp. 78-9
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Commercial organisations have rarely met all the classical criteria because practising 
managers have usually been unwilling to tolerate dysfunction. It is no surprise that much of 
the research into bureaucracy was carried out in public service organisations that were largely 
unconcerned with profit-making within a competitive market and valued impartiality and 
predictability above else. Business normally retains an element of personal discretion and 
arbitrary authority, unless obliged to do otherwise by legislation or trade union pressure.
The kind of organisation of production described so far covered only the hierarchical structure 
of the plant. The hierarchical organisation of production was supported by a very complicated 
horizontal structure: within the plant were a lot of departments, big and small, responsible for 
different types of work. Sometimes they had double responsibilities. This complicated system 
of organisational process had a profound effect on workers’ consciousness, as we will show 
later.
Informal relations on the plant
Interconnections of formal and informal relations
The internal world o f an organisation is more complex than appears at first glance. And 
sometimes it is very obvious that in reality the real processes that are taking place within the 
enterprise are much more complicated than people could imagine. As M. Dalton confirms:
division o f  labour, departmental identification, personal ambitions, turnover etc. - stimulate 
multiple informal phases in the organisation which fluctuate in their distance from th e  aims and 
methods o f  the formal phases....
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For centuries observers and leaders have rem arked on the distinctions between expected and 
unexpected behaviour in organisations. The fact that the distinctions continue to be made under 
various names points to an apparently  universal condition. From at least the time o f  Augustus 
Caesar,'w these dissimilarities w ere recognised and incorporated in the term s de jure (by right) and 
de facto (in fact), which are roughly equivalent to legal or official and actual but unofficial.'“'
I would argue that every organisation, no matter to which industry it belongs, in which 
country this industry is situated, is characterised by the co-existence of formal and informal 
systems. Usually in formal system there is a well-defined formal structure, which describes all 
the responsibility and power characteristics on each level. The formal system is created 
during some period of time, based on the analysis o f  different situations in the past, it implies 
the belief that these formal rules and obligations will help the organisation in resolving its 
problems for a long period of time. That is why the formal system usually implies stable 
conditions for a certain period of time. And in some cases it is helpful. But life is richer than 
an artificially created schema, which is why the formal systems sometimes do not correspond 
with the wide variety of life situations. And in order to compensate for this imperfection of 
the formal system the informal one appeared. In turn, the boundaries of the informal system 
are mainly ill defined, it characterised by a very uncertain structure. But its main advantage 
over of the formal one is that the informal system is very flexible, does not required the 
creation of any formal regulations (oral or written) and resolves problems as quickly as 
possible. *49
41 See Argyris, 1957.
49 Dalton, 1959, p. 219.
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The processes within the organisation sometimes are very complicated. It is not possible to 
predict everything. Planning, schedule changes, supply problems, rush orders, the formal 
system is useless for doing all this things, since all this problems were not possible to predict 
in the formal system. Moreover, some authors stress that
the process o f  aggregate planning, master and operations scheduling and inventory control while 
benefiting from a formal system, are by and large handled by an informal system since  the formal 
system  is perceived to be inadequate to respond to the information needs o f the workers. The 
informal system evolves over the years in response to the shortcoming o f  the formal system and it 
results in close relationships between individuals who are involved in the production process.50
As we can see further, informal relations govern life in production and it is a natural process 
which is part of the ‘universal principles’. Our enterprise was not an exception to this rule. 
Within our enterprise also the relations were organised through the dichotomy of 
‘formal/informal’, ‘official/ unofficial’.
Some processes within the enterprise were handled by an inform al system, because the 
formal system seemingly was perceived to be inadequate to respond to the needs of the 
people. This informal system developed during the years in response to the shortcoming of 
the formal system. The main cause of creation o f the informal system of relations in the plant 
was the very clumsy system of organisation o f production: there were a lot of people 
responsible for the same operations, duplication of functions and a very unclear system of
50 Formal/Informal systems and MRP implementation //Production and inventory management - First Quarter,
1986. p. 118
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responsibilities. Usually in such circumstances people create a system which helps them to 
make easy their relations with others.
Traditionally Doncaster was a city of trains. Railways were one o f the biggest employers in 
industry and a lot o f people from Doncaster were employed by British Rail. A lot of people 
from the local community were working there. There was a continuity in work histories when 
the members of one family were working on the plant. The supervisors, foremen - they all 
came from the local environment. That is why there were a lot of inform al connections, 
which you couldn’t find in other enterprises. Within production a set of informal connections 
was also constructed. A lot of things support this idea: the open day fairs show us how 
important for the local community was the Doncaster plant, because a lot of their relatives 
and friends are working or have worked there.
When I studied the enterprise, the situation was very informal. I could see it in different 
contexts. And there was also a mixture of formal regulations and structure, within which was 
embedded the informal context.
For example, for meeting the production requirement the General Director organised a formal 
procedure of meetings twice a week (on Wednesday and Friday), where all the supervisors 
discussed their production problems. But the way these meetings were conducted was 
absolutely informal. Communications between the chargehand and foremen and the workers 
were based mainly on informal relations, as were relations with the customers. The informal 
structure created its own sources of power. In some circumstances, like, for example, with 
overtime, the informal processes become one of the means through which employees 
seemingly received financial and moral job satisfaction. And I fully agree with the authors,
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which supported my idea, when they were writing:
The informal structure creates its own sources o f power, influence, and decision making; 
moreover, it becomes an outlet through which employees seek and seem ingly receive job  
satisfaction.51
Formal and informal relations from the point of view of the General Director of 
the plant
I raised the question about the existence of informal relations in the plant in an interview with 
its General Director, who was in the post from 1992 till 1995. As he stressed in his interview, 
he was a railwayman, and was always interested in all railway activity. As further 
circumstances showed, he was respected and liked not only by managers but also people on 
the shop floor. Here is his opinion:
As regards those question about formal things and informal th ings - you have to have all those 
things in the fingertips. I w as aware o f  that kind o f  coexistence o f  formal and informal relations, 
because in the w hole railw ay industry, and Doncaster was no exception, there was a formal 
structure, there was a management hierarchy, there was all so rts o f  things, organisation o f  gangs, 
we had grades on the shop floor, there was demarcation on the shop floor, and then you had 
chargehands, supervisors, managers - all those things form th e  railw ay's formal structure. And 
there was a sort o f  formal policies and from the top down there w as the law o f  the land. You had to 
comply with all the railw ay regulations, because any vehicles should correspond with the railway 
safety regulations. A nd that to  me is very formal in the way the w ork had to be done. And I believe
31 Ibid.
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that from the skilled man who served railway apprenticeships, the whole culture o f  work that there 
are rules by which you work. So there was a structure to which people work. So there had to be a 
certain basic quality and I believe it was there.
There was a history o f  work traditionally, because they could not send locomotives out that then 
come o ff  the rails. Right. They also knew that if  things were majorly wrong, the locomotives came 
back. So they had to do  it sort o f  right eventually, so they might as well do it right the first time.
Discussion on formal/informal: the role of informal relations can be illustrated in a number of 
activities.
Overtime
During the years overtime was one of the sources of improving the income of workers. After 
a number of interviews with workers and middle managers I found that the workers 
consciously tried to slow down their work in order to receive overtime. It was most profitable 
for the workers to work overtime that is why they constructed a conspicuous informal system 
of organising their work, and any attempt from the top to change planning or scheduling of 
manufacturing operations was faced with a hidden resistance from the workers. The 
organisation of work traditionally was constructed in such a way that workers had their own 
power to organise and plan their work. So, they had sufficient freedom to turn it in their 
favour. To what extent the atmosphere in the plant was relaxing is clear from the following 
citation:
Once we get on the job  we discuss what we are going to do and how much we are going to  do....
I f  you are a good worker you can be trusted to organise your own job, which is appreciated by the 
chargehand as it saves him  a bit o f  time.
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The atmosphere here on the works is very  relaxed and friendly. I f  you get on w ith your jo b  nobody 
will bother you (Extract from the d iary  o f  the working week o f  a worker in the wooden gang. 
March 1994). There is no pressure. N obody told me: ‘do this and that in these two hours.’ The 
chargehand at the beginning o f  each sh ift gives us an amount o f  w ork we have to fulfil. Then I plan 
m y time(Interview with a worker, p lan t ‘Vagrem’, 1995).
In the interviews a lot of workers honestly recognised that it is profitable to work overtime, 
and some of them confirmed that without the overtime they would struggle to survive:
It is profitable to work overtime. That is why during the day we are not in a hurry. 
W ithout overtime -our salary is around 1 2 - 1 3  thousands pounds a year. With overtime - 
20 thousand per year{ Interview with a  worker, plant ‘ Vagrem’, 1995)
The amount of overtime usually was calculated from historic records. So, for the workers it 
was quite profitable that there was no such system as work records. There was a hidden desire 
to keep the same amount of overtime in order to sustain the same standard of living. The main 
reason for doing overtime was explained to me by one of the workers on the shop floor:
- W hy do you do overtime?
- In order to sustain the acceptable standard o f living, which I have got used to having.
- W hat standard o f  living do you mean?
- G ood house, but not those blocks o f  flats, which you used to have in Russia. Quite a good car 
w ith modem design from a good firm, and not a car like your R ussian ‘Lada’(Interview  with a 
w orker, plant ‘Vagrem’, 1994).
It was interesting that the workers, appreciated how much they worked overtime, even with 
some jokes:
76
I have worked here 31 years (51 with overtime).
According to the Law, the workers could not work overtime more then 72 hours per week. 
But the number of workers who reached this limit was very high.
The financial attractiveness of working overtime is clear from the next extract:
Since September I used to work 7 days a week. 8 hours a day. Everything for the sake o f  overtime. 
You can understand me: If  I have during the week 180 pounds - 2 days work on Saturdays and 
Sundays I have 210 pounds (Interview  with a worker from the wooden brigade, plant ‘Vagrem’, 
1995).
The aims of the workers were sometimes absolutely opposite to those of management: if the 
managers were conscious about fulfilling the plan and getting the job done with minimum 
financial expenses, the workers cared about their money. Here is an opinion of managers:
We are trying to reduce overheads, including overtime. All the job  has to become competitive. So 
we are trying to restrict overtime.
During 93/94 there was a further movement towards budget constraints. At the same time, 
while the increase in overall working time was approximately 7,226 hours for the period 
93/94, over the same period the plant expanded approximately 75,271 hours in overtime. So, 
the official figures showed us that the managers did not have very much success in reducing 
overtime. It is obvious that workers tried to do as much as possible to get overtime, because 
they understood, that:
- All our prosperity is overtime. At the beginning o f  the financial year there is not that much
overtime.
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- And you consider overtim e as a way o f  making money?
- Oh, yes.
- And is management reluctant to give you overtime?
- They want to  do it on the cheapest rate, obviously (Interview with a worker, plant ‘Vagrem’,
1995).
But the situation with overtime was not so simple as it appeared at first glance. The top 
managers could not benefit from overtime, because their work didn’t include overtime. But as 
regards the middle managers, they benefited from overtime in the following way:
First of all, it is they who distributed overtime among the workers, and in such a way they 
constructed their informal power on the shop floor. The way they distributed overtime went 
through informal channels and if the workers didn’t obey, they could have troubles in the 
future:
Officially - it is voluntary, but in reality they force us to work overtime.
I don’t want to be involved in any disputes with the foreman. I am afraid o f  troubles from him.
Overtime is voluntary. So if  you don’t w ant to work overtim e - you shouldn’t. But you’ve got to be 
nice with the foreman, because if  you do n ’t - you will have a lot o f  troubles.
Secondly, foremen and chargehands were allowed to have overtime themselves, with the help 
of which they were trying to improve their own financial situation.
But even with the distribution of overtime, there were some people in a more privileged 
position than other workers: trade union leaders. They could be free from overtime if they
wanted to:
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I don’t want to spoil relations with the chargehand. Even if  I don’t want to  w ork overtim e - I will 
do it. I am not a trade union leader, who never ever worked overtime. But I am  only a worker, I 
don’t want troubles.
Traditionally the plant operated in a ‘meeting the target’ environment, where at the end of 
each period there was pressure on workers to fulfil this target. That is why in order to meet 
the target there was a lot of overtime, sometimes up to 72 hours per week. And even if the 
workers liked overtime, it was too much for them. But, as revealed by the previous quotation, 
they could not argue with the foreman, because he could use his power - formally or 
informally.
Informal relations with the other gangs
The formal system, designed for all production operations and communications, in many of 
the practices used to be handled informally. This situation concerns the relations between the 
gangs. It is obvious that informal relations were constructed as a substitute for the clumsy and 
inflexible system of formal regulations. The following interview with a sheet metal gang 
confirms this idea:
- Do you have com m unications with o ther sections?
- Oh, we have our mates.
- Do you ask them to do  something for your job?
- Oh, yes.
• And all goes according to  some procedure? You should fill in some documents?
- You should do, but you don’t.
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- W hat does it usually look like?
- It is like favour to favour. Theoretically everything should go through the chargehand, but it 
doesn’t go that way.
- How does it work?
- U sually you just ask the guys from the other section to do it. If they don’t, then you go through 
the chargehand.
- D oes that happened often?
- No. (Interview with a sheet metal worker, plant Vagrem. 1995)
- I f  you need assistance from the person from the other gang, how do you usually arrange this
- A ccording to  the rule, we should fill in the formal application. But we do informally the same 
things for them. Favour to favour.
- There is flexibility in a minor way. We trust each other. So we do a lot o f things together 
‘w ithout putting things in w riting’ We are very good at producing paperwork (Interview with 
w orkers in the wooden brigade, plant ‘Vagrem’, March 1994).
Promotion
When I talked to the head of the personnel office, he explained to me the formal procedure for 
promotion within the plant. He explained to me that each vacancy was usually advertised in a 
special Vacancy List each month. In these vacancy lists all the vacancies within BR were 
enumerated. People have the opportunity to apply for this job. Then all the applications for a 
particular job will be collected together and after one week the senior managers would collect
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people for interview. Usually they select for an interview no more then 10 people. According 
to his words the promotion is made on the basis o f the following characteristic:
qualification
experience on the job
attitudes to learning the job.
Also he would consider suitability for the job as well as seniority.
The personnel manager assured me that everybody on the plant has got an equal opportunity 
by law. I wanted these words to be tested on the shop floor. That is why I asked the workers 
about the system of promotion and the main criteria for selection for the upper positions. As a 
matter o f fact, not one worker mentioned the formal system of promotion. According to the 
workers, the main things which were the main criteria for promotion were the following:
more friendly getting on with your boss
attending sport facilities with your boss (Interview with w orkers in the wooden brigade, plant 
‘V agrem ’, March 1994).
When I talked with the head of the supplies department, he told me his own way of selection 
for promotion. He said, the main criteria for him were:
1. Experience.
2. Work record.
3. Sick days off.
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A part from  th e  crite ria  w ritten  ab o v e , each head o f  departm en t could a d d  their ow n  criteria. 
The head  o f  th e  supply  departm en t said that one  o f  the m ain  th ings fo r prom otion  in his 
departm en t w as  how  m uch tim e a  person spent o u t sick. T hus, acco rd ing  to  h is v iew , the 
equal o p p o rtu n ity  po licy  does n o t w ork, because w om en w ith  kids w o u ld  have m any  m ore 
days o f f  th an  m en.
A  lot o f  w o rk e rs  m en tioned  in  th e  in terview s the better possib ilities fo r p rom otion  fo r trade 
union leaders w ith in  the  plant. H ere  are several quo ta tions o n  th is m atter:
Trade union leaders - they are also corrupt in this country, like in Russia, maybe not in terms o f 
money, but in terms o f  promotion. They could be promoted quicker. (Crane Driver, 6.04, 1995).
There used to  be a system o f  promotion based on a higher grade duty. N ow  it has collapsed. The 
management - they create jobs for themselves. They bothered only about themselves - they don’t 
want to be dirty. The selection for managerial positions is not necessarily the best man for the job.
A shortage of materials
The organisation of supply in the plant had a really long history. Before 1987 the plant had its 
own warehouse. After 1987, when the company was split up into three parts, one of the parts 
became The National Supply Centre. The National Supply Centre supplied approximately 
85% of all parts. 15% came through the contracts with other suppliers. Mainly it was 
contracts with British suppliers, but not very often it could be suppliers from outside - 
Sweden, Austria and so on.
Besides, the plant had its own store, where at the beginning of my study there were around 9 
000 items. Among them 5 000 items were repairable, that means that they have to be repaired
/
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at o ther p lan ts and  then  co m e  back. In th is o ff ic e  13 peop le  w orked. T h e  s to ck is t people 
guaran tee 24 hours delivery  w ith in  the plant.
M y first v isit to  the D epot w as  very  revealing  regard ing  supp ly , because I w as th in k in g  that 
W estern  en terprises w ork a s  regu lar as c lo ck w o rk . But th in g s w ere very  fa r from  such 
perfection.
M y first in terv iew  w ith the head  o f  the supp ly  departm en t a lm o st p roved  m y  first feelings. 
W hen he knew  that a R ussian  lady  w ould  com e to  v is it him  he p repared  a  speech . H e said  in  a 
patron ising  m anner:
We never started from nothing, unlike you, Russians. We have chosen our suppliers for years, 
based on the following qualities:
1. Can you supply?
2. How much can you supply?
3. How much time it takes?
4. What will be the quality o f  the delivery? (Interview with the head o f  the supply 
department, March 1994)
It sounded very good, but I wanted to know what is happening in reality. In reality I found 
that the English Railway plant faced big supply problems with the deliveries o f parts. At the 
beginning of my research, when I came to the shop floor, I found that for some reason the 
parts, which had to be delivered on the 21-st o f March, still had not been delivered by the end 
of the month. When I asked the workers from one of the brigades what they usually do in 
these circumstances, they answered me with a deep frankness that they used to steal parts
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from the other equipment and that they call it ‘cannibalisation’ (Interview with a sheet metal 
worker, plant Vagrem. 1995).
We rob Peter to pay Paul. We used to steal the parts from one vehicle and put it into another which 
is due to be repaired in time (Interview with a sheet metal worker, plant Vagrem. 1995).
We rob o ff the bogie or do cannibalisation (Interview with workers o f  the bogie gang, March
1994) .
- Do you usually have all you material and everything in time?
- No. You can’t get it fast.
- What do you do then?
- We do a patch job. Make it’s own. O r we do cannibalisation as in other sections (Interview  with 
a  sheet metal worker, plant Vagrem. 1995).
At the same time the worker explained how they should do it:
Sometimes we do cannibalisations, but the customers are also aware about this that w e’ve  taken 
some parts. So we have to do it secretly (Interview with a sheet metal worker, plant Vagrem.
1995) .
Thus, the individual and group interviews on different levels of the enterprise have shown 
that the enterprise was faced with problems of deliveries and as a consequence o f it with the 
shortage of a broad range of parts and material.
Someone might think that it was a difficult time for the enterprise for several reasons, and 
that these things had been happening in the plant for a short period of time - and in such 
circumstances it is understandable. I would argue that because the research was conducted 
from 1994 to 1996, each time I visited the enterprise the workers reported to me about the
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same problems with materials. Moreover, as the literature confirms, it is not the case only for 
this plant. Such things are quite common all around the railway industry. Hinkley (Hinkley, 
1993) confirmed it in his research. He investigated several maintenance depots. Here are his 
findings in one of the Depots:
The only factor identified as one which attacked morale was a factor outside the control o f  the 
depot. This was availability o f  spares which was a limiting factor in the efficiency o f  the fitters 
effecting repairs. The consequence of, as they saw it, the National Spares Centre failing to keep 
them supplied with sufficient spares was that they had to ‘rob’ o ther vehicles o f  parts in order to 
complete the repairs o f  the vehicles in for its maintenance. It becam e a standing joke  that every 
depot has its own ‘Christmas tree’ - a  vehicle standing idle which w as regularly stripped o f  parts in 
order to keep other vehicles on the rails.”
But life is always moving, and so is the situation with cannibalisation. For example, it had 
changed in Doncaster depot a little bit by 1995 - if before the workers could do it easily, the 
privatisation process with rolling stock has brought some complications into a workers’ life. 
As distinguished from the earlier time, the owners of the rolling stock were divided into 
several private companies. It means that the workers could not steal from one vehicle some 
parts and put them into another one - because the vehicles now belonged to different clients. 
The following extracts from interviews will prove my words:
- There is a shortage o f  m aterial. W e are working on the loco. T he new seats should be put in. 
They were in the store at Christm as time. But they are all finished, no seats there. Since Christmas 52
52 Hinkley, 1993, p. 94.
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- nobody has checked. They d idn’t know they are missing. Now it is March. This afternoon they 
wanted to put the new seats in, and somebody realised that they are out o f  stock. Now, they’ve got 
to w ait until the new seats arrive. It could take one day or one w eek. Nobody knows. So now 
w e’ve got to finish all the testing first, and then to put in new seats. They didn’t order them in 
time. I think it’s a chargehand fault.
- Y ou can’t take them from the o ther loco?(M.K. - interviewer).
- Before, when we had only one customer we’ve taken the items from one loco and put it into another. We had to 
do it secretly, but we used to do it. Now the system has changed. We have different customers, and they are 
aware o f this practice. They warned us: ‘Don’t take anything off. It’s stealing’ (Interview with a worker from the 
wooden gang, March 1995).
Although in some circumstances, when the parts are difficult to distinguish from each other, 
the workers still continue to do it, but on a smaller scale.
When there is a problem with supplies, the workers or the managers should manage the 
situation and arrange things in a such way that the work would be done. Sometimes they 
should manage it quickly, when there is no time to wait for the spare parts. How they tried to 
manage it is clear from the following diary of a worker from the wooden brigade:
The screw s that I want are out o f  stock which comes as no surprise. The next bateh is not due for 
another week so I have to make do w ith a smaller size. Next after setting  up my air drill I am ready 
to fix the packing (Extract from the diary o f  the working week o f  a  w orker in the wooden gang. 
March 1994).
The small spare parts are always out o f stock. Besides, in order to order some parts there are a 
lot of bureaucratic things: it is necessary to fill in some documents, to give it to the
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chargehand, then he should transfer this document to the store... It is understandable that it 
drives the workers crazy:
If  you require anything from the stores you have to get a ticket from the chargehand. You then take 
the ticket along to the stores where it is exchanged to get the material ( i f  in stock) (Extract from 
the diary o f  the w orking week o f a worker in the wooden gang. March 1994).
In one of the interviews, a worker told me that in his section there is a constant shortage of 
small screws, while there are a lot of long ones. When I asked him how he used to manage it, 
he explained to me:
They (managers) w ant the job  to be done. That is why I cut o ff the long screw s in order to get 
small one (Interview  with a worker, plant ‘V agrem ’, March 1994).
The moral on the shop floor was formed over a long period and the main idea was ‘everything 
for the sake of production’. Very often it is done at the expense of quality.
The shortage o f parts could partly be explained by the situation with the National Supply 
Centre (NSC). Before reorganisation in 1987, the NSC was part o f the plant store and 
supplied only the plant. After reorganisation, as was mentioned before, this part of the plant 
became the National Store, a privatised company under direct BR control. It was holding the 
spares for the entire BR network. And because it became the National store, it made things 
worse for the plant because it sends parts not only for the plant, but also for the whole BR 
network. As a result there is a lot of orders, a small number of staff, and constant delays with 
deliveries. According to the workers, the supply from the National Centre became very bad. 
Here is an opinion o f one of the workers:
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Still there is a problem to get the material on to the work. The National Supply Centre is past the gates. But 
sometimes it is more difficult to order from that centre, than from Scotland (Interview with a worker in the 
wooden gang, plant ‘Vagrem’, March 1994).
In the supply department the people understood that it caused a lot of problems to work with 
this clumsy NSC. That is why they decided to work with small firms:
It is better to work with small supply centres. First of all - they are small - and they have not much paper work. 
Because in the big centre we have always such problems. We call them and tell them that we have sent them the 
order, but they tell us, they have not got it. Then they will get it, but we’ve lost the right time. In the small firms 
there are no such problems. Besides, they, as a rule, want to keep their good reputation, they are living in a world 
of competition, so sometimes they themselves deliver us parts as quick as possible. So now we have a lot of 
suppliers from the small firms(Interview with a clerk in the supply department, March 1995).
So by March 1995 the Supply problems were still very sharp at the enterprise. Some people 
considered the cause of it as internal problems:
1 think that we have a not very effective system o f  ordering. A clum sy system, people sometimes 
forget to  order. There are, o f course, som e other problems (Interview with head o f  dismantling 
shop, March 1995).
It is interesting that people in different shops repeated the same things that people forget to 
order. Another worker said:
You can come to the person responsible fo r ordering things and explain to him  what you need. He 
seems to understand w hat you want and  says to you - okay. Then there is a  phone call, o r 
somebody calls him, and he forgets w hat he was asked to  do (Interview  with a sheet metal 
worker).
88
Or, as I cited about the seats, someone didn’t order them in time. One of the workers thinks 
that it was a ‘chargehand fault’.
One o f the explanations of what was happening inside the plant was the following:
Inside the plant there was constructed a very clumsy bureaucratic procedure from the one 
side. People tried to substitute it with the informal verbal system on the other side. People on 
the shop floor adopted the combination of these two systems spontaneously. Besides, the 
industrial process was very complicated, there were a lot of levels which duplicated each 
other, and the substitution was not good enough. So, there was a mess in the system of 
ordering things.
It was clear that the bureaucratic procedures of ordering things were preventing the Doncaster 
plant from meeting demands for repair. The plant definitely needed a new system. How it was 
changed in future we will explain in a later section.
Relations with the customers
When I entered the plant in 1994 I was interested in the mutual relations between the plant 
and the customers, because in Russia - it was a subject o f constant conflicts. I tried to find out 
what was the situation on the British plant. In the following paragraph I would like to  reveal 
my findings on this matter.
The relations with the customers first o f all were based on some kind o f planning. When the 
plant worked out the workload for the following year - there was constant communication 
with the customers on the matter of the amount of work they required from the plant. The 
maintenance repair was based on a mileage basis. After a certain amount of mileage, the
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vehicle should have passed to maintenance repair. So the customer, according to the law, was 
obliged to send the vehicle for repair. Thus, on this basis a pre-planned workload was 
constructed on the plant, which gave a rough idea about the character of future repairs. The 
customers and the plant worked out a mutual contract: the plant was obliged to do some 
repair for the customers, and the customers were obliged to pay for this job. This pre-planned 
repair was called norm al work or classified repair.
In 1994, when my research began, both the customers, the company which possessed the 
rolling stock, as well as the plant belonged to British Rail. So, if in theory there were some 
mutual calculations of how much customers owed to the plant - in practice it was not real 
money - it was a circulation of papers.
All the vehicles when they came to the plant from the customer for repair have to be 
inspected. A very skilled worker will investigate all the systems and parts of the vehicle in 
order to find out some faults, defects. If they have any defects which were not agreed about 
with the customer, the plant should communicate with the customer and ask them: would they 
like them to repair this defect. If yes, than this work was called abnormal - that is work 
beyond the planned normal work or unclassified repair. And o f course it should be 
mentioned that all the work should be done according to the health and safety specifications.
Thus, there was constant communication with the client on the matter of repair of the 
vehicles. Mainly - the clients were known ‘for ages’, relations with the clients were very good 
that is why the communications with them went very often through informal channels. The 
client could call and ask for certain kind of repair and the plant always said ‘yes’. Sometimes
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the p lan t could no t fu lfil th e ir p rom ises, the c lien t w as not p leased w ith  it, bu t because  they 
w ere p a rts  o f  one chain , there  w ere  no financial o r o ther sanctions fo r th is .
T he w orkers also  w orked  acco rd ing  to  the custom er specifications. A ll  the s ta ff  sh o u ld  know  
the specifica tion  -  d iffe ren t cu s to m er - d ifferen t specification .
Making the plan
O ne o f  th e  m ost exc iting  and  w o n d ro u s th ings a t the B ritish  p lan t w as  p lann ing . A ll processes 
w ith in  th e  p lant w ere  p lanned  an d  calcu lated . T he p lan t w as o p e ra tin g  w ith in  th e  financial 
year, w h ich  began on  the 1 st o f  A pril each  year. The financial year w a s  d iv ided  in to  a  set o f  
periods. The w ork load  w as ca lcu la ted  w ith in  each period . The p la n t opera tions shou ld  be 
p lanned  and  carried  o u t in  the fo llo w in g  m anner:
1. The workload depended on the customer’s requirement and usually was worked out at 
the end of the previous financial year.
2. Output should be delivered to customers in accordance with a predetermined time 
schedule, which was agreed as a ‘21 day repair’.
At the end of each set of periods and the financial year as a rule the pressure on the workers 
increased considerably. In these circumstances everybody on the shop floor tried to fulfil the 
plan. But very often quick could not be well. And, as happens in many enterprises throughout 
the world, the workers tried to cut comers in some operations, especially when they were 
under pressure to finish their work on time. So there were areas, where the requirements of 
the customers were not always satisfied. And if in theory the workers confirmed the slogan
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that ‘the customer is always right’, in practice not all the obligations to the customers were 
kept, and the repair was not always done according to rules.
It doesn’t mean that delivery of all the vehicles was delayed to the customers, but it would be 
unjust not to mention it at all. Because the plant could not always fulfil their promises for 
repair on time, on the shop floor a special jargon arose. For example, all the foremen and 
managers on Monday morning received a sheet, where the plan o f repair for the following 
week was written down. But below we will quote what people called that sheet:
We call it ‘w eekly liar’, because it never comes up to the expectations.
We never m et 21 days targets.
As a matter o f  fact, delays in delivery of the repaired trains were not very common, but 
occasionally happened within the enterprise. Because of the situation with the supplies 
described above, or some breakages in the equipment, or reasons caused by organisational 
processes:
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^  target 
| actual
-------------- average output over 5 periods = 89% of target
In case o f delay, usually an informal conversation took place between the customer liaison 
manager and the client on this matter. The plant would apologise for the delay, explaining 
what is the reason o f it. The main intentions o f the managers were of course to minimise the 
delays within the plant.
Sometimes the customer and the plant could agree to make concessions to the plant. I saw a 
clear example o f this when I came to the plant the second time. It was the end o f the financial 
year and the end o f the month. It was supposed that all the electric trains and all the works 
should be repaired by Thursday evening, on the 31-st of March. To the mutual 
disappointment, when there were only two days left, the engine blew in one of the vehicles, 
which had been sent by the Regional Railways for classified repair. The plant had no 
additional engine in stock. It could take several days to get an engine. But even if  they had it,
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they had no time to check the vehicle in the testing house, because the testing time was 72 
hours. For the plant it meant that they could not get payment for the repair. As a worker on 
the loco explained:
W e’ve done all the program, except for one. It has blown up in the test house. They could not 
repair it - not enough time. And they’ve got no time to  take the engine o ff  and to put in a new one, 
because there is no spare engine.
In these circumstances the following brilliant decision was made: to call the Regional 
Railways and ask them to do a favour: to accept the vehicle as repaired and make them pay 
for the fulfilled repair o f the vehicle. As regards the unrepaired engine - to put it into 
unclassified repair for the following year. One of the clerks in the control department wrote 
the following message to his colleague:
Mike! 189-051 has failed on engine. Production m anager asked me to book it o ff  AND RE-BOOK 
IT AS AN UNCLASSIFIED REPAIR CHANGE, SO THAT WE CAN G ET PAID FOR 
CLASSIFIED REPAIR. I have booked everything on and off. Inform Regional Railways o f  this 
matter when possible.
Thanks, Matthew. 31.03.94
As I clarified later in the control department - the client (Regional Railways) had no 
objections to this because they understood that it was not the fault of the depot. - the fault was 
in the defective engine which was delivered to the depot. So, in most o f the cases their 
relations with the customers were warm, informal and supportive.
This case has shown that if all the people involved worked to the rules, they would definitely 
lose their money because o f the failure to meet the target and to repair the loco on time. So,
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they communicated with the clients informally and tried to find formal mechanisms, which 
could satisfy both sides. Finally they succeed in their search.
In some circumstances, as in the case described above, the plant could find half-formal ways 
of handling problems with clients. But there were some occasions (which happened very 
rarely) where agreement could not be reached with the customers. The workers designed a 
more brutal way out of such a situation:
We do everything we can in order to send the vehicles back to the client. But sometimes there are 
certain circumstances, w hen we have some problems with repair, but the customer wants the 
vehicle back immediately. Then, we would say - okay. But when the customer comes to collect the 
vehicle, he couldn’t take it, because we could discharge all the batteries, all the electricity, and the 
client couldn’t take their vehicle - it w on’t move. We know how to organise this. It’s in our hands. 
And we will have additional tim e for repair (Interview with foremen, March 1994).
It is no surprise that the program was sometimes achieved by any means. Although there is a 
constant shortage of material in the plant, it doesn’t stop managers on the shop floor from 
putting pressure on workers to meet the target. That is why workers cut long screws in order 
to get small ones, patch jobs, cut comers and so on.
At the end of the period or the financial year everything is organised for meeting the target. A 
vehicle builder proved this situation:
Some striking plates are quite easy to do but some you can have problems with. Sometimes the 
screwholes are worn in the back plate, which means that the screws keep spinning. This problem is
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solved by chopping out a section o f  the pillar and having the holes welded up. Usually it can take 
all day to  get a welder, but it is done straight awav because the vehicle has to be out for Thursday.
Production was the main dictator on the shop floor. Everything was done for the sake of 
production. But sometimes it caused a lot of problems. One of them was the problem of 
quality: when people tried to fulfil the plan by any means, the quality of work suffers in the 
first place.
Foreigners
This issue concerns the problems of using plant equipment by the workers for their own use. 
We are trying to analyse the world of work, but in that world everything does not always 
appear on the surface: there are some things which are hidden from the eyes of the researcher, 
but nevertheless are an important part o f the world o f work. According to the literature, a lot 
of workers work in the hidden or ‘grey’ economy, and some of What we are interested in here 
is the ways of using free time at work. The main question was: was there a possibility within 
the plant o f  doing things for themselves? A lot of interviews with workers showed us that we 
could answer yes to this question. Almost all the interviewed workers confirmed that they 
were doing a lot of things for themselves:
We make all kind of things, everything for home.
When I talked to the sheet metal gang in 1994 just at the beginning of my investigation, I 
asked them whether they do things for themselves. And one of the workers was really 
confused, because in his hand was one o f the things, which had nothing to do with his job. 
When I assured him that to talk with me is not dangerous for him, he revealed to me the truth.
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This is a part for the gate, which I am doing for my neighbour at home. I have some spare time 
here an d  also a lot o f  material and equipment. So we used to do all sorts o f  things.
Another person told me that they do things for the other gangs as well:
For exam ple - 1 am a fitter, I’ll make something for electricians.
Then he showed me a machine for rolling steel. He made it himself on the plant in order to 
repair his old car:
Everybody here knows that I made it for myself. All the lads know that I do foreigners.
At the same time I found out that almost all things enumerated above were done individually 
and were based on the mutual contract between the workers and his line manager - either 
foremen or supervisor:
All the managers know that we are doing foreigners. Supervisors know about it, but they keep a 
blind e y e  on it. Because if  they need something, they’ll com e and ask me to  do it. And I’ll do it for 
him free  - no money. It’s favour to  favour.
But of course in some cases workers did their ‘foreigners’ secretly, without negotiation with 
their boss on this matter. They told me:
As long as you are not caught - you are out o f  troubles. That is part o f  your wages. I f  you get 
caught - you get the sack (Extract from group interview w ith a sheet metal gang. March, 1995).
The analysis of literature shows us that such things are common in many countries. And this 
circumstance raises several questions. One of them is - if this is quite a common situation 
within different countries, then could it be an intrinsic part of the production process anyway?
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If we will answer yes to this question, it means that the hidden agenda is an inseparable part 
of any industrial process.
The other question is how many people are usually involved in this kind of activity and what 
factors influence it.
We can define such things as use o f enterprise equipment or resources for personal aims 
This kind of thing is usually not registered in the documents of the enterprise. What is really 
interesting from our point of view is the ways of doing such things and the reason for doing it. 
Why is it happening? There are .several explanations of such things given within the 
enterprise:
1. One of the reasons could be the attempt to compensate for work dissatisfaction and to 
take ‘everything that is not controlled’.
2. The second explanation could be an attempt to improve with this the financial 
situation in the family. The person usually thinks in the following way: ‘Why should I 
pay for such things when I buy it, if I could use free material and equipment and pay 
nothing for it’.
3. The third reason is the possibility of resolving your own problems (with the car, or 
with repair o f house etc.) at the expense o f the company and to save money.
4. One o f the things which happens sometimes could be a desire to make troubles for the
bosses.
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Managerial control and Informal relations
Dress as a symbol o f social distance
Within the plant there was a noticeable feature of distinction between the line managers and 
the workers. The supervisors (line managers) wore a blue coat with an orange line on it. At 
the same time all the workers wore an orange overall. So, it was a clear distinction by clothes. 
This distinction has an historical context. In the Railway enterprises until the 1930s the 
foreman would wear a bowler hat and a jacket of a particular colour. The interesting thing is 
that in Britain those distinctions have declined. It is impossible to see this distinction in a 
country such as Australia. Even within the other enterprise in the Midlands, for example, 
someone would not see this distinction as strong as at this depot. It is possible to see other 
distinctions, but not the dress distinction. What is meaningful is that within the plant this 
distinction is still left. And nowadays at first sight it is really surprising.
Why is such a distinction still left in the plant? One of the explanations of such distinction 
would be the traditional character of the Railways’ organisation. For many years nothing has 
changed. But I suppose that there was one more explanation of it - with the help o f such a 
distinction to overcome the level of informality existing on the shop floor. It is not a secret 
that throughout industry
Almost without exception, foremen were promoted from the shop floor normally from the ranks o f  
group leader with the department. Consequently, the foreman was ‘one o f  the boys’ on Monday
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and boss o f  the department on Tuesday. He would normally retain his old workmates and ‘ru le’ 
informally.53
It was not an obstacle to the company. In the situation when the plant was a part of a 
community, where everybody knows everybody, the informal atmosphere was created and 
everybody from the top to the bottom felt a part o f this community.
The main obstacle for the company was the whole clumsy hierarchical system and also the 
system of informal promotions which didn’t allow it to put the best people on those position, 
so these places mainly were taken by the people with a ‘one track mind’, according to the 
workers' opinion. The foremen, who obtain this position from the lower level wanted to 
became more important, and they thought that distinctive clothing could help him a bit with 
it. But still, it was very difficult to do, because the workers didn’t take it seriously. For 
example, in our plant, the workers called foremen ‘dinosaurs’, because they didn’t like 
changes.
Thus, the system of control was based on a formal subordination of the lower position to the 
upper position. And even dress was a means o f expressing that division. But it was very 
formal and people on the shop floor tried to minimise it. In reality - they didn’t take it 
seriously. And what was especially valued was co-operative work. 13
13 Thompson and Bannon, 1985, p. 33
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Management Style
An important theoretical debate of recent years concerns managerial strategy and its 
correspondence with Taylorism and other less authoritarian alternatives. All these debates are 
extremely important for understanding the situation within the Doncaster plant.
From the one side, historically, it was a Taylorist enterprise. There were a number of Taylorist 
control arrangements on the shop floor. The policy of Taylorism did not exist on the shop 
floor in its pure form, but nevertheless there were some features, which we can definitely 
consider as Taylorist principles. According to H. Braverman, the main principle of the 
Taylorist system was 'the separation o f  conception from execution ’. An examination of work 
processes within the plant showed us the high level of fragmentation and differentiation of 
tasks. There was clear division between those who were planning the production process and 
those who just fulfilled the number o f tasks prescribed by managers. There was clear division 
between all kinds of jobs. Moreover, the workers could do only their job tasks and they can 
not advise the managers of the best way o f doing the job. There were managers, who were 
planning, and the workers, who were fulfilling the tasks. From the interviews with the 
workers it was clear as well that they have no clear understanding o f the whole workload for 
the week or month:
- Do you know how m any vehicles you should do this month?
- No - it is a managerial task to know. They ju s t give us the tasks every  day. We do what they tell 
us to do (Extract from interview with wooden gang. March, 1994).
From the other side, the General Manager was a person who tried to overcome restrictive 
Taylorist principles and insert his new innovative thinking into the work process. This
101
manager is one of those who began to emerge following the arguments about harmonisation 
between shopfloor and the management. Quite extensive debates which are taking place 
among managerial circles about harmonisation and management by consensus coming from 
the ‘human resource management’ basis directly concern the Doncaster plant, and, this was a 
manager, who was trying to operate within that new tradition. For him, it was very difficult to 
combine such contradictory things as Taylorist principles and the human resource 
management approach. His innovative approach clashed also with the whole traditional 
system of British Rail and lack of understanding on the lower layers. This was very unusual 
for such industries as the railways. It could be found in the chemical or electronics industries, 
but not in the railway industry, because traditionally this industry produced very distant 
managers, who stressed their distinction from the workers.
One of the things which was distinctive about that sort of management is an attempt to 
eliminate even small signs of social distance. It is part of that process that has been going on 
in western management circles during the last ten years, where they try to attain the best effort 
out of workers by a consensual manager rather than a conflictual manager. And he was a very 
remarkable in that sense.54
The first time, when I came to the enterprise with some other visitors, the General Manager 
organised a tour around the factory for us. He came with us, and at that moment I was really
By contrast with western reality, such types of managers are disappearing from Russian enterprises. The 
paradox is in Russia that many managers would justify the features o f social distance by saying that it is an 
imitation of the West. It is an illusion.
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surprised to what extent his relationships with other managers were informal. He was talking 
not only with managers, but also with a lot o f  workers. He could stop for a moment and have 
a chat with a lad on the shop floor. And he didn’t seem to be a disliked person. Later I found 
out that the people gave him a nickname and it was one confirmation of the sympathy people 
felt to him. They called him a ‘cool hand’, because, according to the workers’ opinion ‘he 
never gets flustered, never raises his voice’. The general opinion of the workers was: We get 
on well with Phil
He personally preferred to work as part o f the team. He constructed the whole atmosphere on 
the plant for teamworking. The General Manager supported this approach when industrial 
meetings took place. The whole atmosphere of such meetings was very supportive and all 
points o f  view were taken into consideration. He was a supporter and follower of the ‘no 
blame culture’. It meant that if there were some weak managers on the plant, or people on the 
other positions, who might make mistakes, his desire was not to punish the guilty, but to train 
him in order to prevent the same mistakes in the future:
There are various types o f  managers in BR. B ut I do believe that investment in people was quite 
good. The railways did apply an extensive training. But they still got difficult people or who were 
pottering around their holes, and there w ere managers who were ju s t strutting around. What 
personally did I do? I also did behaviour modification - or support for weak m anagers rather than 
sort o f  throwing them out. And I think I learned a lot from the managers that I w orked with on the 
rail. T hat was my idea about managing your boss, because you have to understand how they 
manage. And you could say, ‘Oh, I would never do things like him ’. Or som etimes you realise, oh - 
this th ing works. 1 rem em ber that trick. And tha t sort o f approach gave me some basic information 
and I understood very clearly how I would like to  manage.
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Thus that was the managerial strategy of the first person on the plant in the period before 
privatisation.
Control of labour
All the employees at the plant should clock in at the beginning of the shift and clock off at the 
end. They were allowed to be 2 minutes late at the beginning of the shift. This time was paid.
The workers were organised in a number of gangs, usually from 10 to 20 men. One gang 
performed the work of one trade, for example - the gang of fitters, the gang of electricians and 
so on.
The control of the workers was fulfilled by the chargehand - the person who was responsible 
for a gang. His responsibility included the allocation of work within the gang, time keeping, 
control of quality, control of gang performance and so on. Below is a chargehand’s job 
description:
Departmental job description:
Chargehand:
1. Shift book.
2. Booking in (including performance).
2. Time book.
4. Issue book.
5. Material acquisition.
ô.Abnormal work.
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7. Interface.
8. Material red receipt.
9. Job progress.
10. Fire sheet.
11. Technical instruction. (ABCCUS).
13. Meetings.
14. Quality assured system.
The chargehand was subordinated to the foreman, who was responsible for the bay - i.e. 5 - 6 
gangs. He allocated the work for the gang. And the foreman was subordinated to the shift 
production engineer, who together with the production manager worked out the program for 
the following day.
There was a system o f a block card for each vehicle, where what work should be done was 
enumerated. These cards were transferred to the shop floor from the technical resource 
engineer’s office:
There is a system o f  block cards. The fitters will read the block cards - w hat to do with the vehicle. 
For example, loco C lass 37 has 6 block cards. Each jo b  has a  number.
The Workers usually had to read the block card and repair according to the number of tasks 
enumerated in it. In almost all gangs the workers didn’t sign for their job. It was a chargehand
job:
There are instructions. We have to read them. But we don’t sign. The chargehand does all the
paperwork.
104
7. Interface.
8. Material red receipt.
9. Job progress.
10. Fire sheet.
11. Technical instruction. (ABCCUS).
13. Meetings.
14. Quality assured system.
The chargehand was subordinated to the foreman, who was responsible for the bay - i.e. 5 - 6  
gangs. He allocated the work for the gang. And the foreman was subordinated to the shift 
production engineer, who together with the production manager worked out the program for 
the following day.
There was a system of a block card for each vehicle, where what work should be done was 
enumerated. These cards were transferred to the shop floor from the technical resource 
engineer’s office:
There is a system o f  block cards. The fitters will read the block cards - w hat to  do with the vehicle. 
For exam ple, loco Class 37 has 6 block cards. Each jo b  has a number.
The workers usually had to read the block card and repair according to the number of tasks 
enumerated in it. In almost all gangs the workers didn’t sign for their job. It was a chargehand 
job:
There are instructions. We have to read them. But we don’t sign. The chargehand does all the
paperwork.
105
So usually the chargehand made all the records of who does what, where and when. He 
allocated the tasks within the gang and he also had to know the approximate time for doing a 
particular kind o f job.
Supervision was one of the key factors at the point of production. Here is the view one of the 
supervisors:
P e o p le  w ill  w o rk  i f  th e y  a r e  d r iv e n .  I f  th e  s u p e r v i s o r  w e n t  o u t  - th e y  w ill  w o rk  o u t f o r  s o  lo n g ,  th e n  s to p .  T h e y  
w o rk  h e re  4 ,5  h o u r s  a  d a y  ( I n te r v ie w  w ith  a  s u p e rv is o r .  M a r c h  1 995 ).
Control on the shop floor was constructed on the fear factor. The workers were afraid of 
trouble with the person in the higher position. Some of the workers confirmed this:
Here it is the fear factor. Nobody will start w ork before the foreman comes (Interview with 
workers. M arch 1995).
At the same time, it was quite clear that at the beginning of the shift and at the end of the shift 
the workers felt themselves quite relaxed. Between 13:00 and 15:00, when there is an end of 
one shift and the beginning of the other in the workshop there were a lot o f workers who were 
gathering together chatting, drinking coffee, joking. And nobody bothered them. So they had 
some spare time. It was quite often. And supervisors did not blame them for this. Even when 
there was the end of the financial year and some visitors from Russia visited the plant, there 
were a lot of workers within the plant who didn’t work. Such a situation, obviously, was very 
surprising for the workers from the Russian plant, who mentioned:
It is almost unbelievable that workers here are at the end o f  the month and at the end o f  the 
financial year. In Russia in similar circumstances we could not leave the work place. And here 
they are drinking coffee and chatting.
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The workers on the plant told me:
Officially you’ve got to start at 6:00. But you drink coffee, and begin to work a t 6:45.
There are two explanations for such a situation:
1 The middle managers on the shop floor themselves are interested in such a situation, 
because they also could benefit from this situation - they could have some spare time.
2. If there are any troubles with a worker - they would have additional knowledge, which 
they can use against the workers, in case of any troubles or disputes, and this means 
that the people in charge have an additional informal mechanism for controlling the 
workers.
Conflict and change before privatisation
As we have seen, the plant was dominated by the traditions and the rules and regulations of 
the railways which had been built up over a long period o f time. The plant could only operate 
in this inflexible framework by developing a system of informal relations which was a kind of 
compromise between the interests of senior managers, middle managers, workers and 
customers. But the result of the combination of this system of formal and informal relations 
was high levels of inefficiency, with considerable losses o f working time, delays in delivery 
and often poor quality. With the coming privatisation of the railway system and increasing 
competition between different plants and depots senior management was increasingly 
concerned to improve quality and reduce costs. However, as we will see, before privatisation 
these efforts were not very successful. It was only following privatisation that really radical
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changes, which destroyed the whole system of formal and informal relations, were introduced 
from outside.
Total Quality Management
Management’s view o f  TQM
Total quality management was implemented within BR in the middle of the 80s and, as 
Hinkley (1993) mentioned in his thesis, ‘it was one of the most difficult industrial cultures to 
change’.55 The main difficulty was that ‘historically the stereotypically predominant 
management style in Britain was based on power and coercion rather then empowerment and 
respect’.56
The implementation of the new policy in the Doncaster Depot began from the top. The key 
things of the implementation there were that the General Manager himself:
1. Had a great commitment to the new policy
2. Believed in the workforce.
3. Tried to create empowerment for the realisation of the potential of all staff.
4. Had a strong recognition of the ‘all one team’ concept.
Here is his view of TQM:
”  Hinkley, 1993.
* Hinkley, 1993, p. 23.
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TQM was implemented on British Rail in 1984, 1985, 1986. There was a time, when everybody 
was speaking about quality product, total quality management. To me it was excellent. I like it. 
Everybody had to  understand what they did at work. It w as a job  w hich they were doing for their 
customers. And the customer could also be som ebody at work, it could be whoever. And this 
concept is very powerful. What I liked in the whole o f  this approach that it was basic trust in 
human nature and human issues that people essentially wanted to  please and to succeed. Terms, 
which could be summed up as jo b  satisfaction. And that certainly corresponded to the way I 
thought people wanted a manager to  be. That’s a philosophy.
There were a num ber o f  things that happened in the h isto ry  o f Doncaster, first o f  all, when I did 
my training in Doncaster, there was a whole system o f  inspection: there w ere initial examiners and 
finished work inspectors. Part o f  the TQM idea was the idea that people are responsible for their 
own work. They d o n ’t need inspectors to say whether w ork  is bad or done in a different way. The 
person who is doing this work is responsible for it. So w hen BRML was formed in 1984-85 from 
the old workshops, there was a sort o f  restructuring that w ent on. Those levels o f  staff like initial 
examiners, finish w ork inspectors were taken out. They told their own staff: you are responsible 
for you own work. And their immediate supervisors w ere responsible for the formal inspection that 
had to take place.
And if  you think about the way Doncaster would work an y  way - certainly all the vehicles went out 
through the test house, which is where they would check the functionality o f  everything else. So 
the whole process o f  the passage o f  the locomotives through the w orks or vehicles through the 
works had co-operated with the finish work inspection. So they had been through the major 
changes before I cam e. I really felt that the problems w ith  the quality w ere about detail.... Sort o f
cohesion to a standard.
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There was a history o f  work traditionally, because they could not send locomotives out that then 
would come o ff  the rails. Right. They also knew that if  the things were m ajorly wrong, the 
locomotives came back. So they had to do it sort o f  right eventually, so they might as well to do it 
right for the first time.
So I believe, the quality problems there w ere at Doncaster, were items o f  detail. The sting in the 
tail o f  that sort o f  analysis is that detail affects perception. And I certainly have been long enough 
on the railway to see the results o f  the outputs o f  all the workshops, and private industry. And to 
understand only too well, what it meant, when the vehicle came o ff heavy repair or new  build and 
it w as not fit for service and you have to send your own man-on it, o r you have to send it back to 
the works, so I d idn ’t need convincing about quality, and I always had very strong feelings about 
the significance o f  quality. So the major things o f  quality w ere statutory requirem ents o f  safety and 
the Railways rules o f  Safety. And that dem ands the level o f  quality.
And there is a w hole question o f  attention to detail w hether the things were finished properly or 
they were tripped on the painting, which d idn’t actually affect the loco, it may be looked untidy. 
And people would look and say, ‘Bloody hell, shabby jo b  from Doncaster again.’ That perception 
will take it to somewhere else. And so I got to  Doncaster. I knew D oncaster fairly w ell. I worked 
with its products for years and I believe that the m ajor quality problem s at D oncaster were 
persistence and attention to detail.
But at the same time we should stress that the General Manager was presenting a philosophy 
which challenged the traditional thought on the shop floor. And in this sense there is a 
question, how was this new policy implemented on the shop floor? And here the question 
about the middle managers comes up, because they had to play a key role in the development 
of this new philosophy.
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T he G eneral M anager a lso  rea lise d  th a t the  m idd le  m an ag e r is the  key  p e rso n  on  the  shop  
floor. H ere is h is  view :
What happened? Because o f  my b e lie f in delegation I had to delegate some responsibilities to  the 
production manager. I had to  see that he made his shift managers responsible, I had to  see that they 
in turn made their supervisors responsible. Why it sounds that there are lots o f  layers - we treat 
them all. W hen I got to Doncaster, I immediately understood that I had to  get through to 
supervisors, because they were decisive on the shop floor. There were so many people on the shop 
floor that I couldn 't possibly speak with each individual. At Shybrooke they were only 30 people. 
And here there were 6 to 7 hundred people. So the people I had to  hit the m essage with in the 
management team were the supervisors. And it is second hand, that’s why w orks management was 
so difficult. Because what you’ve got to do - to kick your message to  supervisor level and then 
make sure somehow that that m essage gets to the shop floor. And some supervisors manage it quite 
happily, and some don’t.
TQM and team-working on the shop floor
Some observations allow us to suggest that the rigidity and very restricted mind prevented 
some middle managers from direct support of this new ideology. The main thing they 
opposed was the policy o f team working. The team working concept was regarded as one of 
the best solutions for resolving the problems the industry faced at the point o f  production. 
Partly the new concept was seen as a means of overcoming existing contradictions between 
the administration and the workers, the eternal opposition of ‘them’ and ‘us’. But at the shop 
floor level there was little evidence that the team working system was adopted on a deep 
level. Mainly it was only slogans, which had nothing to do with reality. And if even the
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The General Manager also realised that the middle manager is the key person on the shop 
floor. Here is his view:
W hat happened? Because o f  my belief in delegation I had to delegate some responsibilities to  the 
production manager. I had to  see that he made his shift m anagers responsible, I had to see that th ey  
in turn made their supervisors responsible. Why it sounds that there are lots o f  layers - we trea t 
them all. When I got to Doncaster, I immediately understood that I had to get through to 
supervisors, because they were decisive on the shop floor. There were so many people on the shop  
floor that I couldn’t possibly speak with each individual. At Shybrooke they were only 30 people. 
And here there were 6 to 7 hundred people. So the people I had to hit the message with in the 
management team were the supervisors. And it is second hand, that’s why works management w as 
so difficult. Because what you’ve got to do - to kick your message to supervisor level and then  
make sure somehow that that message gets to the shop floor. And some supervisors manage it quite 
happily, and some don’t.
TQM and team-working on the shop floor
Some observations allow us to suggest that the rigidity and very restricted mind prevented 
some middle managers from direct support of this new ideology. The main thing they 
opposed was the policy of team working. The team working concept was regarded as one o f 
the best solutions for resolving the problems the industry faced at the point of production. 
Partly the new concept was seen as a means of overcoming existing contradictions between 
the administration and the workers, the eternal opposition of ‘them’ and ‘us’. But at the shop 
floor level there was little evidence that the team working system was adopted on a deep 
level. Mainly it was only slogans, which had nothing to do with reality. And if even the
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middle managers were saying words like these: ‘We are all one family. We are trying to 
support each other’. The workers refer to this in the following way:
W e’ve heard nothing more about flexibility and team working.
Team working? I t’s a dream that they have.
Team? Not the case. Very weak trade union They are very concerned w ith safety now. Managers 
and the trade union - it is often on the side o f  the managers and we should remind them sometimes 
(the trade union leaders) whom they should defend.
Managers think only about them selves. We aren’t afraid to  express our opinion. But they 
(managers) don’t hear it. They have a belief that they deserve better, lighter conditions for their 
whole life.
We don’t trust managers. M ay be they are not as corrupt as Russian managers, but we still don’t 
trust them (E xtracts from interviews w ith w orkers, March 1994).
Mainly the managers were trying to present things as they wanted them to be, but not like 
they were. These concepts were mainly announced, but it was not seen by the workers as well 
as by the managers as intrinsic to the whole set of production processes. Moreover, the new 
concept of team working was implemented in the pre-privatisation situation, when everybody 
was very concerned about future developments. The social tension existing on the enterprise 
caused by the coming privatisation had divided the work force into two camps, and in these 
circumstances the team-working concept had no real meaning.
There were also several obstacles within the organisation o f production because the whole 
system of organisation of production was very clumsy, it could not reach the desired level of 
flexibility. The creation of such conditions within a production process could be only if  the
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team leaders also were very flexible and can restructure their own mind very quickly. But at 
that time the majority of the line managers and production supervisors of different grades 
were very narrow minded, without any initiative. The majority of the middle managers 
achieved their position because of:
technical competence;
firefighting qualities;
friendly relations with their own boss or as a reward for a long service.
That is why mainly they saw the implementation of the new policy as a threat of loss of power 
that a more open style of management brings. That is why the changing of the whole 
organisational structure was needed in order to implement the new concept.
TQM and Quality
Another issue that comes up from the implementation of TQM was the interface between the 
shop floor and the customers. The main question was: to what extent did the TQM policy 
have the desired impact on the delivery and quality of service?
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1993/94 customer complaints received from businesses 
NUMBER OF COMPLAINTS
6 \------------- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
A M J J A S O N D J  F M
■  TOTAL
MONTHS
1992-1993 AVERAGE
Root cause analysis:
(1) Class 158 bogies paint problems
(2) Class 158 bogies unsatisfactory overhaul
(3) Class 37 LOCO Noise Modification
(4) Class 47 LOCO AVR power fault
(5) 58 LOCO
A - failed inlet T piece guide 
B - exhaust valve bent 
C - Suspect piston crown damage
As was mentioned above, even after implementation of the TQM policy there were some
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delays in the repair of vehicles, caused by several reasons, including the shortage of material, 
and as a consequence of the shortages of spare parts - a low level of quality of repair. But also 
the quality o f repair depended not only on external factors, as a lack o f spare parts, but also on 
the people’s mind, their awareness of the processes of quality. And here we could see that not 
every person on the shop floor was conscious about quality things. The level of culture on the 
shop floor needed to be changed. But it could not happen overnight. People had to have some 
time for changing their mind in terms of safety and to broaden their scope. Not everybody 
could do it. Some of them still tried to put aside the basic things:
If a situation arises on the job that we don’t agree with then we will argue against it with the 
chargehand. Sometimes the trouble is caused by men wanting to cut comers in order to complete 
the job quicker, putting aside Health and Safety Regulations. These people are classed as bad 
tradesmen who often cannot be trusted and whose work has to be double-checked all the time. If 
the trouble is down to bad workmanship then the person responsible is disciplined by the foreman. 
So, there were people on the shop floor, who wanted to cut comers, do short cuts, or speed up 
their work at the expense of quality. Within the plant a number o f control practices were used, 
which can operate in a partly autonomous manner. These practices were built into the 
working process, it was a necessary part of the technological procedure: there was a day-to- 
day control o f ‘who does what, where and when’. And there was a procedure to discipline 
someone who ‘steps out of line’.
At the beginning of each shift the foremen will tell the chargehand the amount o f work to do. 
The chargehand will allocate the job among the gang. The foreman was responsible for 
getting the work done on time. Also the foreman and chargehand controlled the work - the 
workload o f the workers during the day, the quality and so on. Besides, there was a whole
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procedure of organising paperwork, which helped the chargehand to control the work of his 
gang:
When a door is regulated with the striking plate I then sign a list to say it is fitted and working 
correctly. At the end o f  the shift, the list is returned to  the chargehand. W hen the job  is completed 
the list is photo-copied and the chargehand and foreman keep a copy. If  there is a problem with a 
door due to bad workmanship, the list is checked and the offender is disciplined. 1 alw ays double­
check my doors making sure that everything is done properly in accordance with the regulations 
(Extract from the diary o f  the w orking week. 1994).
So within the plant a system of technological control was organised. The offenders could be 
fined and disciplined:
W ednesday 30-th March, 1994. W ooden brigade.
My jo b  today is to fix the bodyside mouldings while the other three men fit the draught proofing 
and casings around the doors. Throughout the night five men are taken into the office over bad 
workmanship. The reasons were really  down to mistakes made during the jo b  so they w ere only 
minor offences, therefore the men w ere let off.
Disciplinary procedure for bad workmanship or other offences had several stages:
1. Some form of counselling
2. Verbal warning.
3. Verbal notification.
4. Written notification. Disciplinary procedure. (Suspension).
5. Sack.
1 1 6
The regulations according to which all the work should correspond had been introduced 
several years ago, but it was only recently that people had begun to work according to these 
regulations. As one o f the workers pointed out:
We have an official list o f  instructions. Now we have to  read it. A few  years ago - we never read 
one o f  the job  instructions. Now - in order to get a quality assurance - you should realise that 
you’ve got to do it (Interview  with worker, March 1994).
The most important thing for the plant was that in 1989 the Doncaster plant adopted British 
Rail standard 5750 (British Standard Quality System). In order to meet all the requirements of 
it all the staff should be quality conscious. As the workers replied about it:
Everybody became fanatical about safety. W e’ve been on safety courses. W e’ve got very many 
certificates, including environm ental standards.
All these safety factors w ill be prioritised.
Adopting this quality standard meant that the senior managers became responsible for quality 
policy within the plant. There should be a whole system of quality and management 
representatives had to check quality. The new system o f document control was brought in. 
Besides there should be a process o f control of basic requirements that the job should be done 
correctly. Inspection and testing o f the process and product. Moreover, the management 
representatives had to test and keep records of any tests they performed. According to these 
systems, within the plant a whole systems o f corrective action should be organised as an 
important element of British Standard. It was constructed in a such way that if anything goes 
wrong - it was possible to  investigate and take action to prevent it from happening again.
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But o f course the commitment to quality could not happen suddenly after the adoption of this 
new system. And the adoption of this system generated some problems on the shop floor. One 
of them was signing for your own work. After adopting the new system people were not 
forced to sign for their own work, but it was recommendable. What was happening in reality 
is clear from the words of the General Manager:
There were a num ber o f  things that arose. What I’ve got there, the practice o f people  signing for 
their own work w as not universally accepted through the works. You see my idea on  those things 
was ‘Okay, that’s a  state o f  mind.’ And as far as possible there was ‘no blame cu ltu re ’. And no 
blame culture is a very very difficult thing to do, you know. Why it is so contradictory, because 
what you are trying to do - is that you are responsible - it is a very subtle set o f  thoughts. I am 
blaming you that you are responsible. One contradicts the other. What you are try in g  to do is to 
preach responsibility: yeah, that’s my word. There is my name against it. So that is m y guarantee 
that it’s good. O f course none o f  us are one hundred percenters, so there is a problem , there is an 
element o f  fear, and I think that’s what motivated people to say ‘We don’t want to d o  it’. What are 
you going to do if  w e get it w rong?’ People want to know, if...
The problem of signing for their own job was not resolved simultaneously. Moreover, from 
time to time some disputes on this matter arose:
‘Who does what?' dispute on the second bay. March 1995.
When BREL was transformed into BRML in 1987 - from the first day all the examiners were 
removed from the structure. The initial repair of a vehicle is very difficult and responsible 
work, when the aged loco comes on the works it has to be initially checked to find out if the 
normal or abnormal repair should be done. This involves an extensive inspection, which 
could last for 2-3 days. There are 15 pages of explanations about the correct things inside the
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loco. At the end the examiner should write a report, which could cost the client company 
thousands of pounds.
The policy of the company after elimination of the examiners was that it is the duty of Cat4 
staff. But these duties were not clearly written or agreed. Cat4 electricians had wanted some 
form o f recognition ever since 1987 because they haven’t got any extra pay for this official 
duties.
It has always been a little bit o f  a grey area (Interview with a production manager. March 1995). 
T he  p ro d u c tio n  in itia tive  m a d e  s ta f f  (fitte rs, electricians-, and  m anagers) ev en  m ore  flex ib le , 
d em an d in g  m ore aw aren ess  ab o u t quality  and  delivery .
There was a ‘good will basis’ working in relation to the customers. Five or six o f the 
electricians have done this work since 1987. They checked all the vehicle inside, underneath - 
all electrical repairs. From the managerial point of view there are certain duties which are Cat 
4 work - final setting, testing and signing off, and this was not negotiable -  ‘It is what we pay 
you for’ -  but the pre-examination was a grey area.
Recently the rolling stock became part o f different private companies. The different owners 
have different specifications. The process o f examining became much more complicated than 
it was before, besides they should do a technical report. The process of writing it sometimes 
takes two or three days, there are a lot of details, too much time, and a very high level of 
responsibility. The electricians made a protest against such a situation. It was an informal 
protest, which caused a lot o f  friction on the shop floor. But, according to one of the workers 
on the shop floor:
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They continued to work at the end o f  the day in order to p lease the master.
As a result of these frictions a serious Quality Improvement Team Meeting was held, where 6 
representatives of managers and 6 electricians took part. As a result of the negotiations a 
consensus was reached and people voted for it. The main points of this agreement were:
1. The responsibility of examining among the electricians will continue to be fulfilled by 
Cat4 workers.
2. More training should be provided for all of them.
3. Documents for examination shoulcTbe easier to read.
4. The small number of the examiners should be increased.
In accordance with these agreements, 6 weeks before 10-15 people were upgraded or 
reclassified. 10 extra chargehands were appointed to do examining. The company said that it 
was the responsibility of the Category 4, because they’ve done it for the last 5 - 6  years. It 
should be very qualified men who should do a very responsible job.
But the success of the electricians had a ‘copy-cat’ effect. Workers from the other trades 
wanted the same things as the electricians. Throughout the factory there was a disturbance on 
this matter.
These things were misinterpreted on the shop floor. There it was regarded as a ‘management 
manoeuvre’. The workers thought that ‘once again the supervisors are rewarded and we didn’t 
get any particular pay for it’.
Many people on the shop floor thought that they keep taking on work which is not rewarded
at all.
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O nce on  th e  a fte rn o o n  shift tw o  fitters w ere  asked  to  ch eck  th e  doo r on  one o f  th e  trains. The 
tw o  fitte rs  w ou ld  do  th e  doo r check , bu t they  w ou ldn ’t reco rd  it - th ey  w ere ad v ised  to  do  it 
by  the  trad e  union. T he  chargehand  (G rade 4 ) had to  s ign  fo r it.
We would expect to do some measurement fitted to the client, but they refused. Four individuals 
were personally involved in this dispute.
M anagers  d id n ’t w an t to w ash  th e ir  d irty  linen  in public , w h ich  is w hy  they  w ere  try ing  to  do 
ev e ry th in g  p oss ib le  to  p reven t the conflic t from  being tran sfe rred  to  th e  nex t level.
H ow  th e  th in g s  dev e lo p ed  is c lea r from  the n ex t passage:
21.3.95
Production manager
Industrial Relations problem 2 Bay
At approximately 19.35 hours this evening, I was contacted at home Shift Production Manager, 
who informed me that Fitter N was refusing to complete the recording of documentation - 
complete c6 Door Check.
I suggested to the Shift Production Manager that he spoke with the fitter and reiterated to him that 
Management considered it was a reasonable instruction and the work was considered by 
management to be a Cat 4 duty.
Fitter informed Shift Production Manager that he had sought advice from his Union Representative 
who had stated the Depot Council considered the duty of filling in any documentation was a 
chargehand’s responsibility and should only be done by a Cat. 4 on voluntary basis. He again 
stated he was refusing to fill in documentation.
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An approximately 20:00 hours, I attended work and reviewed the situation with Shift Production 
Manager.
I asked another manager to speak  with fitters N and M and advise them to complete 
documentation. If they were to refuse, they would be considered to be refusing a reasonable work 
instruction and would be invited to  explain their position to Production manager.
The tw o fitters N_and M again refused the work instruction from their Supervisor and were sent to 
m yself and Shift Production M anager.
I strongly advised them both to c a rry  out the work instruction or they would find themselves in 
serious trouble. I explained that I considered the work instruction was a reasonable request and 
that they should carry out the w ork even if  it was recorded they were conducting it under protest 
subject to the Depot Council m eeting Management the following morning.
K and L, the leaders o f  the trade union, arrived at the Depot and w ere invited to attend the 
meeting. Discussion continued in exactly the sam e vein as the informal meeting between 
M anagem ent and the Deputy C ouncil the previous Friday.
After discussion, I saw no alternative but to reiterate M anagement’s position. I asked the fitters N 
and M to reconsider and to carry o u t the work instruction (even under protest) which I considered 
to be. a reasonable request. Failure to  comply w ould be viewed seriously and would result in both 
individuals being dealt with under D isciplinary Procedure.
I stated this would be a very regrettable course o f  action from M anagem ent but I would have no 
alternative considering the overall situation and course o f events.
Again, both staff refused the work instruction and I informed them they w ould be dealt with trough 
D isciplinary Procedure.
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I invited the trade union leaders K and L to attend a meeting with Depot M anager at 9:00 
W ednesday morning.
At approximately 21.40 hours I was contacted at home by one o f  the supervisors, who informed 
me that two others fitters O and P had returned a Brake Test Sheet refusing to complete the 
documentation and recording o f  measurement taken etc.
I asked m anager to inform fitters that failure to complete the documentation was to refuse a 
reasonable work instruction and statutory requirement. Again both s ta ff refused and they were told 
they would be dealt w ith through the Disciplinary Procedure.
I instructed 2 Bay Supervisors at approximately 21.50 that the offer o f  overtime working was 
withdrawn from the DM U/coaching department until the situation w as resolved.
Production manager.
This dispute shows that to be a manager at this particular plant means ‘to do a lot of informal 
bargaining’ if there is a disturbance - but it is not a formal procedure. This dispute also shows 
that there was the possibility for some overt resistance - that meant that people could express 
their disagreement and that they were not afraid to do it. With privatisation, as we will see, all 
the overt expression became latent. And the final resolution o f this dispute, following 
privatisation, shows this well. The staff are now forced to do the examining in, but without 
any additional money. After the acquisition by Adtranz within new terms and conditions, staff 
have to sign off their own work, do the examining in and lots o f other things. All the waged 
staff signed new terms and conditions in July 1996. The salaried staff signed new terms and 
conditions in September 1996.
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The Fundamental Change Initiative Team (FCIT)
In February 1994 the ‘Fundamental Change Initiative Team’ (FCIT) was organised. The 
B.R.M.L. board wanted to find out the areas, where there could be quick savings across the 
site. The aim o f this Team was
to develop and  expedite the changes required to reshape B.R.M.L. into a competitive commercially 
effective com pany. The driving force behind the initiative is the Privatisation Process; the 
Initiative aim s to anticipate the changes that would be forced upon B.R.M .L./Level 5 sites by new 
owners, w ith  a view to  implementing these changes w hilst the opportunity still exists to do so on 
our own term s. It is hoped that an early  implementation o f  these changes may make the sites more 
attractive to  prospective purchasers, and will also demonstrate to new owners that the sites are 
capable o f  developing and managing the change process.’7
The following restrictions have applied to the changes proposed by FCIT:
1. No changes to grading structures
2. No changes to conditions of service, methods of payment, hours o f duty, and 
allowances.
3. No changes to work skill levels.
At Doncaster it was established as a team of four Management/Supervisory staff working in 
isolation from their normal duties. The team had a remit from the Depot manager to 
investigate any aspect o f the Depot’s functions.
,7 Doncaster Fundamental Change Initiative proposals. Introduction, page I .
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Current Culture according to FCIT
Information was obtained from all departments on site. The Management team was 
interviewed on their personal responsibilities and the role of their teams. The representatives 
of FCIT gave examples of the perceptions and attitudes that the change team believes to be 
prevalent on the site. It is revealed below:58
EVERYBODY’S PERCEPTION OF THE CURRENT CULTURE ACCORDING TO FCIT
* I do as little as possible for as much as possible.
* We get paid attendance money.
* I only use 5% of my brain, because that’s all I’m expected to use.
* I ’m only a ‘rubbing rag’.
* I don’t get paid for thinking.
* N obody thanks you for trying.
* I only come for the money.
* I only come out o f  necessity
* A fair day’s pay for a fair day ’s work.
* It makes no difference what I do, so why bother.
* Better than being at Maplin's Holiday Camp.
* I do the work o f  six men.
* W e reward poor productivity with overtime.
”  Doncaster Fundamental Change Initiative proposals. Introduction, page 9.
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B.R. Overtim e perception:
Traditionally the pay structure has been operated on a historical basis, the base rate system with 
additions that apply under set o f  conditions has been with us for many years and most people see 
this system as antiquated but useful in certain situations.
On pay rise calculations, the % increase applied on base rate figures is enlarged compared to high 
day rate figures. But by far the most significant psychological effect is the fact that overtime is 
used as a ‘satisfying m edium ’ to enable staff to live well, compared to ju s t managing.
The Fundamental Change Initiative Team investigated ineffective time (also referred to as 
‘Lost Time’) in the workshops. They defined ‘ineffective time’ as that part of the working day 
where no work related activity occurs.
They gave examples o f ineffective time:
* Beginning/end of the shift
* Before/after meal breaks
* Random unauthorised breaks during the shift.
A typical shift in March 1994 is shown in the following ‘Bar Chart’
Typical eight hour shift
FFIFFi
10 20 10 10
mins. mins. mins. mins.
Ineffective time, estimated at 1 hour and 4S min. 
Official meal break - 20 min.
30
mins.
Chart 1
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According to the bar chart, shown above, ineffective time mainly occurs at the beginning and 
at the end of the shifts, and at the beginning and end of the meal break. At this time the 
workers used to have a chat with the chaps, having their coffee, tea, make something for 
themselves and so on.
Despite ineffective time, which employees spend on activity which does not relate to their 
work, there was a time, defined as ancillary time - time during the working day that is spent 
on support activities associated with work content time.
The Change team identified those ancillaries that had potential for change and they are shown 
as follows:
* Search for material
* Waiting for material
* Discuss job.
* Wait for a vehicle movement.
* Give/receive/wait for instructions.
* Wait for crane
* Obtain tools and equipment
* Visit to stores.
The results of their investigation were presented as a report to the British board. The FCIT 
offered to reduce overheads with the help of a reduction of spare time, move towards a tighter 
work process and so on.
Despite the professional efforts of the FCIT, nevertheless, the work of this team was not seen 
as important on the shop floor. Moreover, the work of this team didn’t have very much
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influence on the shop floor. Some supervisors were very sceptical about the real importance 
of their work. As regards the workers, they seemed to know nothing about this team. The 
Trade Union leaders considered them as a ‘team o f traitors’, which was searching for 
imperfections on the shop floor. And even top managers regarded them as a team imposed by 
the British Railway board, whom the plant should obey. The team worked for one year and at 
the end of their work all the people involved returned to their previous positions. The team 
did not have any influence on the production process within the enterprise.
Conclusion
This section has revealed that formal and informal relations are interrelated. The informal 
relations covered a lot of processes within the enterprise -  the system of informal relations 
penetrated the whole industrial process. The relations between workers, managers and middle 
managers were regulated through the system of unwritten regulations.
The other observation is that, as a rule, those who use the system of informal relations benefit 
from it. The workers, if they know and use these unwritten rules, can get easier overtime, the 
managers within the informal system search for ways of promotion and so on. There is a 
Russian saying that ‘the fish is looking for a deeper place, but the man for a better one’. That 
is to say, people choose the most profitable wav of doing things. In our case it is more 
profitable to use the system o f informal relations rather than the formal. And such stability of 
informal relations is that in any circumstances it is profitable for somebody to use it.
128
As regards the variety of informal relations and the levels of informality, we have noticed the 
whole range of relations from very informal ways of promotion to half-formal ways of 
relating to customers.
The willingness of people to use these relations reveals another key issue -  people are 
interested in the resolution of existing problems. That is why they are looking for any possible 
way of resolving their problems with a mutually advantageous approach.
The analysis of the literature and out own observation allow us to conclude that all these 
kinds of relations exist in every society and that they penetrate all societal levels.
Despite the system of formal control on the shop floor, a lot o f processes within the shop 
floor at Doncaster were handled in an informal way. The system o f informal relations began 
from the relations with your boss. The whole atmosphere in the workshop was very informal. 
It was confirmed in many interviews:
Everybody is on first name terms w ith the Management, who will always acknowledge you when 
passing. If you feel that you have a problem  with anything, whether it is personal o r it concerns the 
job, you are always made welcome to discuss the situation.
As the data from the plant revealed, the formal structure of control did not always work and 
the informal structure sometimes were more hidden, but at the same time were more active.
So, these two systems had a parallel existence on the shop floor, but all the parties involved 
preferred the use of informal means. And if in theory things had to go through the system of 
formal norms and regulations, in reality it was a much more complicated process. In the 
system where production played the decisive role in industrial processes, some things like, for 
example, quality, had minor importance. As the data revealed, the system of control,
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nevertheless, could not provide the level of required quality, because the traditional 
consciousness within the workshop prevailed. This consciousness meant meeting the plan by
any means.
It was clear that even the many layers of managers could not provide a system of effective 
control from the workplace to the whole plant. That is why changing the whole system o f  
organisation of the production process and process of control was needed. How the situation 
changed will be clear from the next chapter.
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Chapter 2. The Doncaster Plant after Privatisation
As we have seen in the last chapter, the railways were traditionally very bureaucratic, 
surrounded by rules and regulations with a hierarchical management structure and a complex 
division o f labour and responsibilities. This meant that there was a substantial role for 
informal relations at all levels. However, the growing pressure of competition put this 
structure under increasing pressure. The first attempts to change the system had very little 
impact because they came up against the structure of informal relations, leading to'increased 
conflict but no improvements in efficiency. It was only with the privatisation of the plant that 
the pressure for change became intense and it went through a much more radical 
restructuring.
The plant was sold to ABB in June 1995. ABB is an International Company, which emerged 
in 1987 from two companies - ‘Asea’ a Swedish company, created in 1890 and ‘Brown 
Boveri’, which took shape in 1891. Perhaps, now it is one of the most competitive enterprises 
in Europe or even in the world. The main aim of the company is to organise a firm which 
would be competitive on the basis o f combining the global scale, world-class technology and 
the local market. The main slogan o f ABB’s president Percy Bamevic is ‘Think global, act 
local’. With the creation o f ABB the economic environment in Europe has considerable 
changed. Today ABB employs 240,000 people around the world.
At the top of the company sits Percy Bamevic and 12 colleagues on the executive committee. The
group, which meets every three weeks, is responsible for ABB’s global strategy and performance.
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Reporting to the executive committee are leaders o f the 50 or so business area (BAs), located 
world-wide, into which the com pany’s products and services are divided. The BAs are grouped 
into 8 business segments, for which different members o f  the executive com m ittee are responsible.
Each BA has a leader responsible for optimising the business on a global basis. Alongside the BA 
structure sits a country structure.59
The organising logic of ABB.
The main principles o f ABB are:
First of all the company is organising a global network. Executives around the world will 
make decisions in accordance with the global requirement for a particular product without 
regard for national borders. The second dimension is collecting traditionally organised 
national companies. And then trying to combine the two dimensions together.
In Britain ABB acted as before: they bought similar plants in Crewe, Derby, and recently in 
Doncaster, and now that they had the whole set of the best maintenance plants, they began to 
reshape their organisations.
Reorganisation
The main weaknesses of the company from the General Director’s view, who was in charge 
from June 1995, just after privatisation, to 9 September 1996:
”  W. Taylor, 1991, pp. 91-104.
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I think we recognised that we are moving to  a company, or we acquired a company that 
traditionally did not have to com pete for its work. It was traditional that it was a governm ent 
owned company, because there w as X amount o f  work to be done for British Railways, it w as 
called out.. ‘We will give you that, we will give you that..., we will give you that..., we will give 
you that...’. It w as called out to all different works. And they didn’t compete for it. So there was 
not a competitive elem ent within the culture o f  the workforce and deeper in the culture o f  the 
organisation. It was not organised in order to compete. So we also were aware that 
disappointments w ere associated w ith materials management, and a system to support that did not 
allow them to becom e a modern company. Because basically the buying system was basically a 
procurement system, and it was based on history, on what they used last year. W hat we need in this 
business is a system which looks forward - there is a system which is called an FRP system  
(Factory Resource Planning). A system  which can forecast what you are going to need, a system 
which looks forw ard. W e also knew  that the culture o f  the people was in terms o f  the level o f  
overtime, assessable within British Rail. Basically they manipulated all the systems to give 
them selves the highest rate that w as possible like fourteen shifts overtime. Personal allow ances. 
Allowances to do everything, d irty  work allowance, spectacles, protective clothes, overalls. 
Because w e’ve been here before, I worked for BREL in Crewe before it was privatised in 1988. 
ABB came along in 1991 to Crewe. I was one o f  the old culture. I worked for the nationalised 
British Rail workshops. British Rail Engineering Limited. So, I’ve seen the other side o f  it. And 
when ABB came, they really fit the business. In the same way, now we came here and adopted the 
same approach.
What ABB did in the first place was to appoint their own people to the most important 
positions within the workshop:
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And what we did, into that site we brought 10 A BB people, we brought m yself as a General 
Manager, people to manage materials. We brought commercial people in. And to  make it more 
competitive, to  become more customer focused, we a lso  brought people in to manufacturing. It is 
strategic points. There is another way o f doing th a t which is to take people out from this 
organisation and put them to other ABB sites, where they  will be surrounded by people, thinking 
in a different way. And leave them for six months, and then take them back out and put them back 
to work as managers. But before that we do cross fertilisation.
Another reorganisation was concerned with the whole organisational structure. The whole 
organisational hierarchy was reorganised with many fewer layers and made much more clear:
General manager 
I
Product manager 
1
Team leader 
I
Team
It was traditionalist people who se't up the organisation as a hierarchical organisation. Lots and lots 
of layers of managers. Nevertheless we stopped all this. We’ve got to cut it right down. We’ve got 
to take out layers of management, we’ve got to pass the responsibility down, and we’ve got to 
make people accountable on the lowest level. To make them accountable and responsible. We’ve 
got to give them the authority. We are going to trust them. And somebody would find it difficult to 
do that, because we have to leave people to get on with it, you should do a lot of work before 
people would be able to do that. This is why the empowerment status came into focus. And why
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we did that was that focus on core business. Say this is your Doncaster business is, then break it 
down into small units, product groups.
Things that logically sit together. They might sit together for many reasons - it m ight be the same 
customer, similar type o f  work, growth products in one area. This is how we organise our product 
group management. And then we make those units accountable in isolation, one m anager with the 
small team. Although we get clear visibility on the results o f  that small unit, then we put all the 
results back together at the centre and send them off. But what is important is that w e get visibility 
o f  the job  that is being done. V isibility is growing up. The only way to do that is to  focus on core 
business, break those-products down into groups, manageable groups, put them all accountable, 
make them accountable, take away all the excuses, get them to deliver. And it is no t calm, but if  
you find actually the right people, they will be able do it. It is not difficult. T hey  can calculate 
their expenses at home. Here it is the same thing...
About the workers. W hen they arrive at the factory, they leave their brains at th e  gates. Poor 
management traditionally were not be able to use their brain. We get them to use it, we get them 
into a team, into small groups, get them involved, give them some pride and respect that my team 
is performing well. I am on top o f  the league (Interview  with the General M anager o f  the plant, 
Septem ber 1996).
According to the new reorganisation, the Team Leaders would play the key role. The General 
Manager thought that the main qualities of the Team Leaders should be potential - not power. 
The General Manager, according to his words, was collecting all the material about new 
management techniques all around the world. He tried to share his philosophy with the 
employees, which is why he constructed all material and presented it on the boards 
throughout the company. Here we can find some o f his sentences of wisdom:
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As teamwork becomes a fact o f  corporate life, managers must become facilitators rather than 
commanders.
G ive  a man a fish you feed him for a day. Teach a man to fish, you feed him for life.
The confusion over what supervisors should be called is a reflection o f  the way their roles are 
changing. But, whether you call them team  leaders, cell leaders, section leaders, foremen or 
supervisors, these first line managers are key people, and need to be developed as such.
W orks management, August 1993. p.27
F irst line supervisors make it happen. The success o f  any organisational change depends on their 
ability  to inspire the commitment and enthusiasm  o f their teams. W ithout that, the change will 
alm ost certainly fail.
How then can an organisation turn its supervisors into leaders?
1. T he first step is to  appoint people with leadership potential.. .. They need good interpersonal, 
listening and communications skills
2. A  self-directed, empowered team is a group o f  employees w ho are responsible for a w hole work 
process, delivering product or service to a custom er, whether internal or external. Team members 
w ork together to improve their operation, handle day-to-day problems and plan and control their 
w ork.
While I asked the General Manager his view on Team Leaders, and their communication with 
the team, he presented me with his views about the direction in which the organisation should 
move:
The Team Leader’s job  is probably one o f  the toughest. At som e point in tim e we are looking for 
w hat we call total harmonisation o f  terms and conditions. W hen there is no such thing as a man on
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the shop floor, who is on wages, and the man in the office, who is on salary. We are looking for an 
em ployee, who operates on the same terms and conditions. And the only thing different is with the 
rate o f  pay, o f  a reward corresponding to their responsibility. Anything else would be equal. And I 
think before we get to that situation it will take some years, before white collar and blue collar see 
them selves as one. The system in the UK is now with the cross-status. We are breaking our past 
and that is a Japanese approach.
C om ing back to your question about Team Leaders. Until you get total harmonisation and the 
acceptance that we are all equal. Someone, somewhere should break that gap between the manual 
w orker and the office worker, and that perception about w hite collar worker and blue collar 
w orker, and that applies to the Team Leader. Now looking to all those levels, including that level 
o f  first line supervisor, I still believe that was the key and we appear to support that level. And we 
need all we can to do w hatever we can to support him to get the results to  those people. Because at 
the end o f  the day that is the one who is truly undervalued. And unless we are supporting them in 
their objectives, then w e do not want them undervalued. That’s why we are here. So a smart TL 
has to work hard and it is like fox hunting. He has to set up both sides o f  events. Because he has 
assum ed to be - he has to  support the lads, but at the same time he has management responsibility. 
It is a hard job.
Where did you find supervisors?
All the TLs were chosen from within the plant. First o f  all it w as the people from the shopfloor. 
Existing chargehands and existing supervisors. We put them through the series o f  interviews and a 
psychom etric tests, to m ake sure that people would suit this position. But we also have seen how 
they performed. We appointed them last week and we are providing several types o f  training on 
things like time attendance control, absence control, and so on. Some o f  them have been on
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m anaging change programs - it is an excellent course provided by internal people. ABB PROCOM 
- A B B  training program.
W e found it is very useful to use these people, they’ve been there. They know our culture. They 
know  the business side. And if  you get outsiders, they lost the process, they don’t have contacts.
Thus, the new management team reorganised the site according to their new policy. The 
management structure was also reorganised:
New management structure September 1996
G e n e r a l  M a n a g e r
New plan of the plant
In order to reduce overheads and payments for the. inefficient use of the site space, space 
reduction was organised. One o f the bays was closed completely and around the site several 
buildings were closed. Around the plant 25 % o f the area was closed.
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Reorganisation of the production process
I. The main reorganisation was concerned with the reorganisation of the production process: 
the plant was moved to one product operations. It was meant to find out the most profitable 
services in the local market and become the best producer of these services. At the beginning 
there were 5 product groups on the site:
1. Repairable support product group.
2. Vehicle repair product group.
3. Bogies product group.
4. Locomotives/ multiple units product group.
5. Special projects.
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The main emphasis was on Quality/Cost. The main focus on fast turnaround. The 
management agreed with the customers about 7 days operations: it means that all repairs 
should be done within 7 days.
Then, DMU was moved to Crewe with all its equipment. This meant another reorganisation 
and by September 1996 only 4 product groups were left.
II. Another major reorganisation was concerned with flexible team working. Flexibility was 
strictly emphasised. Flexible team working meant less and less demarcations across trades. 
The fitter would do the electrician’s work. 90 % of the labourers had gone, but the shopfloor 
was kept clean by the workers in teams.
III. If before there were calculations based on historic records - they kept materials and spares 
for the output equal to the number of vehicles the plant did in the previous months, so that the 
plant kept stock for 6 months ahead. Now, in the changing environment in that period, 
business might be cancelled. So the plant can’t afford to buy too much material in advance. 
The only thing they can do is to hold a week’s supply of materials. The reorganisation of the 
system of storage allowed the plant to reduce overheads from 2.4 million to 1.5 million 
pounds.
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M aterials statistics (pounds):
STOCK
Aug 95 
3,005,941
Aug 96 
2,113,626
% Change 
- 30%
STOCKHEADS 8,314 4,819 - 42%
KITTED ITEMS (903) (2300) + 154%
TWO BIN ITEMS (NIL) (686) N/A
SUPPLIERS:
TOTAL SPEND 25,240,000 27,065,000 +7,23%
previous 12 months 
(RAILPART) 21,091,054 22,724,000 + 7,75%
TOTAL NUMBER 2,408 400 - 83%
WITH COMMITMENT 840 228 - 72%
Apart from this, a contract with an external firm for the delivery of small bolts and screws 
was organised. As a consequence of this contract a two bin system was organised as well The 
two bin system provided each week all the sorts of small bolts and screws, which the plant 
needed for its effective production.
IV. In the workshop itself the ‘under one roof concept’ was implemented which meant all 
managerial staff in one office near the main production.
V. Within the workshop the level of overtime was reduced considerably. The use of overtime 
in the new circumstances did not exceed 8% per month.
Soon after privatisation the new administration decided to make redundancy of the staff. The 
main aim of it was that the plant should be competitive in the new market environment. In 
order to be competitive - it should work with fewer people, but more efficiently. There were 
two sets o f redundancy. The first redundancy was on a voluntary basis, the second one - half 
voluntary - half compulsory. Altogether the manpower reduction was from 627 in June 1995 
to 312 by September 1996.
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The main feature of the two redundancies was that people who left the plant were selected on 
the seniority basis - ‘first in - last out’. Because of that principle, the younger people left the 
plant. The older ones remained in the plant. The selection procedure caused some problems 
on the shop floor because the youngest people left, who can be flexible, open minded. Within 
the plant mainly people were left, who had worked on the plant for an average of 20 - 30 
years. It is obvious that they faced more difficulties, because they were not so flexible as the 
younger generation. They were one of the obstacles to implementing flexibility on the shop 
floor. If younger people quite easily accepted the changes:
I don’t mind flexibility - you are expected to do any jobs. Before - it was a strict demarcation line. 
Now - no (Interview with a young worker from the coaching bay, who worked on the plant for 2 
years, September 1996).
The representatives of older generations were very upset about this. It was very difficult for 
them to change their mind. Because before they had allowances for doing the job for another 
trade. Now they should do it for the same money:
We are faced with redundancies. They want us to be more adaptable and more flexible. Now 
electricians are sweeping up. Before, we did overtime to go with it (Interview with a former trade 
union leader, 57-old worker on the loco 51, September, 1996).
Here is a view of one of the Team Leaders:
They give me respect. And all that. And if you ask them to do some work you can get people who 
don’t like being told: when you been working on the shop floor for a long time and some of them 
are older then me and they don’t like being told, ‘You do this’, they just don’t like it. Say, you’ve 
got the old brigades, who have been here for 25-30 years and who will not accept the change. ABB
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with their policy o f  flexibility they want you to do a bit o f  everything if  you can to make the jo b  
proper and to make a profit (Interview  with a Team Leader, Septem ber 1996).
The other question comes up with redundancy, whether the workshop became more efficient 
or not? In order to answer this question we will try to reveal people’s opinion. But it is clear 
that there are a lot o f contradictions on the shop floor:
From the one side, there was a lot of evidence on the shop floor that the situation with the 
organisation of the production process improved considerably. It is much more organised 
now. The two bin system was implemented, material storage and a computing system 
organised. As one o f the Team Leaders, who had worked on the plant since 1969 pointed out:
Now - it is more production line. Before - it used to  be a mess. N o date for vehicles to  go out. 
W hen it is ready, it goes out. N ow - if  it is not done - you’ll be sacked. I think it works. I can see. 
Before - there was too much tea drinking. Too much tim e to get a jo b  done. N ow  it is better.
The other worker from the Loco 91, class 37, 58 supported his opinion:
It is more organised now. Before - it was a  mess, because when the vehicle cam e from the client it 
was dismantled and then repaired in different parts o f  the plant. Very often different parts were not 
repaired simultaneously. Now - it is more like a production line. Exchange o f  com ponents.
You can see organisation of things everywhere in the workshop, like for example with the 
material - there are special labels for the storage of material:
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Depot storage material coding plan:
o
ready to use
o
material for repair
• quarantined material
o scrap
There are a lot o f messages of the following kind:
Think Tidy 
STEVE
Remember this is your home 
5 days a week
From the other side it is necessary to say there were very contradictory things on the shop 
floor. And the question to be asked is, apart from the new organisational changes, was there 
any kind o f investment? There was no any evidence of any kind of new technology at all. On 
the contrary - a lot of work was transferred to other plants. Most of the equipment was 
dismantled and taken out. Here is a bitter view o f one of the workers, who had worked almost 
thirty years at the plant:
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This restructuring, w hich they implemented - is very questionable. They’ve taken away our work. 
Lathes, equipm ent. Now  we are less able to do any work.
The factory now is very unsettled. New confidence - declining workload. New management - new 
conditions.
The only view we have o f  the new managers is distrusting. The General M anager is like a robber. 
He was a Crewe man - he cam e here and robbed all our equipm ent. They were stealing our work:
- brascover (valves)
- power units
- traction motors...
The General M anager - he is very polite, he would listen. But it is in theory. In reality - 16 months 
he was here - and took away our work.
The main General M anager’s idea was to spend nothing on restructuring.
Traditionally - there were 4 bays. They altered the cranes. The disruption in the works is 
unbelievable...
From the one hand all the upper managers were talking about the elimination of wasted time, 
and they’ve done a lot in order to cancel it. On the other hand - there is a lot o f evidence that 
people have got more spare time then before:
I have more spare tim e then ever to do work for myself - to do foreigners and something else. The 
only problem now  - it is m aterial. If  before we had a lot o f  it laying on the floor - now you can’t 
get it.
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With the reduction of the workload and new agreements with the customers all the vehicles 
now arrive according to a new schedule: Coming on Monday - off on Wednesday. Coming on 
Wednesday - off on Friday.
Now very often, the vehicle doesn ’t come in on W ednesday, so we have no workload for the rest 
o f  the week.
- W hat are you doing then?
Sweeping the floor, tossing it off.
‘M onday morning - not very much to do ’.
The situation that there is nothing to do is proved in a diary of one of the workers on the shop 
floor:
Friday, 20/09/96.
N o work.
Clean up.
Wash windows.
W hat next.?
ABB. W e care about you.!.
Moreover, after the previous redundancy within the plant there is a lack of people with 
particular skills. That is why the managers are seeking anybody who is able to fulfil some 
jobs:
Monday. 16/09/96
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Finished testing.
6 resets reservoirs required in other shop for morning shift. Nobody to take them So I take them 
m yself on forklift. I have never driven forklift before: FUN!!!
Thursday 19/09/96
Team leader comes up with another job. I am needed to repair air/water separator/regulator valve. 
Again I am the only person on the works w ho knows how to do them. I do it.
N o problem !’ ^Extract from a diary o f  the working week, written by a fitter in the plant. September 
1996.)
Relations with the customers after privatisation
According to the new reorganisation of the production process there was a move towards 4 7 
day operations’. It was agreed with the customers that all the vehicles would be delivered on 
time. If there will be a delay in delivery - the plant should pay 500 pounds per day per vehicle 
to the customers The results of such a policy is shown in the following chart:
CLASS 91 OUTPUT FROM 02/04/96 TO 26/07/96
Locomotive 91020 91003 91002 91016 91026
Actual days 16 15 15 15 18
Contract days 15 15 15 15 15
91020 - 1 additional day for all circulation traction
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91028 - 1 additional day for oil circulation traction, plus 2 days work on after trial snags.
The General Managers’ view on the relations with the customers was as follows:
Relations with the customers have become much more formal now. Here they had cosy 
relationships before, which was okay. They were good relationships, but they’ve got to be on a 
formal basis. For clarification. You tell how people are coming in saying, or just picking up the 
phone and saying: ‘Oh, by the way, I don’t want that doing, I want it to come here’. It has to be 
formalised, contract reviewed. If we look at penalties for days late - at various level - it is quite 
severe. We get penalised 500 pounds per day, and without all formal notifications, when you start 
getting to the commercial aspects, then you really got problems, if you got nothing in writing. So, 
it has to be formal, that’s not intended to be obstructive to the customer, it’s intended to ensure 
that there will be no problems.
-  So do you think that before, it was much more informal?
Yes, less professional. You’ve got to be professional. The customer is doing a lot of things with 
professionals. I think that you could take the view that the customer might see you as being 
inflexible, if you are not prepared to keep changing all these things around. But at the end of the 
day I think he will respect the fact that you are professional. That’s important.
I strongly believe that at the end o f the day he respects that I take the formal position. That is our 
position now. It doesn’t mean that we are irresponsible people and we would say ‘Yes’ to 
everything. And then having said ‘Yes’, we find out that we can’t deliver. So that can lead to the 
customer perception going down. It is so easy to say ‘Yes’, and then you fail. I think its true.
The head of one of the product groups:
Customer needs - far better now. When we first moved to the multiple units - it was embarrassing 
to talk - too much was left without notice. But now we are more satisfied now than before.
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Quality problems
As was mentioned before - the changing of attitudes towards quality was a very long 
procedure. The reorganisation within the plant touched many things, but it was impossible to 
change people’s minds so quickly. The problems of quality still remained within the plant. 
That is why there was a constant struggle for better quality.
AdTranz
Quality
Policy Statement
It is a policy of ABB Daimler-Benz transportation (Customer Support) Ltd to totally satisfy the 
needs of its customers and to dedicate all operations towards maintaining its position as a world 
class company.
This will be achieved through constantly examining the company’s performance and pursuing the 
need for continuous improvement.
By investing in people the company will apply the philosophy of Total Quality through:
- the commitment of all its employees;
- fully understanding the customer’s requirements;
- a willingness to combat waste and reduce costs;
- seeking out constant improvements;
The achievement of these quality goals will be determined by the dedication shown in our work.
All our commitment and actions must be recognised as an expression of quality of service and 
product.
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ABB Daimler-Benz Transportation (Customer Support) Ltd’s quality systems conform to the 
international standard ISO 90000 and provide the framework for achieving high quality products 
and services.
The quality system is all described in division quality manuals and lower tier working procedures.
Steve Svard 
Managing Director 
February 1996
Describing the system with quality, it is worth mentioning the whole system of connections 
between the plant and the customers, because now it has become much more complicated. 
When British Rail was privatised, the master plan was that four owners would have the whole 
of the rolling stock and all vehicles. They let them out to a limited number of leasing 
companies, which run the trains. They would run trains according to specific rules. It was 
going to be broken down into hundreds of companies. What happened in fact was that several 
large companies rent the vehicles. The owners of the companies are required by law to send 
the vehicles for repair after a certain number of miles. To carry out a larger repair, they need 
some plants such as Doncaster which have the facilities for lifting the vehicles off their bogies 
and there can also be technical qualifications. The company that rents the vehicle is under 
contract to do minor repairs : fuel injector changes, light changes - smaller repairs:
When the vehicle is dispatched from Doncaster, we have to carry out all repairs required by the 
owner which are som etimes not as comprehensive as are required by the custom er that is renting 
the vehicle. The ow ner could ask for a bogie change, the custom er wants, when the bogie has been 
changed, everything else should be working. We inform the person that is renting the vehicle, the 
Depot. Just one s illy  example. When the head wire is not working, the vehicle could only run in
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daytime safely. So we can only dispatch the vehicle on Rail Track property w ith  the condition that 
it only runs in daylight. The person renting the vehicle, would say - repair the  head wire, but he 
doesn’t have to pay for it. So we should go back to the person, who pays for th e  repair - the owner, 
asking him if  he w ill pay for the head wire, and he has got two options: he could  pay us, or he 
could insist that the vehicle goes back to the depot, because the head wire repair is under his 
agreement with a depot who is renting. So if  you like you’ve got a slight con flic t o f  interest. We 
have to deal friendly with all three parties. Obviously any one o f them could d isrup t our workload 
in all ways possible. Rail Track insist that when a vehicle has a large repair on the property o f  
AdTranz - before it goes back into service - it must meet all the safety requirem ents, when it cam e 
out o f  service. To comply with this, they insist on a rigorous safety inspection. On a qualified 
examiner, that’s worked on the vehicle at least 5 years, make sure that w e  meet all safety 
standards, all work safety systems worked. (Extract from interview with a clerk, Septem ber 1996). 
H aving p rob lem s w ith  quality  repair, the leas ing  com pan ies, w ho  are re n t in g  the v eh ic le s  
from  the o w n er d ec id e d  to  p u t a special ex p e rt on  the p lant, w ho  w ill c h e c k  all the  w eak  
points w ith in  the p lan t. H ere is an ex trac t from  m y in terv iew  w ith  such  p e rso n :
So what I am doing now for the Angel train leasing company is monitoring that overhaul is taking 
place in here now. They have a problem with quality. There were components from  the depots that 
are from train operating units and when they were coming back from overhaul, the quality was 
very poor.
-W hy?(M .K.)
Various things they would get problems with units, with the quality o f  the paint on  the bogies and 
they would com plain about, because bearing in mind, when the unit comes here  for overhaul, it’s 
got to go out and operate something like three years before it comes back for an o th e r overhaul and 
obviously, when you are doing something you’ve got to make sure that it will last that period. So
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the quality o f  overhaul isn’t up to standard and things are going to deteriorate fairly quickly, and 
they are not going to  get that life out o f  the vehicle or that components that changed. So w hat’s 
happening at the moment is that one o f  the depots would complain about the quality, and the 
standard o f  workmanship from here, and I was brought in to bring that quality standard un. 
Because I know the vehicles, I’ve worked on them I know the areas, where some people might take 
short cuts, to  do the job , where they shouldn’t, and I am here to put my finger on it. To say : ‘One 
minute, you are not doing it right, let’s have it right’. Once I’ve been here for the last three months 
the quality has gone up and improved. But unfortunately in improving the quality, the cost 
increased slightly for the overhaul. What happened is - certain items and certain areas have caused 
us a problem - if  you take a component an example like a complete bogie - on a sprinter, when it 
comes back in after three years o f  hard work it’s covered in rust, dust. It gets very very dirty. 
Com pacted and difficult to  remove. Now. When they come in for overhaul. The first thing they 
have to  do with bogies - they have to clean it. It’s cleaned in a special cleaning m achine with 
caustic, soda, hard biting chemical wash, which takes o ff  m ost o f  the dirt. But unfortunately, it 
doesn’t take it all off. So the implications o f  that is now, in order to get all things off, they have to 
put it through the cleaner twice. So the cost o f  it now is tw ice what it should be. It is the plant’s 
responsibility to clean it. Because the maintenance overhaul schedule says that you will take the 
bogie, clean it and overhaul it to the standard. Then obviously, when it’s coming back they are 
painting over dirt, because they’ve been cleaned that dirt may be there, for a while, might have 
been loosened. So that consequently, when it goes back to the depot, it may fall off. So the paint 
doesn’t stay properly, so consequently you’ve got problems w ith corrosion. Because the operating 
environm ent o f  bogies is very unfriendly. It gets everything thrown up on it from track dust, silicon 
based, you get rain, water, even the toilet defluent. And it gets all to the bogie, and it gets 
absolutely faulty. So in order to bring it back to a standard if  you like to start again, to  make it last
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another three a half years, it’s got to be on a top quality. So tha t was one o f  the com plaints that 
came from the depots that the paint quality o f  the bogies was very  very poor. Then we looked at it, 
we said yes, we agree with you, it is absolutely true. They are no t cleaning these bogies properly 
and they are not painting them properly. So:
A ) . They aren ’t going to last the full three and half years and,
B) . The people who own the vehicle and are paying for an overhaul a ren ’t get a quality job, 
they’ve been charged for it, they are not getting their money’s w orth.
So at that end I am here, and I am saying to the works: ‘Come on, d o  the jo b  properly.’
Safety culture
As well as the problems with quality, there are the same problems with safety. For all the 
years that production was the main dictator on the shop floor, people were not conscious 
about safety. And now everything is turned around. The world has changed and the safety 
values in it have become more important. As an engineer at the plant pointed out:
So everybody is now disappearing running and running in circles, thinking safety. I don’t want to 
get the blame for doing anything wrong. Because now in the privatised industry, everybody has got 
to be very very careful what they do.
But the safety culture also needs to be implemented for a long time in order to be an intrinsic 
part of the production process. Things could not happen overnight. That is why the person 
who is responsible for the safety at the plant has to struggle with the old approach:
W hat’s happened, I am now trying to build safety culture within everybody. I’ve got to make them 
aware o f  their duty to each other, person to  person. It is not necessarily  o f  top management saying - 
do this and do this, it is even down to the individuals. That’s the hardest part to install a  safety
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culture, when productivity is required. Because what we have to do at the end of the day - is to 
make money. And my concern is - how they make money. These got mistaken way of safety.
Just as it was before privatisation with implementing Total Quality Management, there is a 
real gap in understanding of the safety culture between the top managers, who are really 
safety oriented and the middle managers on the shop floor. For many years they were kept in 
their positions because of their abilities to fulfil the plan. Among the new Team Leaders there 
are may be 30 per cent of people, who had a real appreciation of safety procedure within the 
plant. The rest of them didn’t take it seriously:
M.K.- To what extent is the management concerned about health and safety?
Risk Manager- Top management - yes. But at the end of the day it is going to be down to the Team 
Leaders, young managers, they will see it as being involved to make money. I feel that if I was not 
here controlling them and advising them on the health and safety regulations and legislation. 
which is place to contract, if we don’t stick to that, we are going to be in deep trouble, i.e. will be 
prosecuted, it could close the company down for bad practices. That is at the back of everybody’s 
mind. The employees definitely know about, not legislation, but they know about when they are 
doing something wrong. They appreciate that.
M.K.- But still doing it?
R.M.-Not necessarily. Some people won’t. Others will. As you can appreciate it, looking on the 
sociological aspects of it - you can press on people to do things that they don’t want to do. In some 
cases that may happen. That’s why I come in and the safety guard with the safety. If they feel that 
the’ve been pressurised into doing something that they shouldn’t do. The first thing they can do - 
come to me. Consult with safety problems. And I will get them all the way if I consider that it's a 
hazard or dangerous activity. If they don’t get satisfaction with that. They obviously can go to
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unions, to the safety committee. And hopefully eliminate the hazardous activity. That’s why we 
have the safety committee, which meets every month. And they talk to management, and I am 
concerned with safety procedures. Now we’ve got a form -it is a full register of all our health and 
safety procedures, which were ex-BR. Now with AdTranz they are actual procedures. We are 
presenting procedures to managers, production unions, TL and they don’t know about this. Or 
that’s the impression I get. They should have all this paper. Nothing has changed. We have not told 
them to remove the documents whatsoever.
There are some regulations, and it could be a pressure of production - and they will try to avoid 
these regulations. Like they say to you: ‘We are here to make money, not to monitor couple of it.’ 
But if they don’t look after the workforce, compensation claims would come from out of its 
profits. It’s false economy. And lost time accidents. If a person is off work through an injury off 
work - then it is costing us money being off work and it can’t produce, but it’s entitled to a 
compensation claim against the company for not owing a duty of care, not supplying with an ear 
defender. Looses the eye (Interview with the Risk Manager, September 1996).
This culture is very difficult to overcome. People are still thinking in the old manner. They 
are aware about other things, but because they did it for the whole of their lives, they continue 
to do it. The reasons could be different, but one of the reason again is the same, like in old 
times - the dictatorship o f  production:
Recently we had an accident at Derby, where the guy fell from a height of 30 ft, and was killed. 
But in here the guys work at the top of the vehicles with no straps on. And they know that. Nothing 
changed. They know the working height - that is damned, and I can show you the old procedure. 
They know from the past - which was BR that this procedure exists.
M.K.- In comparison with the situation in previous years. Do you consider that the situation has 
improved?
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R.M. - It’s improved from the production side - it's become tighter. When it comes down to 
managerial attitudes - that had become lax - because of pulling the vehicles through the door - to 
make an impression on the new buyers of the company. I know for a fact on one instance, with one 
vehicle - when something was being lifted with the old crane - the two blocks that lift the main 
hook, climbing to get there - a 6 inch piece shot out. Nobody was injured, but because the two 
blocks have gone through the upper limit switch, the crane was faulty, it should have switched off. 
An incident record was filled in. I said ‘Right, that crane is totally out of action. I want a full 
investigation - tell me why it went through the upper limit switches, what caused it. What it needs 
to put it right. That crane is dead as far as I am concerned. That I’ve done on Thursday or Friday 
that week. And I asked the maintenance team to do me an investigation. It was a part of their fault. 
The team coming on the Saturday to do the work, and this is why they were coming from - five 
hundred pound a day down to contract, the production pressure on the managers meant that if they 
didn’t have that crane, it was going to cost us 5 hundred pounds for that vehicle being out of 
standard. If the HSE (Health and Safety Executive) had come in, nobody would have been able to 
use that, because it was on the investigation. They keep that out of action. These guys 
(maintenance team) were told to stand on top of the crane and tell him how high it can lift. So it’s 
defeating the safety device. I was off, because I don’t work Saturday. They disregarded the health 
and safety procedures. That’s the concern I’ve got. I since had the person in control of that 
situation sign a document saying that he accents full responsibility and reliability for any actions 
or initiatives. And he signed it. The man who was in control. And if anybody had an accident, 
injury, compensation claim, the company would not be liable, it would be the actual individual, 
who is telling him or asking people going there and doing things. The procedures are there 
(Interview with the Risk Manager, September 1996).
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Shortage of material
As we can see from the above, the implementation of the ‘two bins system’ has eliminated the 
shortages o f  small screws, bolts and so on. As the workers pointed out:
They’ve been trying to incorporate the two bins system. It has been implemented about 5 months 
ago. If one  is empty on the top - put the other one forward. And the empty bin will get refilled in a 
three-four day period. That is filled by a private firm. It is working now and there are never 
shortages o f  screws.
Now we d o n ’t bother about cutting the long screws. We don’t have that problem now. So now 
there are a s  many as you w ant o f  all different sizes what you want.
At the same time when I talked to the Team Leader, he explained to me that he has problems 
with material:
M.K. -I f the vehicle is due on Wednesday, would it be possible fo r  you  to delay?
T.L.- I f  there is a delay, it costs us 500 pounds a day. Liquidated damages. I f  we do not deliver the 
vehicle a t a  specific time, it would cost us 500 a  day. We do it on time. We 've got material 
problems. I 've  got m aterial problems. The material should have been ordered earlier.
M.K.- What kind o f  material?
T.L. It's a  m eta l strip. We have to use them.
M.K -How w ill you manage this problem ? You w ill order this material?
T.L- We have  known about this problem  at least fo r  6 weeks, but still nothing has been sorted  out. 
M.K-Why?
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T.L- It is not me, it is the office. I f  they sent the order fo r  materials to the National stores, it would  
be correct, but they didn t. So they have been sending it only now.
M .K -H owyou w ill resolve this problem?
T.L- When the office would manage it, while they would send us the material, we would manage it 
(Interview with a Team Leader, September 1996).
T he en g in ee r ex p la in ed  to  m e th e  situa tion  w ith  th e  shortage o f  parts  a s  well:
M .K.-W hen I’ve been here last time, there was a lot o f  shortage o f parts. How has it changed now?
E. -It is still the-same. We still have the shortage o f  components, yes. Again I am giving you an 
example. Because w e’ve got conventional DMU-s, which are still running out the system, some o f  
those are now 35-40 years old. W hen they were built there was still p len ty  o f  supply o f  materials. 
They were built w ith the technology and expertise o f  that time. Now, because things have moved 
on, things been improved, a lot o f  components become obsolete. The original manufacturers don’t 
want to  make them  any more, because it is costly for them to do that, and  they want to do things 
for now, not for the past. At the moment exhausts, which create vacuum  for the brakes, they are 
the only vacuum brake vehicles. Vacuum brakes are more efficient then  air brakes, so there is a 
serious shortage o f  exhausts for those vehicles, and w e’ve only got w hat are on them - only a few  
spares. And those few spares are rapidly disappearing. And there is going to come a time when we 
will not know w hat we are going to do to replace them. Either then w e have to  find a lot o f  
components w hich will make vacuum, or we ju s t have to get rid o f  the vehicles. Because 
unfortunately, w hat was happening - all the vehicles, which have been scrapped, their com ponents 
have either been used up or lost. Now, those vehicles again, because w e ’ve got nothing to  replace 
them with, the leasing company haven’t anything to replace them w ith , it is only again the 
problem s we will get with an overhaul, which will probably start in July nex t year. I’ve been asked
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by the leasing company, and this is Angel trains contracts, to look at what we call the critical list o f 
spares, and I actually have drawn the list o f  it. I’ve already started on it, and basically, tha t’s :
exhausts for brakes, 
engine compressors, 
wheel sets 
final drives 
engine suspensions
T hey’ve got an autom atic fire system, which was developed from aircraft. It’s pretty well obsolete 
by now, and you can’t get some pieces for it. What w e’ve got to do is to try to fit a modem 
autom atic fire system on to  them. Now, obviously, new components may or may not fit in that 
place. If they don’t fit, we can probably look and make some drawings to make them fit. We are 
going to modify the vehicles. To take the equipment which is costing us money. So someone has 
got to take a decision, whether the cost to fit the new equipment is going to be worth it for the 
length o f  tim e the vehicle would be around. Or it would be better to scrap them now, to  get rid o f  
them , because the cost o f  m odifying vehicles now to bring them up to a standard is pretty 
horrendous, so som eone has got to take this decision. What I can do is ju s t recommend, and I have 
some ideas to put forward to them, w hat to do to replace some o f  these components, but it is going 
to cost a lot o f  money. So they need to  make a decision now. Because those vehicles are now at the 
end o f  their working life. So they need to make a decision, is it worth to do that o r to get rid o f  
them . And build new.
I also insist on the conditions that bogies do not lay in the open air. Because now they are storing 
them in the open air. And we consulted the managers not to do it. And only now, because there is 
some spare place, they will put all the bogies in one area under the roof.
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M.K.- Cannibalisation - before it was. But now - because there are some experts, like you, here - 
they can’t do it?
E.- No.
M.K.- And even if  they will do it, you will see it.?
E.- On the exhausted things - I know that there aren’t any available that Railpart (former NSC - 
M.K.) don’t have any that there just aren’t any available anywhere. Now, last week, I rang to the 
vehicle dism antlers and I asked them if  they had got any o f  these exhausts, and they rang me back 
and told me that they actually found two. They were am ongst different pieces. So I said to him, put 
it to one side, I’ll get somebody to buy them. Now they’ve got to buy them. At one time they used 
to say ‘come and take them ’. That was the informal side. Now w e’ve got to buy them. (So informal 
things are now also formalised - M.K.) Because w e’ve  got a little expression o f  this.(He made 
some movement o f  fingers -to put money inside his hand - M.K.) I don’t know if  you’ve seen this 
gesture before. It means that they need to put money in m y  hand. Y es.’
Control of work
Within the organisation there is a big move towards more organised work. It was clearly the 
intention of the upper managers that they would not bear the previous situation, when people 
were drinking tea or coffee not at a particular time.
All the workers as before had to clock on and off, with minor differences - there is no time 
allowed to be late. Even that two minutes for being late, which was allowed before 
privatisation, was cancelled.
The organisation of work has become tighter than ever before. The meal breaks, which were 
20 minutes under BREL (which was not too much from any point of views) were reduced to
160
15 minutes per shift. Within the plant a paper about the meal breaks was circulated, 
originating from the top:
Adtranz 17/9/96 
MEAL BREAK TIMES
To clarify the situation:
Monday to Thursday -
11. to 11.20 M ornings and Mid-Days 
17.30 to 17.50 Afternoons.
5 minutes washing o ff  time is included in the above, therefore team members are expected to be at 
their place o f  w ork immediately before and after the above times.
Friday:
A refreshm ent break o f  5 minutes will be taken by agreement with your Team Leader 
Saturday and Sunday:
1/2 day - N o meal or refreshment break will be authorised 
So the policy is towards full use of each employee. But the implementation of this policy was 
far from perfection. Walking down the shop there were a lot of people wasting their time:
lan - standing on the third bay, doing nothing.
-  What are you w aiting for?
I am waiting for m y supervisor. When he comes back, he will give me a job.
-  For how long have you been waiting for him?
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Not that long, may be fifteen minutes.
What was interesting was that the wasting of time concerned not only the workers, but 
supervisors as well:
When 1 asked one o f  the supervisors to speak to me, he told me, with a very serious expression on 
his face that he was busy. It was no t a meal break, I had a chance to have a look on the table, and 
there were several coupons for th e  national football pools, which he was trying to fill in. I could 
not hide my curiosity and asked him : what is it. He answered:
1 put a lot o f  money there, so please, come in 15 minutes.
According to the new terms and conditions, all the workers should sign for their work from 
September 1996. It was done in order to tighten the control within the enterprise and in order 
to increase the level of responsibility.
At the moment 1 was at the plant this rule had just been implemented and people were not in 
a hurry to sign for their own work. When I asked the Team Leader, why it is happening he 
said:
They should fill them in, but not everybody does it. Team Leaders still sign the full jobs. It is 
changing.
Before - it was a system o f  block cards, where there w as the amount o f  work necessary to be 
fulfilled on a particular vehicle. D etailed description o f  kind o f  work for 3-4 days.
According to the new system o f term s and conditions all the tradesmen should do it them selves.
But they still put OK in front o f  all jo b  description, for example:
- to change valve - OK
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- electrical... - OK
W hen I sp o k e  to  their team  leader, he to ld  m e that he has a w hole book , w here he w rite s  
dow n w h ich  shift is d o ing  w hat. H e to ld  m e that he w ill gather them  together and  ed u ca te  
them . I f  th ey  accepted  new  term s and cond itions -  they voted  for it -  they  should  do  it.
So, the d o cu m en t contro l has becom e m ore form alised  and  been tightened.
Resistance to changes?
U nhappy  w ith  the effect o f  privatisation  and  w ith th e  increased in tensity  o f  w ork ing  th e  
w orkers (espec ia lly  the o ld  one) w ere w illing  to develop  various fo rm s o f  inform al ac tions, 
and  co lle c tiv e  and ind iv idual resistance to  change. B ut actually  they had  a lm ost no chance to  
resist e ith e r  overtly  o r covertly . To understand  w hy w orkers w ere unab le  to  m oun t e ffec tiv e  
res istance  it is necessary  to  consider the v iew  o f  the w orkers on th is m atter:
-  Can you go slow or do some other industrial actions?
You w ouldn’t get involved in any industrial disputes. Nobody wants that. Most people’s future 
here is a little grimy. Y ou’ve got to do the jo b  and you ju s t do it. (W orker - 17 years on the plant. 
Loco, DM U, wagon (RFS)).
I don’t mind flexibility - you are expected to do any jobs. Before - it was a strict demarcation line. 
Now - no. We did resist - 8 years ago. The climate is changed now. New working conditions. I f  
you resist - you are out. Not too happy. Apart from doggy work. We have to do our work. 
Basically I do what I am asked to. If  you do try to escape then you’ll get a reputation o f  trouble 
m aker.
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The effect o f privatisation was widely disliked. But among the workforce was an almost clear 
division between the old workers and the younger ones. The old workers thought that they 
worked hard enough for the whole of their life, and they deserved better conditions.
1 gave everything to the enterprise. I should get as much as possible in return. I deserve it.
The new organisation of work, including team working and multi-skilling, meant increasing 
of the intensity of their work. Naturally, when you have worked hard for twenty-thirty years, 
you want to relax at the end of the day. But in the Doncaster plant they had no chance for 
relaxation. In order to survive in the changing world, they’ve got to be competitive, and for 
this reason they had to work twice as hard as in the past. Also I believe that for some reason, 
the propensity to flexibility is much more likely revealed among the younger ones. That’s 
why the percentage of people who could change their mind was bigger among the youngest 
workers. They were more positive towards changes within their work and all the new things 
which were required from them. Besides, they have a more pragmatic view towards the job. 
The old people consider work as the most valuable thing in their life. The younger people 
have another view:
They think that we should devote ourselves to the full to this work. But this work is sometimes so 
boring that we prefer to get rid o f it and have a rest. We are young and we w ould like to enjoy this 
life. W ork is not the whole o f  life!
Nevertheless, there were some minor forms of individual resistance. To begin with, some 
forms of ‘sabotage’ were reported. Although the managers and the workers reached an 
agreement about deleting the demarcation lines between the crafts, there were some kind of 
grey areas about the work of the labourers. The labourers cat2 and catl historically cleaned
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the w agons and sw ep t the floor. In new  circum stances they  w ere  sen t to  c lean  th e  to ilet, 
because there  w as n o t any  o th er jo b  at that m om ent for them  to  do. T he  labourers d id n ’t agree 
w ith it. T hey  d id n ’t go  to  clean  the toilet.
A lso  am ong  the o ld e r w orkers the k ind o f  go slow  still w as rep resen ted , w hen th ey  d id n ’t do  
w ork fo r a  certain  tim e . B ut am ong  the o ldest w orkers a lso  there  w as  som e k ind  o f  apathy, 
because they  though t th a t they  w ould  be sacked  anyw ay. T he cau se  o f  such a ttitu d es  w as in 
the ch arac te r o f  the n ex t redundancy. M anagers announced  th a t there  w ill b e  ano ther 
redundancy. But w h ile  th e  first tw o w ere on  the  basis o f  ‘first in  - las t o u t’ (acco rd in g  to  the 
previous agreem en t w ith  the w orkers), the fo llow ing  redundancy  w ill be on  th e  basis o f  
several c rite ria , w here  th e  m ost valuab le  w ill be  the level o f  flex ib ility , the am o u n t o f  w ork  
done and level o f  sk ill. In these  circum stances, the o ld er w orkers unders tood  th a t th e  m ain  
factor o f  th e ir stab ility  - th e  leng th  o f  service - had been rem oved . S o  they  w ere  in  th e  m ost 
vu lnerab le  position , an d  m ay  be  it w as the m ain  factor tha t they  tr ied  to  resist th e  n ew  things.
O ’C onnell D avidson  in  h e r ana ly ses o f  resistance  in a  p riva tised  in d u s try  stresses th a t
changes to the organisation of the labour process can (but do not always) provoke strong 
sentiments of opposition, but whether these are translated into action, and the form this action 
takes, and how successful this action is, all depend on a number of other factors.60
The m ost sign ifican t fa c to r in these  circum stances- is the ex is tence  and  the stren g th  o f  the 
U nion. In th e  p lant, w h ere  there  w ere seven T rad e  U nions - all o f  th e m  w ere very  w eak . But
“ O'Connell Davidson, 1994.
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with the privatisation instead of unification and strengthening of their policy, the Unions were 
very demoralised. Here is the view o f one of the trade union leaders:
Leaders o f  trade unions did not act well in those circumstances. Instead o f  unification - they were 
really aggressive to each other. Were protective about the trade: that fitters better than electricians. 
There was a big disagreem ent w ithin the trade union comm ittee (Interview with trade union 
leaders. September 1996).
Another factor which is worth mentioning here is the labour market conditions. Bray and 
Littler have observed th a t:
in general, we can say that the labour m arket structure sets the agenda o f the control relationship.... 
This is because the ultimate form o f  managerial control is the power to threaten loss o f  
employment, a relation, which, in part, defines the nature o f  w age labour.<s,
But the labour market conditions reflect also the form and intensity o f resistance. And 
interviews with people in the plant confirmed that conditions on the labour market in 
Doncaster and area was not very favourable in this sense:
I am now  deeply concerned about redundancy, because there is no work to  go to outside. It is 
frightening to see your colleagues, w ho left. 13 thousand people unemployed in Doncaster.
People w ho are younger - they could get a job. But mainly it is short term, low paid. No career, no 
structure. No future. 61
61 Bray and Litter, 1988, p.569.
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Many people who left were ‘50 + ’, so for them it was very  difficult to get a job . Some o f  them got 
low paid job: near 3 pounds per hour. And we here have £6.32 p.h. But some o f  my colleagues 
have got no job  at all (Extract from interview with a w orker on the loco 37. Septem ber 1996).
It is clear that wider political and social features also influence resistance. And in these 
circumstances we can see that the workers understood that in the situation where the 
government tried to do everything in order to weaken the labour movement and be more than 
usually favourable to the employer - any kind of resistance will fail. And this feeling we can 
find in the answer of one of the workers to the question, why they can’t resist:
Now we are pow erless - very demoralised workforce. S ince I worked here - I’ve seen everything. 
The miners were m ilitant and they got bitten. Here, w e are not militant. And also got bitten. So - 
nothing worked. W hat can you do? It is the governm ent’s policy (Extracts from interview with 
workers, ‘V agrem ’ plant, 1996).
The future - closing down?
What future is awaiting this company? It is very difficult to answer this question. When I was 
leaving the company, there was another set of redundancies ahead. People had very difficult 
feelings:
Most people’s future is a little grimy.
I’ve been here 16 years, and I have never seen changes like these.
The majority of workers and managers did not believe in the future o f the company:
They are going to  shut it any way.
I don’t think there will be a future for me and for this com pany.
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The most bitter feelings were concerned with the modem managers. Not very many people 
believed in the words of the managers. They judged them in accordance with their actions:
They promote them selves as caring people. They talked about ‘investment in people’ and now 
these people are out o f  work.
They are still taking aw ay our jobs. They are moving the equipment to Crewe. And Crewe is a 
Golden Child.
Privaty came here and w e distrusted them. We d o n ’t believe them.
They gave us an ABB badge, paper bag. It is ridiculous.
There is a fear o f  the future. A great works with 150 years history has been squeezed.
The most expected future is another set of redundancies. And maybe the works really will be 
turned into a profitable part of ABB, but it will be without those people who gave the plant all 
their life, all their strength, all their spirit and got nothing in return. And I want to finish the 
description of this plant with the words of one o f the people who worked on the plant:
To be a public sector employee was satisfying to  me. I have always taken an interest in society and 
social welfare. I am very concerned over the privatisation o f the British railway netw ork from both 
a personal and public interest. The whole affair is something that I am neither able or willing to 
accept.
What was regarded as a secure ‘job  for life’, by choice, when I signed m y apprenticeship 
indentures in 1969, no longer has the same meaning or assurance. Long service expectations and 
Company em ployees’ rights, such as the BR pension fund, company redundancy term s, privileged
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travel cards, service seniority, an d  other conditions o f employment earned over many years, and 
looked forward to, are now dishonourably threatened.67
In 1997 it w ill be 150 years s in c e  that tim e, w hen  the land  w as pu rchased  in  D oncaster for 
constructing  the D oncaster p lan t. A fte r m ore then  a  c e n tu ry ’s great h is to ry  o f  bu ild ing  and 
repairing  vehicles, the p lan t’s fu tu re  is very questionab le . W hat w ill hap p en ?  T im e w ill show . 62
62 Roger Holgate in Brown, 1995, pp. 57-58.
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Chapter 3. The M oscow Electro-Mobile Component 
Repair Plant
Brief history o f the plant
The plant was established in 1940 by the Moscow metro to reconstruct and renovate carriages 
and carry out repairs. In 1936-1937 the first Moscow metro stations were built and a repair 
workshop was organised. On the place where the Popugai electrical depot is now situated 
repair workshops were opened, which were soon reorganised into the electro-mobile rolling 
stock repair plant -  Remet.
During the Second World War the plant, apart from the repair of electric trains, produced 
some other items for the Russian army. Several workshops were specialised exactly on 
production for the army. In 1945 the plant began to fulfil the repair of carriages of different 
types, one of the workshops at the same time was producing parts for agricultural purposes.
In research for the history of the plant I made a lot of efforts with low results. A lot of 
materials were destroyed by the state system of saving materials, because they were not 
included in the list of materials which should be saved forever.
Nevertheless I tried to find people who had worked in the plant at that time. Here is the 
evidence of one o f the women, who came to work on the plant in 1946 and has worked in the 
plant for 50 years:
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There w ere a lot o f  good things. When I came to the plant, the managers usually said: ‘L et's work, 
things w ill be better then’. And we worked with such enthusiasm that I can not even express. And 
we w orked hard. The managers asked: ‘The New Year is close, w ho will meet it on the carriages?’. 
It meant that we should help the carriages workers to meet the plan. I was employed as a clerk in 
the personnel department. But at the end o f  the month, when the workshop had to  meet the target, 
all the clerks helped the workers: washed the carriages from inside, cleaned the windows, made 
everything, apart from the bottom o f  the carriage. It was a very happy time. If  the workers put on 
some parts in the trolley and I passed through the workshop, I alw ays helped the workers.
At the very beginning we w ere told that we should work and w ork and work. First o f  all work, then 
personal life. The discipline was very strict in the plant, we cam e to  work early, we were afraid to 
be fired. A nd everybody around was saying that work -  the speciality -  is the main thing for the 
future. I w as very hard working and if  I began my life from the beginning, I think that I would 
repeat it in the same way.
The territo ry  around the plant was very dirty, it was oil and fuel on the land. It w as a nightmare. So 
we organised special subbotniks (Saturday work), and built a garden near the p lan t‘s building. O ne 
o f the leaders told the employees: ‘I will build everything for you’. And after som e time passed he 
built a really  beautiful fountain. There were different coloured lights in it and it w as made so that 
the w ater w as also coloured. It was fantastic. We were young and w e were happy.
In 1948 the plant began to make wheel-pairs for new trains for the Moscow metro. It was the 
only plant-supplier of the wheel-pairs for the plants which produced carriages for the metro. 
Since 1948 the plant has fulfilled three kinds of tasks: maintenance repair of the electric 
trains, capital repair (full renovation) of the electric trains and the forming o f wheel-pairs for
the electric trains.
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From  the beg in n in g  o f  its ex is tence  the p lan t serviced all tw elve  m e tro  system s in the S ov ie t 
U nion.
In 1974 the p lan t began  to  bu ild  a new  territo ry  in  order to  in c rease  its p ro duc tion  capacity . 
The new  te rrito ry  w as bu ilt in th e  suburbs o f  M oscow  accord ing  to  p lans dev e lo p ed  by th e  
in stitu te  T ranse le trop ro jec t. T hus, th e  p lan t since that tim e has co n sis ted  o f  tw o  te rrito ries: 
P opugai in  th e  cen tre  o f  M oscow  and  K uk ino  in  the M oscow  su b u rb s.
A ll the  tim e, from  th e  beg inn ing  o f  th e  p la n t’s ex istence, there  w ere  d ifficu lties  w ith  fu lfilling  
the p lan . A nd  even  i f  it w as th e  o n ly  p lan t in th e  form er U S S R  w h ic h  repaired  th e  e lec tric  
trains, n everthe less , the p lan t w as in  a very  d ifficu lt financial and  eco n o m ica l situ a tio n  at th e  
end o f  80-s.:
The low-prestige status o f  the enterprise, which belonged to the system  o f  the M inistry o f  Road 
Comm unications (M PS) influenced the life o f  the plant’s employees, and in the first place their 
wages, which were traditionally lower than in the whole Moscow m etro. (Farewell poverty. How 
the repair plant becam e a profitable enterprise. Newspaper Vek, 15.11.05.1995.)
T hus, by the beg in n in g  o f  the 9 0 -s  th e  p lan t w as in  a very d ifficu lt situa tion  an d  it cou ld  be  
excluded  from  th e  lis t o f  the p ro fitab le  S ov ie t enterprises.
Elections
At the end o f the 80-s and the beginning of the 90-s in Russia there was further development 
of the democratic processes. One o f the main features of that era was elections of the senior 
managers of enterprises. As in some other places, in the Remet plant democratic elections 
were organised. It is interesting to note that in the period preceding the elections within the
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plant 4 or 5 directors were changed. They governed for 2 - 3 years and disappeared, without 
any noticeable changes within the enterprise. The plant was in a difficult financial and 
economic position, and there were not many people who wanted to govern it.
The new General Director of the enterprise was elected by the collective of the plant in 1990 
on the base of an open competition. There were 3 applicants, but several days before the 
elections the remaining two candidates changed their minds and withdrew their applications. 
So the new director was the only candidate and he won the election. Very soon after the 
election, he worked out a program to develop his independence from the metro authorities 
and leasing seemed to be the preferable way out. The documents was drawn up and the plant 
sent them to the appropriate committee in Moscow. Thus, from April 1990 the plant became 
leasing enterprise, although the decision was made very slowly and only at the beginning 
1992 were the documents about the leasehold finally signed.
Leasehold
Since Perestroika began in Russia there was a shift towards privatisation. But real 
privatisation was possible only after 1992, when the Russian president signed several degrees 
about privatisation. At the beginning of the 90-s the only way for further independence was 
leasing. The General Director o f the plant realised that for the plant it would be more 
profitable to be privatised. But the metro’s authorities didn’t give him permission to do so. In 
conditions o f constant struggle, the plant was allowed to lease all its equipment and buildings, 
but without the right subsequently to buy. The general conditions of agreement were that the 
plant would be on lease for 5 years. A document was signed with the Moscow Metro 
Administration about amortisation of the equipment and planned repair of the carriages.
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The first steps of the leasing enterprise were very difficult. The former authorities were not 
satisfied with the situation, when the plant was not subordinated to them. They tried to put up 
every obstacle to complicate the life of the plant. They had been used to considering the plant 
as their property and they could not understand that the plant now acts as an independent unit.
In fact, the lease meant for the plant that it should find ways to operate in the new market 
conditions without any help from the metro authorities. The situation with equipment on the 
plant was quite difficult: up to 80 % of it was worn out. The main good thing for the plant 
was that with the help of lease the plant escaped from the dictatorship o f the metro 
authorities. If before the plant always had to consult with them about everything, now it 
received much more freedom, for example in formation its own payment system, clients’ 
connections and soon. At the same time, although all employees automatically became 
leaseholders, there were no any substantial changes in their rights. In fact not one of the 
workers could explain the differences between the modem situation and the past.
The governing body
Since the plant began working on lease, the main management team was the governing body:
1. General Director
2. Vice Director on Production in Popugai area
3. Vice-Direction on Production in Kukino area.
4. Head of the Planning-Production Department.
5. Vice-Director on Economic Questions.
6. Lawyer
7. Head of the Marketing Department.
8. Head of the Department o f the External Co-operation.
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As we can see, the governing body consisted o f the upper leaders. There were not any shop 
chiefs at all. This situation caused some problems, when the most urgent production questions 
were not resolved or had been delayed. Besides, in the governing body there were not any 
women, although there are a lot of women at the plant.
The governing body had a meeting once a month and resolved the most difficult industrial 
questions, but the governing body was not a harmonious team. The differences in views and 
positions were inspired by the general manager himself, who used the policy of ‘divide and 
rule’.
From October 1992 the General Director created the position of First Vice-Director, who 
became responsible for all questions regarding production. The General Director himself has 
responsible since then for international activity, for searching for new partners and clients all 
over the world.
The technology
The technology at the plant is very old. Some o f the equipment dates from the late 40-s. The 
majority of the equipment -  up to 70 % -  was bought in the early 70s. The technology of the 
repair of carriages had been worked out in the 50s, and most of the technological processes
were written in the middle 70s.
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The repair
The repair of carriages was fulfilled by both the metro depots and the Remet plant. The small 
defects had to be repaired in the depots. More serious repair was done on the plant. After a 
certain amount of mileage all the carriages running on the metro had to pass through repair in 
the plant. Those vehicles which had been running on the rails for many years had to pass 
through capital repair (full repair). The rest of the vehicles had to pass through maintenance 
repair.
Economic situation of the plant up to the end of 1993
As in the Soviet period, the main production of the plant was the repair of carriages for the 
Moscow metro. Sometimes there were several orders from the other metros in the former 
USSR - Tbilisi metro, Leningrad and so on. There was some kind of co-operation between the 
Plant and other sites in the former USSR.
Supply problems
In the former USSR the whole supply system was organised through the special metro service 
which was called MTS (Material-Technical Supply). For each enterprise in the metro system 
there was a special quota. The plant had 40% quota for supplying material from the MTS 
system. Thus, in the past this service provided some minimum of parts needed by the plant.
By the beginning of the 90s the situation had considerably changed. Moscow metro 
authorities considered the plant’s desire to work on lease as an opposition to the whole metro 
system and they did not want to provide the plant with the parts through the previous system
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of MTS. Thus, in 1990, for example, there was non-delivery of 100 positions from the MTS 
system.
Besides the agreement with the MTS system, the plant had commercial agreements with 
different plants within USSR about the deliveries different parts. By the time the plant was 
transferred to arenda (leasehold) in 1990, there was a disruption of the whole system of 
economic connections between different parts of the former USSR. The whole system of 
centralised supplies from the different regions was collapsing and a lot of connections were 
cut off because of the collapse of the former USSR. From the following Diagram it is clear 
how supply provision for the plant was organised from the different parts of the former 
USSR:
Diagram 3.1.
Extraction from the range of suppliers:
N parts name Supplier
1. axles Dnepropetrovsk, Ukraine
2. wheels semi-finished 
products
Nizhnyi Tagil
3. cogwheel Saint-Petersburg
4. box-trees Tver
5. bearing N 123 Vinnitsa, Ukraine
6. frames Moscow Mechanical Plant
Thus, at the beginning o f the 90s the plant was faced with a lot of difficulties with the supply 
of materials and it had to make quick decisions for resolving this problem: to look for new 
partners or to arrange new agreements with the old ones which suddenly turned out to be 
abroad. It could not be done overnight.
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The external difficulties were supplemented by internal ones: up to March 1993 the enterprise 
had no marketing department and its role was fulfilled by the Department of External Co­
operation. But its work had a lot o f imperfections; people had no knowledge of how to work 
in the new conditions, there was a lack of information about the new laws and regulations and 
a lack of qualified specialists.
Relations with the other depots
First of all the depots and the plant were subordinated to the metro authorities, and were part 
of the same system. The depots maintained the vehicles and if they were not able to repair it, 
the vehicle was transferred to the plant for more serious repair. The MTS system which 
supplied the plant provided up to 40 % of the parts needed by the depots. The rest of the parts 
the plant as well as depots had to find out themselves. Thus, the depots and the plant had 
constant problems with spare parts, and were looking for any other ways of coping with this 
problem. One of the ways of resolving these problems was the system o f informal exchcmeine 
of parts between the plant and different depots. Usually the shop chief or the vice shop chief 
called to the nearest depots in case of lack of some parts in order to find the parts needed. 
People from the depots used to do the same things if they had a lack of parts for repair.
Crises of non-payments
The situation with supply problems was aggravated by the crises of non-payments, which 
began in 1992. A lot of enterprises had no cash. Some o f the plant’s clients was among them. 
They didn’t pay for the work fulfilled. As a result the plant had difficulties with cash as well. 
This crisis touched the relationship between the Moscow metro authorities and the plant.
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There was tension in their relations, because the plant fulfilled repair of carriages, but the 
metro authorities didn’t pay for it, because of the difficulties with getting cash. A lack of cash 
immediately influenced the problems with people.
Staff problems
The difficult situation in the plant influenced the bad situation with labour turnover. Let’s 
take the year 1993 as an example.
The number of employees at the beginning 
of 1993
1372
Among them workers: 1035
For the period of 
1993:
For the period of 
1992:
the plant hired: 666 employees. 582
Among them workers: 566 462
specialists 100 121
the plant lost: 491 356
among them workers 429 309
specialists 62 -
Thus, in 1993 the plant hired 83 more people and lost 135 more people in comparison with 
1992. The labour turnover in comparison with 1992 increased by 7 % and reached the level of 
35.8%. The most noticeable labour turnover in the plant was in January and March before 
wages were raised. In April, when the plant’s wages increased in comparison with the other 
branches o f industry, labour turnover stabilised, but in July and August it increased again.
The highest level o f the labour turnover was in the following workshops and departments:
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Data for 1993: Carriages 
assembling 
workshop 
(CAW) 
Popugai area
Carriages repair
workshop
(CRW)
Kukino area
Wheels repair
workshop
(WRW)
Engine section
hired 71 97 58 34
separated 145 132 76 49
Thus, to summarise the whole situation in the plant, we can conclude that the beginning of
leasehold was a very difficult time:
1. There was a constant shortage of workers of specific categories, up to 35% (turners,
polishers and so on.)
2. Up to 50 % o f equipment was worn out:
Percentage o f equipment fully written off in:
mechanical assembly workshop 43,7%
wheels repair workshop 44,8%
Equipment with amortisation more than 50 %
mechanical assembly workshop 34,5%
wheels repair workshop 37,8 %.
as a result the equipment stoppages amounted to 30,400 norm/hours.
3. Constant shortage o f material and parts led to problems meeting the plan targets within the
plant. As a result, the workshops very seldom fulfilled the plan.
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4. In many cases the co-operation agreements with the suppliers broke down: For example, in 
1990 there was an agreement with the Tver carriage building factory about the 
delivery of 2400 box-trees. 448 box trees were non-delivered.
All the problems enumerated above came to a head when the plant failed to make the plan. 
How it happened we will explain in the following chapter.
Management structure: formal and informal
Interdependence of the formal and informal structure
There were absolutely opposed opinions on the matter o f how the structure o f the plant had 
been organised .One o f person, who had been the head of the Department o f Labour and 
Wages for a long time, told me that the structure of the plant in the past was constructed, as in 
some other plants, according to some scientific elaboration worked out for industries by 
various institutes, checked out in different places and were widespread throughout industry. 
Her view was opposed by the vice head of this department, who told me that the structure had 
been organised in a very spontaneous way, and if people in charge were needed for some 
position, they just invented it and brought them in. I consider, that the second view was more 
realistic, because my experience of researching Russian enterprises showed that usually, 
despite the logical basis o f  any structure, within enterprises the approach which prevailed was 
one I can call organising the position fo r  the person, and not the person fo r  the position. 
Within our researched enterprise this approach always prevailed. Any person in an upper 
position could employ their relatives and friends in the plant. For these purposes they had to 
implement several new positions. In the past it was done secretly and the scale o f such
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appointments was not very wide, because the plant was subordinated to the underground 
authorities and they had to co-ordinate all the changes in the structure with these authorities. 
But it was not a big obstacle, although people in charge used these things very carefully.
Approximately from the beginning o f the nineties, with appearing of the new director, the 
organisation of position for a certain person became one of the main approaches used within 
the enterprise. The coexistence of two different approaches created some weaknesses within 
the enterprise. One of the weaknesses was the situation that the structure o f the enterprise by 
June 1992 had become extremely complicated. That is why it was quite difficult to 
understand ‘who does what’ in a particular department. Sometimes it was difficult to 
understand the differences in functions between some departments, especially when 
abbreviations were quite similar (see, for example Table 1, Production-Planning Department, 
Production Operating Department, Planning Economic Department and so on and so forth.). 
The main weakness o f the structure was that some functions were duplicated by several 
departments. Sometimes there were no clear view of the main functions o f the departments. 
For example: the Production-Operation Department duplicated the functions o f the operators 
in the workshop. People within these departments could not understand the differences 
between their department and the others.
One of the very important weaknesses was that very often the position of the person formally 
meant nothing, but its hidden power meant very much. That is why people who visited the 
plant for the first time usually tried to trace who has the real power, and who are these people.
For example, two people in the plant were responsible for economic questions: the Vice- 
Director on Economic Questions and the head of the Planning-Economic Department.
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Because of the struggle for power, they could not divide their responsibilities for a long time. 
That is why sometimes if some person who has got the signature of the Vice-Director on 
Economic Questions had to go to the head of the Planning-Economic Department in order to 
get another signature on the same matter. And although the Vice-Director’s status was higher 
than the head of the Planning Economic Department - it was only on paper. In reality the 
General Director was afraid o f too much strength o f the Vice-Director on Economic 
Questions and supported the head of the Planning-Economic Department.
Within some of the departments, as for example in the Planning Economic Department 
mentioned above, there was a lot of unnecessary work. For example, socialist competition, 
which was one of the main aims o f this department in the past, was cancelled after perestroika 
began, but the Department still did a lot o f  work in this direction, comparing the indicators 
between workshops. At the same time, the main function of the Planning-Economic 
Department: to define the plan for the workshops for the next month and for the future on the 
basis of the material available and other resources, was done very badly.
The whole system of organisation of production was a very complicated process. Even if the 
whole structure formally was organised on the basis of a scientific elaboration for the better 
organisation of production, the further ways of changing it for a definite person have led to 
the situation, when the structure became extremely complicated and at the end of the day it 
was impossible to govern the industrial process only through the system of formal 
communications. Very often, as we will see, in order to fulfil the plan it was necessary to 
violate some formal rules, to escape from communications with people in formal positions 
and to organise a structure of informal relations. Very often only the co-ordination of these
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informal relations could be an effective way of resolving the problems of production. So, 
there was a coexistence of the formal and informal structure and people very often used the 
informal structure for the successful organisation of production.
The main problem of such a situation was, that the informal structure was not a fixed 
structure. It was very flexible, and it could be constructed very quickly, and disappear very 
quickly as well. Usually, people who are meaningless in a formal structure, play an important 
role in the informal structure, as we will show below in the case of the ‘core’ workers in the 
plant: formally, they belonged to the lowest level in the organisation of production. But at the 
same time, their informal power made people in upper positions dependant on them. Because 
of their knowledge of the weakness of the production process, they could organise the 
fulfilment or the non-fulfilment of the plan and the situation was organised in a such way that 
managers had to negotiate some matters with them informally.
The weakness o f the old structure also was that each area was separated and there was no 
united view of the whole plant. Each Vice-Director on Production was responsible for their 
own area and was absolutely separated from the problems of the other area. For example there 
was a bogie section in Kukino area and the same section in the Popugai area, an engine shop 
in Kukino area and the same shop in Popugai area. All this production was in separate shops.
The main storehouse was situated in the Popugai area. That is why the Vice-Director on 
Production which was responsible for Popugai area could get any material without any 
difficulties, because he was closer to the people in the storehouse. The Kukino area could 
only get material left after the selection by the Popugai area. That is why people from the 
Kukino area complained all the time. Here is the opinion of the vice-shop chief:
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The people from the Popugai area get all new material. They are like sons and we are like a step 
sons for them. They left us only the rubbish.
And here is the opinion of one o f the workers:
We could get fiom Popugai area the parts for ju s t two carriages, and we have to repair 18. First o f 
all the warehouse provides the Popugai area. And they don’t care how we should fulfil the 
program.
The above quotations show that the two different areas were unequally provided with 
materials. But the people in charge could not use the formal structure to get materials. They 
could not go to the head of the storehouse and get the material. Because there was a system of 
informal relations between the person in the store and the vice-director on production of 
Popugai area. And even if the storeman had a lot of material, first of all he had to consult with 
vice-director on production o f Popugai area. Formally, the vice-director on production in 
Kukino area and vice-director on production in Popugai area had the same status. But the 
problem of getting material for Kukino area could not be resolved without the permission of 
the vice-director of Popugai area and for him it was not profitable, because he was 
responsible for the Popugai area. Thus, the formal structure within the enterprise sometimes 
meant nothing, because there were informal structures, much more powerful, than the formal 
one.
As A.M. Smolkin pointed out,
Production is organised as a whole socio-economic system. The man is a main active element of 
such system. But the man cannot accept the aims of the whole system, if they do not correspond 
with his interests. And as an active element of production, the man, in accordance with his
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personal views, could construct his own informal connections (social or industrial), which might 
not correspond with the aims o f  the production system and even disturb its norm al functioning. 
(Smolkin, 1991, p, 29)
Below we will show the formal structure, as it existed on paper. But, as we pointed out above 
and will discuss further, the real processes within the enterprise are fulfilled through other 
structures, sometimes constructed for a limited period of time in order to fulfil some 
processes. But trying to analyse this formal structure we should keep in mind that very often 
the people in the top positions do not posses the power which belongs to people in a 
subordinate position. So, we should stress, that these formal structures didn’t play the most 
important role in the whole system of production. We shall see later what happened when the 
General Director introduced a new structure following the failure to meet the plan in May
1 9 9 3 .
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Informal relations on the shop floor
One o f the main aims of the whole research project was the investigation of the whole 
structure of informal relations inside the enterprise. The system of informal relations is the 
system where there are unwritten rules of behaviour. It includes the norms o f people’s 
behaviour which were not written in the norms and regulations, but people followed them in 
everyday life.
We will try to enumerate below several issues which are connected with the whole system of 
informal relation within the Russian enterprise. The employees’ everyday experience is 
characterised by the understanding of the dualistic coexistence of formal and informal rules 
and regulations. One o f the main features of the Russian plant is that the informal system has 
almost completely substituted the formal one, that is why there is a possibility for informal 
negotiation on almost every question. The main question which comes up in this situation is 
the price which the person should pay for such informal agreement. In England formal and 
juridical regulations set some limits to the scope o f informal negotiations, but in Russia 
sometimes following the laws and regulations means getting into difficulties: getting less 
money, resignation, and sometimes even prison, because the people on the top as a rule are 
more powerful and have more means, even false evidence, for pressing on people. Although, 
as we shall see, the type of problem handled through informal relations is very similar in 
Russia and in Britain, in Russia the informal relations traditionally swamped all of the formal 
rules and regulations.
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Thus, informal relation play a decisive role in the whole system of production. No one can 
ignore it. It should be always be taken into consideration, otherwise you will lose. Of course 
such a situation complicates the whole system of relations in production and enhances the 
role of subjective factors, which is why the level of unpredictability within Russian 
production is so high.
To what extent this informal power is widespread within the enterprise and how it operates on 
the level o f  the workshops we will see below, now we would only stress that the range of 
questions where informal relations play an important role is very wide. Here are several 
examples from the enterprise before its structural reorganisation at the end of 1993:
Relations with the bosses
The relations with the bosses are mainly based on the informal relations. Here are several 
examples:
-  Could you give me some examples, When you personally have negotiated the matter with your
boss?
OK. For example there is firefighting within the plant, when everything should be done quickly 
because of the plan. The foreman comes to us and say: ‘Guys, I want you to work hard.’ We ask 
him: ‘What we will have in exchange?’. He asks us: ‘What would you like?’ I, for instance, know 
that I will need a day off in the nearest future. And the foreman could say, OK, do this job ( it 
could take 2 -3  hours) and you will get a day off. The same on the weekends. We work till I p.m. 
But it is considered by him as the whole day. If in one week I need the day off, he will give it to
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me. Of course, no documents are drawn up, just an agreement between the foreman and us. Why 
do we need the paper work?
And one guy in our brigade was a drunkard and he could be out of work for several days because 
he was drunk. And our foreman had a special agreement with this guy, that if he is drunk and can’t 
go to work, he should pay to the foreman part of his salary. The size of the payment depended on 
the number of days out of work. Of course, we didn’t knew the exact figures how much he paid, 
but it was not a secret that it is possible to negotiate such kind of problems with our foreman.
There are a lot of informal relations. I can tell you that almost all relations are informal (Interview 
with a fitter, The plant "Remet" Bogie brigade, June 1993).
Another thing which is quite important is that a person at the plant first of all should fulfil 
their tasks, and at the same time ‘be nice with your boss’. And these two things could be 
absolutely opposite in the reality. First of all it is clear with the security system: they should 
fulfil their tasks and prevent stealing from the enterprise regardless of the position of the 
person. At the same time their own position depends on the disposition of the boss. So if he 
fulfils his/her responsibilities strictly, he can lose his/her job.
The same situation arises with the Department of Technical Control. This department is 
responsible for the quality of the repaired carriages and formed wheel sets. And if there is some 
complaint about the quality of repair, this department is responsible for it. At the same time there 
were some cases in the plant, when the first vice director at the end of the month, when it is 
essential to meet the target, comes to the head of the department and asks her directly: ‘you should 
close you eyes and do not notice some defects in the repair, and all our resources are available 
to thank you for this
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So it is obvious that there is a kind of informal pressure in the plant, when the bosses use their 
position in order to reach some aims, sometimes even by violating the written rules and 
regulations.
Informal relations with the other brigades
Within the Russian enterprise if there is a necessity to get some people from another brigade 
to do some work there is a system of written rules, that the foreman should write a special 
order and transfer this order to the other brigade. But as a rule nobody wants this paper work. 
It is usually organised on the informal level - between brigades - some workers would ask the 
workers from the other brigade to fulfil the job. If the second brigade is busy with some other 
work - in this case the informal negotiations continue on the level of the foremen - they would 
agree about the right time to fulfil the job. All these relations are favour to favour. It means 
that this time the second brigade will do the job for the first brigade, but at another time the 
first brigade will help the second one in return.
Very often people ask workers from another brigade do something for their personal aims. 
Here is an example o f such relations on the Russian plant:
With the fitters you have negotiations if you have some personal need. If it is not very difficult 
work and you have good relations with this fitter - he can do it for you free. If it is a job, which 
takes a lot of effort - you should either negotiate the price or give him a bottle of vodka (Interview 
with a fitter, Plant Remet.August, 1993).
Sometimes in the brigade there are no parts. You can go to another brigade and ask:
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I could not find the bolts in ou r section, then I went to the o ther brigade and asked their foreman. 
He looked for them and could no t find any. Then he went to the store house and brought me these 
bolts, o f  course without filling in some forms. Just asked for them  in the warehouse.
Informal relations and promotion
The formal system of promotion as such does not exist. There is no official system of 
selection for a certain position as in some western countries. And the system of appointment 
and promotion is organised only through the informal system. This system covers any level of 
the enterprise - from the top to the-bottom. The workers for the upper positions are selected 
on the basis of loyalty to the shop chief. Their commitment to the enterprise, their ability not 
to ask too many questions, keep their mouth shut if they see some hidden action of the upper 
leader and so on.
The approximate examples of the informal negotiations regarding appointment could be as 
following:
One o f  the people in a senior position could come to the G eneral Director and say: 1 have a very 
good person (relative, friend). H e is unemployed at the m om ent. C ould we hire him in our plant?
Usually the Director will think about it and if he trusts the person who asked him to do a 
favour, he will make a positive decision. As we have already noted, at the moment a lot of 
people in the plant were appointed with the help of such an informal system. A son-in-law of 
the First Vice-Director was appointed to a prestigious job in the new Marketing Department. 
The wife of the Chief Engineer is working in the bookkeeping department. A relative of the 
Vice-Director on Production works in the security group and so on. These people were taken
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on because their patron was in a quite senior position. But this system works also with 
ordinary people. Of course the position offered could be lower in this case. Take for example 
the Planning-Economic Department, the husband of one of the economists in this department 
works as a driver, and her sister as a crane driver. The relative of another person in the 
Planning Economic Department works as a worker. The daughter of another economist works 
as a clerk in the Department of External Co-operation. All of them were appointed because of 
a guarantee of their relative for their good qualities. And, of course, I owed my access to the 
plant to the fact that my mother has worked there for a very long time.
A job in the plant has itself become a value in modem conditions in Moscow. That is why 
this value is distributed only among a restricted circle of people, who have some relation to 
the plant. So if there are some vacancies in the plant and the plant should inform the local 
employment agency, nevertheless there is no chance for a person from this agency to get a job  
in the plant. The people involved in the process o f selection in the plant would find different 
ways to reject a candidate ‘from the street’. The most preferable way is always through 
relatives and friends.
Sometimes informal criteria are the only explanation for an appointment - if there is no logic 
to the appointment, then it must be profitable to somebody. For example, nobody could 
understand how a person with low education could be appointed on the shop chief position. 
The answer is simple - it was convenient for the upper management, because this person was 
loyal to the upper management and was not clever enough to undermine the position of the 
people on the top. He did everything he could in order to meet the target and didn’t ask 
unpleasant questions. And these were all the qualities required to put him into this position.
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Cutting corners
If there are some rules and regulations o f  doing the job, nevertheless it is very difficult to 
fulfil it according to them - sometimes there is a lack o f parts because of problems with 
supply, sometimes the parts are so old that the plant has stopped producing them any more. 
How do the workers resolve such problems? The answer is in the following examples, some 
of which are already familiar from the British plant.
In our engine repair workshop quite often there is a situation, when there are long bolts, and we 
have no short ones. In this situation I used to take a hacksaw and cut the long ones, or whet them 
with emery for a shorter size (Interview with a worker in the motor shop. March, 1995).
A shortage o f parts was one of the biggest problems within the plant:
26th of July 1993, Monday.
The rhythm of the work quite normal. During the day in our part appeared the shop chief and vice 
shop chief and technologist with them.
There is a shortage of some parts: distance rings, bolts (suspension), ‘hats’ for the engine fixer. 
Foreman was warned about a shortage of such ‘hats’ almost one month ago, and there is no result 
- yet. There is no additional ‘chalk’ [special metal boxes to move heavy part] so we need to move 
things during the day from one place to another ourselves, and it is very heavy Job. Several guys 
have refused to do it.
At the same time the plan was a real dictator, that is why management was forced to do the 
job even if  there were no spare parts or details. Within the plant, if there were several 
carriages o f  the same type, the parts from one carriage were taken out and put in the other one 
- which had to be repaired first. Such a system was called 'take o ff one’s shoes The system
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was very widespread on the plant. There were no obstacles to such a system, although the 
carriages could come from different depots for repair, but it was a state system and all they 
belonged to one state. In Russia there was a saying, that ‘everything that belongs to the 
collective farm, belongs to m e’. In this circumstances it was quite easy to exchange parts from 
different vehicles.
Sometimes the plant needed huge amount of parts to fulfil the plan. But because some 
economic ties with different plants had been broken, it was quite difficult to get spare parts. 
In this situation a whole system of informal relations with different partners could help. The 
parts could be found as a result of negotiations between the plant and some depot. The 
agreement usually was on a ‘favour to favour’ basis, because the depot could face the same 
situation. Sometimes the spare parts could be found in exchange for a bottle of vodka in the 
nearest depot. The shop chief of the carriage repair workshop at Kukino had very good 
relations with people from the depot. In case of emergency he could ask not only for some 
parts, but also he could ask for several people to work on the plant. It was not very often, but 
sometimes he asked workers from the depot to help in fulfilling the plan for the plant.
Stealing at the enterprise
People try to steal almost everything from the plant: wood, plastic, paint, stick, veneer, bolts, 
steel, glass and so on. Before 1994 there were people on the gates who controlled the stealing, 
but they looked the other way: as a rule people carried the stolen things through the holes in 
the fence around the enterprise.
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People steal everything from the enterprise: the engines - not the big ones, but the small ones, 
which can be put into a bag. But also some reductors were sometimes stolen through the gates. The 
cable as well. One tim e I saw, that the material was thrown out o f the w indow  in the shop. In my 
opinion, everything could be stolen (interview  with a worker from the bogie brigade - June 1993).
Relations with the storemen/storewomen
The relations with the storewomen was based only on the personal relations. For example, I made 
a repair at home and I needed some paint. I asked the storewomen. I needed a lot - 6 litres. The 
paint is very good, it is bright and you cannot buy such paint in the shops. The range o f  the 
temperature o f  this paint is very wide. I talked to her, and, I don’t rem em ber exactly, but I think I 
presented to her a box o f  sweets. That’s it. But to  be honest, I didn’t have very good relations with 
her.
If one had good relations with the people in the store, he/she can get everything from the 
storehouse. But if the relations with the storewomen have been spoiled for some reasons, she 
could make an obstacle to getting material from the store. And if you need something for your 
home, you can’t get anything from her. But other people use this way o f communication very 
often.
Drunkenness
In 1993 drunkenness was one of the most serious problems within the plant. The labour 
discipline among the workers was very low. The situation in the labour market at that time 
also was not very difficult, the level of unemployment in Moscow was not very high, and the 
wages in the plant were not above the average, and sometimes fell below. Also in the plant at
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that moment there were shortages of workers. Here are observation of one o f  the bogie 
brigades in the carriage repair workshop (Kukino area):
Someone who drinks a lot has a bottle o f  vodka when they come to work in the m orning. During 
the break they could drink, or even during work they could always find ways to use 10 minutes. 
Nobody notices it.
When there is some celebration - all the brigade organises a meeting with vodka. I f  it is some big 
holiday - we can sit around the table after work. If there is a shortage o f vodka, we can run to the 
underground station - there are a lot o f  kiosks where we could get spirits.
The bosses also could allow themselves to drink vodka during work. Once I came to the 
office of the shop chief, and a bottle of vodka was standing right on the shelves behind him. 
The workers knew about it:
The shop chief and all the bosses have spirits. All the workers in the warehouses have spirits. The 
higher the position - the more spirits they have.
At the beginning o f the 90s the shop chief could still not fire the workers because of 
drunkenness (then there will be nobody to work), but step by step the shop chief began to fire 
such workers. Once, in the middle of 1993, I came to interview people in the workshop and 
right at the front of the shop a drunk worker was laying. I went to the shop chief and asked 
him: What are you going to do with him?’ He said ‘I will fire him immediately. I warned him 
several times. That’s enough.’
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Informal relations and the payment system in the plant
The most dramatic example of how the informal system operates within the plant is that of 
the payment system. In the payment system the informal system has almost substituted the 
formal one. And as we can see in the following examples, there is a clear tendency for the 
further informalisation o f the payment processes. Below we will try to explain the real 
situation with the organisation of the payment system in the plant in 1993. For this purpose 
we chose one of the workshops, the carriage repair workshop (CRW)
A little bit of history
The CRW workshop is one o f the main workshops in the plant. Earlier the repair of carriages 
was carried out only at the Popugai area, but since 1974 the carriages have also come for 
repair at the Kukino area. This area is larger than the old one, there is more space for 
manoeuvre. But the system o f repair is different from that at the Popugai area. At the Popugai 
area there is a stable system. When the train comes to the plant, the carriage is separated from 
the bogie and the different brigades come to this carriage to repair it. This system was quite 
efficient and had proved itself during all the years of the plant had been conducting repairs. 
But when the Kukino area was constructed, the designers and constructors decided ‘to 
improve’ situation and organised the new workshop in another way -  they created a line 
(conveyor system) in order to improve the efficiency and output of the new area. But in 
practice everything went in the wrong direction. The designers were too far from the real 
processes in production. The main fault of this system was that the designers thought all the 
trains would be similar, and it would be easier to repair them on a conveyor system. In reality
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what happened was that there were at least 5 modifications o f the trains, and it is impossible 
to organise a conveyor line with it. There are different trains, and they need different kinds of 
repair. The workers and the line managers at the plant are very surprised, who invented such a 
stupid system?
The payment system in the workshop
The main aim of the CRW is to carry out two types of repair to carriages - full renovation and 
maintenance repair.
In the middle of 1993 according to the staff schedule there should have been 112 people in 
the workshop. In October 1993 the workshop was only 75% staffed.
The structure of the workshop was :
Shop chief 
Vice-shop chief.
Foremen
brigadiers
brigades of workers.
The system o f repair was organised through 12 brigades, among them:
- bogie workers
- electro-fitters
- electro-operators
- inside carriage workers
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- painters
- upholsterers
- pneumatic workers
- galvanic workers
- body brigade
- covers
- carpenters
- operators
In the shop there were two systems of payment among the workers: piece work and by time. 
The number of workers engaged in piece work was much higher than those who worked by 
time, see Diagram 2.1.
Diagram 2.1 The number of workers in CRW (1993)
The number of piece­
workers (%) 
plan / fact
The number of workers 
worked by time (%) 
plan/fact
1. January 73.1 67 14 12.5
2. February 72.2 68.4 15.3 7
3. March 85.3 80.7 7 5.2
4. April 86.5 78.1 5.2 6.2
5. May 88.3 74 6.5 4.5
6. June 92.1 74.4 8 4.9
7. July 92.4 67.6 7.3 5.2
In each section there were special norms of work, for example in the bogie section, there were 
different times for bogie repair depending on the type of bogie. From time to time, according 
to changes in the technical process, these norms could be revised. In the past there was a
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special normative station, which sent its specialists to standardise the processes. There were 
special plans of norm revision. When perestroika began, all this system collapsed. The plan 
for norms revision does not exist, and the specialists from the normative station stopped 
visiting the plant in 1992. Thus the process o f norm revision had become very chaotic. Now it 
is mainly the responsibility of the Labour and Wages Department. The procedure of norm 
revising itself is endless. Sometimes it takes several days, sometimes several months. The 
most difficult thing is that the norms which operated within the plant were established at the 
beginning o f the 70s. So, the Labour and Wages Department was aware, that almost all of 
them were out of date. There is a lot of dissatisfaction by this situation. The technologists 
send to the Labour and Wages Department (LWD) their suggestions regarding the norm 
revisions, the planners also remind the LWD about the necessity of revision of some norms. 
And of course the workers’ demands are the most militant. According to the opinion of the 
specialists from the Labour and Wages Department, the norms are now very out of date. 
When they were worked out, the main aim was that in every section there should be equal 
efforts. But the workers and the specialists confirm that it is not true. For 20 years some 
processes have changed, there was modernisation of carriages, in some sections new 
equipment appeared - so different sections have different loads. It is clear, that almost all 
norms should be revised as soon as possible. But the LWD has no resources for this. They 
accept the necessity of creating a special bureau. At the moment people in the LWD are 
overloaded and that is why the norm revision goes very slowly.
The payment system at the plant had considerably changed since April 1990. The plant began 
to work on lease and became more independent in the organisation o f payment for its
202
employees. It established a 12-grade system within the plant which mainly concerns salaried 
staff. As regards the workshops, the plant pays to the workshop in accordance with definite 
norms. There is also a set labour capacity for each operation. For each year the full year 
labour capacity is calculated. During the year the labour capacity is the same, but the 
valuations vary. The whole system o f payment was worked out in the LWD. For each section 
the average grade per year was calculated. Each norm correlates with a particular grade. Each 
grade has its own tariff. The piece wages for a workshop are calculated according to a certain 
formula:
The number X norm X 1 hour tariff rate = piece wages of carriages of labour efforts 
for a certain grade
The wages in the brigades in the past were calculated according to:
1. coefficient o f labour participation. (It was quite a difficult task to calculate wage, 
because this coefficient could be 0,8 or 0,9, according to the particular labour efforts 
o f the worker.)
2. the amount o f time spent at work.
3. special addition for the labour conditions.
Later, at the beginning o f the 90s, at the plant the role of the coefficient was diminished and 
the work of each worker was equal to 1.0. Step by step the distribution of money in the
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brigade began with a definite sum. In the middle of 1993 the distribution procedure was like 
this:
All people gathered at a brigade meeting and they form a special record of the proceedings:
agenda: the distribution o f  wages fund of a certain section.
decided: to distribute money in a following way...
If, for some reason the worker o f  this section doesn’t agree with the way the money was 
distributed, then he will get payment according to the tariff and actual time spent at work. But 
it is like a punishment. For example, if the average wages in the workshop were 60 thousand 
roubles, according tariff they would get no more than 18 thousand roubles.
The bonus system
All clerks belonged to the salaried staff. But the salary o f the clerks depended on the plan 
fulfilment of the shops. Sometimes they had a 50% bonus in addition to their salary. In 1993 a 
new Statement about the bonuses for the engineering and technical staff was adopted which 
reduced the dependence of the bonus on plan fulfilment.
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The Regulation about the procedure of payment of additional salary for 
managers, specialists and clerks in the plant.
1993
1. The volume o f the additional salary o f the managers, specialists and clerks 
depends on the level o f fulfilment by the workshops or the separate sections o f the 
planned volume o f production and also on the limits o f  the wages.
2. The maximum size o f the additional salary could not exceed 50%.
3. The calculation o f  the quantity o f  the additional salary:
it is calculated only on the basis o f  the volume o f production o f the corresponding 
production.
4. I f  the plan was not fulfilled by more than 20 %, the additional salary will not be 
paid.
5. The governing body could increase or decrease the quantity o f  the additional 
salary o f  the concrete person, but by no more than 25 %>.
6. The heads o f the departments distribute the additional salary on the basis o f  the  
coefficient o f  labour participation, stimulating the fulfilment o f work f o r  
temporarily absent employees.
7. The additional salary is calculated fo r  everybody, including people on sick p a y  
and on holidays.
8. The size o f  the additional salary fo r  the Vice-Directors is defined by the General 
Director o f the plant.
9. For work in the governing body 5 % additional salary is paid.
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This system itself was quite ridiculous, because some clerks had no connection with 
production. At the same time the direct producers didn’t get any bonuses for their efforts.
This Regulation confirms the fact that the bonus system did not correspond with the 
contribution of the person to the production process, and was too far from any organisation of 
a balance between rewards and results.
In reality, almost all clerks considered such a bonus as an additional part of the salary and 
people see it as an integral part of the basic salary. The system of bonuses depends on the will 
of a definite person, in our case it could be the shop chief, foreman or the director.
The situation with workers bonuses even before 1990 was completely absurd. Officially the 
workers did not get any payment for meeting the target. It was considered that the payment 
for each carriage repair includes the bonus. What is this bonus the workers didn’t know. But 
the bonus system within the plant was a really striking point, because all the office workers 
got an additional 50 % payment to their salary in case of plan fulfilment by the workshop. At 
the same time the direct producers did not receive any additional money for plan fulfilment. 
Because of piece work they could get payment only according to their productivity. This 
situation made many workers very tense.
The above description is supported by an interview with the shop chief about the process of 
money distribution in the CRW:
-  How do they distribute money within the brigade? They do it themselves?
The procedure of money distribution is like this: There is a plan task per month for a whole 
workshop. For example, it is twenty carriages per month. We need to fulfil it. Then we will do the
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calculation o f  the cost o f  the unit o f  production, which includes the wages, the calculation o f  the 
per cent o f  the plan fulfilment. So the wages depend on the per cent o f  the plan fulfilment. For 
each brigade there is a particular price for their work. It depends on their job , but it’s stable. I have 
the fund for the workshop. It is approximately 4 min. roubles - the fund o f  the shop chief. For each 
brigade w e have a staff schedule. This s ta ff schedule is based on the labour capacity. For example, 
if there is a plan to repair twelve carriages, then there should be nine people in this brigade. And it 
is calculated for each brigade. And then there is a sum o f  the tariff schedule o f  each brigade and 
we calculate the basic coefficient o f  the whole workshop. And then we try to  calculate the figure 
for each brigade.
-  Then you are supposed to be a great mathematician?
The main calculations are made by the Department o f  Labour and W ages, and w e work together.
-  Do you have any professional education?
I graduated from the railway transport technical college. My wife has higher education and she 
works on the plant.
Okay, let’s go on: the ta riff schedule is calculated for one year. We have the plan. And if  there 
should be 9 workers, but only seven work, it doesn’t matter. We need the volum e o f  production, 
and it doesn’t matter how many workers did it. 90 % o f  the workshop are on piece work. In m any 
plants there is the same piece rate system. Automatically, if  they do less, they get less money.
We, the shop chiefs, the vice-shop-chief have a stable salary. Plus I get a  particular per cent bonus. 
If  the workshop d idn’t fulfil the plan, then I w on't get the bonus.
-  If it is a problem o f  supply, then you autom atically don’t get your bonus?
207
The definite per cent 1 will get anyway. I will get the bonus for the volume o f  production which my 
workshop fulfilled, but not the bonus for other indicators. O f course, the departm ent which is 
responsible for supply will be punished, but autom atically some part o f  my bonus will be cut 
because o f  a such situation.
-  Do you think it is a ju s t system?
I don’t think so. I don’t think it is successful. But this is state enterprise, and the whole system o f 
organisation o f  production in Russia needs better organisation. But it is very difficult to change it.
-C a n  you explain the further system o f  money distribution?
I am gather the foremen and brigadiers here, I give them the data, which w ere prepared by the 
Labour and W ages Department and each brigade gets the money for the brigade. Then the 
brigadiers and the foremen go to their brigades and there the foreman and the brigadier distribute 
the money within the brigade. They know more closely their brigade, who does what. On the basis 
o f  the coefficient o f  labour participation. There are two ways o f  distribution o f  wages w ithin the 
workshop. There is a special statement, which is renewed each year. This statem ent w as legally 
organised. It is specially worked out, the whole system. There are two ways: by KTU (coefficient 
o f  labour participation) and the free system - by figures. The brigadier can choose the system and it 
is his choice to give pure money. The brigadier can distribute the money, for example, betw een 9 
people, he calculates, how much each person should earn and while he has this average, he can 
vary the figures. This man - gets more money, that one - less. I f  one is m ore efficient - he will 
obtain more money.
-  How does it really happen within the brigade in practice? Are there a lot o f  conflicts about the 
distribution? W hether it was distributed equally, o r not.
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I am outside all these processes. The amount of money the worker will get depends on the level of 
qualification, on the contribution to this brigade. The person could work in the evening or work on 
Saturday. And everything is taken into consideration.
The shop chief is well informed about the whole system of payment distribution within the 
plant. Moreover, he is the key figure in it. At the same time the workers in his workshop were 
in a less privileged position. It is clear from the next interviews:
We ‘give’ the plan and they promise to us everything. For example the plan consists of 20 
carriages, and we have made 18. So they formed the documents about this fulfilled 18 carriages. 
And for the other two carriages which we didn’t repair they won’t receive money. And in case we 
make 20 carriages, who will get bonuses?
-  Who are they?
The administration of the plant. We do not receive the premium. ... Why have we made the plan? 
Because this was a quarter month. And they have the plan - I don’t know for the ministry or for 
whom and how many carriages we have to repair. In three months we should make 54 carriages, 
then they will get the quarter premium. This was a quarter month. Therefore they pressed on us, 
that we made 20. Further, we have made 20 - and they will receive the premium for fulfilment of 
'  the plan, they will receive the quarter premium. We won’t receive anything. We have nothing from 
this 20.
-  And why do you have nothing from this?
That is why we are told we have the lease - that’s it. No premiums, no bonuses. Only according to 
our quotation. And there is another question. The quotation is very low as such, and when they 
begin to divide the money they try to equalise - to make a balance in a such way that within the 
shop there are uniform wages. That is to say, the chief of shop removes money from another team
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and ostensibly adds to us. W hen you go to him and ask: ‘Why we were so poorly paid?’ He says: 
‘And what did you want?. I gave you ‘superfluous money’. And it is happening in a such way, that 
we are begging, and if he gave us some additional 10 to 15 thousand, then we are obliged to him. It 
means that we cannot approach him and ask. (Group interview with the bogie brigade, March 
1993).
Thus the system of payment within the plant was organised in a such way that the workers 
will get nothing for fulfilling the plan. So the formal way leads to disturbance among the 
workers. So, the shop chief finds other ways of paying people. He has his own fund, also he 
can take out some money from one brigade and add it to another. And it is used in order to 
prevent militancy among the workers. But the means which the shop chief uses are sometimes 
too far from the formal one. Besides, it is quite profitable to the shop chief to have such old 
norms: he always can say to the workers that without his help they will get money only 
according to the formal norms. By paying people additional money he, therefore, puts them 
into a position of dependency.
-  Could you tell me a little bit more about these quotations, because it is not quite clear for me - 
who is responsible, that such quotations are so low?
These quotations were made in 1968. the w hole technical process dates from 1968.
-  And what can you do in order to change them ?
We have tried everything. W e even struck for 2 days. And we were given 20 thousands additional 
money once, tha t’s it. They shut our mouth. T hat’s it. Yes, it is useless.
- And have you stopped the strike? You didn’t work during this strike at all?
Yes, but we made the plan anyway.
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-  That is to say you struck, and then  you made the plan. How did it happen?
We were pressed. For two days w e did nothing and in the following days with the help o f  intensive 
labour we made the plan.
-  And the conflict with the shop chief, how did it begin?
The shop chief can’t talk and com m unicate with people. He speaks like this : ‘If you don’t like to 
work here go to the meat factory. There is greater payment there.’ The foreman in our brigade 
always supported shop c h ie fs  line. W e wrote a grievance about him, and he was removed.
-  And now have you worked out a  further plan o f  action?
We struck. We went through all the bosses. The General Director told us, that we are unskilled 
workers. If  you get out - we will definitely find other workers. Here is a constant turnover. There is 
no stable staff.
There are constant shortages, there are no tools. N obody knows how we work. There are no proper 
work clothes. But all they know is the plan. They require from us only the plan. By any means. 
Because they need their bonuses.
The other brigades are dissatisfied too, painters, for instance, but they are com plaining all the time, 
and we have no tim e even to com plain.
-  And what have you decided? To strike with your legs ( to leave the enterprise)?
Yes. The shop ch ie f said that he’ll find the workers if  we leave the enterprise. And you can w rite a 
letter o f  resignation and get out.
The shop chief doesn’t even talk w ith us.
-  Have you decided for how long you will w ork here? Have you written these letters o f  
resignation?
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No. If you want to be dismissed, the only thing you need is just to be drunk. Then you’ll be fired 
quick.
As soon as we find new work we will leave.
The lack of knowledge about the process of formation of the payment among the workers is a 
very common situation among the different brigades. Here is the opinion of one of the 
workers in the bogie section, which was expressed in his diary of the working week:
4th of August, Wednesday.
Not so much work again. There was a rumour within the brigade, that the electricians have 
received for the 16 carriages, which they repaired, more than we've received. We've got an average 
120 thousand per person, but they have some workers, who received more then 140 thousand and 
130 thousand. The deputy shop chief passed through our section,. We tried to find out why this 
happened. We mentioned this point, that it is not profitable for us to fulfil the plan at all, because 
there is no motivation. He said, that it is our responsibility to be ahead and to have 2-3 bogies apart 
from the others. We tried to prove to him, that he gets some bonuses from the plan, but we have 
none. Then he said to us that the price of every carriage includes the bonus also, and we just 
couldn't see it. If it is so, what percentage of our work includes the bonus, and what idiot did that? 
So, it is automatically added to each carriage and for me it is not quite clear if it is a good thing, or 
not. No clearness, no stimulus. For a Russian man it was always clear, if somebody told him 
something like this: ‘This money - for this, that - for that’. Here we have a totally different 
situation. And nothing is clear at all. Besides this, he denied that he eventually has a bonus. It will 
be useful to obtain some information about their bonuses: how often they (I mean shop-chief and 
deputy shop chief and other ‘white collars’) have it and what percentage. Have they the bonuses 
per quarter?
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Because we have only the bonus which is put into the cost of a carriage. We asked him a question 
about our work: ‘Do you consider that we are unskilled workers?’ He stood on our point of view 
and answered that it is quite skilled. But the General Director, when he came to our meeting at the 
end of last year, said that we are unskilled workers. But this is unfair because I am working with a 
spirit level.
And the average grade is 4 for our brigade? To be honest, in order to speak with the 
administration, it is necessary to be a diplomat. And also it would be nice to have some 
‘informant’, who can give us some sorts of information. Then, they will feel, that we are not so 
foolish. To be honest, they already felt some our power, that is why "they are resolving our 
problems. And we, while we are speaking with them, we are stressing that we know how to fight 
with them on the documentary level, we know now how to formulate the documents according to 
the law, but we don't want this yet. And they also understand this, that is why they don't want to 
get involved so much with us. I am afraid that there are only 3-4 people in our brigade who speak 
and express their opinion, the rest of our people usually keep silence. But now, if we need this, the 
whole of our brigade will vote as we want, and if we will need them to sign some document, I am 
sure that all the people from the brigade will sign it.
We have no real description of the technical process. We don’t know the real price of the repair for 
a bogie. We can calculate only the number of bogies repaired. Everything is hidden. That is why 
they can tell us: ‘The shop chief gives you much more than you deserve.’
There should be 15 workers in our brigade. In the electro-operators section - 23. The plan 
increased from 15-16 carriages per month to 20. But the payment is stable and didn’t increase. 
Why? Nobody knows. (Quotation from interview with worker. July, 1993).
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The payment and its distribution is one of the vulnerable points all over the plant. The shop 
chief also confirms that there are a lot of troubles with money distribution:
There is a statement in each brigade about the distribution of payment. There is also the shop 
statement. But nevertheless each month in each brigade there are troubles about payment 
distribution. When I was on vacation - there was distribution according I or 2 type ( by KTU or 
according tariff status). But again there are conflicts. People in the brigades could not distribute 
money. (CRW, Shop Chief).
And here is an opinion of a worker from a facing team. Again the same problems with 
money: a lack of payment for a very difficult job. Sometimes the evaluations are made 
without any real calculation of the time which is needed for an operation. There is a feeling 
that the evaluations were made absolutely arbitrarily. And the revision of such an evaluation 
is a very long process. In some brigades there are fewer people than are necessary, but still 
they can’t get money for the absent people. So again and again - the same problems:
After running for 5 - 6 years the carriage comes for repair. We were paid earlier 20 percent over 
the shop norm. Now it has been cut down.
- A nd why were you paid  more?
Could you understand how we work? Almost all the shift we work on our knees. All day, every 
day. For hazardous conditions we receive 12 percent plus. Earlier the carriage cost 80 roubles. And 
it is now costs 7 thousand. Earlier it was more, now it is less. Then, according to the staff schedule 
it is necessary to have 5 persons for 15 carriages. We get a minimum payment for 3. So for two 
person we receive nothing.
- Have you tried to make any kind of protest?
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Yes, we tried. I talked to the chief o f  the Labour and Wages Department. She has explained to me 
that the plan was increased, the quotations for each carriage were increased as well. But our 
quotations were preserved. Later this business was equated, and they have begun to level us with 
the whole workshop. Say, the average payment in the shop is 35 thousand roubles, and w e've got 
35. But we could not understand, why we have to get equal payment with the others if  we have 12 
percent for harmful conditions and 20 percent the director has given us for heavy work. Plus we 
are working three persons out o f  5. It is very hard. Last time we worked for 7 days without a day 
off. And 3 worked instead o f  5. And we d idn’t receive money for the absent people. Earlier we had 
the highest salary in the shop. Now they have equalised us. Now we receive even less. I have been 
here 16 years and am in m y fourth year as a face maker. We consider that this is unfair.
-  And have you spoke with the vice-directors?
We do not jum p through the head. At first we spoke with our direct boss. We w ent to the shop 
chief. He said the foreman will decide. For example, there is a small bump on the floor. I punch 
them. It takes a lot o f  time, and you can not make the plan with such work. And I should do the 
plan. This is a big problem, because if  you do this job , you can’t fulfil the plan. So now they 
should m ake a decision about this question before the 15-th o f  M arch. But I doubt that they will 
make any decision. I am more than sure. W e need to spend up to 4 hours per carriage for this work. 
And at the same time if  we shall sit for 4 hours on the carriage - then w e could make only 10 
carriages, a maximum. And we have the plan now o f  19.
-  Who is the master in the shop?
It must be the chief o f  shop. We appealed to him several times about punching the bumps. He said 
it is at the discretion o f  the foremen. I w rote a special application, that if  I punch the bumps, they 
should pay m e for this.
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-  And what happened with this application?
I do not know. 1 gave one copy to the foreman. One copy to the chief of shop. And now he has said 
to the foreman ‘At your discretion’, and ‘If we need to punch the bumps on the carriage, so we 
have to pay for it’. But it is not clear how much they would pay for it?
-  Have you saved a copy of your application?
No, I gave it to the foreman. She should decide something on the level of the chief. If it will be not 
decided, then it is necessary to try above.
-  When have you written this application? In January? And now it is April. Nothing has 
changed. What you are waiting for? Why are you waiting for 4 months?
We have begun to set it right and it turns around and we become fools.
-  Since you began to act have you found that your payment was cut down?
If the foreman wants it, you know, she’ll find a way. She is a foreman of 4 sections - carpenters, 
upholsterers, painters and inside carriages.
-  And you have a suspicion that you are suppressed by her?
Well, not suppressed, but at the same time we do not know in what direction money disappears. 
Then the deduction has gone. The calculation was worked out that in our section all carriages are 
under different prices. We do the same work on each carriage, but the prices have variations from 
5 up to 6.S. It should not be such. We consider that we spend an equal amount of effort for each 
car. Only on intermediate carriages we could spend a little bit more. The payment should be 
identical. And we expect that they should calculate on the top price, instead of the lowest. The 
money distribution in our brigade goes according the second variant, it means that it is according 
to coefficient of labour participation and by figures. We signed for such a distribution. And in
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order to avoid some superfluous claims, we do not divide different categories. We pay no attention 
to the different grades. W e agreed that we all in our brigade work equally, and that the coefficient 
o f  labour participation is the same too. Now, when there is the process o f distribution, we even are 
not always present. Because nobody informed us about it. Once we found out that they divided the 
money we w ent there. And usually just the foreman comes and gives us a sum, and I personally 
consider it is not enough. I evaluate m yself higher. For one carriage I was not paid, for the second 
was not paid, but at the end o f  the day she will pay, otherwise she has no choice. In other words I’d 
like to say that, before we were paid 20 percent over the shop norm. At the beginning o f  this year 
there was a general meeting. The director agreed to add this percentage to our brigade. Then, after 
this meeting, I appealed to  the foreman, then to the shop ch ief - but in fact nothing has changed. 
The prices are still equal to  other sections.
-  And have you communicated with the other area (‘Popugai’). Are there the same brigades 
with a similar situation?
We know that in the o ther area the prices for the carriage are even cheaper. There continuous 
‘cheating’ goes on. Deceive the people.
The guys in the upholsterers brigade work, they have a quite normal situation. And in our brigade 
there is real pinching. Earlier we were supported in some way, 20 percent was thrown to us and in 
the past when everybody had 300 roubles per person, in our brigade there was alw ays 350 - 380 
roubles. And we felt the difference. And now everything is upside down, for example, the 
mechanical shop is now receiving directly 50 thousand. And we receive under 40. A nd earlier we 
always had m ore then them.
-  You have written the application in January, today is April. Are you going to take some 
further steps?
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We have not stopped the struggle. T he head o f the Labour and W ages Department promised to  pop 
in and to clarify the situation with th e  wages. I don’t know what they will decide, but 1 touch this 
problem twice a week. (Interview w ith  a Facing Team. April 1993)
The previous interviews have revealed that there are differences in the picture, which is 
showed by the shop chief and the workers. Definitely within the workshop there is room for 
money manipulation. The shop chief and the foreman are the key figures who are responsible 
for the wages in the workshop. From one side it is quite good that all the money is 
concentrated on the level of the shop and the shop chief together with foremen could 
distribute the money. From the other side, the role of subjectivity in such distribution is very 
high. Within a Russian workshop, as I stressed several times, the role of informal relations are 
very high. That is why the hope for objective distribution is very low. In our case the shop 
chief has a special fund from which he takes the money for incentives. Because he is a human 
being he could have his weaknesses as well. And the rumours in the workshop confirm this 
situation: the shop chief is very keen to help the inside carriage workers, because he began his 
working life in the same place. That is why he uses any possibility to support financially the 
workers from this brigade. Besides, at the moment of my investigation, at the beginning of 
1993, he worked out his new order in accordance with which the brigade which didn’t fulfil 
the plan or made some faults or made a lot of defects or went slow would be punished up to 
50% of their salary. And the appropriated money will be accumulated in the fund of the shop 
chief. One of the consequences was that the shop chief received several disciplinary 
punishments from the governing body for free manipulations with money. But that’s it. He is 
still a shop chief.
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The data from the research showed that the disputes and scandals regarding the money 
distribution took place within the workshop quite often in 1992 and 1993. One of the 
interesting features of all these disputes is that there was a clear demarcation line between the 
workers from the one side and the line managers from the other. Thus, we could see, that the 
old Marxist principle about the division between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is still applicable to the 
modem situation within the plant.
The shop chief o f the CRW confirmed that there is a possibility for subjective decision in 
money distribution. But he was insistent that such cases happened very rarely. Here is an 
extract from the interview with a shop chief:
-  Could some subjective factors influence the foreman’s decision of distribution of money?
Of course there are some cases. I can’t say that there could be a special love between a fitter and a 
brigadier, but it is not a secret, that there are some brigadiers who are more loyal to some workers. 
The brigadier could support the nucleus of the brigade. When the brigadier distributed the money, 
each member of the brigade is informed about the amount of money, a special protocol is 
constructed, where there is the wage of each person of the brigade, and the brigadier, two or three 
members of the brigade should sign this protocol that the brigade has accepted this protocol. After 
this the brigadier goes to the Labour and Wages Department where all the calculations are 
checked. And then the protocol goes to the Bookkeeping Department. There were some cases 
where there was dissatisfaction with the wages after such a distribution of money. In this case, 
according the statement, the shop chief or the foremen can distribute the money according to the 
tariff rates and the time actually worked.
-  How often do such cases happened?
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Very seldom. In m y experience - twice. W hen the foremen and the shop ch ie f signed this 
document - then again  - to the Labour and W ages Department and then to the Bookkeeping 
Department.
-  I f  there are conflicts within the brigade on the distribution, do the workers com e to you?
Yes. If there are som e conflicts between the mem bers o f the brigade - they do not come to me. But 
if  there are some conflicts between the majority o f  the brigade and the brigadier or the foremen 
and they disagree w ith the distribution o f money and each side considers that it is right, then the 
workers usually com e to me.
-  And does this happen very often?
Quite often. Seldom, bu t more often than the first one.
-  During your two years  how many tim es did they come to you?
I suppose 10 times. In th is case he appeals to the foreman. I am trying to understand the essence o f  
this conflict and then to  make a decision. And m ore often I keep the foreman’s side. Because the 
foreman is the most qualified person, most responsible person and he is responsible for the 
fulfilment o f the plan task . And I think that he is the most objective person.
Forms of conflict: case study of an industrial dispute
When we decided to observe any industrial disputes within the enterprise, the main aim o f 
such observation was to understand in what way disputes within the enterprise are 
institutionalised. What formal channels do the employees use in order to resolve industrial 
disputes? Besides, our aim was to give several typical examples o f industrial disputes within 
each particular enterprise in order to have a basis for comparative analysis with the others.
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The first dispute appeared in the Carriage Repair Workshop when I began to study the 
enterprise in spring 1993. The dispute began in February 1993 in one of the 12 brigades of 
the workshop. The workers o f the bogie brigade (12 people) put forward a series of demands, 
including:
- salary increase,
- revision of the technical process,
- changing the foreman.
- providing work clothes,
- providing special material for doing the job.
The demands were discussed between the workers and written on a small piece o f paper 
(which afterwards disappeared in an unknown direction). The whole dispute appeared 
spontaneously when the payment for the previous month was paid. According to the worker's 
view, it was not enough, and the payment didn’t correspond with the workers’ efforts. In 
search for justice they went to the shop chief, where tried to convince the shop chief to meet 
their demands. They said that they would not work until the demands were meet. At this stage 
three people became leaders - the brigadier o f the brigade and two other guys. In front of the 
shop chief the brigadier made a speech, the others tried to support him. The shop chief 
explained to the workers, that it is not his fault, that he has a tariff agreement and that, in 
accordance with this tariff agreement, he made all the payments and even added something to 
the brigade from his own fund. Besides, he warned the workers that if they won’t work they 
will be punished according to the present rules of labour discipline.
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Up to this point there were no documents which made any mention of a strike, all the 
workers’ activity was in accordance with the labour legislation. According to the law the 
workers could be punished for a violation of labour discipline, but not for a strike. Being 
dissatisfied by the shop chief s explanation, the workers went to the first vice-director. The 
brigadier explained the situation. In order to explain to the workers the situation, the first vice 
director explained the main points:
There are external organisations, underground authorities, for example, who are responsible for the 
prices for carriages. But at the moment they didn’t increase the ta riff for the carriages, that is why 
there is no possibility to increase the payment within the plant.
There are financial problems. When the underground will sign for the new prices, then the 
paym ent will increase automatically. But now there is an agreem ent with the underground, and we 
are operating according to  this agreement.
He spoke for a long time and from more practical questions went to the whole situation in the 
country. The workers were absolutely dissatisfied and angry because they didn't want words, 
they waited for some real practical solution. Absolutely disappointed, they returned to their 
workplaces, but didn't work. The deputy shop chief came across the workshop and reminded 
the workers that they should work, otherwise they will be strongly punished. Then another 
person, the vice-director on Kukino area came over. Among the workers he was known as 
one o f the leaders who doesn’t like to talk foggy, but who can help the workers. He said, that 
he will try to find some resources. The workers were in doubt, that is why they continued to 
play dominoes till the end of the working day.
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On the second day the workers came to their work but played dominoes. Because of their 
position (the brigade was situated at the entrance to the workshop) it was impossible to avoid 
contact with the brigade. That is why the shop chief, while he was walking down the 
workshop, several times warned the workers about the consequences of their behaviour.
On the second day a division among the workers appeared. Those workers who sometimes 
drank vodka at the workplace or had any other violations were frightened and said that it will 
not possible to get something with the help of a strike. But the leaders advised them ‘to shut 
their mouths’. The strike continued. The workers from the other brigades supported the bogie 
workers silently.
At the end of the second day, the vice-director of Kukino area came to the workers and said 
that he had found some money for the workers - 13,5 thousand roubles and that it should be 
shared among the workers. He also said that the technical process will be revised as well as 
the piece rates. But it was only words. There were no documents given to the workers from 
the administration side.
As the workers found out afterwards, the vice-director together with the shop chief found the 
money for the workers. The workers were promised they would be paid the money on the 
next day, and that the question about the foreman would also be resolved.
On the third day the workers didn’t know what to do: either to work or to continue the strike. 
The majority o f the workers thought that it is better to work and to make money. ‘They 
promised to pay us money, and to meet our demands. May be it is enough.’ By this time the 
majority of the workers were afraid of some sanction from the side of administration, that is
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why they decided to work. The paradox of the situation consists in the fact, that they worked 
hard. And although the whole workshop didn’t fulfil the plan, the workers o f this brigade 
fulfilled the plan.
The main results of the strike were:
1. 13,5 thousand roubles were paid to the brigade and shared between 5 workers (the 
three leaders of the strike among them). The workers considered it a pittance from 
the administration.
2. The foreman was changed. And instead of a 35 year-old man a 55 year-old man 
from the technological department was appointed.
3. The administration promised (oral obligation) that the technical process will be 
revised in the nearest future.
How did the events develop further?
The administration was very skilled in battles with the workers. Because several disputes had 
developed since January 1993, the administration decided to work out a regulation about 
strikes and put it into the Collective Agreement.
That is why in the Collective Agreement which was signed by the trade union on 21.04.93 
two new points appeared:
1. In case the administration of the plant does not fulfil its obligations under this collective 
agreement because o f some objective reason, the trade union has no right to strike.
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2. If the parties cannot reach agreement, the trade union has the right to organise meetings, 
pickets, demonstrations in order to support their demands, but in non-working time and 
without violation of the plants’ activity.
In spite o f its apparent wish to help the workers, in reality the administration showed its 
literacy in the struggle against the workers and very quickly reacted to the workers’ militancy. 
The workers, on the contrary, showed the absence of even a small knowledge of how to 
struggle with the administration. That sheet of paper, which the workers used for their 
demands was destroyed by the vice-director o f  the Kukino area just after the conflict.
The administration showed its power and decisiveness in their struggle for power. Besides, 
the administration has got many other resources: lawyers, Department of Labour and Wages 
and other specialists. The workers in this battle were very vulnerable in comparison with 
administration.
As I found out, the administration used the old principle in its struggle with workers: to 
divide and rule. During my investigation I’ve seen several times that one brigade has got 
much more than the another. It was done by the administration in order to break any solidarity 
between brigades.
The further results showed that the technical process was not revised even in July 1993. And 
then the order about a new structure was appeared, according to which the bogie section in 
Kukino area was restructured, and became a part of the new bogie shop. The whole situation 
with the restructuring we will discuss in a later chapter. But first we will explore the situation 
when all the contradictions of the plant came to a head, and it failed to make the plan.
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Chapter 4. The Non-fulfilment of the Plan: a Case- 
study
The system of Soviet economic planning was based on the principle of command: the 
Ministry gave orders to the plant, the General Director then gave commands to his 
subordinates. As Dryker wrote, this system operates through the dimensions of hierarchy, 
subordination and obedience/disobedience, through vertical rather than horizontal links’.63 
The whole system of Soviet planning’ needs more focused discussion, but here we would 
like only to note that it was based mainly on the system of planning from the achieved level’. 
Because the whole system was highly centralised and the planning organs often could not get 
very detailed information about the enterprise, the only means o f  constructing plans was to 
look back to past performance and simply to make some addition to the achieved level in 
order to make plans for the future.
Under the Soviet system achieving the plan was overwhelmingly the most important objective 
of every enterprise. However, although the plan was supposed to be rigidly laid down, and 
imposed on the enterprise with the force o f law, in reality there were dozens o f ways around 
the plan, from regular re-negotiation of plan targets to systematic concealment of failure. 
Nevertheless the failure to make the plan could have serious consequences, especially for the 65
65 Dryker, 1981, p.39.
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managers and other engineering-technical workers (ITR), whose bonuses, unlike those of the 
workers, depended directly on the fulfilment of the plan.
The Soviet system has now collapsed, but the legacy of the system remains at the level of the 
enterprise, which retains the principles of command and of planning from the achieved level 
in its internal operations.
Although the enterprise transferred to leasehold in April 1990 it still retains the traditional 
forms of management, including the central importance of the plan. Moreover, because the 
system retains the very strong monopolistic features of the former Soviet system the break­
down of one part o f the chain means stoppages or problems for the rest o f the chain. The 
present chapter investigates the causes and consequences of the dramatic failure to fulfil the 
plan in May 1993.
In the enterprise the plan is no longer handed down from the metro authorities, but is now 
constructed on the basis of negotiation with the main plant’s client - still the metro authorities 
- and agreements with other clients. But the plan remains just as important, and just as much a 
constraint, because if the plant does not fulfil its contracts it will not get the money to pay for 
new equipment, meet the cost of wages etc. So the whole system still operates in order to 
meet the plan. And if the plan is not fulfilled, there are a lot of problems inside the enterprise 
for all the employees and for the top managers, and outside the plant for the clients.
Within the plant the senior managers try to construct a scientifically approved plan for the 
enterprise, but because the real system of production operates in a really complicated way, it 
is almost impossible to predict the result. The weaknesses of the system of planning from the
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achieved level remain, because if there is no basis for increasing performance within the 
workshops, at the points of production, the system o f planning by mechanical addition to the 
achieved levels will always fail. So the whole system of planning is incomplete. In reality 
there are a lot of factors which influence the fulfilment of the plan within the enterprise. In the 
past, the plant belonged to the Ministry of Railways, and the Ministry planned the whole 
range of its production and the variety of its services. Now, there is a special department of 
planning within the enterprise, which has a very complicated system of planning.
The transformation of the plant to a leasehold enterprise certainly brought a number of 
advantages to the plant, which have been discussed by Tchetvemina.64 First, the plant was 
transformed from an unprofitable enterprise into a profitable one. Second, in the past the plant 
was subordinated to the Ministry and metro authorities, and came under great pressure from 
them in relation to output and other questions. In new circumstances the enterprise became 
more independent from such bureaucratic structures. The relationships with higher authorities 
now involve mainly negotiations about the prices of the units of production. The plant 
reached an agreement with the metro authorities to reconsider the prices for the carriages 
every three months. And they have to stick to this agreement, because if it is not kept (and it 
is usually the higher bodies who try to breach it, because they make a profit if they can delay 
price increases) the plant can secure the sanction o f a fine, and can refuse to deliver the 
repaired carriages to the client. This means that the plant no longer suffers the pressure of 
orders from above.
64 Tchetvemina, 1991.
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I would say that the other advantages mentioned by Tchetvemina in her article are more 
questionable. She wrote: leasing changes the status o f the collective and individuals by 
making them responsible for the enterprise’s results. The advantages of collective self­
management are clearly demonstrated when employees do not simply take part in decision­
making but really manage the enterprise’.65 She also argued that Teasing creates an effective 
system o f labour incentives for the collective as a whole, as well as for its workers. That is 
because the collective is in charge not only of distributing wages but also of deciding how to 
use revenue, such as whether to expand production or build equipment to increase labour 
productivity, or build a sports complex’. This idealistic prediction is not borne out by my 
study, which concerns the difficulties which impede the fulfilment o f the plan, problems with 
the incentive system and other problems.
It appeared that REMET was more or less able to meet its plan targets every month, when 
suddenly in May 1993 the whole industrial program of the enterprise appeared to collapse. 
One o f the main workshops didn’t fulfil the plan. The result was that the plant failed to supply 
the contracted repaired carriages to the metro, and for this reason incurred a penalty of about 
110 million roubles. How did this happen? How did the events develop? How did a plant 
which was supposed to be increasing its production programme suddenly collapse, apparently 
without warning? These are the questions 1 will try to answer in this chapter.
If we look at the process of production as a whole in May, we can see that the whole plant 
worked as usual. As usual there was a shortage of material, a lack o f workers and
65 ibid., p.217
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unrhythmical supplies o f parts. As usual people went to work on Saturdays and worked in the 
evenings. But nevertheless nobody could remember such a serious failure in the past. Let’s 
consider the situation closer. For our purposes we chose the carriage repair workshop at 
Kukino area (CRW), which we discussed in the last chapter.
The carriage repair workshop
The carriage repair workshop at Kukino was supposed to carry out maintenance repair work 
on 18 carriages and capital repairs on 1 carriage each month. At the end o f May only 5 of the 
carriages for maintenance repair were delivered. The carriage assembly workshop at Popugai, 
according to the plan, had to carry out maintenance repairs on 11 carriages and capital repairs 
on 4, and in May fell short of the plan in respect of one capital repair only. As we can see, the 
most serious problem was in the Carriage repair workshop at Kukino area. Table 4.1 provides 
a general idea o f plan fulfilment at Kukino area during 1993
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Table4.I: Fulfilment o f  the plan in 1993 in the Kukino area.
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In order to analyse the situation we should try to investigate the whole range o f reasons for 
the non-fulfilment of the plan. Let’s start by considering some objective factors.
First of all, a shortage of supplies of materials and parts from different enterprises. In the past 
there was a centralised system of supplying materials within the metro system and a special 
store supplied about 40% of the parts needed by the enterprise. With the transition towards a 
market economy this system broke down. And now the role of the Department o f External 
Co-operation and the Department of Material Supply within the enterprise has increased. But 
the problem is that first of all the whole system of accounting and inspection o f parts is not 
regulated. Second, the staff of this department are the same people as were there in the past 
and they have no special skills, they have not been taught such things as how to establish 
communication with new partners, they have no idea of how to work in the developing
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conditions of the market economy. The third reason is that the number o f staff is the same, 
but the amount of work has increased. So sometimes they just psychologically and physically 
cannot organise this work in the best way. Besides, some of the partners who supply materials 
are in different parts of the former Soviet Union which are now sometimes situated in 
different countries, for example in Ukraine. If several years ago it was very easy to get parts 
from Ukraine, now it takes a long time, because there is a new customs service and before 
you can transfer parts from Ukraine to Russia it can take a month or more just to co-ordinate 
all the formalities. Because of this situation some departments within the plant faced the real 
threat o f breakdown. That is why two people from the Department of External Co-operation 
went to Ukraine and carried out up to 50 bearings per person themselves in sacks. These were 
sufficient for two weeks, but then it was necessary to repeat the trip to Ukraine. This example 
shows us that in the conditions of collapse of the Soviet Union and the whole system of 
economic connections enterprises have invented a new system o f 'carriers’ (perevozchiki), 
i.e. people, who try to resolve supply problems by carrying parts from one enterprise to 
another, from one part of the former Soviet Union to another. And this system co-exists with 
the system of pushers’ (tolkachi) - these are men who try to by-pass, or at least speed up the 
official supply system and obtain by semi-legal or even outrightly illegal means, the key 
supplies needed to ensure plan fulfilment’(see Dryker, 1981, p. 64).
The supply position in May at CRW workshop was really awful - there was no special caustic 
to wash bogies, there were no locomotive engines and other parts, but it is really difficult in 
analysing this situation to distinguish objective reasons for these problems, connected with 
the breakdown of the Soviet system, and the subjective reasons which, from my point of
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view, played an essential role. Thus one explanation for the supply failures could be the 
inefficiency of the Department of External Co-operation. The head of this department had 
amply demonstrated his incompetence over the previous months, but because he was a good 
friend of the General Director nobody could do anything about the situation. He had been 
invited by the General Director from another enterprise, and in the Director’s eyes he was a 
verified’ person, on whom the Director could rely. In addition, he was in his early sixties, 
and therefore he was not considered as a serious pretender to the Director’s post. Maybe as a 
technician or as a specialist in engineering sciences he was really good, but as the head of 
such a serious and important department he was really weak.
The other very important problem is the organisation of the rhythm of production. Because o f 
the lack of parts it is very difficult to organise the production process. So the tradition of 
storming’ at the end of the month very much continues to exist within the enterprise. 
Besides, interviews with workers and middle management showed us that parts are 
distributed in a very unequal way. Thus, the Popugai area has much better conditions because 
the main store is there, and there is a better system of communications between the 
workshops and the staff in the store. The Kukino area, because it is situated in another part of 
the city, has problems with supplies because people at Popugai have no motivation to supply 
the Kukino area. For this situation there is a Russian proverb: ‘keep your own shirt close to 
your own body’, which means in this circumstance that people in Popugai’s workshop were 
closer than those from Kukino to the staff o f the Popugai store, who distinguish between 'our 
people’ from the Popugai plant and 'strangers’ from the Kukino area. If people from Kukino 
go to the Popugai store to get some parts or material, in the words o f one o f the shop chiefs
233
from Kukino: The Popugai staff will tell them to fuck off and they will get nothing.’ So the 
Popugai area is in a privileged position. From the objective point of view there is no system 
of regulating the relationship between the parts of the plant and this creates real problems.
Now we would like to analyse another very serious objective factor which prevents the 
fulfilment of the plant - the shortage o f workers. The production program of the plant is 
calculated by the Planning-Industrial Department in accordance with orders from the main 
client, the metro, and from other clients. In drawing up the plan this department takes into 
consideration the situation within each workshop: the number of workers, the productivity of 
each workshop and other indicators. But the main problem is that the Planning-industrial 
Department draws up the whole industrial program on the assumption ihat the program will 
be carried out by the whole staff within the workshop. But what happens in reality? In reality 
there are a lot of vacancies. This situation is really interesting, because in the mass media 
there are a lot of reports about unemployment in Russia. Why in these conditions are there so 
many vacancies? In order to answer this question, we have to investigate more closely the real 
picture within the enterprise.
One of the main causes o f  such a situation is that the workers want to earn much more money. 
And it is possible for them to do this if they work not only for themselves, but also for that 
guy’, i.e. for an absent person. The amount of money which the workers earn is calculated in 
accordance with the numbers laid down in the staff schedule, so there is an unwritten 
agreement between workers and middle management (foremen and the shop chief) that the 
shop will keep vacancies and the workers will work hard without any recruitment o f new 
workers. This unwillingness of workers to allow recruitment is described by the Russian
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saying 'I won’t eat it, but I won’t give it to anyone else’. The workers physically cannot fulfil 
the job with the reduced number of people, but nevertheless they object to the recruitment of 
new workers. The shop chiefs understand that if they recruit new workers to the plant, then 
the salary of the existing workers will be much more lower (and consequently the labour 
motivation of the workers will be reduced). So the shop chiefs carry out a quite conscious 
policy of recruiting people to the workshop up to the limit of 70 % of the staff. As I 
mentioned above, the Planning-Industrial Department follows a quite different policy, they 
calculate the whole plan in accordance with the complete staff. Thus we can see that there is a 
real disproportion in numbers between those who plan the industrial programme and those 
who carry it out. According to the data of the Planning-Industrial Department, it is possible to 
fulfil the whole production program for the month, indeed to repair 22 - 23 carriages per 
month if the sections are fully staffed. But as we can see (Table 4.2) the number o f workers 
within workshops is much less than is required. And this is one of the most important factors 
which constrains the fulfilment o f the plan.
Another important objective reason for the failure to meet the plan is a lack o f repair 
equipment. The plant is a monopolist. There is no similar plant in the city which carries out 
the same kind of repair, so metro carriages can be repaired only at this plant. But the demands 
are bigger than the plant can meet, so the carriages run for longer without maintenance each 
year. Because of the increasing runs, the parts are more worn out, and so the more parts need 
to be repaired. But the capacity o f the special mechanical-repair workshop is limited, and the 
workers in this workshop can’t provide the whole range o f parts required. The repair 
equipment in the mechanical-repair workshop is very old and also can’t cope with the whole
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volume o f  work. Thus, this is one more objective constraint on the ability of the plant to meet 
the plan.
Table 4.2: The number o f  piece-work workers in the Kukino area
In the ideal case the mechanical workshop would have a special circulating store, from which 
replacement parts could be drawn while the-broken part is repaired. But the creation of such a 
store is a very difficult task and it can only be done in the future. It is not only in the 
mechanical workshop that there is no such 'normative stock’, there is none anywhere in the 
enterprise. One might ask why the General Director doesn’t buy new equipment or the whole 
range of parts required? And here we can see another constraint which has a major influence 
on the activity of the plant - financial constraints. There is a limited amount of money in the 
plant for the General Director to spend on equipment at any particular time. But the problem
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is that almost all the equipment is now in such bad condition that it needs repair or 
replacement. It is impossible to replace all the equipment, although the equipment is being 
replaced step by step. The plant has got some new presses and lathes, but this is still a drop in 
the ocean.
The whole situation is aggravated by the bad organisation of the production process. There is 
a lack of responsibility at every level of the plant, which appears in a lot of examples of 
interaction between parts of the organisation. Here is one of them. In February, the special 
service of technical inspection (OTK) raised a question about the automatic couplings. The 
head of this department warned the Deputy Director about the problems with automatic 
couplings in February: they are working at the limit of the permitted tolerance. She wrote a 
special message in the Deputy Director’s Report Book. Her assistants warned the staff of the 
workshop in March and again in April that it is almost impossible to work with such 
automatic couplings. There was no reaction from either the Deputy Director or shop chief. 
Finally, the head of the technical inspection service, following her formal warning in 
February, decided to stop the production process and refused to accept the carriages with 
defective automatic couplings which did not correspond with the required standards. Because 
the service didn’t accept carriages the whole of production was stopped for a week. As a 
result 6 or 7 carriages were not accepted by this service. Undoubtedly, this delay influenced 
the productivity of the whole workshop. When this case was analysed at the production 
meeting devoted to the failure to meet the plan it turned out that the Deputy Director had 
simply ignored the warnings from the inspection service, and did nothing to improve the 
situation. However the head of the inspection department had also exceeded her rights:
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according to her job description she had no right to stop the whole production process without 
first warning the General Director of the enterprise. This example shows that people at 
different levels do not always fulfil precisely their own instructions and job descriptions, 
which can lead to big breakdowns of the whole plant.
People who are not very familiar with the Russian production process could easily be led to 
believe that the objective factors described above are more than sufficient to explain the 
failure of the plant to meet the plan in May. But those who know the Russian enterprise better 
know that all these factors explain nothing. All these factors have been more or less 
characteristic of Soviet production for decades. They influenced the production process in the 
previous months, just as much as in May, but nevertheless, the workshop fulfilled the plan or 
almost fulfilled the plan from January till April, as they had done month in month out over 
previous years. So, it is necessary to look more deeply, and to investigate the reasons which 
lie beneath the surface. So we would like to analyse other factors which had a very large 
influence within the enterprise.
Formal and informal relations in the Soviet enterprise
Production relations in most enterprises are characterised by the co-existence and co­
operation side by side o f formal and informal relations. Theoretically, the enterprise should 
produce its goods through the well-organised and institutionalised system o f formal relations. 
In reality a lot of enterprise processes pass through a non-institutionalised system o f informal 
relations. These kinds o f relations penetrate the whole system of organisation, including:
• operations;
238
• participants, including relations inside and outside the enterprise;
• different levels of organisation;
• the process of production;
• the whole range of ways and degrees in which control is organised;
• results.
In general it is in practice the nature and extent o f the informal system of production relations 
that largely determines the structure and functioning of the formal system, and it must also be 
recognised that the informal system has its own dynamic. Because informal negotiations are 
not subject to official control and regulations it is difficult to get information about such 
relationships, and it is really hard to say to what extent such relations are based on informal 
agreements. But it is undoubtedly true that the informal system within Russian production 
relations is extremely important.
One of the problems o f getting valid information within the Russian enterprise is that at 
different levels of the enterprise the researcher can find absolutely contradictory explanations 
of what has really happened and is happening within the enterprise. Sometimes these 
contradictions concern very substantial questions. And sooner or later the researcher could 
assume that people are telling lies. But there are various different reasons why this might 
happen. One o f the possible answers could be that people at different levels o f the enterprise 
possess different amounts of information. Those who are working on the top levels of the 
enterprise very often have less information or distorted information about what is happening 
at the lower levels. That is why inadequate information leads to insufficient and incomplete 
explanations. In addition, there is a desire 'to present the enterprise in the best possible way to
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strangers’. This position is also deeply rooted in Russian culture and we have special proverb 
for this: 'don’t carry out rubbish from your house’. From the researcher’s point of view the 
most fruitful approach is to hear as many explanations as possible with all their nonsense and 
exaggerations and then try to construct your own opinion about what has really happened. But 
it is also very useful to use a multiple-strategy, i.e. combine different methods in your 
research. For example, in one interview with a female foreman 1 was told that the workshop 
aiways fulfilled the plan. At that moment I was at the beginning o f  my study, but 
nevertheless, I already knew something about production, so I didn’t believe this information, 
but in order to prove or disprove this information 1 spoke with different people and also I 
found the statistical data, where it was quite clear that every month the workshop failed to 
repair one or two carriages from the plan.
Why is the system of informal relations so important? One of the main reasons, from our 
point of view, is the shortcomings of the formal system of production relations, and in this 
situation the informal system is needed to supplement or even entirely replace the formal 
system, whose restricted rules and instructions don’t lead to satisfactory results and do not 
reflect real relations of power, capability and influence. The strength o f  the system of 
informal relations lies in the fact that it is firmly rooted in traditional values and practices and 
that the process is very flexible and speedy. And this leads to the alternative kind of 
explanations for the failure to meet the plan - explanations which refer to intrinsic features of 
the whole former ’Soviet system’. Under the Soviet system all subjects within different 
economic and social structures used informal methods which became established practice. 
The results of the case study show us that the informal system has a great importance within
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the production process in Russia. One of the aims of the case study was precisely to 
investigate the whole framework of industrial relations within the enterprise from the point of 
view of their formal and informal structure, organisation, operation and practices, as well as 
the economic circumstances to which they are subjected.
In looking more closely at the failure to fulfil the plan we find several examples in which the 
two systems are really complementary, and some in which the informal system completely 
replaces the formal system. To put it in the most general terms, the plan appeared to have 
been fulfilled month-in month-out by the operation o f various informal relations, which made 
up for the deficiencies of the formal system. However, as the situation inside and outside the 
enterprise got increasingly difficult the informal systems came under increasing pressure, 
until in May they reached breaking point. In May a whole series of problems arose in these 
informal systems which, when they broke down, revealed the complete inadequacy o f the 
formal system that was supposed to regulate production. Already in the discussion above we 
have seen the importance of informal relations in the operation of the system, supplies only 
being maintained by pushers and carriers, the informal relations between the incompetent 
Supply chief and the General Director, the regular practice of storming, the informal system 
of distribution o f supplies from the main store, the maintenance of a permanent labour 
shortage, the informality of the system of inspection. In the following sections we will 
investigate the crucial areas in which informal relations broke down catastrophically in May, 
and not by chance, as in the case of the factors already mentioned, but by conscious decisions 
of customers, workers and managers.
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Informal relations with customers
When we look at the official figures for the fulfilment of the plan it appears that on paper, 
apart from May, more or less all the planned carriages were repaired. But if we checked all 
these carriages at the end of the month we would see that almost every carriage still had 
defects and incomplete repairs. Yet all these carriages were accepted by the metro authorities. 
How could this happen? One of the explanations is that within each plant there is a system of 
informal relations surrounding such inspection. We are all people, we all have our 
weaknesses. So, the workers and the managers from the workshop established good 
relationships with the people from the metro inspection. The whole system works on the old 
principle - 'you do something for me - I’ll do something for you.’ That is why at the end of 
the month it is only the system of informal relationships that helps to get people to sign that 
this particular carriage has been accepted by the metro inspection’s rolling stock service. 
Theoretically, it means that within the same day all these carriages should leave the gates of 
the enterprise and be delivered to their customers. But in reality, of course, all these carriages 
will continue to be repaired for at least ten to fifteen days.
Now, let us consider, what happened in May. Some of the customers - i.e. various metro 
depots - expressed their indignation at such a system. They expressed their opinions several 
times in the daily meetings o f General Directors of each unit with the head of the whole metro 
system. They rebelled against the old system, saying simply that they could no longer put up 
with such a long cycle of repair. They insisted that they pay for the job, for quality and for 
quick repairs. Instead o f that they can’t get their repaired trains back in time. They wanted a 
proper system of repair with concrete terms and conditions established. Their complaints
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created a great scandal and a lot o f depot managers supported this complaint. The result was 
that the head of the whole metro issued a special order to the rolling stock service. This order 
laid down that any person who signed for an unrepaired carriage without authority would be 
sacked. Following this order everyone in the rolling stock service was very frightened, and 
they decided to carry out their work according to the rules, which meant that only those 
carriages which had been fully repaired were signed for by the SPS service. All the other 
carriages, which had some defects or problems, were not accepted. That is why this system of 
informal relationships broke down.
What about the workers?
And what about the workers’ role in all this? After all, they are the people who actually have 
to repair the carriages. They are the people who have to make superhuman efforts to complete 
jobs with inadequate supplies and inadequate equipment, working in bad conditions with bad 
organisation of production. They are the people who have to work in the evenings and at 
weekends to meet the plan at the end of the month. In the end it was the workers who did not 
make the plan because they were no longer willing to compensate for the defects of the 
system.
The most important reason for this, as we saw in the last chapter, is that within the plant there 
is a badly constructed incentive system, which doesn’t focus directly on the producers. The 
system does not motivate the workers to fulfil the plan. The earnings of the administration of 
the workshop, as o f  all the managerial staff, depend on the productivity of the workshop and 
fulfilment of the plan. They have special bonuses of up to 50% of their salary if the workshop
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or the plant meets the plan. As regards the workers - they have no such system o f extra 
bonuses. Their bonus is related to each carriage that they repair. But the workers have little 
information about how the price of each carriage is calculated, and so how their earnings are 
calculated.
The workers’ big dissatisfaction arises from the fact that those who don’t fulfil the plan 
sometimes earn more than those who do fulfil it. The workers think that it makes no 
difference to their earnings whether or not they fulfil the plan, and so they have no incentive 
to do so. Thus, the system of workers’ payment doesn’t correspond with their aspirations. 
And there is a real contradiction in this sense between clerical workers, managers and the 
General Director, whose bonuses directly depend on the fulfilment of the plant, and the 
workers, who do not feel themselves sufficiently motivated to meet the plan. When I 
interviewed a shop chief about this matter, he said:
We have a piece-work system within the enterprise. For example, we should produce 20 carriages 
per month. We know the price o f  each unit o f  production (for example, one carriage). People, 
when they begin to fulfil the plan, know at the beginning how much they could g e t by fulfilling the 
whole plan o f  20 carriages. And if  they fulfil less, they will get less money. The w orkers’ bonuses 
are included in every carriage they repair. If he repairs the carriage he will get a  75 % bonus. As 
regards the ITR, if  the plan is met they get a 50 %  bonus. But what happens is that the worker 
can’t see his bonus. He may earn, say, 70 thousand roubles, but he doesn’t realise that this 
autom atically includes his bonus.
As we saw in the last chapter, the workers know the total wage that they receive, but they do 
not know how this breaks down into basic pay and bonuses.
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Thus, from our point o f view, one of the most important factors underlying the failure in May 
consisted in the unwillingness of the workers to fulfil the plan. The workers’ dissatisfaction 
with the bad incentive system, which gave them no incentive to make the plan, and which 
they had tried to change, led to an unwritten agreement between the workers in May in some 
sections that they would not fulfil the plan. For them it was one of the means of trying to draw 
attention to their problems. They had raised the question of the incentive system a long time 
ago, but nobody took any notice. They asked people at different levels of the enterprise about 
this unjust system, but got no answer. In February, one brigade had gone on strike. The First 
Deputy Director with responsibility for the Kukino area clarified his position towards the 
fulfilling of the plan later, in August 1993, when some of the workers raised this question 
again after one of the production meetings. Here is a short quotation from the diary of one of 
the workers:
A fter the meeting we again went to the First Deputy D irector and said to him that it is not 
profitable for us to fulfil the plan. We have no bonuses for fulfilling the plan. But people who 
d o n ’t fulfil the plan have the same payment as we do. A lso clerical w orkers alw ays have bonuses if 
the plant fulfils the plan. The First Deputy Director answered, 'I f  you are not mad about the plan, 
you should have nothing to  do with this plant. There is no place for you here.’ Then he told us to 
get out and hinted to us that he was spending 95 % o f  his time resolving our problems, but he has 
m ore serious production questions to resolve.
This quotation very clearly shows us the real attitudes of management towards the workers. 
The dictator’s voice and tone still exist in the enterprise. But the problem is that times are 
changing, even if only slowly, and for workers it is not sufficient to hear orders only now.
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With the transition to the market economy some of them very quickly accepted the wind of 
the change’ and now they are really trying to understand how the system operates, and how 
their labour efforts will be evaluated. And if they are really dissatisfied with the system which 
operates within the enterprise, sometimes it is in their hands to show the managers that they 
also can do something. Such a situation happened in May, when they were really dissatisfied 
with the whole system and part o f the workers agreed that they wouldn’t work too hard for no 
reward.
It is very interesting that the shop chief in this situation aligned himself with the workers. He 
tried to organise the whole production process, but there were so many barriers to this. In the 
middle of the month he organised some working Saturdays, but at the end of the month, when 
he received a strict order from the ’top’ to work on Saturday and even on Sunday he refused 
to do it. He said in his interview:
I realised that the workers are really exhausted, they are working like tired-out horses. And I didn’t 
force them to work on Saturday. I thought that if  it is not the fault o f  my workshop, but o f  a whole 
set o f  other circumstances, why should I do it?
Role of personality and authoritative control
If we investigate the management structure at the Kukino area, we can see that the most 
authoritative figure within this area is the First Deputy Director, a man with a very strong 
character. In previous months the plan had been fulfilled mainly because of his great pressure 
on the people and his strict order 'to fulfil the plan’. In May he went on vacation and his 
responsibilities were taken up by his deputy. The Deputy Director, although he had worked at
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the plant for a long time, is nevertheless considered by the specialists as completely 
incompetent in the organisation of production. So, another of the real reasons for failure was 
the absence o f such an authoritative person from the plant. The Deputy Director at that time 
was fully involved in the organisation of a small enterprise within the plant, and this was 
much more important for him than the organisation of production. Some of the managers 
complained that it was difficult ever to find him at his place of work - he was always absent. 
Moreover, immediately after the failure to meet the plan in May there were rumours that the 
breakdown in the Kukino area was contrived by the Kukino management as a challenge to the 
governing body of the enterprise as a whole, to force it to pay attention to the Kukino area, 
which is too far from the top and whose problems are always resolved last.
We missed the plant Purging the guilty
Everybody has always known that the whole system of production has always been irrational 
and inefficient and needed to be changed, and that economic crisis in the transition to a 
market economy makes such changes inevitable. Several people within managerial circles 
have long been saying that it is a bad system that there is no clear organisation of production, 
but their voices were not considered.
It was clear from the middle of May that the plant would miss the plan by a long way (which 
was why 1 decided to carry out intensive fieldwork during this period), and at the end of May 
the full extent o f the failure was apparent. But serious attention to this matter was only paid at 
the beginning o f June, when the plant was faced with the problem of incurring enormous
losses on its contracts.
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An investigation was launched and a series of production meetings held to get to the bottom 
of it. But this was a typical Soviet investigation. The issue was not why did we not make the 
plan, but 'Who is guilty?’ and 'Who should be punished?’ These two questions become 
central at the all meetings devoted to analysing this breakdown, with only isolated calls to 
change the whole system rather than spending the whole time working out special 
punishments. On the 7th of June, the Director organised a production meeting with the heads 
of departments and shop-chiefs to analyse the general situation. At this meeting many shop 
chiefs spoke, complaining about shortages o f  parts, about the failings o f the supply 
department, etc. The chief of the carriage-repair workshop demanded that the people, who. 
from his point o f  view, were responsible for this should be punished, including the head of 
the Department of Material Supplies. Eventually it was decided that in accordance with the 
regulations all engineering-technical personnel would be deprived o f their bonuses. In 
addition it was decided over the next two days to prepare a special Order concerning the 
punishment o f the people most responsible. The First Deputy Director for Production was 
urgently summoned back from his holiday to head the special group working out this order.
In the morning o f 9th of June, after the Order listing the proposed punishments had been 
prepared, the General Director organised a second production meeting, at which the 
calculations o f bonuses for the various shops and sections for the month were announced, 
followed by a roll-call of the heads of departments, each of whom was quizzed by the General 
Director about shortages, with a cross-examination o f those responsible for various failures of 
supply and production decisions.
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A further production meeting was called that same afternoon, attended by about thirty 
managers, the main aim of which was to find 'scapegoats’ for the failure to meet the plan and 
to decide their punishment. The meeting began with a reading out of the draft Order, which 
noted that the failure to meet the plan had cost the factory 110 million roubles, identified the 
main reasons for the failure, and proposed various punishments involving the deprivation of 
various managers of a proportion of their pay and bonuses. After the reading of the draft 
Order the Director asked for suggestions or opinions, and the meeting flared up. The whole 
atmosphere of this meeting was unpleasant and awful, and reminded one of a real bazaar’ 
because everybody tried to 'throw the blame onto somebody else but justify himself.
The sharpest argument was between the head of the quality control department (OTK) and the 
Director. The former had been deprived o f 20% of her pay as a punishment, but she insisted 
that she had done nothing wrong and so did not deserve any punishment. The head of the 
OTK asked the Director a question:
—  Do I understand you correctly that I have been punished precisely for the fact that I stopped 
accepting carriages with defective autom atic couplings, and that is what I am being punished for?
Director: —  N o that is not right. For the organisation o f  quality. The question o f  quality is very 
complex and your fault is not that the automatic, couplings are defective, but that in the 
organisation o f  work itself there must be a system o f  regular pressure from the management to 
maintain quality. In February you wrote an order to  the Deputy Director, and he did nothing. But 
there are other people in the leadership. You know whom you should take these things to. You 
should write orders into the log repeatedly to  say, repeatedly to record, repeatedly to resolve things 
and if  everything is not sorted out you should come to the Director and tell him. It breaks my heart
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to say it, but you know  that the result is that tomorrow the factory will come to  a standstill. And 
this has consequences for everyone.
The head o f  the O T K  p u t  her question  again:
—  I do not understand w hat I have been punished for, because I did not produce defective products 
or ruin the plan.
Director: —  We have explained it to you: because having seen a particular defect you did not 
register it correctly and  did not resolve all the problems. You should have given an order to the 
Director or his First D eputy for Production o r told them about the problem. There is a log for 
orders.
The head o f  O T K  w as b eco m in g  increasing ly  upset:
—  Paragraph 3.4 o f  m y official instructions says that I am obliged not to release products which do 
not conform to the ex is ting  norms and to  prevent the movement o f  defective products. How have I 
acted incorrectly? W here does the O rder state w hat I have been punished for?
Director: —  Well, yo u  violated point 3.1, w hich provides for a situation in which a fault is 
discovered. In that case you have to bring it to the knowledge o f  the Director o f  the factory.
Head o f  OTK: —  ! w as punished because since the 1“ June the wheel shop has come to a 
standstill, but until th en  nobody gave a damn about anything, although we have been writing 
orders since February and  this problem was put forward then.
Director: —  You stopped the shop. The metro did not stop anybody, and the factory is not allowed 
to stop. There is a shop  chief, if  he does not resolve the problem, it is necessary to  go to higher
authorities.
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Head o f  OTK : —  I have a question: why is everything confined to the questions about the 
automatic couplings? W hy out o f  12 carriages signed by the OTK - yes, we took responsibility for 
them ourselves, and signed them with bad autom atic couplings, nobody stopped them. Why out o f 
12 carriages were only 5 accepted by the metro rolling stock service? W hat is the O TK  punished 
for in this situation?
Director: —  N ot the OTK. I told you - the head o f  the OTK. I was not told about you r problems, 
although 1 knew about this question at the end o f  May. Your should have signed this question into 
the log for the Director. You are being punished for not fulfilling point 3.1 o f  your official 
instructions.
They suppressed further discussion of this question and went on to elucidate others.
Then the question of the punishment of the Deputy Chief Technologist for the failure of the 
automatic couplings was discussed. People rose to his defence and said that he was to blame 
for nothing. The faulty part in the automatic couplings is not one of those which is renewed 
and it is not possible to resolve this problem all at once. The Deputy Chief Technologist spent 
all his time in the shop and the proposed 30% reduction in pay did not seem just.
Then the question of the punishment of the Supply Department arose and its representative 
spoke:
—  Apart from the reducing gears, all the problems o f  components in short supply itemised were 
resolved in one o r two days. The ch ief o f  the carriage assembly shop comes to the Departm ent five 
times a day and these w ere all resolved and, as you can see, the carriage assembly shop made the 
plan. And so you have to  answer the question, why did the Kukino site fail to deliver such a huge 
quantity o f  carriages? W hy are these questions now raised so sharply, why could this not be
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resolved at the time? Why did the shop ch ie f him self not move quickly, phone? I heard nothing 
from him, not a single call for six months?
A cry came from the ranks:
—  Because comrade Popov [First Deputy Director] was there, and he pushed them all, and he went 
o ff on holiday, he is still on holiday now, now they are making a m ess o f  it here again.
D irector: —  Comrades, we are not in the bazaar, 1 call you to order.
Then the proposal was put that the punishment of the Material-Technical Supply should be 
kept to a maximum of ten percent, and not to punish its Deputy Chief at all.
Director: —  Tell me, how is your conscience? What about the stocktaking? We have to do this 
sometime. Will Ivanov [C hief o f  the Supply Department] work alone, o r will you help him all the 
sam e? And work as agreed? So what are you proposing?
Head o f  OTK: —  Can one ask a question?
—  O ne can.
She repeats her earlier question:
—  W hy out o f  12 carriages signed out by the OTK w ere only 5 carriages handed over?
The Director appeals to Ivanov, the Deputy Director for the Kukino site, who was in charge 
of the site in May.
—  A natolii Dmitrevich, please answ er the question.
Ivanov: —  Yes, I can. The carriages were not ready, they were not ready. 1 am also interested in 
the question: you had the right to stop production. But what right did you have to sign out 12 
carriages with defective couplings?
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Head o f  OTK: —  It is very difficult to work with dishonourable people.
Ivanov: —  I would have been able to turn out all 15 carriages, but the OPS knew what w as going 
on, and they all had defective couplings.
Head o f  OTK: —  This is a vile lie.
She is in tears, b u t con tinues to  speak:
—  I have no regrets about my pay, the thing is that the whole business is very unpleasant. I can 
even resign in favour o f  A natolii Dmitrevich. But that is not the point. We are simply looking for a 
scapegoat and not for a reason. The reason is presented as something else: wanton practice, not the 
system. Everything rests on a personality and that personality is Petr Andreevich Popov. He is not 
at work and everything collapses. And as soon as he is not here they do not fulfil the plan, because 
there is no clear organisation o f  production. And now Anatolii D mitrevich - a very dishonourable 
person - tries to pile it all on us. When we assumed responsibility and signed for 12 carriages, a 
total o f  five were handed over. We took on this responsibility, together with the C hief 
Technologist and C hief Engineer, but this was not the reason. Then he accuses me o f  having 
signed for them. Yes, because I understand and I spoke with Petr Andreevich about the fact that 
one cannot tear everything up all at once, because then we will not fulfil the plan at all. We need to 
get together again and think about how we will fulfil the plan in future, and not look for a 
scapegoat.
Director: —  Is that your proposal?
Head o f  OTK: —  1 don’t know. But I think that the question o f  the couplings has nothing to do 
with this investigation. And Ivanov is the only one who is at fault. At fault in the organisation o f  
production. We must resolve the question o f  how we are going to fulfil the programme in future.
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Then th e  D eputy  D irec to r fo r E conom ic  Q uestions stood  up  and  stated  h is  opinion th a t 
nobody  shou ld  be punished .
—  I think that nobody should lose any pay. All the services worked in May as they had worked 
before, including the supply service. Everyone has been punished by the situation existing in the 
factory. There are im perfections in the situation itself which we must take into account. There has 
not been any wrecking. M aybe the service o f  the C hief Technologist and so on could have worked 
better. All the services mentioned in the order have already been punished by the situation existing 
in the factory. I have spoken repeatedly about the fact that the existing regulations on the incentive 
system and the system o f  bonuses are inadequate because they don’t take into consideration the 
particular features o f  each department and service. It is necessary to work out a differential 
approach to the different departments and services within the plant. But for this reason it is 
necessary to organise the whole system o f  accounting, for example for the Department o f Material 
Supplies, and to calculate, how many parts were brought to the plant, how many were taken ou t 
and so on. But before such a system is organised it is absolutely useless to punish people, because 
this regulation has absolutely no connection with their labour efforts. As regards the o ther 
departments, in accordance with the existing regulations we autom atically punish people because 
the main workshops d idn’t fulfil the plan. But some departments, for example the book-keeping 
department, shouldn’t suffer from this. If  they had their own plan and they fulfilled it, they should 
not be punished. But the issue is the revision o f  the existing system. The new punishment doesn’t 
correspond with the existing regulations. We can’t improve the regulations constantly by inventing 
such new  orders. We should improve the whole system. The system o f  accounting first o f  all, 
because on that point the w hole incentive system is based. That is for production. And wrecking. 
Here it has turned out that there was a situation in which there were personalities, conflict 
situations, about which I did not even know (between OTK and production). But we have already
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punished all the ITR for the existing situation [because they had already lost their bonuses for plan 
non-fulfilment M.K.]. And this order simply does not refer to the system and I think that simply 
cannot be repeated from month to month as a result o f  such an extraordinary situation. One cannot 
put things right carrying on in this way all the time. It is necessary to improve the system. The 
system o f  accounting first o f  all, since the whole incentive system is based on that. This is my 
proposal and I am still more convinced o f  its rationality. So my proposition is that the order should 
not be about cutting people’s pay, but it should make maybe two or three concrete points. For 
example, the Deputy D irector for Production must prepare production that means we must give 
precise dates for the perfection o f  the supply accounting, working out the normative bases. 
Concretely, not one programme is fulfilled. If  he were made responsible for them regularly each 
month, then they would work more regularly.
Director: —  Look, we have sacked one, two, three people in this service, and the situation does not 
change, the system is still there. The stocktaking has not been carried out. The order about carrying 
out a stocktaking has not been fulfilled, but nobody has been punished until this Order. So my 
opinion is that they have to be punished.
At this wider meeting management was divided about the question of punishment. Some of 
the members of management were for punishment, others for partial punishment, and a third 
group against any punishment, but for improving the whole system.
At the end of the meeting the question of punishment was put to the vote, with six of those 
present having a right to vote. There were four alternatives:
1 . to punish corresponding to the proposals of the draft order, supported only by the 
Director.
2. to reduce the punishment for some individuals, supported by only one present.
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3. to punish nobody, which got three votes.
4. to punish the Deputy Director for Production A.D. Ivanov, supported only by Ivanov
Thus the majority took the decision to punish nobody. With this the meeting came to an end.
At the end of the meeting o f management, the Director, who had tried to prevent me from 
attending such a 'scandalous’ meeting took the sociologist aside and said:
M arina Vyacheslavovna, now you have seen a little spectacle which I put on specially. I knew that 
my proposal would not carry, but I had to play it out.
So, in accordance with the existing regulations, all the engineering-technical staff lost their 
bonuses, but those shops in which the plan was fulfilled or slightly underfulftlled, received 
bonuses as follows:
In the most ’guilty’ shop, because they had not fulfilled the plan and repaired only 5 carriages, 
there was no money to pay wages to the workers, so the shop chief went to the First Deputy 
Director and asked him for approximately 1.5 million roubles to pay the wages. He asked 
permission to pay a percentage for the carriages which were partly repaired, and as a result 
workers received 70 % of earnings for each carriage (15) which they had partly repaired. The 
average salary for the whole plant in May was 55 thousand roubles, the average salary in the
himself.
Plan Fact Bonus (%)
Carriage assembly shop at Popugai
Carriage repair shop at Kukino (CRW)
Wheel shop
Wheel repair shop
Motor section
Electro-machine section
Bogie section Popugai and Kukino
15 15 16.34
19 5 none
264 264 50
205 182 50
15 14 49.30
19 16 22.46
15 14 none
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carriage-repair workshop was 45 thousand roubles. The shop-chief earned 63 thousand 
roubles, but if we take into consideration the fact that he had in his hands a reserve fund, 
which is 3 % of the wage bill for the whole o f the shop, he added 15 thousand roubles to his 
own salary, i.e. he had 78 thousand roubles. Thus, even if the bad organisation of production 
in the workshop was partly to blame for the failure to meet the plan, nevertheless the financial 
position of the shop-chief did not suffer.
What was changed in the plant following the breakdown of the 
plan?
Nothing was changed. An Order was worked out which listed the duties of the main people 
responsible for the organisation of production, but this just duplicated their existing job 
descriptions, without any changes in the systems as a whole. The requests of the workers to 
improve the incentive system were ignored. The workers were still trying to improve the 
system, but without success. Nobody was punished. From an interview with the shop chief 
which was conducted in August it was clear that nothing had changed at all:
I asked them to punish the people responsible for the breakdown. The G eneral Director put this 
question in the hands o f  the Board o f  governors, but this proposal was rejected. Everybody wants 
to be very kind. Nobody was punished and nothing was changed. Now I again have nothing in the 
workshop. The heads were delivered only yesterday. Supply has gone to hell. I f  I were the 
Director, I would say: 'Lads, you worked like this, I propose this and this. I propose and insist that 
we punish those responsible. This is my responsibility. And as the person in authority, I order that 
this person and this person be punished. .. But now everything rem ains as it w as in the past.
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The General Director of the plant together with his First Deputy Director invented a new 
structure for the enterprise. The new structure was worked out in great secret and only these 
two people were involved in it. As a result, several people who were directly involved in the 
breakdown were appointed to new and higher positions. The head of Material Supplies, in 
addition to his existing responsibilities, was offered a post as the head of a new small 
enterprise. Another person was appointed as head of carriage production. Just as in good old 
'Communist’ times, when a person fails to do a job at one level, the people from the top 
usually put him in a higher position. The same happened in our plant, when the person who 
was directly responsible for the breakdown of the programme was put in the new structure of 
the enterprise in a higher position and instead of control of only one part of the plant, in the 
new structure he is responsible for two parts of the plant. This is the opinion of the one of the 
shop chiefs about this transformation:
Now there is a restructuring going on. Ivanov has been put in charge o f  the whole o f  production. I f  
it were up to me I would throw  him out. But "they’ held him... He is usually a very rare guest in the 
production area. It is difficult to catch him in the workshop, and nobody knows where he hangs out 
during the w orking day. He is zero in terms o f  production.
But there is a good reason why the General Director and First Deputy Director have kept this 
person. First, because he was quite flexible and quickly understood how he could benefit 
from the new conditions. He organised a small enterprise, which involved a restricted circle 
of people, including the General Director and First Deputy Director, who could get additional 
money for their own benefit. Besides this, there are other explanations for such behaviour of 
the people at the top. From interviews with different people, I discovered that he has a relative
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who works as a guard within the enterprise. All materials and parts which are removed from 
the enterprise go through this person. So, he possesses all the information about the people 
who use their position for their own benefit. For example, the First Deputy Director built his 
own dacha (country home), and he needs to remove a lot o f cheap material from the 
enterprise. In this circumstances, the same kind of relationships still exist - 'you do something 
for me - and I will do something for you’. That is why, because of his relative’s information, 
Ivanov knows too much, and it is better to sustain a good relationship with him, because it is 
well known that if  he dislikes somebody, he could make trouble.
The two Deputy Directors who offered some reasonably intelligent remedies were weakened 
and either some departments were taken away from them, or they were shifted to lower 
positions. They were simply left out of the new structure of the enterprise. One of them, who 
realised the game that was being played, said with bitterness in his voice:
All the rules o f  th e  game are now constructed in a such way that it is possible to  weaken m e, but
not for me to progress.
The main reason for this is the struggle for power o f the General Director. He just wanted to 
weaken the potential pretenders to his post. With new conditions and with the transition to 
leasehold, the Director of the enterprise comes to possess a lot o f power. And he has much 
more power than, say, the metro authorities, and he doesn’t want to lose this power under any 
circumstances, at least until he decides himself to give up his position and to move to a more 
profitable one.
The whole process o f  restructuring of the enterprise, and what role the system o f formal and 
informal relations in the plant played, we will discuss in the following chapter.
Chapter 5. Structural Reorganisation, Stabilisation  
and Recovery. Continuity and Change 1994-97
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Changes in management structure 1993-1997: Informal relations in 
structural reorganisation and the new management structure
The new structure was proposed in the plant on the first of August 1993. According to the 
previous structure the- plant was divided into two parts: Kukino and Popugai and different 
workshops. According to the new structure there was a restructuring of these workshops and 
organisation o f production in a such way that similar workshops in the two areas were united. 
Organisation of the production and repair of carriages (PRC) replaced two workshops: 
Carriage-Repair shop (Kukino) and Carriage-Repair Shop (Popugai). Wheels production 
(WP) replaced the two wheel workshops in Kukino and Popugai areas. Some sections were 
transferred into separate shops (for example, the bogie section in Kukino and Popugai areas 
was transferred into a separate shop).
This new structure was worked out by the first Vice-Director under the leadership o f the 
General Director and none of these coming changes were discussed among the employees! 
They were faced with the fact o f its implementation. The General Director made an order 
with a statement that this new structure is constructed in order to improve the control of the 
plant, increasing the volume o f production and in order to help the future transition towards a 
share-holding company. The work on this new structure was conducted secretly. Several
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people had some vague ideas about the development of a new structure, but they were not 
certain about the real changes.
The approach of organising the position for the person and not the person fo r  the position was 
preserved in the whole process of restructuring of the enterprise. All this situation of the 
implementation of the new structure caused some troubles among the management team, and 
tension within several departments, because people were not sure about the future existence 
of their sections. There was no discussion about the changes in the old structure, on the 
contrary, the main specialists didn’t take part in the discussion. Even the chief specialists, 
among them the vice director on economic questions and the chief engineer, were only 
informed about the new structure when it was worked out. A lot of people in senior positions 
could not understand the logic of the whole restructuring. For example, the vice-director on 
economic questions expressed his opinion about new structure to me in an interview:
It is the same eggs, but the view from above. It is necessary to  rebuild the w hole system o f  the
enterprise, but here we see only tiny changes on the surface.
The first appearance of the new structure was accompanied by a lot o f  rumours, because there 
was general information only about the new positions, but it was not clear who will get which 
post. But this was all on the surface. In reality the new structure implied a hidden agenda 
where all the top positions were reserved for certain people.
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Order
08.07.1993 N 197
regarding further improvements o f  control in the plant
In accordance with the decision o f  the governing body o f  02.07.93 and in order to 
improve the management system within the enterprise, for fulfilment o f  the main 
obligations to the metro and depots, and also taking into consideration the influence 
on the economic development o f the market activity and competition, I order:
1. From 10.10.93 implement the following changes in the production structure
1.1. Exclude the positions o f  3 vice-directors o f  the enterprise on the Popugai and 
Kukino area.
1.2. Exclude from the production structure o f the plant :
- production-operation departments (Kukino and Popugai areas)
- production-planning department
- analytical operation department
- bogie department
- engine department
2. Implement from 15.07.93 the new departments in a new structure o f  the plant: 
-production on repair carriages.
-production on the repair and forming o f  wheel sets.
-production o f  making and repair o f  spare parts 
-material technical supply service
- production-operation department 
-operation department
- bogie workshop
- engine shop
- 3 production-operating bureaux
3. To implement the new positions into the staff schedule:
- the head o f  the production o f  repair carriages.
- the head ofproduction on the repair and forming the wheel sets.
- the head ofproduction o f  making and repair o f  spare parts
- the head o f  production-operating department.
- the head o f  the operation department
- the head o f  material technical supply service
- the head o f  the bogie workshop
- the head o f  the engine shop
- the heads o f  the production-operating bureaux (person)
4. To the head o f  the Labour and Wages Department - to implement the new changes 
in the production structure and staff schedule o f  the plant.
5. The heads o f  production should work out in July Statements about their 
productions and job descriptions for new positions in their structures.
Director o f  the plant Signature
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As we can see from the above order, there are only positions, without names of the people. 
Who will get those positions was a big question. A lot of people wanted to be appointed to 
the top positions. There was a struggle for power. The candidates first of all had to obey the 
General Director, committed to the enterprise and not undermine the position of power within 
the enterprise.
Obedience and support of the General Director was extremely important. One person in the 
top position - the vice-director on economic questions - didn’t understand that importance 
opportunely. Several times he tried to press his opinions, even ones opposite to the Director’s. 
He insisted that there should be constant revision of the Director’s activity and that there 
should be legislative and executive authorities within the plant in the new structure. He was 
quite clever, but he didn’t anticipate that because of that feature he could be thrown out of the 
plant. In winter 1993/94 he was accused of having been caught red-handed taking bribes at 
his work place. Later the case was not proved and was thrown out by the court, but he was 
fired from the enterprise. A lot of people regarded him as a very honest person, and didn’t 
believe that he could take a bribe, and there was a rumour within the plant that everything in 
this case was contrived, but nobody could confirm it. This case just demonstrated that where 
there is such a struggle for power, all means could be used. And one should know that if 
he/she is not a supporter of the director, he/she could loose everything.
The most ‘hot point’ was the position o f the head of the Production o f Repair Carriages 
(PRC). At the very beginning there were some rumours that this position will be given to the 
vice-director of production in Kukino area. But at the same time some people were very 
critical about the abilities of this person. The only positive fact was that he was very loyal to
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the first vice-Director and very helpful to him personally. One of the shop-chiefs expressed 
his opinion about this person:
we cou ldn 't find this person during the day, because he is fulfilling his ow n business, and if  I was 
a G eneral Director, I would throw him out.
But nevertheless, as was announced later, that person was appointed to this position. The 
appointments were often made not on the basis of the professional abilities of the people or 
their business skills - mainly it was on the basis of closeness to the General Director, and the 
obedience to him or to his close circle.
According to the new structure there was no such position as vice-director on production (as 
in the old structure). This position was substituted by the position o f the head of carriages 
production. The person who had been the vice-director on production refused to accept this 
position because he considered that formally the position of vice-director sounds more 
important than the head of carriages production and that the position o f head of production is 
lower than the previous position vice-director on production. That is why he told the General 
Director that he didn’t agree with such a title. That is why the Director then decided to 
implement a new improvement of the structure: to organise the title General Director for 
himself, and to rename the position of heads o f the productions as Directors of Production. 
This example shows that some Russian people like not only an important position, but also an 
important title, which brings a lot o f significance on the surface.
As about the changing the whole production structure, there were different opinions also. As 
the vice-director on economy told me:
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Any system has a rational kernel, the previous structure could be very effective, if  it was organised 
in a proper way. - and on the contrary,- it is useless to do  anything if  it v iolates the principle: ‘the 
right man in the right place’. And if now there are a lot o f  people who do not correspond with the 
position they obtained, then in one year there will be the same problems even with a new structure.
That is why some people argued that the whole of this reorganisation was not helpful for the 
plant.
When all the people had been appointed to their new positions, there were some more 
problems: the structure had been constructed, but the responsibilities o f the people had not 
been determined. That is why a lot of time was spent in order to work out new responsibilities 
which would be co-ordinated with the new positions. For example, there was a person who 
worked in the plant, then left the enterprise, and just at the beginning o f implementing the 
new structure came back to the enterprise. The General Director thought where to put him and 
preserved the production-operating department especially for him. At the same time, when the 
new Directors on Production heard about this they were opposed to it because they thought 
that it will be duplication of functions with the planning-economical department. The people 
in this production-operating department for some period didn’t know whether they would 
work or be fired. Then, step by step the main functions of the department were defined. The 
department became responsible for the production plan on the basis of data from the 
marketing department. And the planning department calculated the prices. As a result of such 
hidden developments of the structure, the whole of its implementation introduced dissonance 
on the different levels of the organisation.
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At the same time the structure was a formal recognition of some changes which had taken 
place in the organisation since it had been working on lease. In December 1992 the 
department of marketing had been formed, at the same time the department of external 
relations was organised, so the situation in the plant was changing in accordance with the new 
times, and these changes were regulated by the new structure.
Despite all the difficulties o f its implementation, more and more people came to recognise 
over time that the new structure did correspond more with the real situation. Although within 
the enterprise the method o f appointing through friends and relatives prevailed, it develops 
the independence of some structural units from one another and also the results of the whole 
reorganisation speak for itself: now the plant fulfils the plan and the level of production has 
increased significantly in comparison with the past.
At the same time the General Director expressed his opinion on the structure:
although the structure now m ore corresponds with the tasks we need to fulfil, nevertheless we have 
to recognise that it is very clum sy and difficult for managerial control.
Below, we will represent the new structure of the plant, which has been constantly revised 
and renovated since 1993. Some new departments have appeared. The structure will show, 
how the organisation has changed since the beginning of the 90s. But at the same time it will 
show that the further development of the real life was immediately reflected in a very 
complicated structure.
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We can see that the whole restructuring within the enterprise was a natural process from one 
side. The changes in the organisational structure followed the changes in the legal form. The 
same processes we can observe in many other enterprises.
The enlargement o f the main industrial workshops and the unification o f them into one 
production unit have led to the elimination of the duplication o f the functions of some o f the 
workshops, and also reduced the number of disputes. (For example, the old dispute between 
the providing spare parts in the Kukino and Popugai areas. There is no division for 
competitive workshops now, they became a part of one production and the Director of 
Production is now interested in the uniform provision of both sites).
Besides, new departments were constructed. So, the changes in the enterprise structure were 
characterised by the new market relations. Some of the departments were constructed on the 
basis of western models (for example, a Venture Department). Thus, the main tendency was 
the correspondence with the present situation. That is why the role of the traditional 
departments, who played a decisive role in the past command-administrative relations was 
diminished with the new market relations. And the role o f the new departments as for 
example, Department of Marketing or Department of External Co-operation increased.
From the other side, the whole process of restructuring was a part of further centralisation of 
power in the hands o f the top managers and especially of the General Director. All process of 
reorganisation were organised in a such way that all new structures supported the unlimited 
power of the general director. He tried to destroy any threats to his position as soon as 
possible.
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Besides, the new western approaches together with market mechanisms were combined in the 
new structure with the old traditional approach to organise the place for a certain person, and 
the whole process of restructuring was organised with the help of informal relations, which 
played a decisive role in the whole process.
Privatisation and transition of the plant into a share-holding 
company. September 1994
In 1994 there was a further step in the privatisation of the plant, with its -conversion from 
leasehold to a joint-stock company. The program of the transition of the plant into a private 
company was organised under the direct leadership of the General Director. The documents 
had been prepared in 1992 and sent to the government authorities. But the documents lay in 
the government offices for almost two years, before the plant was allowed to be privatised. 
The plant was privatised in September 1994. If we consider the whole preparation for 
privatisation within the plant, we can see that there were some tendencies towards 
transforming the enterprise into a competitive market enterprise: production was reorganised, 
some new departments were formed (for example, the department of.marketing). Thus, the 
upper management, and mainly the General Director, was one of the main leading forces of 
the future changes.
In order to analyse the main causes of the conversion of the plant Remet into a share-holding 
company, it is necessary to stress several positive features of its new legal form:
l . If the share-holder decided to leave this company, he can sell his shares to the company.
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2. The new organisational form gives the possibility to attract quite big financial resources 
from investors without being dependent on the financial support of the banks.
Now, consider the process of development o f  the plant since 1994. The registered capital of 
the company on the 25.05.95 was 476 347 000 roubles, which consisted o f 422 641 normal 
shares and 53 706 privileged shares (I share = 1 thousand roubles).
The first issue of shares was registered in the Department o f Finance of Moscow on the 4th of 
September, 1995, a total amount of 320 min. roubles. The second issue was registered on the 
2nd of February 1996, total amount 880 min. roubles, among them ordinary shares (total 
amount 580 min. roubles) and privileged shares (total amount 300 min. roubles).
Thus, the plant was organised into a share-holding company. The main governing body of the 
shareholding company became the annual Conference of Shareholders that can elect the 
Directors, change the regulations, approve reorganisation and so on. Once a year the company 
should organise the Conference of Shareholders. The main governing organ of the company 
between Conferences was the Council of Directors.
The first conference of share-holders of the Remet company was 20.05.1995. 526 share­
holders took part in this meeting. The share-holders approved a report on the activity of the 
governing body and the annual balance of the enterprise and made a decision to set the rate of 
dividend payment as 2 238 roubles per 1 share for 1994, which was an annual rate of 446 % 
per year. (Note: the deposit rate of the financial banks in the same year was 120-150% per
year).
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In 1995 the plant developed at very high speed. The sum of registered capital increased in 3.8 
times and by 1.01.1996 reached 38.9 billion roubles. Balance profit was:
Table 5.1
Balance profit of the plant Remet in 1995-1996. 
(min. roubles.)
01.01.95 01.04.95 01.07.95 01.10.95 01.01.96
18 573 3 499 9 764 23 525 30 304
The process of share distribution was conducted without any difficulties, there were not any 
disputes about this question. According to experts, around 10% of the shares belonged to the 
General director, another 10 % of the shares were in the holders had no more than 60 % of the 
shares.
By the time of the second Conference of Share-holders, which was organised on 25.05.1996 
on the plant, there were 1551 registered share-holders, who possessed 414 327 shares, among 
them 347 261 ordinary shares.
Very soon people felt the positive sides of the possession o f shares. The dividends per share 
were paid each quarter of the year. And the pensioners first considered that it is profitable to 
get shares. So now, they begem to buy shares as one of the ways to increase their incomes.
If before the plant always had to consult with Metro authorities about everything, now it 
received much more freedom, for example in formation its own payment system, clients’ 
connections and soon. At the same time, although all employees automatically became 
shareholders, there were not any substantial changes in their rights. In fact not one o f the 
workers could explain the difference between the modem situation and the past. A Genet al
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meeting of the Leaseholders was organised once a year. The Collective Agreement of the 
leaseholding enterprise had to be revised once every 3 years.
The economic situation in the plant since 1994
The plant had quite big problems approximately till the end of 1993. The difficulties of the 
past influenced the plant’s production. Only at the beginning of 1994 did the situation within 
the plant become stabilised and the plant began to show an almost unique example in Russia: 
in the situation of total production failure all over the country, there was a stable increase in 
production.
The general dynamic o f production you can see in Diagram 5.1.
Diagram 5.1. Dynamic of the repair of the carriages 1994-1996
maintenance repair
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The programme for 1996 was planned according to the orders received by the marketing 
department. The fulfilment of the program of the plant for 1996 showed that there was an 
increase in the volume of production in comparison with 1995 in :
capital repair of carriages : by 50,5% 
forming of the new wheel sets - by 15,9%
The volume of production of the other products o f the plant fell because of the lack of the 
external orders.
The construction and repair of the wheel sets increased in 1995 in comparison with 1994. But
Diagram 5.2. The dynamic of the wheel sets construction and repair 1994-1995. 
The number of pairs of wheels per year
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afterw ards fell b ecause  a  lack  o f  the o rd e rs  from  ex ternal partners:
Since 1994  th e  s tructu re  o f  o u tp u t h as constan tly  changed . T he s tru c tu re  o f  o u tp u t in  1994 
was as fo llow s:
D iagram  5.3 . T h e  s tructu re  o f  o u tp u t in  1994
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In the structure o f the production of the plant in 1995 the share o f the repaired carriages was 
64% in comparison with 54% in 1994. The share of the new wheel sets - 27% (36% in 1994), 
and the repair o f  engines - 7% (6% in 1994). The existing economic conditions on the 
Moscow Metro influenced the changes in the output of the plant. From one side, the number 
of passengers in Moscow Metro increased considerably. At the same time, approximately
275
70% of the rolling stock has been running for 15 and more years. As a result, more and more 
carriages required the full renovation and capital repair. That is why the number of the 
carriages passing through the capital repair increased.
At the same time, in the situation of constant deficiency of financial resources, the Moscow 
Metro has reduced the number of carriages which they used to buy from the Mytishi carriage- 
construction plant, because the cost of the new carriages is considerably higher then the cost 
of repair the old one. The plant Remet had an agreement with the Mytishi plant about the 
construction o f wheel sets. Once the Moscow metro reduced the number of new carriages it 
bought, the Mytishi plant reduced the number of wheel sets bought from the Remet plant. 
That is why the output of wheel sets fell considerably in 1995. The lack of orders for the 
production o f wheel-pairs forced the plant to look for new orders for this kind o f product. 
And the General Director stressed that it is necessary to get orders from the metro in different 
cities and to organise the repair o f the railway carriages. As the General Director pointed out 
to the Conference of Share-holders in May 1996:
‘Constant dropping wears away a stone’. At the moment, the M oscow  metro has increased the 
orders for capital repair to our plant. But it could not be forever. W e hope that some other plants 
will put an order to our plant for 60 wheel sets per month as th ey  do now. But we should 
concentrate all our attention on the improvement o f  the quality o f  o u r product, and we have to 
reach the highest levels o f  competitiveness.
The plant has a great potential and we will open in the nearest future other branches in different 
cities o f  Russia and CIS countries, where there is a metro. The plant w ill enter the XXI century as 
a great financial firm with a w hole system o f  branches with a whole se t o f  designers, technological
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elaborations. We have power, we believe in ourselves and we do believe in the victory o f  our 
mutual business!.
One of the main features of the industrial activity of the plant in 1996 was the further 
tendency to the stabilisation of the work of the production departments.
Table 5.2 Comparative analysis of the rhythm of production (in %):
Popugai area Kukino area
1995 1996 1995 1996
Finishing repair of carriages in the 
first ten days of the month 23,2 23,3 27,9 27
Delivery o f repaired
bogies to the client in the first ten
days of the month
31,6 34 42 38
Delivery of wheel sets to the client in 
the first ten days of the month 14,5 23 23,1 34
Delivery o f engines to the client in 
the first ten days of the month 23,5 25,6 28,5 38
As we can see from Table 5.3, the situation with the rhythm of production improved 
considerably in comparison with 1993, when storming at the end of the month was quite
common:
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Table 5.3 Rhythm of production of the main production workshops in 1993:
ca rriag es repa ir 
w o rk sh o p  
(K u k in o  area)
carriag
w orks!
(Popup
es assem b ly  
top
ai a rea )
w heels shop  
P opugai a rea
decades 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
January 13,3 - 86,7 - 19,7 80,3 18,9 20,9 60,2
February 15,7 28,1 56,2 13,2 24,2 62,6 20,6 29,5 49,9
M arch 14,3 27,4 58,3 - 30,3 69,7 1,0 4,1 94,9
A pril - 44,4 55,6 26,7 - 73,3 19,4 40,0 40,6
M ay - - 100,0 7,1 14,3 78,6 7,6 36,0 56,4
June 32,7 12,2 55,1 - 7,1 92,9 9,8 4,5 85,7
July - 26,1 73,9 12,3 3,9 83,8 19,5 23,9 56,6
A ugust - - - 4,2 13,3 82,5 - - -
S ep tem ber 9,4 15,0 75,6 16,3 4,4 79,3 21,8 27,2 51,0
O ctober - 29,0 71,0 - 8,8 91,2 20,6 13,6 65,8
N ovem ber - 9,2 90,8 - 12,7 87,3 20,5 36,2 43,3
D ecem ber - - 100,0 19,0 3,9 77,1 21,4 26,3 52,3
A verage
1993
4,7 15,4 80,2 7,8 10,0 82,2 16,4 26,6 43,0
As we can see in 1993 mainly, workshops fulfilled the plan in the last ten days, and this is 
true for almost all the workshops. The carriages workshops repaired the majority of their 
production output in the third ten days (more then 80%).
The present situation in the plant from this point of view became much more organised, and 
the departments usually fulfilled the repairs according to the planned program without 
firefighting at the end of the month.
Besides, the time for the repair of the carriages was also reduced, mainly because of a more 
effective way of utilising the repair places.
One of the key factors of stabilising the rhythm of production in 1996 was the very stable 
work of the production of spare parts within the plant. In order to improve the planning and
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control of providing materials, the production-operating department was re-structured, and 
within this department a bureau for preparing production was constructed.
From the very beginning of the disruptions o f the economic connections in the former USSR, 
the plant was re-oriented into the organisation of a self-providing system of spare parts. That 
is why the mechanical-assembly workshop became responsible for providing spare parts for 
the needs o f the plant.
In 1996 there was a further tendency within the plant to reduce the number of parts produced 
by external partners. The number of the parts produced by the mechanical-assembly shop 
increased by 201 units.
In 1996 there were still 79 parts made by external partners, among them:
6 - because of the lack of equipment,
22- because of the lack of rigging,
51- because of internal reasons within the mechanical-assembly workshop.
In 1997 the plant will maintain the tendency to reduce the number o f parts delivered by 
external enterprises, and it was planned that by the beginning of 1998 the plant would provide 
the whole range of spare parts.
Another factor proving the tendency towards stabilisation in the plant was the reduction of 
labour turnover.
Stabilisation of labour turnover
In 1995 the staff structure of the plant was constructed in the following way:
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managers (heads of the departments, workshops and so on) 12 ,1%
specialists 13,3%
clerks 0,4%
workers 74,2%
In 1996 the plant hired 336 employees, including 272 workers and 64 specialists and 240 
people left, of whom 203 were workers and 37 specialists.
The next figures show us the main tendencies in labour turnover:
Diagram 5.4 The dynamic of labour turnover in the plant (in %).
%
Wages increased and became the third highest in Moscow.
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Stabilisation of wages
Table 5.4 Average wages in the Moscow metro system as a whole, in some electrical railway 
depots, and in the plant Remet in 1996 (average wages for the month).
Depot January
1996
(roubles)
October 1996 
(roubles)*
Depot ‘Sevemoye’ 1365 498 1 415 982
Depot ‘Fili’ 1 422 263 1 588 828
Depot ‘Izmailovo’ 1 229 164 1 324 000
Depot ‘Novogireevo’ 1 050315 1 354 888
The average wages in the underground for average 
number of workers for this month
1 071 118 1 216 170
The average wages in Diant Remet for average 
number of workers for this month
1 541 253 1 908 704
The average wages in Plant Remet including the 
wages for work in the small enterprises.
1 531 994 2 300 024
* 1 US Dollar in January 1996 was around 5 200 roubles. By the end of the 1996 it was equal
to 5 ,590 p e r 1 $.
As the General Director pointed out at the conference of the labour collective, devoted to the 
problems of production:
We have constructed an island in the ocean while there is such bardak (chaos) in the whole 
country. The average worker in the country gets 200 - 300 thousand roubles, no more. A worker in 
our plant has 1.5 min. roubles. In the Saint-Petersburg plant w hich constructs carriages for the 
metro the wages o f  w orkers are at most 300 000 roubles. M oscow is characterised by the same 
situation, excluding the oil and gas industry (Speech o f  the G eneral D irector at the conference o f 
the labour collective. M ay 1995).
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Core-periphery relations in the new conditions
Core and peripheral workers
As we saw earlier, there are different ways of categorising ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ workers and 
there are some questions about the applicability of this conception in Russian conditions. At 
first sight there are a lot of differences between the conceptions o f ‘core’ and ‘ peripheral’ 
workers in two different countries like Russia and Britain. From some points o f view, the 
‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ workers within a Russian enterprise have a relatively homogeneous 
status and secure position within the enterprise and this is completely different in Britain. But 
also, there are differences in the sense that in Britain mainly, the higher the skills of the 
employee, the higher the status he has. In Russia we can find a lot of examples when low- 
skilled workers are highly paid and, though it is more rare, it is possible that a high skilled 
worker has a lower payment. (For example, if he has high skills, but also he has no 
commitment to the enterprise, and is constantly fighting with the administration and the 
middle management about his rights. In these circumstances the management could find a 
way to reduce his level of payment. Because a lot of questions are resolved in an informal 
way.) However, despite the differences, this conception is very useful because it gives us the 
opportunity to consider how the labour force is organised, and what is really useful is that this 
conception is applicable both to the internal as well as to the external labour market.
One basis of the distinction in Russia is in accordance with the division of production into 
main and peripheral production, leading to a division among the workers depending on the 
form of production. In the past the main attention of the administration of the enterprises, and
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also the ministries, was concentrated on main production. And there was a hierarchy of 
productions: main production was the core production. All the rest of the workshops which 
repaired and made equipment and parts for the main production were considered as peripheral 
to the main production. As regards the status of the workers employed in these different 
shops, their status also was different. The workers o f  the main production were always highly 
paid, the work on the main production was regarded as more prestigious work.
In the period o f transition within enterprises that stratification began to change. First of all 
such subsidiary productions as the production of spare parts for the plant became much more 
important than before. And simultaneously the status of the workers engaged in this 
production increased as well. So the role of the workers of the high qualifications as 
toolmakers in the new conditions increased considerably. Thus, we want to stress that the 
understanding of the categories ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ workers connected with the 
technological division among the workers has changed considerably. But when we turn from 
the division between workshops to the division within workshops we find that in the 
workshops themselves the divisions among the workers were preserved, just as they were in 
previous times.
‘Kadrovye’ - ‘non-kadrovye’ workforce in modern conditions
With the transition to the market economy, a lot o f co-operatives were organised. And at the 
beginning some of the ‘kadrovye’ workers left the enterprise, while some persistent violators 
of discipline were also dismissed from the enterprise. So, from one point of view, the process 
of unification o f the workforce took place as the number at the top and the bottom shrank. But
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at the same time, we can’t say that the differentiation between different workers had fully 
disappeared. Within the workshops there is still a clear demarcation line between the ‘core’ or 
‘kadrovye’ workers and ‘peripheral’ workers.
Some researchers have stressed that with the transition to the market economy the workers 
become a more homogeneous group than before (Kozina and Borisov: 1986) I would stress 
that from my point of view this could be the case if we only consider the workers as opposed 
to the administration, and in this case, keeping in mind the division between ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
within the enterprise, we could say that the upper management and middle managers with the 
development of the commercial relations have opened for themselves much more new 
business activities and therefore became much more alienated from the workers. The workers, 
in turn, became a much more coherent group. But this observation could also be very 
deceptive. The processes observed within the enterprise gave me the opportunity to suggest 
that the division among the workers with the appearance o f the market relations exists, and in 
some cases has become much stronger, because there are workers included in the process of 
getting additional resources in new conditions, and there are workers who are excluded from 
it. This leads to the clear demarcation line between two different groups.
Before I begin the analysis of the real situation within the plant concerning the status o f ‘core’ 
and ‘peripheral’ work forces in modem conditions I should stress that in real production it is 
very rare to find the pure situation of a cause-consequence relationship. As very often 
happens, there are several sets o f  problems which are interconnected. In our case-study we 
found a lot of cases when informal relations were interlaced with payment problems, or 
caused payment problems, and cases, where formal/informal relations were interrelated with
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‘core’/ ’peripheral’ relations. Thus, it was quite difficult to define, what is the real picture, 
because life itself is very complicated. In the following mini case-study we will see, how the 
division between ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ work forces caused a serious conflict about the 
payment system, and we will try to  uncover what role formal and informal factors played in 
these circumstances.
As we pointed out above, within the enterprise there was a system of ‘core’ workers, who 
played a decisive role in the production process and had considerable control over production. 
The core workers within this enterprise were the workers of the main production area, highly 
qualified, skilled workers, who had worked for the enterprise for 20-30 years. But we should 
stress that not all workers included in this category by the formal criteria of length o f service 
within the enterprise should be regarded as ‘core’ or ‘kadrovye’ workers. Among workers 
with a long length of service they formed a separate group. These were workers who knew 
production very well, with whom managers, designers, technologists could come to consult. 
So it was workers with some abilities. It is not a secret that usually there are some workers 
within the enterprise, who have worked there for a long time, but can not even hit a nail. 
Certainly this kind of workers could not be regarded as a ‘core’ workers.
The ‘core’ workers are sometimes called by managers the ‘skeleton’ of production, i.e. if, for 
example, 100 workers work in the shop, the ‘skeleton’ of the shop could be formed by 10 
workers, so it was usually up to 10% of the whole collective. And production almost 
completely relied on these workers. This is the minimum number of workers, who work in 
particular jobs and without whom the process of production would not be possible.
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In some enterprises, with the transition towards a market economy and because of the very 
difficult economical situation within certain plants, this group of workers has been almost 
destroyed. In our researched enterprise, because the situation was not that bad, the ‘core’ 
workers were preserved, and such workers stayed within the enterprise. Some changes may 
have taken place in their age configuration. If workers with length of service of 30 and more 
years left the plant because of health problems or have got their pensions, they were 
substituted by a younger generation.
The position of the managers towards the kadrovye workers
In the past a lot of attention was devoted to the ‘kadrovye’ workers. With the transition 
towards a market economy, the attitudes towards this group of workers on the different levels 
of management have changed. On the level of the plant real attention to this category of 
workers has almost disappeared. The upper managers, including the General Director didn’t 
pay any attention to preserving of such a group of qualified workers. In an interview with the 
General Director he said:
We know that there is a queue outside the enterprise, there are people who would like to be 
employed by us. Not only people from Russia, but also people from CIS countries, who are 
prepared to work hard like miners (including two weeks on - two weeks off). So it does not matter, 
how skilled are our workers here. If they are not satisfied with our wages or something else in the 
plant, we will let them go. We are not interested in preserving such workers. There are a lot of 
highly qualified people outside, who would be glad to get even one tenth part of the salaries of our 
workers. (Interview with the General Director, November, 1993)
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Thus, as we can see, the position of the top management, including the first vice-director, 
became more pragmatic in comparison with the past. If before there was a tendency towards 
preserving such workers on the enterprise level, in new conditions this approach has changed 
considerably. Nevertheless, this was only the opinion of the General Director, who was quite 
far from the real relations with workers. But the employment policy very much depends on 
the level of the shop. Always the shop chiefs implemented their own policy, sometimes 
absolutely opposite to the upper managers. How has it changed now?
On the level of the shop in new conditions very much continuity was still clear. The policy 
towards different categories of workers among the middle managers was quite differentiated, 
because at the end o f the day the middle managers were responsible for the plan. And they 
had to organise production in a such way that they would efficiently meet the target. And in 
order to do this they have to rely on a definite category o f workers as in the past, mainly on 
the category of ‘kadrovye’ workers. So, there is an unwritten agreement between the line 
managers and the ‘core’ workers. The workers are prepared to support the foreman and shop 
chiefs, and they, in return are ready ‘to feed’ them.
These workers are sometimes also called the ‘worker elite’. I would see a slightly different 
nuance o f this term, but. I think that this term also could be appropriate to that category of 
workers who are very qualified, and who can fulfil the program of the plant. And the line 
managers divide the workforces in their workshops into two groups: the core workers, elite, 
who get the piece o f the pie together with managers, and in return provide the plan fulfilment 
from one side, and the peripheral workers, who fulfilled less privileged work from the other
side.
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At the same time the position of such ‘kadrovye’ workers within the different shops also 
varied. For example, as we can see below, in the engine shop, the ‘kadrovyi’ worker works 
hard, but he organised production in a such way that everything is constructed for his 
convenience.
In another shop, which we will not consider here, the situation happened as follows: the 
‘kadrovyi’ worker organised the process in a such way that he does not work at all. He 
became a brigadier, and he is free of work. And he works very rarely, in certain cases, when 
the person is ill, or absent for some reason.
One of the features of such workers in the new conditions in my opinion is that they have a 
more secure position within this particular shop or section in comparison with the others. By 
secure position I mean first o f all that if there will be a reduction o f the work force, they will 
be reduced in the last place. Then, the system of informal relations with the middle managers 
provided them with quite good financial rewards, of which other workers were deprived. The 
‘core’ workers keep secret the amount o f money they receive in order to prevent social 
tension within the collective.
Besides, I should stress that the relations between core/peripheral workers comprise a whole 
set of dependencies of the peripheral workers on the core workers. And this dependency is 
very often regulated in informal ways.
Production was arranged in a such way that everything was organised for the ‘kadrovye’ 
(core) workers. If they need a crane, then it is organised first of all for them. Highly paid work
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also was organised mainly for them. And vice versa, because they had quite good conditions 
for their work, they had higher salary, a higher percentage of plan fulfilment.
This is the view of one of the workers regarding the core worker:
Yes, he gets everything. But he can work hard as well. And he can organise the workers in his 
brigade.
For ‘Kadrovye’ workers everything is organised in a proper way, everything is done quicker. 
There is a mutual connection between ‘kadrovye’ workers and the managers: the managers 
rely on these workers, and the workers could get some benefit from managers for their 
diligence. But because o f such different approaches to the workers, the other workers, who 
are excluded from this category consider this as real discrimination. Look at the following 
example:
In our workshop there are 2 brigades, 4 persons each. These brigades are identical. We repair the 
engines. At the very beginning of my work at the plant I found out that the other brigade was 
always doing the most profitable work, more clean, if it is possible to say. We are doing all the 
rubbish and actually we are doing the jobs which they are don’t want to do. I tried to understand 
why it happened. In the second brigade one of the ‘kadrovye’ workers works. He is the leader of 
the other brigade. He has worked on the plant for 36 years. He knows the plant and the people very 
well. I've heard that he worked with our shop chief at the beginning of their working career and 
even that they studied together in technical school. Now he admits that the shop chief is a ‘bowl of 
shit’, but at the same time he doesn't want to spoil relations with him. I found out that he has 
selected people on the principle of hard working. And if somebody entered his brigade and he 
didn't like him, then he got rid of this person from his brigade. Everybody in the workshop is
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afraid of him and doesn't want to argue with him. They think it will cost too much, because of his 
relations with the shop chief. Sometimes even the shop chief consults with this worker and asks his 
opinion. He organised everything in such a way that better work (higher paid), good material, tools 
are given to him in the first place. The second brigade (where I am working) gets all the rest.
There were several times, when I argued with him. I faced a situation when he took over the crane 
from our brigade for a long time. The crane should work equally for both brigades. But at least 70 
% of the working time the crane is used by his brigade. But we have to accept this situation, 
because everybody in the shop is scared of his reaction.
On the 5 of February I had another scandal with our ‘core’ worker. He became so impudent. 
Usually everything is for him - cranes, tolls and nobody could say a word to him. And today I had 
assembled the engine and I had to transfer it for further technical inspection. For this operation the 
cranes was necessary. And he took the crane without any excuses for tomorrow's work. I told him 
: ‘Hey bastard, are you crazy? Why not put a label on the crane that it belongs to you, that it’s your 
private property. I must give the engine to the technical inspection, and you work for tomorrow.’ 
He kept silence, because he respects me. But if there was another guy instead of me, he would 
hardly notice him and would continue to do his work. And in this situation I took the crane, and he 
didn't object.
Yesterday, on the 14th of February, I noticed that he again took the crane for his brigade. I decided 
to stand up for our rights and see what he will do. In several minutes he called for me. I was 
surprised, because I hadn't even talked to him for the whole week. When I approached him he 
said: ‘We will do this job now and then the crane will be returned to your brigade.’ Partly I was 
glad - it was my victory. It was not easy for him to overcome his pride and say it to me. For many 
years everything was done for him and in this case he failed.
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To be honest, I could not understand this division. The young workers are nothing in comparison 
with the o ld  ones. The new are suppressed by the old ones. They are given the worst work and so 
on. At the same time ‘kadrovye’ workers have all the power over the production process. They 
organise everything up to the highest standard. And in any case they can stop the production 
process. T hat is why they have power. But at the same time the shop chief also  has the power, and 
it is recognised by the ‘kadrovye’ workers. They say, yes, we can do nothing with the shop chief. 
He is the m aster here. Thus in a such way there is some kind o f  parity between them. Each party 
knows its pow er and preserves the necessary neutrality. (15.02.95)
The situation where almost everything is regulated by the core workers is sustained in 
different workshops. What we can see in the workshops is that there is a relation of 
dependency o f the peripheral workers on the core workers. Below is an example from the 
blacksmith section in the mechanical assembly workshop:
One of the kadrovyi worker has worked in this shop for 12 years and because this is work in 
hazardous conditions, he already qualified for an early pension. Now within the workshop:
1. Formally he is a brigadier.
2. He has the highest qualification and respect from the top.
3. He doesn’t work - he just governs who does what.
4. He chooses the newcomers. In case he doesn’t like anybody, he just gets rid of him.
5. The whole process of production is regulated by him: he defines the quality of work
done, he controls the work in all senses: the quantity and the quality.
6. Informally - he is the right hand of the foreman and the shop chief.
The line managers organise their policy through the ‘kadrovye’ workers. At the same time, in
case of any unrest among the other workers, they can rely only on ‘kadrovye’ workers, and 
they will perform the tasks for all.
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Now, in modem conditions, where the rate of unemployment in Moscow is quite high, 
nobody wants trouble and even does not think about any kind of protest. So, people obey the 
orders of the brigadier.
Thus, can see that the employees in the workshops are not a homogeneous group, but it are a 
combination of different groups, among which one of the central roles is played by the 
division between ‘core’ (kadrovye) workers and ‘peripheral’ workers. This division was 
organised by managers in the past and this division is still maintained even in transformed 
enterprises. This division helps managers to preserve their power. At the same time it is a 
double-sided relation, because the managers divide the workers and feed one part of them, 
and these workers, in return, support the managers’ power and prevent it from shaking down. 
These relations are not regulated in any institutionalised papers, they exist in real life in the 
whole system o f informal communications. They are not lying on the surface, but they 
represent one of the main parts of industrial relations in the modem Russian enterprise. That 
is why we decided to find out the hidden mechanisms of communication between different 
groups of the enterprise, based on informal relations. It was not easy, because these kinds of 
communications are mainly hidden from the outsider. I am sure that some part of these 
mechanisms are represented in the process o f payment. That is why I suggest considering the 
modem situation in the payment system.
Plant and market restructuring and changes in the payment system
Approximately from the end o f 1993, the distribution of money within brigades was almost 
fully replaced by the distribution money from the top. It means that the money calculated by
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the Labour and Wages Department was accumulated in a special Shop C hiefs Fund. Then the 
shop chief himself distributes money among different brigades. Sometimes he consulted with 
the foremen. And then the foreman distributes the money among the workers. Very rarely the 
foreman could invite the brigadier and ask him about how to distribute money within the 
brigade. Mainly everything was defined on the highest level and the workers didn’t participate 
in the process of money distribution at all. This kind of money distribution opened the 
possibility for even more subjective distribution of money - the foremen as well as the shop 
chief could be subjective about some worker or some brigade. And now the role of informal 
relations with the upper management has increased very much. Even in the previous years, 
there was possibility for subjectivity and unjust decisions, but now the possibility for such 
things had increased.
Although in the past the whole system of money distribution was quite complicated, there 
was some kind of participation of the brigade in this process. I would argue that, of course, 
the whole system was far from a real democratic method of distribution, because the amount 
of money for the brigade was fixed, but at least there was some kind of participation of 
workers in this process. Since 1994 this process was concentrated only in the hands of the 
foreman and the shop chief. The worker now only gets the payment list two days before pay 
day. In this payment list you could not understand the process of wage calculation. If the 
majority of workers on the plant do piece work, at least the process of piece work payment 
should be understandable for the workers. But it is a dark point. Nobody knows how it is 
calculated, there are only rumours about this calculation, and how money is distributed 
between the workers. But these rumours show that the whole this process is very far from
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scientific methods developed by, for example, Frederick Taylor. According to them 
everything is simpler - first the shop chief takes off his payment, then the foreman takes off 
his part. All the rest is divided almost equally among the brigade. The differences could be 
only if one person worked fewer days than the others, or if the person belongs to a privileged 
group of ‘kadrovye’ workers - the workers, who have worked for 15-20 years in the plant, 
showed their loyalty to the bosses and for their loyalty they get paid more.
To pay more to some workers and to deprive some o f the workers can now be done easily 
because of the Shop Chief s Fund. These funds began to be formed in the early nineties. The 
main aim of such funds was at the beginning to give the shop chief more responsibility and 
the possibility for encouraging the hard-working brigades. In reality this system opened up 
greater possibility for machinations from the side of the shop chief. The shop chief is almost 
the only person who controls all this fund, so there is a possibility for appropriation of money 
by them. It could be only rumours, if they were not proved by some facts from reality - the 
shop chief of the engine shop has three cars - one is a Russian Lada, two others are Mercedes. 
Several months ago there was a traffic accident, where one of the Mercedes crashed. Then he 
quickly repaired it in the auto service. The shop chief o f  the blacksmith workshop has two 
cars - a Mercedes and Russian NIVA. The vice shop chief of the same department has a 
Volga car. And these examples could be continued. The cost of the Russian car in Moscow 
quite expensive. As regards the Mercedes - it is a very expensive car, even second-hand.
The formation of the Shop C hiefs Fund is only one o f the ways in which management has 
more informal control of the system of payment. Even more significant was the development 
of a system of parallel payment through small enterprises.
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Small enterprises
The system and principles o f  payment have changed considerably with the arrival of market 
relations. Below we will try to show that the range of frauds with the payment system have 
increased considerably. First of all, this was as a consequence of several changes in the whole 
system o f organisation of the turnover of documents. Some of these changes are summarised 
in the following paragraphs:
First of all it was connected with the organisation of system of small enterprises (SET 
Approximately in the middle of 1993-within the plant so called ‘small enterprises’ began to 
form. These small enterprises were one of the forms of limited liability company introduced 
by Russian legislation. This kind of company became very common in Russia because of its 
secure position from the point of view of financial responsibility of their founders. According 
to the documents the small enterprises had a contractual relation with the plant: they used the 
equipment of the plant, electricity and so on. And they are supposed to do additional work for 
the clients. But that was only on paper. When these small enterprises were organised within 
the plant, there was not any real restructuring of the staff. All that happened was that some 
people within the workshop organised a set of documents, and formed an ‘enterprise within 
an enterprise’ through which they could get additional money for the same work. Originally it 
was one o f the means of escaping from taxes, as there was a special tax on wages: according 
to Russian law there was a special limit for the wages fund within the plant and the plant paid 
heavy taxes on overexpenditure of the wages fund. The mechanism of these small enterprises 
was very similar to that of Russian co-operatives. Some planned amount of parts the plant 
produced for the average prices. But additional work for other organisations the plant could
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produce for higher prices. That is why the same work had a different cost within the plant and 
within the small enterprise.
The leaders o f the small enterprises were selected carefully. They had to be devoted to the 
General Director, and the most obliging got the right to organise the small enterprises in the 
first place. The main principle, which was used for the organisation of the small enterprises 
was that the director of the small enterprise and the shop chief would be one and the same 
person.
The small enterprises as such were not the focus of the current research, but from the first 
steps of the organisation of the small enterprises it became clear that these small enterprises 
were opened as one additional income resource for the upper management o f the enterprise. 
There was a non-written agreement between the upper managers of the plant and the heads o f 
the small enterprises : the former gave the possibility for the middle managers to earn more 
money. And the second had to pay them in return. So it was a mutual advantageous 
agreement, which fed a selected circle of people.
Once the small enterprise was formed within the workshops, a lot of possibilities appeared for 
money manipulation. For example, the way of organisation of financial documents within 
such ‘ small enterprises’ was simplified. So, for example, to receive wages from the small 
enterprises it was enough to provide the passport number, address and signature of the person 
receiving the wages. The payment for the small enterprise did not pass through the accounts. 
As a result there was an opportunity to put 'dead souls’ in the payment sheets of the small 
enterprises. These could be the relatives and friends of the foremen, chiefs o f shops or other 
people responsible for the organisation o f the small enterprise. The directors of such small
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enterprises were usually people who fulfilled the responsibilities of shop chiefs, heads of 
production, production managers and so on. As the financial documents of the small 
enterprises haven’t to pass through the accounts department, there was an outflow of money 
through informal channels.
When these small enterprises were formed, there was a further changes in the status of the 
line managers - their positions became higher, because the small enterprises immediately 
increased their responsibility and financial authority.
How the. situation with the small enterprise influenced the workers’ conditions within the 
plant is shown by the following interview:
We have no exact information about how much money the management of the small enterprises 
receives at the moment. However, our chief obviously did not purchase a Lada car out of his own 
salary (it was just impossible) and then bought a western car without selling the first one. Then the 
western car crashed and he repaired it quickly. Only with one salary you couldn’t do it. With us he 
creates complete arbitrariness ‘If I want I will pay you the payment for the small enterprise, if not 
no.’ One guy was absent for three days in the month, then the shop chief cut off his wages for the 
small enterprise completely. And why? He didn’t come to work just for three days, and he was just 
sick. Well, you can not pay him for the whole month, but pay him proportionally according to his 
days in. But he refuses to do it. Another guy from our team has decided to tell the truth. He 
considered that he was poorly paid for the small enterprise. Well, he went to the chief of shop, 
who was at the same time the director of the small enterprise. The worker asked why he received 
such a small payment? And chief answered him: ‘Well, you are dissatisfied with this payment, all 
right, next month you and your team will get absolutely nothing’ And he fulfilled his promise. You
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can not find the truth. You can not find the truth whether we are definitely ow ed something, and 
how much we are owed.
May be some o ther brigades know how much they will receive. We abso lu tely  don’t know 
anything. We w ere told that only part o f  our work is registered through the sm all enterprise and 
that in order to increase our salary they (bosses) remove a part o f the paym ent from the other 
brigade and add it to  ours. But the shop chief puts it in the following way T i l  pay w hom I want to 
pay from the sm all enterprise. (Interview with a w orker o f  the engine shop, January  1996)
According to rumours, the guys from one of the teams refused to receive payment for the 
small enterprise from the hands of the chief. They wrote a paper that they want that all this to 
be conducted through the bookkeeping department. All the chiefs were not happy with it. 
They came to the brigade and asked them to take back their application. Probably it shocked 
them. Certainly, now, they fill in all the documents themselves, and do what they want. And 
the whole practice would be stopped if it had to go officially through the accounts 
department. The pay sheets are now organised in a such way that you should not see who else 
is on the same sheet. It was done intentionally so that people could not see how much money 
the other person receives. When you come to get your payment for the small enterprise the 
shop chief is shouting: 'Quicker, quicker, don 7 scrutinise the sheet. ' Here is the comment of 
one of the workers:
They are afraid that we could find out their payment. And recently we did find the payment sheet 
with the salary of the foreman, maybe he lost this sheet. It was for July. And now it is December. 
So he got 2 million, and it was in July. And our payment in this month was around I million. And 
he is simply the foreman, and gets SO % more then us. I think that the shop chief has around 5 or 6 
millions from the small enterprise. (Interview with worker, plant Remet, 25. II. 95)
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This interview shows that the wages for the small enterprises do not correspond with Russian 
law, according to the law the plant had to pay the salary. But with the small enterprise it is not 
true. The shop chief created his own laws, and he tries to make all workers live according to 
these laws.
Approximately since the beginning of 1996 the largest part of earnings was organised through 
the system o f small enterprises. It was obvious that the most money was concentrated within 
the hands o f  the shop chiefs, who had more possibilities for money manipulation.
At the same time, the part which passed through the bookkeeping department became smaller 
and smaller. The proportion of the salary passed through the small enterprise and the official 
channels we will illustrate with the salary of one of the workers in the mechanical assembly 
workshop. Through the bookkeeping department he received the following pay slip:
Payment sheet
January 1997, days - 20, number of hours 158.60 
Mechanical assembly workshop,
Blacksmith department/ piece work 
Worker’s Number 123 Ivanov M.K. 
gross income 1 200 000 
Calculated:
piece work payment 1 200 000 20 days
Total 1 200 000
Deducted:
pension fund 12  000
trade union fund 12  000
taxation 132 541
T o ta l: 156 541
Through the small enterprise the same person got 2 400 000 roubles. This means that the 
earnings which go through the small enterprise are at least twice as much as the official
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salary. Also, as you can see, the taxation is deducted from the sum of 1 200 000. And the 
taxation for 2 400 000 depends on the will of the person. If he is a law-abiding person he will 
go to the taxation bureau and pay taxes. If he would like to hide it he will hide it. And then it 
is a task for the tax inspectorate to find the hidden income.
As we could see from the payment list, there is no sign of the way the wages are calculated, 
although they should be calculated in accordance with some standing order. At the same time, 
according to the worker, he had never seen any such standing order at all.
Everything is done by the foreman and shop chief. They just ask us to come and get payment for 
the small enterprise. Of course we depend on them, because we don’t know the exact date, when 
the money for the small enterprise will be paid as well as the amount of money. (Extract from an 
interview, December, 1996.)
The fact that such a situation with the small enterprises is quite common in Russia is 
confirmed by an article in the very popular newsweek Arguments and Facts. The workers of 
the experimental machine-building factory in Gukovsky town (Moscow region) organised a 
picket with the following demands: ‘to dismiss management’, ‘Give back our salary’. As a 
matter o f  fact the workers of this factory, as well as the designers, had not received their 
wages for a long time. At the same time the management in this period bought themselves 
cars: first one chief o f shop, then another. Why does it occur? Here is a quotation from the 
article:
Within the plant there are several small enterprises, through which all profitable orders are 
organised, such as ‘Ggel’ (the plant was given a very profitable credit for the creation of the light 
engine plane ‘Ggel’), light wires for metro etc.
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And from here there is some additional money for the management o f  the factory and o ther chiefs, 
although the agreement about the order at the beginning was formed w ith the factory. And then the 
management renews the agreements with small enterprises, i.e. with itself, because it is precisely 
they who are the founders. Then they select the executors, who have the chance to get some 
additional money.
Though it is necessary to note that those people who directly make the great amount of work 
receive very little. Here an example from the same article:
1 worked for a long time on the principle that however much I was given, that’s good, says the 
designer Verestshagina. But once 1 could not bear it at all. For an independent report w hich I made 
m yself I was paid 130 thousand roubles, and six chiefs, who hadn’t even read the report, just 
signed it, received 160 thousand roubles. I expressed my anger and since that time I have not been 
given any work at all.
It is necessary to note that the work itself now becomes a value. And the distribution o f  work 
is now monitored more seriously than before,.66
Thus, we found out that the organisation of wages within the plant depends on the will and 
disposition of people in power. So if you want to have a good salary, you should find out the 
informal ways of ‘pleasing your bosses’, you should be nice to them, do not ask any kind of 
questions, and wait for the pittance from above.
66 K o ro s t ik o v a ,  1 9 9 5 , p .6 .
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One of the features of the majority of reorganised enterprises is the change in the 
differentiation in the level of earnings of the specialists and line managers (so-called people 
‘from the upper echelons of authority’) from one side and the workers from the other. And if 
the distinctions in earnings of the working people and line managers in the first stages of 
privatisation were not so big, step by step this distinction reached the highest point. So, in the 
researched enterprise, the difference only in official wages is between ten and fifty times.
The general tendency is that, if the difference in payment of the workers and line managers is 
on average two to three times, the earnings of the highest levels of the organisation reach ten 
times the earnings of the workers.67
The freedom of the general director has increased since 1993, when in the collective 
agreement it was stated that the salary of the General Director should be 5 times the average 
level of payment within the plant. Thus, the salary of the General Director was dependent on 
the salary of the ordinary worker. But it was still only on the surface. This statement legalised 
the official amount of salary for the General Director. But it doesn’t include his salary for the 
founding o f the small enterprises. Besides, it doesn’t include the unlimited power of getting
67 B y  th e  s u m m e r  o f  1 9 9 4  th e  a v e r a g e  w a g e s  p e r  w o rk e r  w i th in  th e  R u s s ia n  p l a n t  h a s  r e a c h e d  3 0 0 $  p e r  m o n th ,  
b y  th e  e n d  o f  1 9 9 6  -  3 5 0 $ .  In  c o m p a r is o n  w i th  th e  w e s te r n  s a la r ie s  it c o u ld  b e  t o  r e g a rd e d  a s  s m a l l .  B u t  i f  w e  
w ill c o n s id e r  th i s  s a la ry  in  th e  c o n te x t  o f  th e  g e n e ra l  le v e l  in  M o s c o w , th e n  i t  is  p o s s ib le  to  s a y  th a t  th e s e  w a g e s  
w e re  in  th e  to p  lis ts  in  M o s c o w . A  h ig h e r  s a la ry  w a s  e a r n e d  o n ly  b y  th e  G a z p r o m  w o r k e r s  ( t h e  g a s  a n d  o i l  
in d u s try ) . I f  w e  c o m p a re  th is  s a la ry  w ith  th e  a v e r a g e  w a g e s  in  th e  w h o le  o f  R u s s ia ,  th e n  w e  s h o u ld  s t r e s s  th a t  is 
v e ry  h ig h ,  b e c a u s e  a c c o r d in g  to  d a ta  o f  IT A R  T A S S  ( R u s s ia n  in fo rm a tio n  a g e n c y )  th e  le v e l o f  w a g e s  in  R u s s ia  
f ro m  N o v e m b e r  1 9 9 4  to  M a rc h  199 5  h a s  f a l le n  fro m  $ 8 7  d o w n  to  7 2 $ .
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other resources from the plant such as building materials and parts for the General Director’s 
own purposes.
The power of the General Director also increased because in the changes to the Collective 
Agreement for 1994 it was stated that the salary of the Chief Engineer, Chief Bookkeeper and 
Vice - Director would be fixed by the General Director.
New tendencies in the sphere of payment of labour
One of the typical features of Russian production is the fact that as a rule the workers cannot 
understand how their wages are determined. Any researcher can confirm this form her own 
experience or by asking workers. It is obvious that the system of payment o f labour should 
not be so complicated and it should be understandable by workers. In theory many authors 
have recognised that there should be an interdependence between productivity and earnings. 
However, in practice everything occurs in an absolutely different way. Even if  the person is 
paid time-wages, there are many extra charges and deductions from payment. Moreover, in 
Russia very often the salary is paid not only for good work or productivity, but also for 
commitment to the chief, and more often for humility before him. And it should not be hidden 
that in our post-socialist reality the organisation of payment depends absolutely not on formal 
criteria, but on the informal relations with the bosses.
Thus, to summarise the main features of the modem conditions in the sphere of payment 
within our researched enterprise, we found the following features:
1. Deeper differentiation in the sphere of payment of labour between the workers and 
the upper levels - the line managers, the director and so on.
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2. More hidden ways of calculating payment. Decrease of the level o f information, i.e. 
the reduction of information about from what components their earnings consist of, 
how they are determined and how much they will receive in hand. The upper 
echelon more often remind one of local tsars.
3. More complete dependence on the activity of a particular person. ‘I will do what I 
want’ is the slogan of those who possess the power. At the same time, middle 
managers now have more freedom in the distribution o f money and now more 
freely dispose of money resources.
4. The line managers (foreman, shop chief) have received greater freedom in the 
distribution o f money in modem conditions. And the level o f  frauds68 in the 
distribution of money has also increased.
5. The differentiation of earnings between simple workers and the upper bosses 
occurs with the help of additional means, such as barter, dacha69 construction, trips 
abroad and so on. At the same time there is a differentiation in payment of ‘core’ 
workers, supported by line managers and peripheral workers.
6. In modem conditions the role of the money incentive plays an important role in the 
whole process o f rewards, whereas in the past money was part o f a set of
6* By frauds in this case we consider the hidden way of money distribution, when the money, earned in fact by 
the workers and the other categories of employees within the workshop, is distributed only between the small 
group of people in whose hands there is 'eal power.
69 Dacha - (Russian) - countryside home.
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incentives, including getting a state flat from the enterprise or getting a car, which 
was in deficit. Nowadays, money has substituted almost all other kinds of rewards. 
Moral stimulus has almost disappeared from the reward system within the 
enterprise. Besides, now people realise that with money they can buy everything. It 
is obvious that the shelves in the shops are now full with all kinds of goods. That is 
why getting access to resources has diminished in importance, and getting access to 
higher levels of payment has now become more important.
7. At the same time, the growing rate of unemployment has reduced various kinds of 
collisions between employees on the one side and administration on the other. If in 
1992-1993 there were cases o f strikes and open disputes, at the present moment 
practically all open conflicts have ceased. The majority of conflict situations simply 
do not leave the latent phase. The discontent with the monetary policy of the 
administration is mainly displayed at home or in the smoking area, far from those 
who are responsible for it. Because the level of mistrust among the workers has 
increased, the level of individualisation, where each basically stands for himself or 
herself, has become one o f the characteristics of the present time, contrasted with 
the early stages of privatisation.
We have examined some of the strategies which managers used in order to manipulate the 
payment system for their own purposes. We also tried to show some of the workers’ strategies 
against these manipulations. But it is clear that at the present moment the workers lose 
considerably, because all the power lies in the manager’s hands. Nevertheless the data from 
our research shows that the power struggle still remains in the labour process. The managers
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use any means (money manipulation, informal connections and so on), for improvement of 
their personal financial position. First of all they think only about profit. They could change 
their position and think about the workers only under particular pressure or circumstances. 
Only if they see a threat to their position, could they support the workers.
The workers have less knowledge of laws and regulations in comparison with managers. At 
the same time the informal system, which has penetrated all levels and systems of industrial 
organisation, made the whole process of communication between different groups within the 
enterprise very complicated. In reality one can get nothing if one struggles only according to 
written rules and regulations. The system itself imposes the necessity to understand the whole 
system of unwritten rules, which might be more helpful than the written ones.
Because the informal system plays such an important role in the whole system of 
organisation, the role of personal relations with the top managers is a key factor in improving 
payment. In new conditions only personal loyalty to the direct boss or to higher chiefs is the 
key factor in increasing payment. At the same time, such a high level of personal power and 
informal ways of regulating things brings a high level of uncertainty and unpredictability to 
the whole system of the enterprise.
The system can vary from one brigade to another. But in general it is used to support the core 
workers, as was described in an interview with the shop-chief of the carriage repair 
workshop:
The brigadier can choose the system. And when the brigadier and foreman receive money from the 
shop-chief, they can distribute the money in accordance with the coefficient of labour 
participation. But this now happens quite seldom. A much more common system is to distribute
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pure money. For example, the brigadier knows the number of people within the brigade and he just 
divides the whole sum by the number of people. And then he begins to vary to whom he will add 
something, and from whom he will take something. But this distribution depends first of all on the 
level of skills and also on the labour efforts. How the workers worked: some workers could stay in 
the evening, or to work on Saturday - everything is taken into consideration. Of course, there is no 
‘such special love’ between the brigadier and the particular worker. But he, certainly, is more loyal 
to some of the workers, first of all to the ‘kadrovye’ workers (‘core’ workers, who have worked on 
the enterprise for a long time). And he tries to support the ‘nucleus’ of the brigade. (Interview with 
shop-chief, plant Remet).
But the problem is that very often this distribution doesn't depend on the real labour efforts o f 
the workers, but on their loyalty to the brigadier and to the foreman. And also the workers 
who have worked for a long time on the enterprise usually have a high level of skills and 
therefore some categories of young or new workers are put in a much more vulnerable 
position.
Industrial disputes
Engine shop: February-March 1996 -  Small Case-Study
The place o f the workshop in the whole system of production
The engine shop is situated in the Popugai area in the centre of Moscow. The number o f 
workers in the shop is 65, including 25 women. There are three sections: sectioning section, 
anchor section, fitters section. The shop deals with the re-assembling and renovation o f
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engines for the metro carriages. The organisation o f the labour process is the same as in the 
carriage repair workshop: Shop chief, foreman, brigadier, workers.
The conflict arose on the basis of dissatisfaction with the payment system. The latent phase 
continued for a long time. A lot o f people were not satisfied with the position of the shop- 
chief. He was a worker in the past, but since that time he has forgotten about working life. 
Even the other shop chiefs noticed his bad attitudes towards the workers. The most 
unpleasant thing for workers was the distribution of money for the so-called ‘small 
enterprise’. Only the shop chief distributed the money and the way he did it was hidden from 
the rest. The distribution was completely secret, nobody knew anything. There were no rates 
known. And this uncertainty generated a lot of rumours and suspicion among the workers.
Some chiefs o f other shops began to notice that the chief of the engine shop became very rude 
with the workers, and in conversations with the workers they asked: ‘He is very hard to work 
with. Isn’t he?’
On the 15th o f February, Friday, the workers got their pay checks and were surprised. The 
payment was considerably less than usual for almost everybody. Even the ‘core’ workers 
could not understand why the payment had been cut. When several workers went to the shop 
chief to find out the reason, they were shocked by the rudeness of the shop chief, when he 
told them ‘You’ve got too much for your work. I even paid you more than you deserved.’ A 
lot of people were very angry with him afterwards. The people shouted. But among the 
workers were people who knew how to struggle with this. They said, ‘We should write a
letter to the General Director’.
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One day was spent for preparation of the letter. There were other suggestions: to break the 
plan target. But they decided first to try the letter.
On the next day the situation was very calm. People worked according to the ‘go slow 
principle’. If before they were waiting for the crane, now nobody wanted to work with it. 
Several days passed and on Wednesday, 27 February the declaration was written and signed.
Here is the letter:
To: the General Director o f the share-holding company Remet 
From: The carpenters of the motor shop 
27 February, 1996 
Declaration
On the carpenter’s section of the Motor (Engine) shop an unhealthily tense situation has 
developed. With conscientious attitudes towards our work, we are dissatisfied with the 
attitude of the shop chief towards us.
In connection with this we appeal to you and ask you to resolve the following question:
1. Unobjective payment for our work:
• when one or more workers are absent we do not receive the additional payment for 
this person;
• payment for work on weekends is considerably lower than in the other workshops;
• the work which is not included in the technical process is not paid.
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2. In connection with unobjective payment of our labour we insist that the wages for the 
whole of the work executed by us is passed through the factory, excluding the small 
enterprise level.
3. We also ask the administration to pay attention to the infringement of working conditions:
• Bad illumination of work places;
•  Bad working ventilation;
• The resting room is not equipped for this purpose.
Numerous oral references of the workers to the shop chief have not brought any results, in 
this connection we ask you to consider the questions stated above within three days, to draw 
appropriate conclusions and to inform us of the results. In case of the absence of an answer to 
the questions in our submission we will use the right to address to higher instances.
Yours faithfully,
22 persons signed.
Because the shop chief usually had informants within the workshop, he knew about the letter 
the same day.' Some foremen came to the workers in order to find out what was going on. 
There was a rumour that the shop-chief and the head of the small enterprise were revising the 
rates for the small enterprise.
On the next day the workers went to the General Director at 9 o’clock, but his secretary was 
absent so they decided to come back later. On the way back they faced a person from the 
planning-operating department, who asked them to try to resolve the conflict at the lower
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level, without appeal to the General Director. The workers were unsure, but one of the leaders 
said that we can loose nothing if  we will wait a little bit. If there will be no results, we can 
always register this declaration.
Thus, the workers decided to resolve the question by peaceful means, without official 
registration of their letter. One o f the workers went to the head of the production-operating 
department and the head of the small enterprise. He explained all the demands. And left a 
copy of the declaration. This man said that they will try to resolve the conflict.
Now, the brigade was warned that there will be a meeting in the shop. But nobody knew 
when. The head of the production-operating department and the head of the small enterprise, 
when he tried to find out the piece-rates for carpenters, was shocked by the low level of the 
rates which he saw in the Department of Labour and Wages. According to these rates, the 
salary of the workers within this shop was very low. That is why the shop chief said that he is 
paying more than they deserved. But it is not a normal situation that the rates had not been 
revised since the 70s. And this dispute just revealed that nobody cared about the workers. 
But from the workers’ point of view, the shop chief should care for the workers. But it was 
their dream.
My comments: If we compare the dispute in the Carriages Repair Workshop in 1993 with the 
present one we can see that the militancy of the workers has reduced. The reason for this is 
first of all the developing unemployment in Moscow: the workers are frightened to be behind 
the gates. But nevertheless we can’t say that disputes in such have disappeared. The objective 
processes had led to a situation in which it was mainly the most industrious people who had 
been gathered together in the brigade where the conflict appeared. Without any doubt among
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the objective reasons for the dispute was the worsening of the situation in several spheres: 
financial, labour conditions, attitudes from the side of the shop chief. The development of a 
new market situation was a catalyst of the conflict, because the workers now know that for 
money they can get a lot of things. But the dispute developed in one particular workshop. 
That is why the main role in the development of this dispute was played by a subjective 
reason: - the developing machinations of the shop chief, together with the experience of some 
of the workers in struggle against administration. It has happened that in this motorshop was 
one of the workers who had been on strike two years before in the bogie section, and from my 
point of view this played a decisive role in this conflict. We can see the development of the 
means o f institutionalisation : if in the previous conflict there was a sheet of paper with the 
list of desired questions, in the present situation it was a declaration signed by the 22 people.
The news that the workers decided not to register the letter reached the shop chief very 
quickly. Before, he was really afraid of the workers’ actions, but when he got the news he 
passed through the workshop proudly. And there was even a very significant event: usually 
the workers take some materials from the other brigade. And here one o f  the workers was 
carrying the heavy material, and met the shop chief. At this moment the shop chief said: 
‘Why are you carrying this material from such a long distance? There is a whole set of it here, 
close. Go and take it.’ The workers were very surprised. They had never seen him be so nice 
to the workers. The workers decided that he was really frightened.
After this case in the workshop there was a rumour that there will be an industrial meeting to 
resolve all questions. They thought that it would be on the 29th of February, but in one of the 
fitter’s brigades one of the ‘core’ (kadrovye) workers was absent.
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The key issue was the workers’ decision was to get rid of the payment of the small enterprise 
and to organise it through the bookkeeping department. The workers discussed this whole 
question, and reached an agreement that it is not profitable for them to get payment through 
the small enterprise: first o f all if you are on sick pay, you can not get the payment for the 
small enterprise, while if it will be organised through the bookkeeping department, then they 
will get more. Besides, the small enterprise also does not take into consideration when there 
is calculation of money for the holidays. At the same time the system of small enterprises was 
very profitable for the shop chief, foreman and people in power, because it allowed them to 
get a lot of money. That is why the shop chief sent the foremen to talk with the workers 
informally, to press on them a little bit in order to change this decision.
On the 6th of March the foreman came to the workers in the evening and told them that it is 
necessary to decide just now, how you would like to get their money. He said ‘The shop chief 
is waiting for your decision right now’. The workers were curious, why should we decide it so 
quickly? The workers didn’t understand exactly why there is so much pressure, but decided, if 
the bosses are so concerned about this, then they don’t want it, and are trying to confuse the 
workers. The usual opposition of the workers to the bosses forced the workers to decide that 
they don’t want to get payment through the small enterprise. They told the foreman. The 
foreman immediately warned them: ‘If that is your decision, you will lose a lot’.
At the same time, the shop chief began to negotiate with the ‘core’ worker in a fitters’ 
brigade, a person who had worked on the plant for 36 years. He said that I don’t have enough 
time to explain everything, but I should warn you that you will lose money, approximately 
400 000 roubles (at that time it was equal to approximately $80). Until this moment this
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‘core’ worker was on the workers’ side: he signed the statement to the General Director and 
supported all their demands. When the shop chief came he changed his position and said: ‘I 
told the workers several times that we gonna lose, but they don't want to listen’. The workers 
understood that he wants to change his mind. Nevertheless all the people in the brigade 
confirmed their decision to get payment from the bookkeeping department.
On the 7th of March in the workshop rumours were flowing that all the workers will lose if 
they stand by their decision. The workers were very suspicious about it: if there is so much 
pressure, then the bosses don't want to lose a piece of the pie. Some of the workers were 
saying: ‘Even if I lose something, OK. It is better anyway, because I don‘t want to beg the 
shop chief all the time. We have our own pride. Not everything is built on money’. At the 
same time three people from the management even stopped to say ‘Hello’ to the workers who 
were at the centre of this dispute. At the same time, an order for the improvement o f labour 
discipline came from management - the foremen passed through the workshop and tried to 
find out who was drunk. When nobody was found, they looked in the resting room and found 
empty bottles of vodka. It was a usual tactic of management -  to look for vulnerable points 
among the most militant workers.
On the 12th of March one of the. workers in the fitters’ brigade decided that it is better not to 
loose 400 000 roubles. So he ran to the shop chief and told him that he wants his money put 
through the small enterprise. The workers from all brigades got the information about him 
and there was a spontaneous meeting, where they tried to explain the situation to him. He was 
in doubt, and after conversation with the workers again changed his mind and decided to put 
his money through the plant’s bookkeeping department. Then he asked the foreman and the
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workers about the industrial meeting in order to clarify situation. The meeting was organised 
in the office o f the shop chief. The agenda was the following:
Meeting devoted to the demands of the workers concerning the small enterprise.
March 1996
Participants: The motorshop workers, foreman and the shop chief.
Voices: Let’s begin.
Before the discussion began the workers were given a sheet o f paper on which was written:
Payment in the past Payment through the small 
enterprise
Payment through the
bookkeeping
department
The foreman said: Time is running out, so this is the essence: You’ve got the table, where 
there are two columns, in the first column there is your wages together with a small 
enterprise, if you are getting your salary in the small enterprise. The second... (he didn’t 
explain). You should sign whether you agree with it or not. And how we decide, that is how it 
will be. You should sign the document, do you understand?
My comment : he was talking very quickly, so as to confuse people. Besides, the sheet of 
paper was constructed in a such way that there were three different kinds of payment, but the 
foreman asked for only one signature. In my opinion, any person, who signed this document,
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even if he agreed with the first column, could be considered as supporting payment through 
the small enterprise. Because in the past the bosses worked out the whole process of cheating 
the workers, so they wanted to cheat them also this time again.
The workers felt that there was some trap, but they could not understand the essence of it. 
Then one of the worker raised a question:
- No, I didn't understand, how can I sign it, if I don’t know how much money I earn? You 
calculated it, but didn’t inform us about the method by which our earnings are calculated, on 
what basis? How can 1 agree with this? I can write only that I have been informed about this, 
but 1 can not agree or disagree.
Another of the workers:
‘Well. Here we can see this sum and this sum, but where is the 30 % increase o f wages?
My comment: The question was quite direct. The history of this question is that because of 
the level of inflation wages are usually increased every six months. The meeting was held at 
the moment when the workers were waiting the addition to their payment.
The foreman was really angry with the worker who raised the question, he began to shout:
‘Do you understand? With those who violate discipline, and I am talking about it very 
seriously, the sanctions will be very hard, independently o f  the position o f the person, whether 
it be a brigadier or a worker. Understand me? Have you read the statement near the canteen? I 
can remind you. And you shouldn’t ask me ‘why do I get less money’. I will punish you, and I 
will draw up special papers (on violation, drunkenness etc.) then you won’t need to ask me 
why so small payment. You will go to the personnel department and see the documents. Then
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you won’t tell us to fuck off, that’s a lie, and there will be nothing. For this I will punish 
everybody, I won’t be so kind to you. 1 promise.’
My comment The foreman didn’t even take the trouble to explain anything to the workers. 
His tactic was to frighten the workers. It was obvious that all the leaders of the shop were 
interested in putting money through the small enterprise - first of all because it is far from the 
official channels and opened the possibility for machinations, because there was less control. 
If the money was put through the bookkeeping department, the middle managers then will 
loss control of it. And they didn’t like it. For some period of time they had used this channel 
for their personal enrichment, and they didn't want to stop it.
I am asking you again I gave everybody this sheet of paper during lunch and now we should 
sign it: agree or disagree with it.
If you decide to refuse to get money from the plant, then the payment for the small enterprise 
will be through the bookkeeping department. This is the main conflict.
The first question is the payment - through the small enterprise or separately?
Let’s vote.
Who would like to get money through the plant?
Twelve.
Who would like to get it through small enterprise.
Three.
Who can explain this decision to me?
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Silence.
Comments: In this round the bosses lost. The workers won. Later they talked among 
themselves: even if we get less money, we don’t need to beg them all the time. And bow.
The latest phase of the dispute:
After this meeting the foreman and the shop chief understood that they had lost. That is why 
they decided to organise heavy pressure first of all on the ‘core’ workers. They spoke with 
them several times, argued their view and tried to divide the opposition and make it weaker. 
In fact, when the next payments were due, they bought the ‘core’ workers, paying them even 
more than 400 000 roubles, and deducted from the most militant workers about 1 000 000. 
When the rest of the workers saw the results, all their militancy disappeared, because the shop 
chief had found the most vulnerable point among the workers. One of the main organisers of 
the conflict gave up further struggle. The second leader, when he saw the results, went to the 
personnel department and asked to transfer to another workshop. Because he has some 
powerful relative, he was transferred quickly. The rest of the people were humiliated.
After this dispute finished, the shop chief realised that he has unlimited power in the shop, 
and now his manipulations with the small enterprise have even increased, but the workers 
keep silence.
Some thoughts about the conflict
1. This conflict showed that the bosses divide their workforce into ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ 
workers and they use this division for their control. When the dispute arose, the shop chief
318
first of all tried to find support from the core workers. And then with the help of the 
division among the workers he stopped the conflict and victory was on his side.
2. In spite of the three years that had passed since the previous conflict, the list of questions 
touched during this dispute was almost the same: the problems with payment, disparity 
between technical process and evaluation of the worker's job. It means that during the last 
three years nothing has changed in the attitudes of administration towards the workers. In 
the plant during this two or three years there was no revision of the rates and technical 
process. The analysis o f several conflicts showed that the same disputes about payment 
were repeated in the different shops and different sections.
3. Another feature of this conflict was that it proved that the opposition between ‘us’ and 
‘them’ still exists. And at the present moment this opposition has appeared in a sharper 
way, because the gap between the amount of money received by the administration and the 
workers became much wider.
4. The conflict that arose in these two workshops revealed the real place of the shop chief in 
the plant. Shop chiefs (as well as foremen) express not the workers’ interests, but those of 
the administration. Thus, they conduct the function of capital, that is why they- inevitably 
belong to the class of bourgeois, even if they are not real owners of the enterprise.
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Changing informal relations in production in modern conditions
Industrial activity
In many industrial enterprises there is a rule not to hurry up with meeting the target in order to 
prevent the revision of norms. Our enterprise was not excluded from the list of such 
enterprises. Within production this unwritten rule was common for the whole period of the 
existence of the USSR and is still preserved. The workers now try to fulfil the plan by no 
more then 104-105 %. Otherwise they could face an increase in the norms. As a rule, such a 
practice is supported by the foreman, because at the end of the day he is responsible for plan 
fulfilment and if the plan will be too high, it will be difficult for him to organise its 
fulfilment.
As before, there is a difference between the real fulfilment of the plan in production and its 
official documentation. With the appearance of the small enterprises the whole process of 
turnover of documents on the level of the workshop became much more complicated. The 
work fulfilled by the workshops is now divided into two parts: one for the plant, and one for 
the small enterprise. But this division exists only on paper. In reality the workers do the same 
work as before, and they don’t know which part will be passed according to the documents 
through the small enterprises, and which part will be organised through the plant.
Cutting corners. The problems o f  quality
The problems of quality improvement were raised by the General Director constantly. He 
stressed that in the situation of competition with other plants, the quality of work will play a
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decisive role in the quantity of new orders in the future. But the main problems within the 
plant were that the problems of the highest quality could not be improved overnight. It is 
necessary that the whole collective from the top to the bottom should be concerned about 
quality. At the moment such a shift in people’s consciousness hasn’t happened yet. In 1995 
there were seven hundred calls to the depots about defects in repair. The plant had to pay 
damages in 122 cases, and there were six cases of stopping of the carriages on the metro lines, 
caused by poor-quality repair. It means that the violations of rules in the production process 
still exist. Here is one example:
We repair the engines. But they are very old. There are definite norms for each operation. But 
because the engines are very old it takes a lot of time to adjust them. The people from the 
department of technical control are checking our work. If I am busy with the part of the engine for 
too long, she tells me: ‘Well, finish it. Enough’. I know what I should do, and that I‘ve done 
everything I could, but the indicator didn’t improve. I don’t know why. And then she takes a 
decision: ‘Okay, leave it like this.’ She will accept it as a repaired unit. I know that it is against the 
rules, but may be this engine’s impossible to regulate at all. This is a very small imperfection, but 
it could influence the whole work of the engine - it could work, it could stop. Who knows. Diary of 
a worker, engine department: May, 1995.
Employment policy and informal relations
The whole process of employment became fully based on the system of informal relations and 
blat. Since the plant was privatised and the situation with unemployment in Moscow became 
very sharp, even if there are some vacancies for specialists the plant does not employ people 
‘from the street’. The personnel department employs only the relatives and the friends of the
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people who work in the plant. The person who works in the plant should give a 
recommendation for the new person to be employed, stating that he/she possesses the required 
qualities. And in case this person will cause some troubles, the person who recommended this 
person also could have troubles Because everyone now values their job, they try to 
recommend only people with good qualities, and not jeopardise their own positions.
Drunkenness
The situation with drunkenness has changed considerably since 1993. Step by step it became 
much better. The real situation in the labour market, and also the changes in the position of 
the enterprise, improved the situation with drunkenness. The workers began to value their 
jobs and to be afraid of loosing it. Now you can’t see drunk people lying on the shop floor. 
The heavy drinkers have been sacked from the enterprise. Even very gifted people were 
sacked. One of them was the head of the computing department - very clever, but a drunkard. 
So the attitudes towards the drinkers was very strict. But it does not mean that the workers do 
not drink at all at the work place. Let’s see the following quotation:
If the workers drink at w ork they drink very carefully so that nobody notices. A lot o f  people were 
fired for drunkenness, so w e are afraid o f  loosing our jobs. People w ho worked in the enterprise 
for a long tim e can violate the rule and be drunk. Then they can regulate this problem with the 
foreman or the shop chief, and resolve this problem. But if  you have nobody to stand for you at the 
top, you’ve got to be careful. From an interview with a worker, April 1996.
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Stealing from  the enterprise
Since 1994 a security system was organised in the plant. Approximately 150 people were 
employed in order to secure the plant’s property from internal and external thieves. 
Nevertheless the situation is still the same. Stealing is one of the main problems in the plant. 
How is it happening? First o f all the security guards might check the bag, but they usually 
check only the big one. Thus, the majority of small things are stolen with the help of the bags. 
The second way is to bribe the security system -  they live in a country where people in power 
use their position all the time. So, people try to find out which person from security is not 
honest and to steal something. The guards in the security called by the workers fly-fighters, 
because they do nothing on the plant apart from watching. It is possible also to bargain the 
problem of stealing with security, but only on a personal level with a particular guard. If you 
know a person from security, you can organise stealing. The third possibility is to organise 
stealing through the loaders. The loaders carry the rubbish out through the gate. (One of the 
workers in the plant needed steel plates for his sauna at home. So he bargained with the 
loaders, and they put 5 steel plates 1 m x 0,5 in the box, then put it on the car and went out 
through the gates.) The fourth possibility is to negotiate this matter informally with the direct 
boss. The system in the plant is organised in such a way that the bosses are not checked by 
security at all. There is one explanation: the jobs of the security guys depend on the bosses’ 
decision. That is why if somebody from security became very suspicious about upper 
managers, they, in turn, could fire them immediately. The bosses in the plant have the right to 
put their cars in the car park within the plant. (All the workers leave their cars behind the
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plant’s gate). So if there is an agreement with the boss, he could take out some materials from 
the plant by car.
Within the plant there is a system of selling materials to the employees at prime cost. But 
people choose this way only if they need a great amount of material. For example, to take the 
linoleum for the house, if they need 10-15 meters. You can’t carry it through the gate in their 
bag.
At the same time, the amount of stealing among the workers could not be even compared with 
the amount of stealing among the bosses. They steal not with bags but with cars and lorries. 
They steal material, steal the workers’ time, when they ask the workers to do something for 
their houses. Some of the bosses invite the workers to their country houses to repair 
something or in order to build something. In this case they might pay the workers a little 
money, but mainly they work for their salary.
The workers feel that the bosses take out much more than they could do. Here is one 
example:
For one o f  the vice-directors sheets o f  a special high quality material were treated in galvanic 
baths. As a result all these baths were spoiled com pletely. The plant needed one tonne o f  special 
chemical means in order to renew the baths after the procedure for the vice-director’s country 
home. The renovation o f  the baths was done at the expense o f  the plant. The head o f  production 
made a special statement, where these expenses w ere regarded as overheads.
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Labour discipline
Labour discipline was one of the most difficult problems in the past in Soviet enterprises. The 
real situation in the observed enterprise showed that step by step the situation with the labour 
discipline has improved. Now the situation with labour discipline has become more strict. 
Several times per year within the plant there is a special checking of the time the employees 
arrive at work and leave work. Because people are afraid of being sacked, late arrival has 
almost disappeared from the enterprise. At the same time, we can stress that there was also a 
shift towards more formal relations or formalisation of labour discipline, nevertheless, there 
are some areas, where the questions regarding labour discipline are still regulated informally. 
One of the examples - the absence of the employee from the work place for one day. 
According to the formal rules, the person who wants to take a day off should write an appeal, 
which should be signed by the foreman and the shop chief. Then, this note should be 
transformed to the bookkeeping department. In reality everything is organised within the 
workshop informally. In some workshops there is an agreement with the line managers that 
the workers could have a day off without official registration and even they that don’t need to 
do any additional work to make up for this day. In other workshops the workers could have 
the day o ff without official registration but they should work this day back on Saturday. In 
any case, it is organised through informal negotiations of this matter with the immediate boss: 
foreman, and in case of the absence of the foreman, with the shop chief.
The termination of work and the time of leaving the enterprise are also based on an informal 
agreement with the direct boss. Even if there is a definite time for each section for leaving the
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work, nevertheless in many sections the workers leave work earlier. Here is the evidence of 
one of the workers:
O fficially we should finish our work at 4:15 p.m. But usually at ha lf past three w e go to wash our 
hands and go to  the shower. But before we always wait for the words o f  our brigadier. I f  there is a 
strengthening o f  labour discipline w ithin the plant at a certain m om ent, he might tell us to  finish 
later. And usually we depend on his decision. I f  he is in a hurry, we could finish earlier. I f  he is not 
in a hurry, we should wait for him.
Most recent events
At the beginning of March 1997 I received the following information from the plant: all the 
employees who were employed by the small enterprises were given sheets of paper, where 
there was a list of their wages in the whole plant and in the small enterprise. All the 
employees were strictly recommended to go to the taxation bodies before 1st of April to pay 
taxes. They were told that all the documents with all the names had been sent to the 
employees’ taxation centres. This was the official information.
The unofficial version, confirmed by some senior managers, was rather different. In Kukino 
area several workers were dissatisfied with the whole situation with the small enterprises and 
they appealed to the Court. After their appeal the competent organs immediately found a lot 
of violations of the laws, one of which is that the work in the small enterprises should be done 
after working hours, but in reality it is fulfilled within the working hours. As a result, the 
leaders in the plant, including the first vice director, issued an order to disband the whole 
system of small enterprises within the plant. All the documents were suddenly destroyed
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(according to rumours), and the workers received their payment for March through the plant, 
without small enterprises. The workers guessed that the founders of the small enterprises had 
been caught by the taxation bodies, or by somebody else, and they quickly destroyed 
everything. So now one of the most informal channels of getting money was broken.
All the employees employed by the small enterprises were strictly recommended to go to the 
taxation bodies, and actually it is very interesting, why the workers should go themselves to 
the taxation bodies, if  there is a bookkeeping department in the plant and there is a 
bookkeeper in the small enterprises, and these bookkeeping departments had take out all the 
taxes from the wages automatically according to the law? Why had the taxation not been 
taken out by the bookkeeping department?
The explanation was as follows:
1. The taxation was taken out from the part of the payment put through the plant.
2. The taxation was taken out from the part of the payment put through the small 
enterprise.
3. The taxation in these two enterprises for joint payment were not taken out, and this 
joint sum considerably exceeded the taxation taken out. So now people themselves 
should go and pay these taxes for the whole amount o f money received from both 
sides in the plant in 1996.
I guess that before, the small enterprises escaped from thorough checking out, and evading 
taxes was one of the key points of their profitability. This year they were caught out. The 
workers’ view is that the administration of the small enterprises had to pay a certain sum in
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fines, and they decided that the workers would cover this sum, if they paid these taxes. So it is 
clear that the big money-pie for upper management has disappeared. But the management is 
now trying to revise the existing regulations in order to recover the small enterprises in the 
nearest future.
Conclusion
Despite the persistence of many traditional structures and practices, of conflict, confusion and 
corruption, the Moscow plant has been very successful, increasing employment and paying 
high wages. What was the cause of such success? Was this a result of structural 
reorganisation and privatisation? From our point o f  view there was an interdependence of 
objective and subjective factors which led the enterprise to success.
I discussed the reasons for the success of the plant with several people from the enterprise: 
the head of the Planning-economical Department, vice head of the Labour and Wages 
Department, vice head of the Planning-operational Department. They all had the same view: 
that the success of the enterprise was due first of all to the talent of the General Director. The 
specialists confirmed that he is a very intelligent person, with very far-seeing views on the 
future development o f  the plant. With the appearance o f market relations, he was embedded 
into the new conditions very quickly. His wide scope, the number of issues he controls, and 
his policy have led to the current situation. In almost every interview with the experts about 
the causes of the plant’s success the name of the General Director was mentioned. His 
progressive views, his ability to anticipate new situations, his constant aspirations to improve 
the plant’s future. The economist said:
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The plant in the past was one for the whole USSR, but I remember that six or seven directors were 
changed, and the situation o f  the plant got worse and worse. Only with the arrival o f  the new 
General Director was the situation stabilised. So I believe that it was his influence. He found the 
new orientation fairly quickly and used the new circum stances for the better developm ent o f the 
plant. (Interview with the head o f  the Planning-economic Department, April 1997)
And this is the view of the vice-head of the Department of Labour and Wages:
I think that mainly the success o f  the enterprise is based on the personality o f  the General Director. 
It was he who transformed the situation from very bad to very good. Besides, he selected a  team o f 
specialists, who were interested in success.’(The view o f  the vice-head o f  the Departm ent o f 
Labour and Wages, April, 1997).
Another factor which they enumerated was the policy towards independence from the metro 
authorities and, as a consequence of leasehold, the distribution o f  the plant's profit according 
to plant's own considerations. As they mentioned, in the past the profit o f the enterprise had 
to be shared according to special normatives, constructed by the Ministry of Transportation, 
and approved by the metro authorities. There were certain normatives for fund o f  social 
development, fund of material support and so on. In the new circumstances the plant had the 
possibility to spend its profit according its own needs. Thus, in'the situation when the metro 
authorities stopped providing the plant with state flats for its employees, the plant itself began 
to buy apartments for the employees, at an average rate o f five to seven per year from its 
profits.
The development of production has now become the plant’s own concern. If before the metro 
authorities could dictate the ways of spending profit: sometimes a decision was made to
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cutting off expenditure for new equipment, or even cancelling orders for the new equipment, 
the plant in the new situation had become more independent in this sphere. Within the plant a 
system now was constructed in which the most necessary equipment was bought immediately. 
Moreover, the plant began to buy equipment not only for production purposes, but also for 
scrap utilisation. Thus, in 1996 special equipment was bought for converting copper scrap 
into pure copper and so on. In modem conditions, all the expenses o f the plant were organised 
for its own profit. Thus, some of the expenses of the metro authorities were cut down and 
they could use the released resources for other purposes. Besides, for the metro it was 
profitable that the plant’s production output has increased considerably since the transition to 
the leasehold. The metro needed more carriages repaired, and the plant provided the required 
number o f  carriages. So, without any additional efforts from the metro authorities they have a 
very profitable enterprise, which provided them with good quality repaired carriages.
The third factor, which was named by the experts from the enterprise as a cause of success, 
was the reorganisation o f  the payment policy. They were really misled that with the transition 
to leasehold the whole system of payment in the plant was reorganised, and that, despite some 
manipulations with wages, the payment policy was organised in such a way that the value of 
the labour o f workers has increased considerably. The view of the experts was that the wages 
in the plant considerably differ from wages in the whole industry. In this situation the worker 
in the plant values his/her work and the amount of money obtained. Their main conclusion 
was that there has appeared a possibility to get more payment fo r  those who work harder. 
According to their views, the payment by results, which had been implemented since the plant 
worked on lease, gave the possibility to increase the level of payment in accordance with the
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amount of work done. I argue in my paper that this is absolute nonsense, and as we proved in 
our study, a lot of interviews with workers have proved the absolutely opposite situation.
The next factor discussed by the experts from the enterprise as a cause of the plant’s success 
was the hieh intensity o f  labour. They believed that the level of intensification became in 
some parts of the plant even higher than in similar production abroad. In their eyes it was a 
great achievement of the General Director. His intention to investigate the intensity of labour 
at similar plants all over the world had brought a fruitful result. He travelled a lot himself, 
saw a lot of factories, depots, plants of the same kinds in different countries. Moreover, he 
organised trips of key specialists from the plant to visit similar plants abroad. One of the 
specialists remembered one case from her own trip abroad:
I don’t remember w here I’ve been in France, or in Germany on a sim ilar plant, but we were there 
with the Vice-director on Production and the head o f  the Planning-operational Department. And 
when we passed the engine section, he raised a question how m any items they repair per month. 
The production m anager said two. O ur Russian colleague tried to  define more precisely: ‘Tw o 
units per day?’ The m anager from the western plant said: ‘No, tw o units pier m onth’. It was a real 
surprise for the Russian side. The Russian manager said: ‘then you  should learn from us, not we 
from you’.
One more factor named was the plant's policy towards suppliers and the marketing policy. In 
the past the plant was supplied through the system of the MTS (material-technical supply) of 
the metro. With the transition to leasehold the plant began to form a new list of suppliers. The 
first two years was really difficult, because there were no connections with the new suppliers. 
After two years the plant had formed a whole network o f new suppliers. The suppliers were
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selected on the basis of their stable deliveries, good quality and low costs. Sometimes the 
plant had to stop connections with the closest suppliers, as for example with the bearings 
provided by the GPZ plant in Moscow, and to organise connections with other suppliers in 
other cities. The Moscow GPZ plant could not provide stable deliveries, and the Saratov plant 
was interested in long established communication with a stable Moscow plant. Over a period 
of three years, after the organising of the Department of External Co-operation, the plant 
formed a list o f  competitive suppliers. Now, in the situation when one supplier dictates their 
conditions, the plant has the possibility to choose between different suppliers.
Another basis for success was the plant’s marketing policy. In the opinion of the specialists 
from the plant, the General Director was a market-oriented person. He was searching for new 
orders not only in Russia, but all over the world. Since 1990 there have been different kinds 
of orders from abroad: there was an order from Hungary for making wheel sets, there was an 
order from Iraq for producing wheel sets. At the end of 1996 the plant has opened a new 
branch in Tbilisi. The branch was organised on the basis of the profit o f the plant. The idea 
was the invasion o f the Caucasus market. The Caucasus branch will produce wheel sets and 
engines for the Caucasus.
Although we discussed the cause of success with experts within the enterprise, and their view 
of the main reasons for success were interesting, these estimates should be treated with 
caution. From our point o f view, being inside the enterprise, where everybody is trying to 
prove their loyalty to the General Director and the nearest members o f his team, deprived 
them from an adequate vision of what’s happening in reality. But at the same time, since we 
have no access to the policy-making between the enterprise and different external bodies, we
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can only guess what processes were taking place in reality. Thus, below we will try to express 
our vision o f the situation.
We consider that first of all it is necessary to understand the character of the relations with the 
external organisation which gives orders to the plant.
To begin with, we should scrutinise the results o f structural reorganisation. Before, the plant 
was a structural unit of the metro authorities, they could easily press on the enterprise 
managers to lower the prices of the carriages. Thus, there was a direct dependence of the plant 
on the metro .officials. The movement towards leasehold gave the opportunity for the plant to 
form its own price policy. The price for the repair of the carriages was reorganised. First of 
all, the cost o f labour became higher. The cost o f the carriages became much higher as well. 
Thus, in this sphere the plant has got its independence. But at the same time this fact does not 
explain the situation, moreover, it is open to a number of different interpretations. First of all, 
there is a carriage-building factory at Mytishy in Moscow region, which produces new 
carriages for the metro. The question arises here: why is the production of the Remet plant 
preferable for the metro authorities? If the price of repaired carriages became much higher, 
why do the metro authorities not buy new carriages from the Mytishy factory and prefer to 
repair the old ones? One of the explanations could be the cost of the new carriages: it is twice 
as expensive to buy a new carriage them, for example, to organise the full repair o f  an old one. 
However, the impression that repair is cheap is very misleading. Despite scarce financial 
resources, the metro still has the possibility to pay for 50-52 repaired carriages per month. 
Why is it happening? Several people within the enterprise gave me the following explanation: 
the metro authorities cannot buy new carriages from the Mytishy carriage-building factory
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because (hey would have buy them from their profits, which do not exist. The metro is still 
fully subsidised by the City Government. The metro pays the bills o f  the plant Remet from the 
utilisation category. So, the expenses for the new carriages and for the repaired ones are 
separated in different spheres in the metro. Because the cost o f  the repaired carriage was 
much less than the cost o f  the new carriage, the Moscow metro had the possibility to pay for  
it.
We may be more inclined to believe in this explanation, but it is not obvious. The metro 
authorities could change the category of their expenses on paper and buy the new carriages 
not from the profit, as they are doing now, but from utilisation category. Or they could move 
papers in a different direction and organise payment for the Remet plant through the profit 
category. In this case the plant could have problems with payment. But the situation is 
constructed in a such way that the plant is having orders, receiving payments in time and so 
on. Thus, we should make a conclusion that there is a sense in such a situation. This situation 
is favourable for both sides. We know also that payment to the Mytishy plant for the new 
carriages bought by the metro has always been delayed, but the Remet plant is almost always 
paid in time. This is a situation, which needs further examination.
Another example of the disposition of orders is the order for repair of the engines. The metro 
authorities wanted to give an order for engine repair to the Dynamo plant in Moscow, instead 
of the Remet plant, but they changed their mind. What circumstances forced them to change 
their mind? One could guess that it was the quality o f repair at the Remet plant and the cost of 
the repair, but I would guess that it was because of ‘better organised communications’ 
between the General Management of the Remet plant and the metro. The quality of repair in
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the Remet plant may be higher than in the other plant, but it is not considerably higher, 
because it is a question of technology and the technology at both plants is the same.
At the same time the real problem for the researcher is that we don’t know where to get this 
information from. Nevertheless, the best guess on the basis of a lot of interviews with top 
management of the enterprise and with other informants is that there is undoubtedly a hidden 
agenda in the relations between the enterprise and the metro authorities. There are hidden 
informal connections o f the enterprise with those who are responsible for the orders. That is 
why I think that the main cause of the good connections between the plant and the metro 
authorities is their personal relations. The results of other investigations, examination of 
literature, information in mass-media support my point of view: in a period of deep economic 
crises the role o f  mafia-bureaucratical informal relations has increased. We don’t think that 
in this case these relations have the character of mafia connections. We only stress that 
subjective factors, mainly the personal informal relations between the people in charge from 
both sides, play a decisive role in the plant’s success. I am sure that the management of the 
plant uses both formal and informal relations with the authorities in order to construct 
favourable conditions for the plant.
It does not mean that the other factors, as for example economic factors, do not play any role 
in getting orders, but I suppose that the economic factor plays secondary role. The role of the 
subjective factors was stressed by the General Director himself in an informal conversation 
with a foreign researcher. When the General Director was asked how the price of orders from 
the metro was set, which is the most important determinant of the prosperity of the plant, the 
General Director replied: 'bureaucrats are the same all over the world, but ours are cheaper
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Thus, even if there is no hard data to support our point of view that informal relations play a 
decisive role in getting orders for the plant, there are indirect features, which give us 
considerable grounds for believing that they exist in reality. An interview with workers also 
revealed some interesting information:
The enterprise succeed not ju s t because the General Director is a genius, but because he knows 
where and how to creep under a certain person. He just chose the right time and the right place, 
and he won. The enterprise was not profitable before and became profitable now just because the 
people occupying the top positions within the enterprise have very good connections with people 
at the ‘very top ’.(Interview with a worker, plant Remet, May 1997)
Thus, the workers’ view supported our idea that the enterprise is profitable because the 
General Director knows how to approach powerful people.
As regards the other factors which were enumerated above by the experts from the plant, they 
also need further examination, especially the principle ‘to get more payment for those who 
work harder This is a very questionable confirmation. Because all the data from our own 
research shows absolutely the opposite results: it does not matter how much you work on the 
enterprise, you will get payment according to the chiefs vision. All the interviews with the 
employees support this idea.
The thesis about the intensification o f labour also requires closer consideration. First of all it 
is very difficult to compare the intensity of labour on different plants in different countries. 
The main cause for this is very different approaches: if in western countries the work process 
is organised as an exchange o f components, the Russian plant does repair itself. It makes the 
comparison very complicated. The intensity of labour might have increased, but the cause of
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this was not the financial rewards for more intensive work. The key factor here was the 
growing level of unemployment which has led to the situation, in which people were pressed 
to work harder in order to preserve their jobs.
At the same time the lack of competitive enterprises of the same kind reinforced the plant’s 
monopoly and the new laws about the possibility of organisation o f small enterprises helped 
to reduce the level of taxation and to increase payment within the plant for a while, in 
comparison with other plants in Moscow.
Thus, to summarise the reasons for success, we could name the following reasons:
Objective
1. More freedom in policy making, independence from the metro authorities, so I 
consider that it was partly a success of privatisation.
2. The laws about the possibility o f organisation of small enterprises.
3. The growing level of unemployment, which made people work harder in order to 
preserve their jobs.
4. One of the main reasons is that the plant represents a pure kind o f monopoly. There 
were no competitors in the former USSR, and now situation has not changed. 
There are some projects of Moscow metro authorities to build new plants, but these 
are still only on paper.
Subjective
1. The personality of the General Director.
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2. Some specialists in the management team.
3. Good relations with the upper bosses in the metro authorities.
However, even if we tried to summarise the reasons for the success of the enterprise, 
nevertheless the real picture of its success is still unknown. I would say that the success of the 
enterprise is a real mystery not only for me as a researcher, but also for most of the 
employees. Some of them do not believe that the flourishing situation will last for a long 
time. In one of the interview the following view was expressed.
I really don’t know, whether to buy all the shares I could buy, or leave them. 1 am not sure that it 
will last too long. And then I will throw money away, and the plant will have collapsed. And what 
then? I don’t know (interview with the vice-head of the planning-operational dept).
Thus, the real future o f the enterprise is questionable as well, because it developed not only 
on the basis of economic activity, but there is a great deal of personal influence in the process 
of development. All that we can do is to observe the further changes. We’ll see.
We have co n sid ered  the w ho le  p rocess o f  restructu ring  o f  one  en terprise . T he p e riod  observed  
was from  1992 up  to  th e  beg inn ing  o f  1997. A s w e have seen, there  w ere  a lo t o f  ch an g es in 
the form al s tru c tu re  o f  th e  en terp rise , system  o f  paym ent and  so on . A s V. K aba lina  po in ted  
out
the enterprise w as in the old Soviet system, and is in the transitional period, the basis o f  the whole 
society. The collapse o f  the old system o f control o f  the economy influenced the changes in the 
external relations o f  the enterprise and its organisational structure. But all these changes touched
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only the formal system o f  the enterprise, at the same tim e the informal relations, which appeared in 
the distribution, but based in production, have been less subjected to these changes. "
The informal relations in some areas stopped, in other areas, with the appearance of new 
economic conditions, they have flourished considerably. The main conclusion which we 
should make on the basis of our research is that informal relations are a reality of the 
enterprise on the basis of which the production process is organised. In these circumstances 
the understanding of these processes is very important for all categories of people who work 
with the enterprise or within the enterprise. And the understanding of the real informal 
mechanisms existing in the enterprise will lead to their utilisation in support of its future 
development. 70
70 K a b a lin a , 1 9 9 7 , p . 2 5 .
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Chapter Six. Conclusion
Analysis of the processes within two plants
Comparison is a natural way o f  thinking. There is nothing more natural than to consider nations, 
ideas, social institutions, to compare them with other nations, ideas, institutions. W e obtain 
knowledge through comparison. (Dogan and Pelassy, 1994, p. 11. )
Below we would like to analyse the main similarities and differences within both plants 
before and after privatisation.
Before privatisation
First of all I would like to stress that at first sight I was really surprised to what extent the two 
plants were similar. At the very beginning I was lucky that for the purpose of my research two 
plants were selected whose production processes were very similar. The activity o f  both 
plants was concerned with the repair of different kinds o f rolling stock. The only difference 
between them in this sense was that the Russian plant repaired only rolling stock for the 
metro, and the British plant was responsible for the repair of almost every kind of vehicle 
running on British Railways, including different kinds o f locomotives and diesel multiple 
units as well as carriages for the London metro. Both plants had all the facilities for the whole 
overhaul o f the vehicles as well as for quick maintenance repair. Both plants had similar 
stages of repair, caused by similar organisation of the production process.
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The similarity was not only in the kinds of trains repaired at both plants (the new passenger 
trains at both plants were quite sophisticated with a lot of electrical fittings, automatic control 
and so on) but also in similar types of technology used for repair. At the same time despite the 
new types o f  trains, both plants (Vagrem and Remet) were operated with technological 
equipment which was mainly out of date. Most of the equipment at the Russian plant was 
build in the 70s. The equipment at the British plant was the same, and some o f the testing 
equipment was even older.
Organisation of production
When I began my study both plants were state enterprises, and that is why I think there were 
so many similarities. According to our own observation and data obtained, the labour process 
at the Soviet plant had many common features with the labour process observed under the 
capitalist system in Britain. As Don Filtzer pointed out ‘many of the forms of work 
organisation and defensive practices developed by Soviet workers on the shop floor are also 
found in capitalist factories, although not as universally and systematically as they occur in 
the USSR’71. I would argue that some features which we could see within the Russian labour 
process we have seen at the British plant as well, and these features was implemented 
systematically and universally all around the factory.
First of all the main similarity, which I found very interesting for the purpose of my research, 
was the organisation o f  the production process. As we can see above, at both plants
71 F iltz e r, 1 9 8 6 ,  p . 2 0 9 .
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hierarchical system of organisation of production was constructed. If at the Russian plant 
there were 5 levels of control from the top to the bottom, at the British plant there were up to 
8 levels of control above the workers. The workers in the English plant were organised in 
gangs, combined on the trade principle. The workers in the Russian plant were organised in 
brigades on the same principle. The gangs were very similar to brigades: usually they 
included from 10 to 15 people. The vertical system of organisation of production within both 
plants was supplemented by a very complicated horizontal system of different departments, 
responsible for different types o f work. So, the system of production organisation was very 
similar. At the same time, the similar organisation of production, despite cultural differences 
in different societal systems, revealed the same weaknesses. Too many managerial levels 
influenced the increased level of uncertainty at the point of production. Workers tended to by­
pass the centralised rules and laws, or in other words the workers developed their own 
informal ways of overcoming the bureaucratic obstacles.
Organisation of the labour process
Control o f  labour and organisation ofproduction
One of the key questions from the point of view of the organisation o f production was the 
control o f  labour. The nature of the capitalist as well as socialist labour processes has been 
the subject of intensive debates over the years. The publication o f the book written by Harry 
Braverman opened another round of discussion about the substantial features of capitalist 
labour process. Braverman's main thesis was that under capitalism there is a separation of 
conception and execution. He compared the skilled manual craft worker at the beginning of
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the nineteenth century with the worker of the middle of the twentieth century, and made the 
conclusion that in the twentieth century the managers have removed all the decision-making 
from the workers and that the worker under the capitalist labour process is only the executor 
of managerial decisions. The main feature of the capitalist labour process was that with the 
help of scientific management, developed by Frederic Taylor, the labour process will be 
divided into lots of different pieces, and therefore the control over the labour process, which a 
craftsmen had, was broken down and as a result there was a de-skilling of workers. It is too 
complex to reveal the whole set of questions connected to Braverman’s findings here. What 
we would like to stress here is that several aspects of this debate are directly important to the 
issues which we investigated within the researched enterprises. First o f all, our point of view 
is that production at both plants was organised according to Taylorist principles. But by no 
means was there a separation of conception and execution.
The organisation of production at the English plant was organised through the hierarchical 
system of commands from the top to the bottom: the production manager made a priority of 
tasks for a certain period, the shift managers considered the workload for the shift, different 
supervisors divided the tasks for the foremen, who transferred the further detailed tasks to the 
chargehand and at the end the chargehand distributed the amount of work for the gang. Thus, 
the system of control was based on a formal subordination of the lower position to the upper 
position. The organisation of work within the plant was constructed in a such way that there 
was a high level o f fragmentation and differentiation of tasks.
The organisation o f the production process within the Russian plant was similar: according to 
the workload for a certain period the shop chief defined the prior tasks to fulfil to the
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foremen, they divided particular tasks between different brigades according to their 
specialisations, and the brigadier within each brigade explained the main tasks for the period.
So, there was a similarity in organisation of production, and nevertheless, there were some 
differences as well. From the very beginning, the Soviet state, in order to sustain a relatively 
high level of production, tried to borrow some of the Western theoretical models. One of 
them was the conception of scientific management developed by F. Taylor. Lenin in his 
works paid a lot of attention to the Taylorist methods of organisation of production and the 
Bolsheviks tried to impose the Taylorist principles throughout all Russian industry. 
Nevertheless, all the features of the Taylorist principles could not be implemented in Russian 
production processes in their pure form. Almost all the principles had to be modified and 
adjusted to Russian conditions because, as D. Filtzer stresses,
well before Stalinist industrialisation Soviet workers had won a large degree o f  control over the
pace and organisation o f  their work, a factor which helped them to resist attempts to  introduce
Taylorism and impose 'scientific' output norms throughout the 1920s.72
This control over the work they preserved up to the end of the 80s. Thus, the implementation 
of Taylorist principles in Soviet industry was faced with a lot of obstacles. If we will look at 
the formal side of the production process within the Soviet Union, we could see that 
conception was separated from execution: the decision making was an area of the upper 
managers and it is assumed that the workers should fulfil the managerial decisions. But life is 
richer than the theoretical conception which is why, even if scientific management
72 Filtzer, 1986, p. 153.
344
theoretically implied the full obedience of the workers to the managerial orders and 
instructions, in reality the workers had developed a lot o f different ways of by-passing and 
overcoming the countless managerial decisions. Moreover, sometimes only by by-passing the 
formal rules was it possible to reach the required level of output. Besides, as we noted above, 
the workers within the Russian enterprise were trained as 'universalists' that is why very often 
they fulfilled a lot of tasks, belonging to their trade and auxiliary work. That is why, in my 
opinion, the scope of the Russian worker was wider than the English one. When 1 asked them 
about the amount of work left they could explain to me in detail how many carriages they 
have done and what further tasks they have to fulfil.
At the same time workers in the British plant from my point of view had a more narrow view 
of the tasks performed. First of all, when I asked them questions about the vehicles which 
they needed to repair, their answer was: ‘we don't know. Ask our managers, they will explain 
everything to you.’ 1 assume that the basis for such a situation was first of all because the 
western enterprise implemented the Taylorist principles in a more pure form. The second 
reason, in my opinion, was that the English plant did several kinds o f repair: among the 
vehicles there were diesel multiple units and locos. That is why the whole picture really was 
concentrated on the managerial level. And maybe the last explanation could be the existence 
of some extra levels in the organisation of production: The English plant had more levels in 
the organisation of production, and therefore more detailed separation of tasks.
The limitations of the whole system of organisation of production at the English plant were 
understood by its General Director. Trying to implement the team working concept and total 
quality management approach he wanted to overcome these limitations, but as practice
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showed, it was almost impossible to make a cosmetic repair of the plant without changing the 
whole system. It was necessary to change the whole system in order to have a successful 
enterprise.
We should stress that the question of control is inseparable from the question of relations 
between managers and workers. And, as L. Graham has pointed out
a clear definition o f  control at the point o f  production is difficult to pin down, because it involves a 
complex process o f  struggle betw een workers and management (Graham, 1994).
As we have seen on both enterprises, there was a clear division of ‘us’ and ‘them’ between 
the workers and the managers. And both sides, from my point of view, were trying to find 
formal and informal ways to control the work process. And if the managers organised their 
control from the top, there was a considerable level of control from the bottom. And as we 
have seen in our description of the plants, there was an informal system o f control over the 
work process. We found it extremely interesting that despite all cultural differences and 
different political systems, there was similar behaviour of workers in the Russian and British 
plants. Despite the system of formal control from the top, a lot of processes on the shop floor 
were handled in an informal way. Although the formal structure was more overt, sometimes 
workers ignores it, and in turn the informal structure was more hidden, but more efficient. 
Such things quite often happened in many enterprises, and as Mainwaring and Wood stressed 
(1985)
even management’s fragmenting the most technical task will not necessarily uncover the tricks that 
workers leam from each other or from the act of doing a particular process, tricks that often save 
the worker time and effort (1985).
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And we, within our researched plants, have seen the results of informal activities. One of such 
results was quite significant time losses at both enterprises.
Time losses
For many years one of the main characteristics of labour in Russia was big time losses, due to 
'poor organisation of production', supply problems, high level of unpredictability and 
unreliability. According to D. Filtzer
This 'Sovietization' o f  factory conditions played a large part in frustrating the Bolsheviks’ attempts 
to introduce Taylorism , which in part had been designed to break up the traditional organisation o f  
labour in Soviet factories, (p. 159).
Another obstacle for the further expansion o f Taylorism according to Filtzer was
The traditional practice o f  having skilled workers carry  out their own auxiliary tasks, instead o f  
entrusting them to  unskilled or sem i-skilled workers w hile they them selves concentrated on direct 
production. Skilled w orkers were trained as 'universalists' on the jo b , and w ere expected to carry 
out diverse functions. They thus had a great deal o f  freedom  over how they organised their work 
and how fast (o r slow ly) they perform ed it. (p. 159).
Our own research have shown that these features o f the Soviet labour process have been 
preserved up to modem times. All the features enumerated above, such as time losses, bad 
organisation of work, supply problems we have found within the Russian plant before 
privatisation.
As we could see from  the data w ritten above, there w ere a  lot o f  non-productive losses w ithin
the production process: the w orkers at the Russian p lant used to  expand the lunch tim e by 5-
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10 min., had unofficial breaks and so on. A lot of work time were lost due to shortages of 
parts and materials. The Russian workers could be late for work or leave work early. It was 
quite common to discuss all the news at the beginning of each shift so that the workers 
usually spent 15 minutes and more for this. It was quite common to leave the work place early 
for the lunch break and to go to work after lunch sometimes even 15 minutes late. The 
workers could play dominos during the lunch break. Within the Russian plant unwritten rule 
was worked out that the workers have to finish their work earlier than all the technical staff, 
so that workers usually finished their work half an hour before all other employees. At the 
same time, even this time was further negotiated with the middle managers of particular 
brigades, thus the workers could leave factory even earlier and sometimes this time could be 
one hour earlier than other technical staff.
Besides, workers used to steal working time for their own purposes. As the results of the 
research have shown, a great many workers at the Russian plant did things for their own 
purposes: different kinds of equipment for home and country homes, for cars and garages. 
Thus, in general, ineffective worker's time could be estimated at the Russian plant as from 1 
hour and 30 min. up to 2 hours.
At the same time, we have seen a similar situation at the British plant. Although the British 
workers had to clock on and clock off at the beginning and at the end of the shift, there were 
great time losses during the shift: the workers could drink tea at the beginning and at the end 
of the shift. They could add several minutes to their meal break. Moreover, according to the 
interviews with workers, they often used their working time for making tools and equipment 
for their own purposes or even for managers at the plant. Thus, the ineffective time, which
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employees spend on activity which does not relate to their work at the British plant, was equal 
to 1 hour and 45 minutes.
At the same time a lot of work time at both plant was lost due to shortages of parts and 
materials. The results our own research have shown that in the British plant this also 
happened quite often.
Besides, because the situation at the Russian plant before privatisation was very unstable, the 
Russian workers had a lot of control over the labour process. They knew how to organise 
their work in the most effective time, moreover, the Russian workers had developed 
mechanisms for overcoming the obstacles connected with the shortages of parts and could 
regulate the pace of their work easily. The workers had a considerable level of freedom in 
organising their work, that is why they could speed up or speed down according to their 
wishes.
As regards the English plant, the workers there also had a considerable level o f freedom. 
Because for them it was profitable to work overtime, the workers have constructed a whole 
system o f speeding down their work in order to obtain overtime. There was a lot of evidence 
at the plant that the workers could organise their work in their own way.
Thus, to summarise, we should stress that at both plants, Russian and British, there was a 
considerable level of control of workers over the labour process, and especially over the ways 
of organising work and the pace of work. According to D. Filtzer, work speed and job 
organisation have always been 'the most vital question on the shop floor', moreover, he wrote 
that 'these have always been central points o f confrontation between workers and
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management, both under capitalism and in the Soviet Union’.73 The data of my own research 
have shown that the Russian as well as the British workers within the researched enterprises 
had quite a considerable level o f freedom for work speed and job  organisation. We assume 
that the British workers in order to get such a level of freedom had to act collectively. The 
Russian workers have reached this freedom through individual negotiations with managers. 
Nevertheless in both plants the workers stressed in interviews that they have some freedom in 
organising their work.
There was a real tension between the workers and managers regarding the control of work 
speed and job organisation at the Soviet plant.
What we would like to stress here is that at both factories before privatisation there were quite 
considerable time losses. The managers used different mechanisms to tighten the work 
process, and to eliminate the waste of time, but nevertheless their attempts failed: workers 
used different mechanisms for using the work time for their own purposes.
At the same time we should stress that because the Trade Unions over the long history o f the 
Soviet state played a minor role as workers’ defenders, the role of collective actions during the 
long history of the Soviet state was at the lowest possible level. In these circumstances only 
individual forms of workers' control over the labour process could be possible. And in this 
sense the workers found different ways of using this control for their own benefit.
73 Filtzer, 1986, p. 155.
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The payment system
On the shop floor of both plants a 'shop floor culture' was constructed which was to some 
extent similar. For example, if in the British plant there was a cultural norm 'I do as little as 
possible for as much as possible', the same cultural norm was formed within the Russian 
plant. Mainly it was expressed in the following Russian expression opposed to managers: 'if 
they think that they are paying to us, then let them think that we are working for them'.
Besides, at both plants the amount o f work done did not correlate with the size of the worker's 
wages. In the British plant there was a time-wage payment system and it was organised on a 
national level and was highly centralised. In order to change the worker’s salary it was 
necessary to bargain the salary o f each grade on the national level. The whole system of 
collective bargaining was quite clumsy and slow, but nevertheless an institutionalised system 
was constructed through which it was possible not only to get a payment increase, but at the 
same time to resolve some industrial disputes regarding the payment system. At the same 
time it didn't matter how much work the worker did, the amount of his/her salary was fixed 
and calculated only on the basis of the amount of time spent. Moreover, because the 
possibility to increase the salary was only through the national system of collective 
bargaining, the British workers selected another way of improving of their financial rewards: 
through the system of overtime.
At the Russian plant the payment system was highly de-centralised. Moreover, if in the 
British plant there was a time-wage system, the Russian plant operated mainly on a piece­
work system. In the past, in the Soviet era, the different Ministries formed the basic 
instructions for setting out the norms for different categories of workers, but there were also
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special normative departments setting out the norms for the industry. With the beginning of 
Perestroika the system of ministries was destroyed and mainly the labour and wages 
departments were responsible for the setting out the new norms at the plant level. At the same 
time, there were a lot of normative, which were out of date (worked out in the 70s). The 
labour and wages departments had neither the capacity nor the desire to revise all the old 
norms. That is why some norms were tighter than others. In these circumstances there were 
some operations, where it was impossible to get a standard salary only according to the rates 
for piece work. In such cases the managers on the shop floor had to construct a new system of 
payment, very often applicable only within this particular plant or factory. In most cases the 
salary of the workers depended on the skills of a particular manager (shop chief) and his 
abilities to construct a just system within the workshop. In reality, as we could see from the 
above description of the payment system within the Russian plant, there a very voluntaristic 
method of calculation of workers’ wages was formed, with a lot o f informal bargaining 
between those who were responsible for the final payment and the individual workers. 
Besides, the most vulnerable point of the whole payment system at the Russian plant was the 
fact that there was not any kind of institutional mechanism o f workers ’ protection against the 
voluntaristic decisions o f  the managers. Even if there was a trade union within the plant, the 
local trade unions very often failed to support the workers’ complaints. In most cases the 
trade union officials supported the side of the administration and in many cases the individual 
workers had to negotiate different problems with middle managers informally.
So, at both plants we have observed the effect o f  minimising o f  efforts from the side o f  the 
workers, and the desire to improve their financial rewards by any means. But the ways, which
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they were trying to use for the maximisation of their financial rewards were quite different, 
because the whole system of material incentives was absolutely different in both plants.
Profitable/unprofitable work
The work within the Russian plant was divided into profitable and unprofitable jobs on the 
basis o f the norms constructed by the Department of Labour and Wages. Because the rates for 
some work were more rigorous than for others, the work itself was divided into profitable and 
unprofitable. The managers used this division: they gave the more profitable jobs to the more 
privileged or more obedient workers. Jobs within the British plant were also divided into 
profitable and unprofitable ones, but in the sense of the job itself, because workers were on 
the time-rate system. And British managers also used the division between profitable and 
unprofitable jobs for their own purposes. At both plants the managers used this division as a 
means of control o f  workers.
Several words about differences in the payment system. I would say, using the results of my 
own research, that the time-rate system was more advanced in the sense that it supported 
cohesion among the workers. In many cases, when there were opposed interests between the 
managers and the workers, the interests o f all workers were the same under the time-rate 
system. In the Russian plant, the piece rate system was another factor of division among the 
workers and another obstacle for unification of the workers in their fighting against the
managers.
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The use o f  overtime within both plants
Overtime was used quite often during the Soviet era and in post-Soviet conditions. At the 
same time the situation with overtime in the Soviet factory was absolutely different to the 
British one. There was a whole formal system of rewarding overtime work in the Soviet era, 
similar to British one: mainly it was in different plants equal to 1.5 of the daily rate during the 
week and 2.0 of the rate at the weekends. Nevertheless, as was stressed by D. Filtzer
Because most overtime was illegal, m anagem ent - often with the collusion o f  the trade-unions - 
frequently refused to adhere to established overtime rates, so that the overtim e would not show up 
on the ledgers o f  the factory's wages departm ent.74 75
Within our Russian plant there was a similar situation. Even if there was a formal procedure 
within the plant for using overtime, this system was changed at the beginning of the 90s. 
Because the Moscow metro decided to pay for the final repair, they paid for the amount of 
work done, but not for the hours spent on the repair. That is why very often overtime was 
organised as a consequence of managerial mistakes and organisational failures, and in this 
case the workers had to pay for the managerial disorder by their efforts. I fully agree with D. 
Filtzer, who wrote that
There w as thus an ongoing process o f  bargaining on the shop floor between managers and 
workers, each o f  whom confronted the need to pursue their particular goals and needs in a highly 
unpredictable environment.7’
74 F il tz e r ,  1 9 8 6 ,  p . 4 5 .
75 Ib id . ,  p . 4 5
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If there were objective reasons for the plan failure from the side of management within the 
Russian plant, they could negotiate with the workers the necessity to work overtime and find 
additional mechanisms of additional payment. At the same time the workers could go slow or 
speed down their work intentionally for several reasons and in this case managers could pay 
nothing, but force workers to work overtime. Mainly the workers in the Russian plant were 
unwilling to work overtime, because it was absolutely unprofitable. And it was absolutely 
opposed to the situation at the British plant, where working overtime was very profitable.
But what was similar at both plants was that, despite quite big differences in the overtime 
system within the plant, workers worked out informal mechanisms of overcoming the formal 
rules and regulations. So, within the British plant the workers tried to go slow or speed down 
their work in order to get overtime and therefore increase their salary. The Russian workers 
tried to negotiate informally the mechanisms of payment for overtime and therefore increase 
their payment as well.
Moreover, the middle managers at both plants used the overtime system as an additional 
informal mechanism or as a means of pressure on workers. Within the British plant the 
overtime was distributed by middle managers and the way they distributed it was very 
informal. Keeping in mind that a lot of workers wish to work overtime, they used the 
overtime as a stimulus only for those workers who always obeyed managerial decisions. 
Thus, the middle managers constructed their informal power on the shop floor with the help 
of overtime.
Within the Russian plant the same system of informal power o f  middle managers through the 
system o f  overtime was constructed, with only the difference that they were forced to work
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overtime. And in case a person didn't work overtime, they could punish him or her later. At 
the same time, within the British plant overtime work officially was voluntary, but managers 
forced people to work overtime as well, especially at the end of the financial year and 
financial periods. Thus, workers at the British and Russian plant had to negotiate overtime 
work with middle managers in order to protect themselves from further negative actions from 
the management side.
Conclusion on payment
- 1. The payment system at both plants didn't correspond with the workers' efforts: the 
size of their salary didn't depend on the amount o f work done. The principle: the 
more you work the more you get paid was not applicable in either plant, although 
the payment system differed considerably at both plants.
2. On the one hand, middle managers had established an informal power regarding the 
distribution o f overtime, profitable and unprofitable work and so on at both plants. 
On the other hand, in other areas there was constructed an informal power of 
workers regarding the pace and speed o f their work.
Meeting the target
Despite some differences in the duration of periods and the periods for planning, both plants 
planned the level of their work ahead. One of the main differences from my point of view was 
that the Russian plant worked out the new plans for the future only on the basis of historic 
records, sometimes paying no attention to the limitations of supply problems, staff 
requirements and especially to the needs of the clients. One of the main differences between
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the plants in this sense was that the Russian plant had mainly only one client - the Moscow 
metro. The British plant at the beginning of my research had different clients, that is why it 
planned their work in accordance with the clients’ orders. They also used the historic records 
parameters but it was one of several components for planning. What was especially 
interesting at both plants was that they tried to meet the target at the end of financial period, 
and sometimes their attempts failed. The reasons for the failure to meet the plan were also 
very similar. Despite several attempts of some managers (including the head o f the supply 
department and the production manager) to give me a false picture of the real situation in the 
British plant, I found that the British plant had problems in supply provision, organisation of 
production and so on.
The same situation existed within the Russian plant. The plan was constructed for each month 
and quarter of the year, but the situation within the plant up to the end o f 1993 was really 
destructive. Almost each month the plant failed to meet the target.
When both plants failed to meet the plan, there was storming and firefighting at the end of the 
month or at the end of the financial period. Everything was organised in the quickest way. It 
was surprisingly similar pressure. When I first entered the British plant, it was the end of the 
month and the financial year. I was not informed that the end of the financial year in some 
British enterprises is in March, that is why I was just lucky to see to what extent the situation 
within both plants was similar. I knew that within the Russian plant the rhythm o f work was 
very unstable, but I thought that within the capitalist enterprise everything worked like a 
clock. My thoughts were wrong.
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The value of money
Although the Russian plant at the beginning of my research began to work on lease, 
nevertheless, almost all the relations with the metro authorities were still preserved as before. 
It is necessary to mention here that the Russian production relations mainly were 
characterised by non-monetary relations. That is why all the transactions with the authorities 
was quite nominal. The relations of such kind were described by Simon Clarke in his article, 
devoted to the Soviet production process:
All transfers of products between enterprises were equally directed, at least in principle, by higher 
authorities. Although prices were attached to these transfers, and monetary balances were adjusted 
correspondingly, such transactions were only nominal since the 'money' in question was strictly 
money of account, which could not be diverted to other purposes or converted into cash.76 
To my surprise, the situation in the British plant was very similar. First of all, at the beginning 
of my research the plant belonged to the BRML company, which had four different depots as 
parts o f  the company all over Britain, and the company had the one budget for the whole 
company. The company had a central body, where the profits and losses were calculated. 
Nevertheless, the governing body was responsible for the real situation, and within the plant 
there was mainly the circulation of papers concerning meeting the target. Also at the 
beginning of the 90s the policy of commercialism was implemented. Because the plant was 
only part of the whole company, the profit and losses depended on the productivity of all parts
76 Clarke, n.d., p. 6.
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of the company. But what I would like to stress is that there was no circulation of real money 
within the plant. All the payments were organised through the circulation of papers.
Informal relations at both plants
First of all I should stress my observation: although the informal relations within the British 
plant had narrow scope and were not rooted to the same extent as we have seen within the 
Russian enterprise, nevertheless their existence was quite noticeable within the British 
enterprise. This suggests that, despite cultural or political differences, there are some things 
within any organisation which are universal, one of which is informal relations. From the one 
side, any organisation without exception produces formal rules and regulations. From the 
other side, people work within any organisation. Because people are human beings, it is 
almost impossible to construct universal rules and regulations and predict any situation which 
people could faced with. That is why the presence of people within an organisation stimulates 
informal processes. Thus, to summarise, the processes within the enterprise are part o f  the 
‘universal’ principles. And our question here is not the existence o f informal relations within 
the enterprises as such, but the question to what extent the informal relations became a part of 
the industrial processes at both enterprises. And in what particular areas the formal system is 
supplemented or substituted by the informal one.
At both plants the production process was organised in a such way that at the end of a certain 
period there was pressure to fulfil the plan. Production was the main dictator, and in order to 
fulfil the plan the workers constructed their own informal ways. At both plants in periods of 
firefighting we found the custom o f cutting comers, to by-pass laws and obligations towards
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the customers. At both plants the programme was sometimes fulfilled by any means. The 
situation was aggravated when there were no spare parts or screws or nails. The workers in 
these situation have to find ways of overcoming the obstacles. In the British plant the workers 
cut off the long screws in order to get smaller ones, in the Russian plant workers did the same 
thing, or in some cases could steal some material from the nearby depots.
One of the explanations of the existing situation on the shop floor could be the culture o f  
workers. But another of the main reasons for this could be that working to rule, according to 
some specification, meant the use a lot of time and that was not to the advantage o f the 
workers. High quality was not supported financially at either plant. Within the Russian plant 
there was a piece-rate system and the payment was calculated according the amount of work 
done independently of the quality of work. Thus, because it was not profitable to sustain a 
high level of quality, the workers cut comers. And even though within both plants the 
managers developed control over the work processes, nevertheless, the workers developed the 
areas where they could bypass the rules. At both plants there were no formal obligations to 
sign off the job done. In Britain it was the responsibility of the chargehand: to keep records o f 
what was done by each worker, in the Russian plant it was a duty of the foreman. Thus, 
sometimes the workers could cut comers, and bypass some formal rules in order to do things 
quicker. So, it is a question of bad workmanship to some extent. From the other hand, very 
often these things were done after negotiation with managers, thus managers themselves were 
aware of the necessity to bypass formal rules and obligations and with their permission these 
rules and obligations were bypassed. This situation was observed at both plants and we have
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to accept that in this sense the managers and workers were consolidated: it was profitable to 
both sides to meet the target in order to get financial reward.
Besides, at both plants there were shortages of parts and material. In this case the workers of 
both plants worked out their own ways of overcoming these obstacles: within the Russian 
plant the workers 'took o ff  the required parts and material from the next carriage, and put 
these parts on the repaired one. A similar situation was found in the British plant, where the 
workers did the same thing: took off the parts from one vehicle and put it on another. They 
called it cannibalisation. This process was repeated constantly at the British plant and was 
almost stopped only with privatisation and the division among the customers. With the 
appearance of different customers the process o f cannibalisation became more difficult: the 
rolling stock belonged to different customers, who thoroughly calculated each part on the 
vehicles.
Informal relations with the other gangs
Formal practices, designed for all production operations and communication, in many cases 
were handled informally. Thus, at both plants formal rules and obligations concerning 
relations between the different production units were constructed: gangs in the British plant 
and brigades in the Russian. In reality at both plants the workers have chosen the quickest 
way of communication with the other brigades. Instead of filling in some documents designed 
at the upper levels, the workers used a direct way. The approach favour to favour ’ was the 
most applicable way at both plants in communication.
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Promotion
At both plants promotions were handled informally. Despite the existence of formal ways of 
promotion in Britain, the managers worked out informal ways of choosing the right person. 
Even if the formal rules were constructed in a such way that they chose 'the right man in the 
right place', the real procedures were mainly handled informally. The managers appointed to 
the upper positions only those who had been tested on the shop floor, who had proven their 
obedience to the upper managers. Within the Russian plant the procedure for promotion was 
handled totally informally. The promotion to an upper position depended not on the 
professionalism and qualities of the worker, but on his ability ‘to be nice with managers’.
A shortage o f material
As we have seen, at both plants before privatisation there were constant shortages of material. 
Here I would like to stress that the shortages within the British plant were as systematic as in 
the Russian plant. The situation with shortages had continued at both plants for many years 
and there were objective and subjective reasons. The objective reason for shortages was that 
part of the rolling stock was worn out, and in these circumstances it was very difficult to find 
spare parts. The situation with shortages were common not only in our investigated plants, 
but as I found also in Russian and British literature, it was a vulnerable point around the 
whole railway industry. At the same time there were subjective reasons for the shortages of 
parts and materials due to some personal mistakes in planning the material, in ordering things 
and so on at both plants.
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What was really common at both plants was the way in which the people responsible for 
material and parts supply tried to get them. In the Russian plant they used all kinds of 
informal connections, supplementary to the formal one: with supply centres, other depots and 
different plants. A lot of agreements were based on the ’favour to favour' approach, where the 
managers at the plant asked for some material and in exchange could give the other required 
parts to the other partner. Very often in Russia the very common method of exchanging parts 
for a bottle of vodka was used.
Within the British plant there was a very similar system. When there were failures to get parts 
through the formal channels, the British managers called to their friends at the other depots, 
scrap centres, and tried to get spare parts. Thus, the formal ways were supplemented by the 
informal ones, with the only difference that if in Russia a bottle o f vodka was the universal 
equivalent almost in any activity, in Britain people used another way of showing their 
gratitude. But mainly it was the same 'favour to favour' approach.
Relations with the customers
A lot of activities with the customers were handled on an informal basis. The British plant 
had long-established connections with all the customers, which is why sometimes the 
relations with them were regulated by phone calls, without any documentation. These 
informal connections with the customers led to the situation in which, when the delivery of 
the trains was delayed to the customers, there were not any penalties from the side of the 
customers on this matter, although a lot o f them were not satisfied with such a situation.
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A very similar situation existed within the Russian plant. Although at the plant there was a 
technical inspection from the metro authorities (SPS service), the main client of the plant, 
nevertheless all questions were negotiated on an informal basis with the SPS people. If the 
plant failed to meet the right date, it was possible to negotiate this problem with SPS 
inspection and find a possible way out. The real data o f the repair could be falsified in the 
documents, and the trains could be delayed to the customer. As we have shown, within both 
plants according to output statistics there were constant delays in the deliveries of trains to the 
customers.
Besides, as we found out, there was another system, when the plants were trying to protect 
themselves against the tricks from the customers: when the vehicle came from the client for 
repair there was a serious initial examination at both plants, because the client could rob some 
parts and parts from the vehicle, but require it from the plants later. Thus there was a whole 
system of informal relations both from the side of the plant to the clients, as well as from the 
clients towards the plant. Maybe it was my personal observation, but in my opinion, in Russia 
the plant used many more ways of cheating the customer. In Britain there were more civilised 
ways of treating the customer, with some exceptions. In some circumstances, as with the case 
when the motor blew up, the managers worked out half-formal way of registration of this 
thing. Besides, in the British plant there was a special position of customer liaison manager, 
who was responsible for relations with the customers. So, we could assume that the British 
plant was on a higher level of development of communications with customers, although not 
very high.
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1'hus, to summarise, within both plant we have observed the usage of formal and informal 
relations. The only difference was to what extent they were rooted in the everyday routine on 
the shop floor. There is no doubt that the scale of the use of informal relations was much 
wider within the Russian enterprise, and informal relations were deeply rooted in Russian 
culture and reproduced in industrial relations.
Industrial disputes within the two enterprises
As the data from both plants have shown, the whole system of collective bargaining at both 
plants was different. While in Britain formally a highly centralised system of collective 
bargaining had been constructed, in Russia since the first years of industrialisation a highly 
decentralised system of bargaining, mainly on an individual basis, had developed. At the 
same time, even if  in Britain there was such a formal procedure, the Donovan Commission 
identified a conflict between two system of collective bargaining: the formal system of 
national bargaining and informal system of workplace bargaining. And within the Railway 
industry, especially in the 80s, there was a tendency towards workplace bargaining instead of 
applying the national procedure. But even if there was a lot of bargaining within the British 
plant on the shop floor, nevertheless the scale of development of the informal relations within 
the British plant was much narrow than within the Russian plant.
What was different at both plants was how disputes were institutionalised. In case of any kind 
of conflict within the British plant there was an institutionalised system of dispute regulation. 
At the same time in Russia such system was non-existent. Bargaining was organised mainly
on an individual basis. It does not mean that there were no collective conflicts. There were
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some collective disputes, but the way disputes were negotiated has shown that within Russian 
Industry as a whole there were no such mechanisms of collective defence of workers’ 
interests. In case of collective disputes, the workers didn’t know how to organise the struggle 
for their own interests according to the law: the workers had very little knowledge about how 
to organise their protest. And, in turn, the managers were quite skilled in all nuances 
regarding industrial relations, especially those managers, who passed through the 
organisational system of the Communist Party, and who could manipulate workers’ ignorance 
easily. Thus, because of some institutionalised system, the British workers knew how to 
struggle, and in many cases they were not afraid o f threats from the manager’s side, mainly 
because there were mechanisms of protection against the arbitrariness of the managers. In 
Russia workers were always afraid of some actions from the opposite side, because no rules 
were constructed and in many cases the managers could use informal methods and sack the 
most militant workers. In these circumstances the dependence of the workers on the managers 
was common within the Russian enterprise. Thus, we should stress again that the system of 
dispute regulation in Russia was highly decentralised and informally negotiated with the 
managers mainly on an individual basis.
As we have seen from the data about both enterprises, there were an industrial disputes within 
both enterprises during the time of case-study. The data have shown that within the British 
enterprise in the situation when all attempts to resolve the dispute at plant level had failed, 
both sides agreed to transfer the dispute for further consideration to an Industrial Tribunal. So 
both sides were informed about such formalised procedures and agreed to use them. At the 
same time, the disputes within the Russian enterprise have shown that there were no such
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formalised procedure for dispute resolution. The level of workers’ knowledge about the 
dispute regulation procedure within the enterprises as well as outside the enterprise was very 
low. The data from research have shown that the workers didn’t know how to struggle with 
the managers with the help of documents. They, from their side, widely rely on oral 
agreement with the management, while from the other side, the managers were so skilled that 
they wanted to secure their position by introducing internal laws and regulations regarding the 
collective action immediately after the dispute happened.
Moreover, even if the example of the dispute with the examiners within the British plant has 
shown that workers didn’t win the battle, still the British formalised system of collective 
bargaining gives some examples of workers’ victories. At the same time the analysis of the 
Russian experience has shown that for many years o f the existence of the informal system of 
negotiation with management, the situation was such that the managers always win. They 
have the power and knowledge and therefore they are always right. As a consequence o f this 
the mode o f worker’s behaviour was:
Paragraph. 1. The boss is always right.
Paragraph 2. I f  boss is wrong, see paragraph 1.
Thus, the situation with informal relations on the shop floor influenced the process o f the 
institutionalisation of industrial disputes in Russia. The process of dispute institutionalisation 
goes very slowly. At the same time within the British plant we have noticed also the 
subsequent decline of national bargaining.
Division of labour within the plants and relations between core­
peripheral workers
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The main difficulty with the comparison of core/peripheral relations in both plants was the 
fact that within both countries there was a different concept about core and peripheral 
workers. In the 80s in Britain, as well as in all European countries, a new theory of core­
peripheral workers developed which corresponded with labour market flexibility and the 
restructuring of employment relations. But the main problem of using this concept for the 
analysis of both plants was that'these market relations were only beginning to emerge at both 
plants, and the scale of market restructuring within both enterprises was very narrow. If 
within some other industries the employers organised their labour force using a division 
between 'core-peripheral' employees, and a division between full-timers and part-timers, 
within both researched plants the number of part-timers as well as contractors and sub­
contractors was very low.
At the same time it does not mean that within the plant there was no division of labour at all. 
First of all there was a division caused by the production process, and there were gangs of 
fitters, electricians and so' on. Thus, there was a clear demarcation line between the trades, 
and at the British plant the trade unions, which were very weak at the plant, nevertheless 
sustained this demarcation and any changes in the responsibilities o f any trade had to be 
negotiated with the representatives o f the trade union. That is why, when there was a trend 
within the plant for team working, there were a lot of difficulties with the implementation of
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this system. Besides, there were divisions among the workers. Briefly we would like to 
enumerate the main findings from the British plant:
1. First of all. there was a clear division between the core and auxiliary workers, and types of 
work performed by them. All workers within the British plant were divided formally into 
direct and indirect workers. The direct workers were more skilled workers, responsible for 
the organisation of the main production process, and the indirect workers were the workers 
of the lowest categories who did mainly auxiliary or low skilled work (crane drivers, 
labourers and so on). At the same time all these direct and indirect workers within the 
plant were regarded as core workers, because they all had a secure position, they had 
possibility for promotion, holidays, sick pay and so on. And from my point of view, this 
division among the workers into direct and indirect workers was not very noticeable and 
meaningful in the plant. The highly centralised payment system, developed in the railway 
industry for decades, was one of the main factors which supported cohesion among the 
workers at the plant. The payment differentials between direct and indirect workers were 
very low. The differences, according to workers, were no more than fifteen pounds per 
week, or less. At the same time, more noticeable and quite distinctive was the division 
between:
2. The old workers and newcomers. This division was supported by the Trade Unions and 
accepted by the company. All reductions o f staff were made on the main principle: 'first in 
- last out'. This principle of seniority made one of the main divisions among the 
workforce. The old workers were in some way in a more privileged position than others 
and they sometimes could use their position for their own profit. For example, the old
workers, because they worked in the plant for a long time, could refuse to do some hard 
job and ask for another. They had good communications with the middle managers and in 
this sense the younger workers were in a more vulnerable position. At the same time, I 
think that these old workers did not necessary have higher level of skills in comparison 
with the newcomers, but there is no doubt that they had higher status among the 
workforce. The newcoming workers could have more knowledge, but because of this 
seniority principle they were in a less secure position. Thus, the length of service itself put 
workers in a more secure position. And the length o f service did not always correlate with 
an increasing level of qualification.
3. The other division among the workers within the British plant was a division between the 
ordinary workers and trade union officials. The trade union officials had reached an 
agreement with the enterprise manager and they had a special time for fulfilling their union 
responsibilities. There were seven trade unions within the plant. And each representative 
had a special room, where it was possible to sit down and relax, have tea or coffee. Besides 
the leaders of the trade unions there were shop stewards on the shop floor. They also had 
some privileges in comparison with ordinary workers.
4. At the same time, as 1 found during my research, there was one more division within the 
workers: between good workmen or very responsible workers, and workers with low level 
o f responsibility, or bad workmen. The first group o f workers fulfilled their job carefully, 
paid a lot of attention to parts, after the job was fulfilled they checked seriously their work 
several times. And there was another group of workers, who paid no attention to parts, cut 
comers and so on. Apart from psychological reasons for such a division, I would argue that
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this division among the workers was caused by the fact that it was not in the interest of the 
workers to do work of the highest quality: such work required a lot of effort but was poorly 
rewarded. In these circumstances some of the workers tried to minimise their efforts by 
any means.
Thus, we could see that the workers at the British plant were not as homogeneous a group as 
seemed at first sight.
One of the main differences within the Russian plant in comparison with the British one was 
that within the Russian plant there were three different ideas connected with core/peripheral 
relations. And these ideas were interrelated and interconnected. There were the following
ideas:
1. First was the idea of 'core-peripheral' workers in their relations to the production process. 
The 'core' workers from this point of view were those, who were involved in the main 
productive process. All other workers, including auxiliary workers, such as repair workers, 
labourers, crane drivers were regarded as peripheral. This division was based on the idea that 
the main production defines the whole life of the enterprise. As a result there was a situation 
had developed in which the main production had more material resources, usually had better 
labour conditions and was more prestigious. Thus, if  the differences in size of payment 
received by core and auxiliary workers within the British plant were almost meaningless, the 
same differences within the Russian plant were quite considerable. Main workers were above 
auxiliary. The status of main workers at both plants was quite high, even if the payment 
differentials between the main and auxiliary workers at the British plant were not very high. 
But all these workers had the same system of social protection: the right for vacation, sick
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pay, promotion and so on, nevertheless, the status of the auxiliary group within the Russian 
enterprise was very low. They had the lowest wages within the plant. This division was quite 
similar to the division in the British plant into direct and indirect workers.
2. The second idea was 'kadrovye - non-kadrovye' workers. The 'kadrovye' workers were 
those who had worked in the enterprise for a very long time (usually for 20 -  30 years), but 
their main feature was that they were loyal to managers, they always obeyed the managerial 
decisions and, mainly because o f this, they had reached a very stable position within the 
enterprise, and could stay within the enterprise for a long time. There was a mutually 
advantageous approach between 'kadrovye' workers and the managers: they supported each 
other in the unpredictable conditions of the Soviet production process. These workers were 
regarded as 'core' workers from the point of view of the managers, and all the rest of the 
workers from their point of view were regarded as peripheral. The managers used this 
division between 'kadrovye-non-kadrovye' workers as a means of control, and used it quite 
successfully. I suppose that this division on 'kadrovye - non-kadrovye' workers within the 
Russian plant was very similar to the division within the British plant on old workers and new 
comers.
From my point of view there is an interdependence between the length of service and the 
level o f qualification, and within both plants the majority o f old workers have reached a 
middle level of skill, because they were more experienced than the young workers. At the 
same time, not necessarily all old workers would have the highest level of qualification. 
Within the Russian plant it could happen that some of the 'kadrovye' workers had the highest 
level o f qualification within the plant and could fulfil work of the highest quality. In this
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circumstance there was a combination of both features: the length of service and the level of 
skill. At the same time, more often there was a situation, when 'kadrovye' workers had an 
informal agreement with middle managers: the managers intentionally raised the formal grade 
(razryad) of the workers in order to give them a higher level of payment, while in reality the 
person could fulfil the job only of a lower grade. The managers used such a method as a 
means of control: at any moment they could ask workers to fulfil the required tasks, because 
they had made a concession to the workers.
3. The third idea of the core workers was the idea of 'skilled - non-skilled' workers: within 
each trade historically it was organised in a such way that there was a group of 'core' workers 
who were trained as 'universalists' and who performed different tasks. They had the highest 
qualification and could do everything in the situation of constant supply problems and all the 
uncertainty of the production process. Very often they performed the tasks of the different 
grades in circumstances of lack of qualified specialists of some grades. At the same time, the 
skill o f such workers was the only dimension of their power. Very often such workers 
preferred to be independent from managers and in case of pressure from the management side 
they could easily leave the enterprise. The managers usually tried to find additional formal 
and informal ways in order to pay to these workers substantial money, because in the situation 
of total production pressure, it was necessary to keep such skilled workers. These skilled 
workers worked in different parts of the enterprise, they could be among those who were 
involved in the main production process, and they could perform the auxiliary work from the 
point of view o f production: they worked as toolmakers, blacksmiths and so on. Their status 
from the point o f view of providing the final output was not very high, but at the same time
373
this group of people provided the necessary equipment and parts for the organisation of the 
production process.
4. At the same time, we should stress that within each different category, enumerated above 
there was further division among the workers. One such division is quite important for the 
understanding of the work within a Russian enterprise: this is the division between 'drinkers 
and non-drinkers'. Within each grade, among skilled and unskilled workers, within kadrovye 
and non-kadrovye workers there was a category of drinkers. I would consider them as 
peripheral workers. The 'core' workers were responsible for some work, but these peripheral 
drinkers were used by managers as a means of plan fulfilment. These drinkers were not 
sacked from the enterprise because the managers had to preserve them within the enterprise. 
For managers it was very profitable to keep these workers, in case of resistance or refusal to 
do some work from the side of the other workers (it does not matter whether skilled or 
unskilled, kadrovye or non-kadrovye). These drinkers violated labour discipline and could 
miss one or two work days or come to work drunk. In this circumstance the middle managers 
have compromising materials for them. It is called a catch for the tail. Because these workers 
had been caught for some violation, they had to obey the managers, otherwise they would be 
sacked. From the other side, it is very profitable to managers to have such violators, because 
in the unpredictable conditions of Russian production there is very often a necessity to work 
overtime, or to come on Saturday or Sunday to fulfil some work. The non-drunk workers 
could reject the idea o f working overtime, because such work is very unpopular within
Russian factories.
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After privatisation
As we could see, there were a lot of similarities in both plants before privatisation. Both 
plants were privatised almost simultaneously, and here we would like to find out the answer 
to the main questions: to what extent did the situation at both change, and in what direction 
are they both going?
The most general feature of privatisation in the two plants is that in the Russian plant 
privatisation was a way in which the enterprise was able to become prosperous by changing 
its external relations and exploiting its monopoly position and informal connections, without 
making any significant changes within the plant. The first stages of preparation for 
privatisation in the British plant showed weak attempts to change the methods o f  working 
which failed because they did not overcome the informal relations, but when privatisation 
came it saw a radical transformation of the internal relations of the plant.
First of all we would like to look at the organisation of the production process.
Organisation of the production process after privatisation at both plants
As we can see from the above description of both plants, the organisational process within the 
British plant has changed completely. The main emphasis was put on working in teams. The 
team leader became a key figure within production.
The question of control
At the British plant since privatisation control became tighter, the workers were obliged to 
meet the standards of work and there was an order to sign for all their work done. Moreover,
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it was emphasised that all employees should intensify their labour efforts, and where possible 
to sacrifice free time for the company. In reality a lot of employees were so frightened by the 
enormous redundancy that they were ready to work for ten and more hours in order to sustain 
permanent employment. The main fear was connected with the fact that it was really difficult 
to find any job in the town, that is why as a consequence of a set of redundancies the new 
company received consent and conformity from some of the employees.
Although the hierarchical system of control was decentralised, nevertheless the key functions 
of control were transferred to the team leader. Even if flexibility was strongly emphasised, I 
could not notice any changes in the understanding by the workers of the situation in their 
team or in the whole company. As before, the worker was only an executor o f the managerial 
decisions, while the key figure was the team leader. The team leader was responsible for 
planning work of the team, correcting every situation. And in reality flexibility meant not the 
enrichment of the worker’s labour, but merely expansion of the number o f tasks performed by 
the worker. But the work tasks were strictly monitored by the team leader. Within the plant all 
the team leaders passed through special training regarding the control o f workers, and there 
were special programmes devoted to efficient ways of controlling the workers’ usage of time 
within the enterprise. Moreover, the new company strongly supported the implementation of 
new computer based technology. Computers appeared on the shop floor, and there is no doubt 
that there will be further development o f the computerisation of the plant. At the same time 
the modem level o f computer technology gives the possibility to record up-to-the-minute 
changes o f workers’ tasks, so there is a possibility of using such computer for the control of
workers.
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The question of control is very close to the question of quality. The whole industrial process 
implies the control of quality at the different stages of work. Although within the British plant 
the optimum standards were already incorporated in the production process, nevertheless, the 
new company began to implement further steps in order to tighten the control of labour and 
quality control. The requirement of the company for each worker to sign off their work was 
one of these steps. At the same time, during our research we have found out that there were 
definitely differences between the top priorities of the company towards quality and the 
preparedness of the employees to accept these priorities. The practice on the shop floor has 
shown that workers in many cases were not ready to work according to the highest standards 
of quality. As was already said, the workers were not financially interested in performing 
work of the highest quality, from the other side, their own attitudes to work were formed in a 
different environment and they were used to doing a lot o f things in other ways. And there 
some time should pass before they will change their attitudes to work.
At the same time the production process within the Russian plant remained the same: 
although there was a process of enlargement of some workshops and they were transformed 
into productions, the work process itself hasn't changed. As was noticed by S. Clarke
The disintegration of the administrative-command system has not been accompanied by any 
transformation of the production relations at the enterprise level. The growth of the market has not 
been associated with the development of competition, through which the enterprises would be 
subjected to the law of value.77
77 ib i d . ,  p .4
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The process of privatisation, which happened within the Russian enterprise, brought some 
new things in the question of control, but added nothing new to industrial relations. The 
Russian plant, as it has been in the past, remains the only enterprise in Moscow which repairs 
metro trains. In these circumstances no competition arose, and the system o f 'one client - one 
producer' remains.
In this sense, the situation with the British plant became absolutely contrary. The plant has 
been privatised by Swiss-Swedish company, ABB, and the main concern of this company was 
to construct real competition between different depots belonging to this company. There are 
at least three different depots at the moment, which should compete for orders. Thus, the 
British plant after privatisation began to act in a more competitive environment than the 
Russian one.
As Simon Clarke wrote:
The disintegration o f  the administrative-comm and system passed power into the hands o f 
enterprise management, and provided managers with the opportunity to turn their position into 
their own advantage.’78
The most attractive form of privatisation to the former managers was the shareholding 
company, where the control of profit was in the hand of the former industrial nomenclature. 
The researched Russian enterprise was no exception to this rule. The enterprise upper 
management tried to concentrate all control in their hands. The managers didn’t implement 
any significant restructuring of the social relation of production within the enterprise. And so,
78 i b i d . ,  p .  10
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even in new circumstances, the control is still in the hands of management of the enterprise, 
as it was before. This control exists mainly because they tried by all means to preserve more 
than 50% of the shares in their hands. Moreover, the managers used the ignorance of the 
workers for their own purposes: mainly the workers are badly informed about their rights and 
possibilities of decision-making from their side. The years and years of previous dominance 
of managers made the workers absolutely subordinate to the managerial orders. In new 
circumstances only a few workers know the power which they can have through the shares. In 
many cases they still believe that managers are as powerful as they were before, and they can 
change nothing.
Structural changes within the enterprises
First of all I would like to stress that the British plant had enormous and very dynamic 
changes. The situation within the British plant over the three years from 1993 to 1995 
changed very slowly, and then there were dramatic changes, which brought an absolutely new 
structure of the enterprise. Within one year the whole organisation process was restructured 
completely. There was a set of redundancies, which led to a considerable staff reduction 
(from 619 in June 1995 to 312 in September 1996 and only 150 by September 1997).
1. First of all instead of the conveyor system of repair four product groups were organised. 
The whole industrial process was also restructured and several managerial levels were 
eliminated.
At the same time the Russian plant faced no dramatic changes. The whole process of 
restructuring o f the enterprise led to a staff increase: if at the beginning of research (October
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1992) the plant had 1062 employees(among them 284 1TR and 778 workers), at the beginning 
ofl997 there were 2035 employees (among them 253 managers, 275 specialists, 6 clerks and 
1501 workers).
At the same time, we should stress that apart from some changes in the structure of the 
enterprise, connected with changes in the external conditions, when the marketing department 
and the department of external co-operation were organised, the law department became 
stronger, at the same time other changes within the enterprise remind one of cosmetic repair. 
The new structure of the enterprise combined some o f the new features corresponding to 
market reality, and at the same time it preserved the old traditional elements of the Soviet 
system: hierarchical subordination from the top to the bottom. And even if there are some 
features of collective decision making, in reality the whole power is still preserved in the 
hands of the General Director.
There was enlargement of the main workshops and they were transformed into single 
production units, which led to the elimination to some extent of inter-shop conflicts regarding 
the distribution o f the material resources. Nevertheless, even if there was an enlargement of 
some departments, the duplication of functions within the plant was not eliminated.
Changes in the management team
The privatisation o f the British plant has led to simultaneous changes in the management 
team of the enterprise. A new General Director was appointed immediately. At the same time 
there were ten people from the new company who were appointed to the main positions 
within the enterprise, who were familiar with the main concepts and activities of the
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company. Thus the whole process of structural change within the enterprise was supported by 
people who had already worked within the company for some period. Moreover, in order to 
change the approach among the old managers of the plant the new company organised special 
training in other branches o f  the company for such people. Thus, there was a total change not 
only o f the management team, but also the whole philosophy and attitudes within the 
company.
According to the law, the main governing organ of the Russian plant is a governing body. We 
should stress that during the whole process of restructuring there were no substantial changes 
in the composition of the governing body o f the enterprise: the same people, who were on the 
top of the enterprise at the beginning of the structural changes still preserve their power. 
Mainly all the representatives of the governing body are people who were in the top positions 
before privatisation. Thus, the whole process of restructuring of the enterprise has not 
changed the management team of the enterprise.
All the attempts to change the formal structure of the enterprise have not led to changes in the 
informal connections within enterprise.
Changes in the payment system
First o f  all we should stress that the changes in the payment system connected with 
privatisation within the British plant were only in a period of transition that is why it is 
difficult to draw final conclusions. At the same time, we have seen some of the processes 
which began within the enterprise and to some extent the processes within the enterprise were 
very similar to processes within other privatised industries. As J. Haskel and S. Szymanski
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(1994) have pointed out privatisation/changing objectives has led to large-scale labour 
shedding as the company became more profit oriented’. In addition, their findings suggest 
that ‘increased competition reduces wages’. The British plant was no exception to this rule: 
there were substantial economies in wage costs and big staff reductions. The main profitable 
part for the British workers was overtime which was reduced to 8%. That is why the average 
wages among the workers have fallen considerably. At the same time, we can confirm that the 
intensity of work increased considerably.
Contrary to the British plant, the Russian plant shows us an outstanding example o f the 
‘successful’ privatisation. There were no staff reductions, and it didn’t lead to falling wages. 
In reality, the wages increased considerably. At the same time the whole system o f  wage 
formation was preserved. Moreover, new mechanisms of wage manipulation were 
constructed. We should stress that the formation of the payment system still remains the most 
secret sphere o f any enterprise, as it was before, and with the transition to the market 
economy some mechanisms for further violations in this sphere appeared.
Formal/informal relations
Here we would like to summarise the processes, which took place within both enterprises in 
the sphere of informal relations.
From the one side, we can observe at both plants the process of formalisation o f  some 
informal processes: for example, a more formal approach towards the violators of the labour 
discipline, more formal relations with the customers at the British and Russian plant.
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At the same time we can observe that the new movement towards market relations also led to 
the further expansion of spheres of informal relations, particularly in the Russian plant. The 
new possibilities of the market economy opened the new possibilities for forming informal 
relations in new spheres of activity of the enterprises. Such a tendency was observed not only 
in the researched enterprises. As the Russian researchers from Samara have stressed .
Although th e  traditional spheres o f  informal relations became narrow, nevertheless, the informal 
relations d o  not disappear, they are beginning to form in new spheres o f  activity o f  the 
enterprises.’ (Alasheev S., Tartakovskaya I., Lapshova E., 1997, p. 141 )
So we can stress that the system o f informal relations is very dynamic. That is why sometimes 
spheres which were traditionally based on the informal relations could be formalised and, in 
turn, other spheres where formal relations prevailed could be informalised.
Thus, in order to summarise the development o f industrial relations within both enterprises 
we could enumerate the following processes which have taken place within the enterprises 
after privatisation.
1. From the one hand, we have seen the quite clear tendency towards the formalisation o f  
informal relations at both plants. For instance, there was a tendency towards signing off work 
by the workers at the British plant and application of formal criteria to violators of labour 
discipline within the Russian enterprise. The use of formal punishment for violations of the 
labour discipline became more common within the Russian enterprise. Besides, relations with 
the customers at both plants became more formal and well documented.
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2. On the other hand, we have seen the tendency towards further informalisation o f  the 
existing formal and informal relations within the Russian plant in many different spheres: the 
system of employment became strictly informalised. The formation of wages is also a sphere 
in which we have observed a further tendency towards deeper informalisation. Besides, new 
spheres of activity developed based only on informal relations.
At the same time within the British enterprise this tendency to further informalisation of 
formal relations was not observed. There was a constant rhetoric about working in teams and 
informal relations between the workers and team leaders, and at the same tim e there is more 
control of workers from the team leaders’ side. That level of informality which existed on the 
shop floor before has almost disappeared. It does not mean that informal relations do not exist 
within the British enterprise. But in many cases the scale of their usage has become much 
more narrow than before. There are still informal relations between the gangs, but because the 
whole process was reorganised and because there were so many redundancies, in my opinion 
the workers on the shop floor now show more apathy in all their activities. Moreover, the 
whole process became more intensified which is why the room for informal socialisation of 
the workers between the teams narrowed. In my opinion, there is an ideology o f individualism 
of a different kind. And on the individual basis there is still room for individualised informal 
relations.
Core/peripheral relations
Now, we would like to see what happened with the core-peripheral relations after 
privatisation.
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Within the British plant the following tendencies were observed:
1. First of all there was an elimination of the demarcation lines between the trades. The trend 
was towards multi-tasking and multi-skilling. The British plant used the Japanese approach to 
the organisation of production. The division between direct and indirect workers has 
disappeared. The positions of workers of cat. 1 and 2 were eliminated. And all the workers 
had to fulfil main and auxiliary tasks. Universalist principles were implemented not only on 
the shop floor, but also in different departments. Team working as a concept implied mutual 
exchangeability.
2. The division between old workers and new workers was also eliminated. In the first 
redundancy ABB had to sack people according to the principle ‘first in - last out’. But the 
result of this redundancy was very negative for the company: the young, open-minded and 
more flexible workers were redundant, while the old workers, often with very conservative 
views, were preserved within the enterprise. The company had another vision of 
core/peripheral relations, and they negotiated with the trade union the principle of seniority. 
That is why the next redundancy was based on other principles. They preserved workers with 
the ability to be flexible, to accept changes, to have an open-mind and high qualification 
regardless of their length of service. The formal principle o f seniority was substituted by other 
principles. Thus, to summarise, we could see that the old workers have lost the secure 
position which they had in the past.
3. The new company imposed new attitudes at work and tried to reduce the time losses that is 
why they eliminated all the time losses connected with the implementation of trade union 
duties. The company allowed only one part-time official representative for all seven trade
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unions. Thus, even if the division between the ordinary workers and trade union officials still 
exists, the main differences between the union leaders and ordinary workers was abolished: 
they all work hard on the shop floor.
4. The division between skilled and non-skilled workers. Because the company made a lot of 
redundancies, some people of unique professions were sacked. In this circumstance, the role 
of the workers-universalists has increased significantly. At the same time, even if  these 
workers could perform different tasks for different trades, nevertheless, according to the 
evidence of these workers, the company didn't provide them with a higher salary than the 
others. Thus, there is no stimulus again for such workers to fulfil different tasks and work for 
an absent person from another trade.
New trends within the Russian plant connected with privatisation
1. The movement towards market relations has changed the status differences on the shop 
floor in the Russian plant. First of all the differences between main and auxiliary workers 
were almost eliminated. In the new conditions the dictatorship of production was substituted 
by the dictatorship of profit. In these circumstances the trades which were not involved in the 
direct production process could produce parts for the market and make a profit. That is why 
the role o f  the auxiliary workers such as toolmakers and blacksmiths increased considerably 
within the enterprise. Their status became higher, and their salary could be higher than that of 
production workers. Thus, we could see that in this sense the changes within Russian 
production have led to the situation that existed in Britain in the 70s and 80s, where the 
workers of the highest qualification such as toolmakers were the most highly valued.
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At the same time we could see that within the whole society the status of highly qualified 
workers became lower. With the transition to the market economy new spheres of activity, 
connected with the market relations, developed. And in turn, there was a further reduction of 
demand for highly qualified workers: in the circumstances, where a lot of industries have 
considerably reduced employment there is almost no demand for skilled workers. Thus, the 
changes in the labour market led to the situation, where there is a lack of demand for highly 
qualified workers. Thus, we should stress that in the period of transition the value of the 
highly qualified manual labour was reduced.
2. From the other side, the division among the 'kadrovye - non-kadrovye' workers was 
preserved within the enterprise. Moreover, in new conditions, where the possibility for 
machinations with payment increased, the managers used their power in order to support 
financially the 'kadrovye' workers, because they 'were tested' during the length o f their service 
and always supported the managers, so the managers could rely on them in new conditions, 
when there is necessity to fulfil the plan, and from the other side, the 'kadrovye' workers rely 
on managers' decision for financial rewards for their loyalty. Thus, we can see that the 
movement with old workers within the Russian plant went in absolutely the opposite 
direction : if the British old workers have lost their power and seniority, Russian 'kadrovye' 
workers in turn have got more power and a more secure position within the enterprise. The 
production process is organised in a such way that 'kadrovye’ workers are provided with 
material and equipment first o f  all. The most profitable work in terms of money is also 
distributed among them, they have got better financial support than the other workers and so 
on. All unprofitable, heavy, low-paid jobs are left to other workers. Thus, there is a clear
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division between 'kadrovye' workers and 'non-kadrovye' workers. The second are suppressed 
by the first. And this division is strongly supported by the middle managers.
At the same time we should stress that in the past within the British plant there was a formal 
agreement between the managers and the trade union regarding the principle o f seniority, by 
contrast with the British plant there is not any written rule or regulation which gives the 
’kadrovye' workers so much power. This power exists only in the informal relations and is not 
regulated in any documents. It is just supported by managers.
3. Skilled - unskilled workers. The division o f  workers in this sense has become less visible.
4. Drinkers - non-drinkers. In the new conditions there was a tendency towards improving the 
workforce and some heavy drinkers and violators were sacked. At the same time some 
drinkers and violators were preserved within the enterprise: the managers still have to rely on 
such workers. From the one side, the drinkers became more careful, because in the situation 
of increasing unemployment they try to preserve their jobs. At the same time in case they 
violated some formal rules, the managers use their weaknesses for their purposes. They can 
press on such workers to work on Saturday and Sunday, and will not get a refusal, because 
otherwise the violators will be sacked.
Thus, we considered the changes in core - peripheral relations at both plants. Are there any 
similarities after privatisation regarding this matter? From our point o f view the British plant 
saw profound changes in the core-peripheral relations. With the elimination of the division 
between direct and indirect workers and the introduction of the team-working concept all 
workers became regarded as 'core' workers. The division between the productive and non-
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productive workers was completely eliminated. Moreover, the intention of the British 
managers was to destroy the demarcation line not only between the workers on the shop floor, 
but also to eliminate the division between the 'white' collar and 'blue' collar workers. 
According to the views of one of the Managing Directors there should be no division among 
the employees at all. Thus, if within the British plant there was a trend towards the 
elimination of any kind of division among the workers, within the Russian plant the main 
divisions were preserved and even reinforced.
Resistance and compliance on the shop floor
First of all we should stress that there were collective and individual resistance on the shop 
floor among the British workers after privatisation. But the scale of such resistance was much 
smaller than before privatisation. The main reason of reduction o f different kinds of 
resistance was obvious: the fear of redundancy. At the same time we would like to point out 
that despite this fear some workers tried to implement some attempts in order to resist 
changes. In my opinion resistance to new rules and regulations within the British enterprise 
was interrelated with the former division between old workers and newcomers. Old workers, 
who had worked at the plant for many years, always had power over the younger workers. 
Even if the capacities of the older workers were lower, they still had the advantage that they 
were employed by the company earlier. Besides, they worked for the plant for 20-30 years and 
this fact was also meaningful in the eyes o f the old workers. In new circumstances, when the 
company asked for a greater level of flexibility and intensification from the workers, not all 
old workers agreed with these demands. The main finding of my research was that the
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younger workers’ adaptation to the new changes was quicker than the old ones. The young 
workers didn’t mind flexibility, moreover, they were more tolerant to the changes 
implemented by the company. The old workers in many interviews expressed their militancy 
towards the new managers and high level o f rejection of new changes. The position of many 
old employees was that they deserved better treatment, and they didn’t want to change their 
mind so quickly.
It is difficult to say what influenced the sabotage of the managerial decision, when some of 
the old craft workers refused to clean the toilets. It was a collective confrontation of the old 
workers to managerial requests. And by this action they struggled against the new 
requirement of the company to destroy the demarcation line between trades and jobs. And in 
my opinion this collective resistance was from the one side an attempt to show that the old 
workers still have some power, but from the other side it was a final stage of their 
desperation. The previous set of redundancies was done on the seniority basis, that is why a 
lot of old workers were left on the shop floor. But before this collective resistance there was 
an announcement that the next redundancy will be based on the new principles, and the length 
of service will be meaningless to the company. That is why some o f the old workers in my 
opinion felt that they had nothing to lose even if they implement a collective resistance.
Besides, I consider as a form of collective resistance the refusal to sign off the work done. 
Even if there was a company regulation to sign off any work done, most of the workers 
’forget’ to sign off the documents, or continue to write ‘OK’ instead of the name of the 
employee.
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At the same time, the above reaction of the old workers to the changes does not mean that 
there was no resistance among the younger workers within the British plant. There was a lot 
of individual resistance on the shop floor, expressed in a hidden way. First of all there were a 
lot of situations on the shop floor observed by me, when the workers finished their work and 
didn’t want to report it to their team leader. The company’s idea of the intensification of work 
was faced with hidden resistance of the workers. They used to have some free time at work, 
and they want to preserve this priority. They didn’t like it that the team leader has so much 
power.
Some of the workers used the old principle of ‘work to rule’ without any additional initiative 
from their side. Other workers doing all the work required still 'left their brains at home’, and 
didn’t bother about the company’s values and requirements. And this is their way of 
resistance.
But at the same time the whole spirit of the works was filled with more tension than it was 
before. The fear of redundancy was a very effective mechanism of workers’ oppression.
To some extent the situation within the Russian plant was quite similar. With privatisation the 
workers lost their power. At both plants, as we have seen, the relations between workers and 
managers after privatisation have worsened. The number o f overt conflicts fell, but the hidden 
tension has risen sharply.
There is a tighter control over the work process than before, and there are no new bases for 
healthy relations between workers and management.
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Although there were collective strikes in 1989 and 1991, nevertheless the working class have 
no power and no institutionalised system to make a collective action.
The worker's ignorance of their rights continued. Although they are shareholders of the 
company, many do not even know that it is privatised, nor that they have shareholders’ rights, 
nor do they know the difference between ordinary shares and privileged shares.
Conclusion to the comparison
Now we are trying to answer the question raised before: to what extent were the changes 
within both plants similar and in what directions are they both going? Despite some 
similarities between the Russian and British plants before privatisation, in my opinion the two 
plants after privatisation went in absolutely different directions. As we have seen from the 
description of the processes within the British plant, there a ‘pure’ privatisation has happened, 
when the company was taken over by another foreign company. The whole ideology of the 
company was changed. The deepest restructuring was implemented. In the light o f all these 
changes within the British enterprise it can be argued that more focused and comprehensive 
reforms were implemented within the British plant. (Although still there is another question 
of whether it was successful or not). At the same time the reorganisation within the Russian 
plant more reminds one of a ‘cosmetic’ repair, where only the facade was repaired and the 
whole building left unchanged. Most changes within the Russian enterprise were half-hearted, 
mainly involving ‘privatisation games’, which have not lead to the restructuring of the 
enterprise. Despite some processes which have changed at the enterprise, as for example the
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level o f output has increased, in most cases it was not a result of structural changes within the 
enterprise, but some informal connections with those who are responsible for the orders.
Although the Russian plant at the moment has quite successful results, it does not mean that it 
is a stable enterprise with a definite future. The Russian plant still preserves its monopoly on 
the market. If competitors appear on the stage, all the benefits of being a monopolist will 
disappear in a moment. Within the plant competitive approaches, which could help the plant 
to survive in market conditions, were not constructed. At the same time the British plant, 
because of its highly competitive strategy and up to date philosophy, could be a stable actor 
on the British market.
To some extent the movement towards privatisation in Russia has led to the assumption that 
Russian enterprises will reach Western standards. But the comprehensive analysis of the 
Russian environment has shown that specific Russian features, and especially the informal 
relations influence all processes, including privatisation. The market orientation influenced 
some improvement within the Russian enterprise, but in comparison with the Western one, 
my strong opinion is that within the Russian enterprise there is a mixture o f  everything: old 
and new approaches, compilation of Russian and Western strategies, old technology and high 
level of manual labour and market-oriented departments.
So, the Russian enterprise in some spheres looks like the British plant 20 - 30 years before, 
especially regarding the organisation of the labour process. At the same time, in some spheres 
the enterprise is trying to be closer to the European standards, as for example when the 
marketing department, the venture department and so on were opened. At the same time there
393
are some spheres, where there are very traditional Russian features, which are very difficult to 
abolish, especially in the sphere of informal relations, elite relationships and so on.
My thoughts are similar to the view of one Russian sociologist, who wrote:
There is a sociological question... whether it is possible that, being in transition from post­
perestroika disruption to  global post-modernist civilisation, we find ourselves in feudalism ?’
And here is his answer to this question :
W hat has happened in Russia at the moment strongly reminds me o f  the establishment o f  the ‘new- 
old’ feudal mode. For example, the well-advertised privatisation (this is a whole philosophy, not 
only an economic innovation), in particular, has led to  the situation that all the power o f  the ‘lords’ 
and ‘peers’ has been reinforced in each privatised structure. They are the heads and now the 
ow ners o f  different structures. It is a very narrow circle, as a rule it is comprised o f  the leader and 
a few  o f  his very ardent subordinates. These ‘peers’ have fantastic incomes even according to 
American standards.’ (Pokrovsky, N. 1995)
Further the author says that privatisation was advertised as a means of démocratisation of 
society, but as a result of such ‘Russian’ privatisation there was a feudalisation of the whole 
society. With a lot of ‘vassals’ who do the main work and depend on the wishes of their 
powerful ‘peers’.
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Appendix 1: Methodology
I would like briefly to outline the main methodological aspects of my research. As is clear 
from the written material presented above, I conducted case studies of two plants. At the 
beginning o f my study I knew that the main criticism of case study methodology concerned 
the concept of subjectivity. For this reason, it was my intention from the beginning of the 
study to reduce the number of potential problems and to organise the research in such a way 
as to reduce, wherever possible, the level of subjectivity.
In order to do this, I tried to combine various methods of conducting the research. Within the 
British plant, for example, I used interviews of which I conducted more than 80 throughout 
the organisation. It was my opinion that I would receive objective information only by 
comparing the material obtained from the different levels of the organisation, and I therefore 
selected interviewees from top and middle management, and from among rank and file 
workers. I conducted not only individual interviews but also group interviews with 'gangs'. 
This was possible within the British plant before it was privatised mainly because the 
employees had more ‘free’ time at work. In addition to using interviews, I also participated in 
meetings between the general director and the plant's managers. The information recorded 
during such meetings, together with my interviews, provided the best opportunity to look at 
organisational processes from within the plant.
I am very grateful to the General Manager of the plant, who gave me access to the enterprise 
in 1993, and who never set any limits on my work, nor put up any barriers.
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In addition to my interviews, I collected all other relevant documents that I could obtain 
within the enterprise and I believe that this helped me to construct a more comprehensive and 
systematic picture of activity within the enterprise. Such documents included production and 
output statistics, and industrial and trade union minutes. I also had access to videos and slides 
available within the plant.
Observation also played an especially important role because I was a stranger and had to 
obtain a lot of information with my eyes. I was very pleased when I was able to persuade a 
few workers within the plants (two in the English plant and one in the Moscow plant) to keep 
a diary o f their working week - 1 count this as one of my main successes. I think this is a very 
important source of information for the researcher, but one which is rarely used in modem 
sociological research and almost entirely neglected in Russian sociology.
I should stress that I conducted research in the Russian enterprise over a much longer period 
of time than in the British plant, as a result of which I obtained twice as much information on 
the former as on the latter. I was granted access to the Russian plant in 1992 and, during the 
following year, 1 visited the enterprise almost every week, conducting many interviews with 
workers and management. In accordance with my agreement with the enterprise's General 
Director, I participated in industrial meetings and in conferences held by the labour collective. 
During this time I conducted approximately 60 interviews with employees. As in the British 
plant, I interviewed not only individuals, but where it was possible, I conducted group 
interviews with brigades o f workers. I analysed the General Director’s directives and any 
other documents that I was able to obtain through a system of informal relations with many 
informants working at the plant. Between May and December 1994, I was a participant
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observer at the plant, during which time I worked as a clerk in the financial-planning 
department.79 From December 1994, I continued to monitor processes within the plant and 
during this period conducted another set o f  20 interviews. I also recorded several industrial 
disputes and labour collective conferences. I analysed the Collective agreement of the 
enterprise and many other documents. As a result of all my activities I obtained a substantial 
amount of information on most of the important activities of the two plants being studied, on 
the basis of which my thesis was written.
I also think it's important to comment on my position as a foreign researcher in a foreign 
organisation. I think that one of the main advantages of being on ‘foreign’ territory during my 
research was that I could ask as many 'naive' questions as I liked, which may have been more 
problematic for a native researcher to do. It also helped in some respects that people within 
the organisation believed that as a foreign researcher, I would not use any information against 
them. However, in contrast, within the Russian plant (and especially on the shop floor), I was 
often seen as a member of the management team and it was sometimes difficult for me to 
overcome people's perceptions. Back at the British plant several workers regarded me as a 
'Russian spy' and therefore some of them did not want to talk to me candidly, while others 
refused to speak to me altogether.
79 The special post ‘Head of the analytical-statistical bureau' was constructed especially for me by the General 
Director o f the Russian plant, who thus proved the idea expressed in my thesis that in the Russian plant, jobs are 
found (or created) for people and not vice-versa!
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I would also like to stress that my gender influenced the research project and in this respect it 
was absolutely clear that people in the two plants related to me in quite different ways. In 
general terms, within the Russian plant I was seen firstly as a 'woman', and only secondly as a 
researcher, whereas in the British plant it was rather different. On several occasions at the 
British plant, one of the workers on the shop floor treated me quite badly, inferring crudely 
that I was looking for particular respondents not because of their ability to provide me some 
valuable material, but simply because they were men. As a result, each time I appeared on the 
shop floor he would make jokes at my expense but, within the framework of the study as a 
whole, this was only a minor disturbance and one which my previous experiences of research 
had led me to anticipate and even prepare myself for.
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Appendix 2: Three W orkers' Diaries
DIARY
of the working day, written by fitter of the 2nd rank 
Plant "REMET", MOSCOW 
The Role of the brigade in the system of production:
Our brigade fulfils the first stage of the whole production cycle, namely, re-assembling bogies 
under the carriages, and if the working process in our section will stop, simultaneously the 
whole repair production will be stopped. To whom are we subordinated?
First of all we are subordinated to our brigadier and to our foreman. The number of workers 
in the brigade: According to staff regulations - 15. Work at present time -10.
In our brigade sometimes there is movement towards understanding some of our questions. 
During several months we have been trying to reach an agreement about revision of the 
technical process, because only after this is it possible to revise our payment (which in our 
opinion is very low). In February 1993 our brigade was on strike, and we demanded the 
revision of the technical process, change of foreman, revision of our payment. But at that 
period we knew nothing about how to fight with the administration in such a way that all our 
demands were met. Besides, I was a new worker and had worked on the plant only a few 
months (since December 1992). So, the promises of our administration towards the revision 
of technical process were not fulfilled, neither in December, nor now. That is why in our
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brigade dissatisfaction was growing up about such kind of things, that somebody from the 
"top" considers us foolish people. But our brigade is almost the only one, who always fulfil 
the plan. But the payment does not so much depend on fulfilling the plan. For example, in 
May the workshop didn't fulfil the plan, the whole workshop produced only 5 carriages out of 
18. Our brigade fulfilled the whole plan - 36 bogies (2 bogies on 1 carriage). But the payment 
was - 100% for 5 carriages and 70% for the rest. That is why this month in our brigade some 
dissatisfaction about the percentage of our work again arose: if we again will fulfil the plan, 
but the workshop w o n 't, we don't want to agree with such kind of things. We work hard and 
for our job we would like to get real money. During the disturbance in our brigade, I and 
Eugeny (he is my friend and former brigadier of our brigade) decided to change the situation 
and to do something in order that our demands were met. But we needed qualified help, that 
is why we asked the sociologist who is doing her research in our workshop and interviewing 
people. We asked her to help to us and she organised a meeting with a representative from 
Academy o f Labour and Social Relationships. On Friday, 23rd of July I went to this meeting. 
(We agreed to go there together with my friend Eugeny, but at the last moment he had some 
troubles at home and couldn't join me). We met with this person. At this meeting were I, a 
person from ALSR and the sociologist. I realised that this person was very skilled in these 
questions, and he explained to me step by step how to act in some occasions, what are the 
main regulations about labour in our country, and how the workers should behave in some 
situations. In any case it was a very helpful meeting. And also my work on this plant will be a 
great experience for me for the rest of my life. And it doesn't matter where I will work in the
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future (no doubt, that I won't work on this plant for a long time), the whole story within this 
plant taught me a lot, and I’ve got a very good experience.
26th o f  July 1993, Monday.
Rhythm of the work normal. During the day in our part appeared Puzirev (chop chief), 
Kudriashov (vice shop chief) and technologist.
There is a shortage o f some parts: distance rings, bolts (suspension), "hats" for the engine 
fixage. Foremen was warned about shortage of such "hats" one month ago, there is no result 
yet. Our guys again were forced to do some job (to recast disparity on clutches), though shop 
chief promised to clear this question. As regarding this question, we have been trying to 
resolve it for six months: we are doing the job without any payment, but we are wasting a lot 
of time for this particular work.
There is no additional "chalok" (special metal boxes) so we need to transport it during the day 
from one place to another, and they are very heavy. Several guys have refused to do it.
We were late for our job by 7 minutes after playing dominoes. Foreman came to us and there 
was a lot of noise (mainly from our side), because there is no place to store repaired bogies. 
Other brigades (electricians) have no time to fulfil the plan. That is why, from our point of 
view we do not deserve blame from the foremen, that we are sitting and playing dominoes. 
Foremen lost his temper and said that he will write a resignation letter, and went to his room 
on the top. One person then told us, that he complained to the First vice-director about three 
men who are spoiling his life on the plant. (But to prove this fact, whether it was or not, we
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can't at the moment.) Disturbance within the brigade growing in connection with the amount 
of money, which we can get if we fulfil all planned bogies (38).
On Friday, (23rd of July), we went to the First vice-director - 4 people from our brigade and 
asked him about the payment for our efforts (labour): we will fulfil 38 bogies for 19 carriages, 
i.e. the whole plan, but the whole workshop won't fulfil. In this case, how will they pay for 
our job? If they will again do percentage - (70 %) - we completely disagree with such a 
system. Zverev - First vice-director promised to us to get 90 - 95 % of payment and asked us 
to work on Saturday (On the 24th of July). But if I understood right, nobody believes Zverev.
We are planning to assemble two carriages in one day, and to work on Saturday only on 
presentation of the repaired carriages.
27th o f  July, Tuesday.
The rhythm of work on our section normal. Appeared during the day: Pyzyrev (Chop-chief), 
Zverev (first vice-director),technologist with the main technologist, and with vice-director of 
the Vykhino area (Kolotushkin) - though he is on vacation.
We decided to do two carriages per day, i.e. on the 31st o f July to fulfil the 19th carriage. 
Before, we wanted to fulfil the carriage on the 30th o f July. We had a conversation with the 
First vice-director and we accused him, that electro-assembling workers didn't appear on 
Saturday at all. He answered to us, that we shouldn't poke our noses in things that are not our 
business ,and fulfil the plan.
Came to us (or to be more precise) passed through our section Luba - the Leader o f the Trade 
Union. We asked her to help us to resolve the problem with percentage o f our work and
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technical process. She said, that next Tuesday she will be in our plant again and she will tell 
us what she undertook. There was a conversation with our foremen about the limits of reserve 
parts for the period of one month. From my opinion, all these limits are "plucked out of the 
air" and need to be revised. For example: the limit of suspension to the bogie within one 
month is - two hanging parts, but only during one day 1 changed two o f them.
In the brigade we decided that at the beginning of the next month we will organise a meeting 
and write to Zverev. But it will depend on the amount of money which we will obtain this 
month and also what Luba from the Trade Union will tell us. That's all.
28th o f  July, Wednesday.
Rhythm o f the work normal. Puzyrev, Kudryashov (vice-shop chief) technologists and vice­
technologists appeared on our section. In the morning 12 suspensions arrived. After lunch 
there was a delay with assembling of the bogies, because we received "fists" for the wheels 
and engine too late. But, nevertheless, we managed to assemble one carriage by the end of the 
working day.
I had a conflict with my foreman. He made me recast my "forced" defect. "Forced" because 
we have no repair variant o f this part, that is why we need to fix only what we have. (From 
the safety point, in the underground, there is a very strong guarantee. For one part - there tire 
10 extra parts. And I am sure that this defect doesn't lead to a dangerous break in the 
circulation of the trains. From the other side, we must have special repair variants o f this part 
and they must be prepared with our orders, but we have no such parts).Thus, I refused to 
recast. As a result, my foreman wrote a report on me for the shop-chief. Shop-chief called for
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me, there were foreman, and deputy-chief. I proved that I was right in this circumstance. And. 
the situations turned in a such way, that it was the foreman's fault. After this accident, the 
foreman told our brigadier, that he would write a letter of resignation. I think, that this time he 
decided to do it very seriously. Also, he told the brigadier, that our salary will increase not by 
70 %, as in the other brigades, but only by 30 %, or, very likely, that our norms will cut. What 
will happen exactly and why, we don't know yet. We will speak with the First vice-director 
tomorrow.
Our brigadier organised a meeting of our brigade at the end of the working day. To some 
extent, this meeting was organised with one purpose: he wanted to retain the foreman in his 
position with our help. Why he did it - it is quite clear: because two shoes - are a pair. Slava 
(foreman) supports the brigadier and vice versa. That is why our brigadier is worrying. 
Generally speaking, as a foremen, Slava doesn't fulfil his functions at all. Either he is present, 
or he isn't - it does not make any difference. That is why we told him ages ago: "Slava - your 
business is to get money, supply parts for the brigade. As regarding our responsibilities, we 
know it well and we needn't your help." In our work process we know ourselves: who needs 
help and where and when. We have a rather flexible system, and all the lads work with co­
operation. So, if we see that somebody overstrains himself, we will try to help him. Or, if  
somebody understood that it is impossible to do this job without help, he will apply to the 
brigade. Foreman in our section is absolute zero. Maybe he was a good technologist in the 
past and knows some technical process, nevertheless, he can't work with people at all. Two 
years left before he retires, and he wants to have a calm job, but not here. Here is the place,
4 0 4
where you should struggle for everything, but he doesn't want to spoil his relationships with 
the administration. And this last point disturbs us very much.
29th o f July, Thursday
Rhythm of the work normal. Appeared on our part Puzyrev, Kudryuashov and technologist. 
SPS-service (metro service, which accepts repaired carriages) didn’t accept one carriage with 
defects. (I was called to shop-chief on the matter of this defect earlier - shift of suspension 
and bush on the roller). I refused to change the bush as before. As regarding the shift of 
suspension, 1 decided also not to remove it, but to negotiate this problem with SPS-service. 
First, I went to the deputy-shop-chief. He told me: "Negotiate this problem yourself', - though 
it was his direct responsibility. After him, I went to the Shop-chief. He said to me, that he will 
negotiate this problem himself. I proved to him that I have no reserve parts, in order to change 
this suspension, and also I have a lot of work. He agreed. Thus, he resolved this problem with 
SPS-service. That's all.
Slava came to us and said, that this month they cut the prices for the repair of carriages within 
our brigade by 30%. We warned the First director, that Shop-chief will try to deceive us this 
month. After this Eugeny and brigadier went to the First Director. He forced them out and 
called foreman. We said to Slava, "how to behave in this situation" and sent to Zverev. By the 
way, after that conflict , when I was called to the shop chief and the foreman was in an 
uncomfortable position, he became very kind to me. It is unknown for how long. Slava came 
to us from the "top" and said, that Zverev called from the other place, "Sokol", the head of the 
department of wages and labour. Disturbance within the brigade was mainly about this
question.
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30 th o f July, Friday
Rhythm of work normal. Appeared on our section Puzyrev, Kudriashov, Zverev, technologist, 
main technologist, Kolotushkin (he is on vacation).
Today arrived this "auntie" (i.e. the head o f the department o f wages and labour - comments 
o f sociologist). They were walking along our part, speaking about something with the 
foreman till lunchtime.
After lunch Slava (foreman) came from the "top" and said, that she checked it all out. The 
price really was cut this month by 30% only in our section. (We are thinking, that this is the 
fault of Lena - she is working in the department of wages and labour in Vykhino, and her 
husband is the shop chief o f  our workshop). The price was restored at the end. Also Slava 
said, that Zverev will pay for the 17 carriages 100% of payment and for the 2 carriages 95% . 
Zverev said also that they want to separate our section from the workshop yet, because the 
price for repair is too low within our area and in the Sokol area too, if they separate us, it 
might be much lower. That is why they decided to wait, when the new technical process will 
be established, they will decide. But the conversation about this matter was very quick, that is 
why nobody knows any details.*
That's all for today. Tomorrow we are going to work ( it will be Saturday), because we need 
to present some of the 17 carriages left.
* [In spring a decision was made about separation of the bogie section from the whole 
carriage-repairg workshop. But, in order to do it, it was necessary to revise the whole
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technical process, and then, on the base of it, to revise all kinds of norms. Then, they will be 
able to organise a separate bogie workshop.]
31st o f  July, Saturday.
Rhythm o f the work normal. Zverev passed through our section, then Kudryashov and 
Puzyrev.
No news at all. We made our 19-th carriage and went home.
2nd o f August. Monday,
The beginning of the month. Rhythm of work: practically without any work. Appeared on our 
part Zverev ( two times), Puzyrev - he is on vacation, Kudryashov and the technologist. There 
were no events at all. I, Eugeny and one more person went home at 13.30. Tomorrow, if  there 
will no job, the other 3 people will leave the workplace earlier.
3rd o f  August, Tuesday.
There is practically no work at all. At 11.15 there was a meeting for our and wheels workshop 
about transition towards a share-holding company. We were sitting there and were listening 
with half an ear. Again, particularly for the workers, there will be nothing. Some people 
raised foolish questions. Sometimes it is very surprising, to what extent some workers are 
really foolish. But also, we, the workers wait for nothing good. It is quite clear, that they, 
from the top" , will find the way to make fools of workers. In principle, all thoughts o f  the 
administration are devoted to the idea, "how to get more" and trying to do it in different ways, 
depending on their position.
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After the meeting we again came to the First director and said to him, that it is not profitable 
for us to fulfil the plan. We have no bonuses from fulfilling the plan. But people who don't 
fulfil the plan have the same payment as us. Also the clerical workers always have bonuses if 
the plant fulfils the plan. Zverev answered us: "If you are not mad on the plan, you have 
nothing to do within this plant. There is no place for you here." He eventually told us toget 
out, and he hinted to us that he is spending 95% of his time resolving of our problems, but he 
has more serious industrial questions. Then, we were not very insistent on our further 
conversation with him. To be honest, all those demands, which we made from the beginning 
of July were met. And if we were more persistent in our demands, we could get 100% 
payment for all carriages we repaired this month, but we had no more desire to co-operate 
with him.
Luba from the Trade Union said nothing to us. She told us, that this is very complicated 
question, and she needs some time to consider it. That's all.
After our lunch we were playing dominoes from 14.00 p.m. to 16.00 p.m. There was no work 
at all.
4th o f  August, Wednesday.
Not so much work again. There was a rumour within the brigade, that electricians have 
received for the 16 carriages, which they repaired, more then we received. We've got an 
average 120 thousands per person, but they have some workers who received more then 130- 
140 thousands. Passed through our section Kudryashov, deputy shop chief. We tried to find 
out why this happened. We mentioned this point, that it is not profitable for us to fulfil the
408
plan at all, because there is no motivation. He said, that it is our responsibility to be ahead and 
to have 2-3 bogies apart from the others. We tried to prove to him, that he gets some bonuses 
from the plan, but we have none. Then he said to us, that the price of every carriage includes 
the bonus also, and we just couldn't see it. If it is so, what percentage o f our work does the 
bonus include, and what idiot did that? So, it is automatically added to each carriage and for 
me it is not quite clear if it is a good thing, or not. No clearness, no stimulus. For Russian 
man it was always clear, if somebody told him something like this: "This money is for this, 
that is for that". Here we have a totally different situation. And nothing is clear at all. Besides 
this, he denied that he eventually has a bonus. It will be useful to obtain some information 
about their bonuses: how often they (I mean shop-chief and deputy shop chief and other 
"white collars") have it and what percentage. Have they the bonuses per quarter? Because, we 
have only the bonus which is put into the cost o f a carriage. We asked him a question about 
our work: "Do you consider that we are unskilled workers?" He accepted on our point of view 
and answered, that it is quite skilled. But Vinnik - General Director - (when he went to our 
meeting at the end of last year) said that we are unskilled workers . But this is unfair because I 
am working with a spirit-level. And the average grade is 4 for our brigade? To be honest, in 
order to speak with the administration , it is necessary to be a diplomat. And also it would be 
nice to have some "informant", who can give us some sorts of information. Then, they will 
feel, that we are not so foolish. To be honest, they already felt some our power, that is why 
they are resolving our problems. And we, while we are speaking with them, we are stressing 
that we know how to fight with them on the documents' level, we know now how to 
formulate the documents according to the law, but we don't want this yet. And they also
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understand this, that is why, they don't want to get involved so much with us. There are only 
3-4 people in our brigade who speak and express their opinion, the rest of our people usually 
keep silence. But now, if  we need this, the whole of our brigade will vote like we want, and if 
we need to sign some document, I am sure, that all persons from the brigade will sign it.
the end.
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Diary of the working day of Clive L. at the Adtranz plant.
Monday, 16/09/97
Arrive at work. Just had a week's holiday in Scotland with Lee, Eleanor, Curtis and Lee's 
Mum and Dad. (I need another holiday!). It feels good to be back. With my comrades.<- 
Russian Ha! I wonder what has happened? Are we to close yet? What has been going on? 
First thing is to go to the paymasters (Where is Marina?) and pick up my wages owing, under 
BR ownership we normally get a wage advance for holl’s. But not under ABB. (SHIT).
Anyway pick up ?290 quid, not bad, but I did some overtime while it was there so I would 
have money to come back to.
Report for duty
I am required to test air reservoirs. Two are on the job because they are unable to take them 
down.
He says it’s OK?.
So I drag the test equipment back over to the other shop and test the other ressers that can! be 
took down.
12:15. Finished testing.
6 ressers reservoirs required in other shop for morning shift. Nobody to take them So I take 
them myself on forklift. I have never driven forklift before: FUN!!!
I go over where the test equipment is and remove it to take to the job. I spend 2 hours doing 
this and setting it up on the job.
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Finally, I am ready to start, because the ressers are on the job 1 can only fill them 1/2 full with 
water. Then I have to pump them up. To pressurise them. 30 minutes later it is pressurised to 
300 lb. sq. in. Team leader decides it has took too long. So, I don’t bother testing the other on.
Tuesday, 17/09/96
Good news! I am working with Peter Buxton, he is a woodman, (vehicle builder). So I won't 
be doing fitting today, 1 hate being under jobs working in the shit.
Replace two vestibules one two jobs it's going to be a hard day’s work. But it's better than 
tossing about underneath.
A vestibule is the diaphragm between two coaches, keeping the water and cold out.
Job
cc
Replace the two vestibules no problem, but had to stay till 12:30 to do it.
But at least we got some overtime.
Wednesday: 18/09/96
Report for work...No fitting today. Brilliant.
I have got another vestibule to replace with Peter.
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Job goes as planned.
Marina Asks for a diary.
Pete is pissed off cos he is not getting any back money, so we toss it off all shift.
Thursday. Pay dav. 19/09/96
Dissapointed. (spelling of the worker.-M.K.)
1 thought I would get more. Still people worse than me.
Today I am repairing valve for another product group. I am the only person who can do them.
They are interlock valves off class 91 locos they connect the parking brake to the pneumatic 
brake. Finished.
Team leader comes up with another job. I am needed to repair air/water separator/regulator 
valve. Again I am the only person on works who knows how to do them. I do it.
No problem!
Friday. 20/09/96
No work.
Clean u p .
Wash windows.
What next.?
ABB. We care about you.!.
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Diary of the working week 
By Robert Welbourne: Vehicle builder
28 March - 1 April, 1994
Our section repairs and maintains passenger and non-passenger vehicles. This involves such 
things as repairing and renewing panels, doors, floors, ceilings, seating, windows etc.
At the beginning of a shift we report to our chargehand who gives us a job and also any 
information. Once we get a job, myself and my mate head towards the drink mashine where 
we get a coffee and then collect the tools. Once we get on the job we discuss what we are 
going to do and how much we are going to do. Each task involved has a set time in which to 
do it in. So we usually get stuck in got the first half of the shift so that we can relax a bit more 
afterwards. If you are a good worker you can be trusted to organise you own job, which is 
appreciated by the chargehand as it saves him a bit of time. If you require anything from the 
stores you have to get a ticket from the chargehand. You then take the ticket along to the 
stores where it is exchanged get the material ( if in stock).
The atmosphere here on the works is very relaxed and friendly. If you get on with your job 
nobody will bothers you. Everybody is on first name terms with the Management, who will 
always acknowledge you when passing. If you feel that you have a problem with anything, 
whether it is personal or it concerns the job, you are always made welcome to discuss the
situation.
4 1 4
If a situation arises on the job that we don’t agree with then we will argue against it with the 
chargehand. Sometimes the trouble is caused by men wanting to cut comers in order to 
complete the job quicker, putting aside Health and Safety Regulations. These people are 
classed as bad trades men who often cannot be trusted and whose work has to be double- 
checked all the time. If the trouble is down to bad workmanship then the person responsible is 
disciplined by the foreman.
Our work consist of many tasks which can differ from day to day. Sometimes it can be 
interesting, other times boring, which I will now explain in this week diary.
Monday, 28-th March. Aften Shift 2 pm - 1- pm.
Today we are reminded that this week is the end of the financial year and that all the years 
workload must be completes for midnight Thursday. My job today is to make and fix some 
wooden packing pieces into the battery boxes of a Pacer vehicle. The first thing to do is to 
measure up for the new packing and then to cut them to size at the saw mill. Next I pick some 
screws up from the cupboard in our section . The screws that I want are out o f stock which 
comes as no surprise. The next batch are not due for another week so I have to make do with 
a smaller size. Next after setting up my air drill I am ready to fix the packing.
After half an hour I am introduced to “Marina from Russia”, who was at first concerned about 
stopping me from working. I put her mind at ease when I said that I could easily catch up and 
that I was glad to have a rest as it can get quite hot when you have your head stuck in a 
battery box.
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I am allowed two hours to complete each battery box which is plenty of time. This allows me 
to go at a leisurely pace and to finish eight cell boxes for 8 p.m. I then tidy up and then go for 
a drink and a talk with my mates on a job until 10 p.m. Overtime is on until midnight for 
those that want it. I decline the offer because I am tired and want to go home to bed.
Tuesday, 29-th March
Today I am working on a Diesel Multiple Unit with three other men. Our task is to fix 
striking plates and to regulate the doors. Which means working to strict regulations. We 
organise the job amongst ourselves, getting all the striking plates, set screws, and packing, 
and then setting up the air drills. Some striking plates are quite easy to do but some you can 
have problems with. Sometimes the screwholes are worn in the back plate which means that 
the screws keep spinning. This problem is solved by chopping out a section of the pillar and 
having the holes welded up. Usually it can take all day to get a welder, but it is done straight 
away because the vehicle has to be out for Thursday. After the holes are welded up, a new 
block is put into the pillar and fresh holes are drilled and tapped out for a striking plate.
At 5:30 p.m. it is time for our break which is twenty minutes long. Most of the men play 
cards down at the section but I choose to sit in the saw mill to read my paper in peace. After a 
break we return to our job and continue on the doors. When a door is regulated with the 
striking plate I then sign a list to say it is fitted and working correctly. At the end o f  the shift , 
the list is returned to the chargehand. When the job  is completed the list is photo-copied and a 
copy is kept by the chargehand and foreman. If there is a problem with a door due to bad 
workmanship, the list is checked and the offender is disciplined. I always double-check my
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doors making sure that everything is done properly in accordance with the regulations. 
Tonight we are under pressure so we dare not pack up the tools until 9:30 p.m.
Wednesday 30-th March
Today we are on the same job. All the stocking plates are completed so we have to do the 
repairs to the interior. My job today is to fix the bodyside mouldings while the other three 
men fit the draught proofing and casings around the doors. Throughout the night five men are 
taken into the office over bad workmanship. The reasons were really down to mistakes made 
during the job so they were only minor offences, therefore the men were let off. At around 8 
p.m. the job is taken outside for re-fuling (?) and to be tested. My task is finished so I pack up 
my tools and go for a drink of tea with my mate. We return to the job where we sit and talk 
until 9:15 p.m. We then go back to our section to give the chargehand a progress report.
Thursday 31-st March
Today is the end of the financial year. All this years workload must be completed by 
midnight. Myself and three other men are given the snag sheet for yesterday's job which is 
outside in the Test House. After collecting our wages we pick up our tools and go to the job. 
Where we discuss who is going to do what on the vehicle. Once we have organised things we 
set about doing our tasks. There isn’t much to do on this vehicle so we soon get on top things 
in order to relax later on. The main problem is a striking plate, one of the screws is spinning 
so we have to get it welded up. One of the man has been absent from the vehicle all afternoon 
so we have left this task for him as he has not done anything all day. When he returns, he
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responds by shouting and swearing, and saying that it isn’t fair. We all leave the job before he 
starts to get nasty.
Two of us return to our Chargehand for another job. He puts us to work on an Observation 
coach, which is used by a management team for checking the railway lines. After on we get to 
know that the other vehicle has been completed on time so the pressure is finally off. It is now 
7 p.m. so we set about doing the abnormal work on the vehicle. My task for the rest of the 
night is to fit a window. This sees me through until 9 p.m. when we then sit down and relax 
with a drink until 10 p.m.
Friday 1-st April 12:30 p.m. - 7:30 p.m.
Today we are back on the observation Coach to carry on with abnormal work. Myself and my 
mate have no intention of doing a great deal as it is the last day before the Easter Holidays. 
We sit down for ten minutes on the vehicle and discuss how much we are going to do. Also 
we talk about what we are planning to do on our holidays. We pick easy tasks to do on the 
vehicle which sees us through until 6:30 p.m. For the last hour a few o f  us sit down on a job 
with a drink where we talk about our long weekend ahead!
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